Square, Inc.v.J. Carl Cooper

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

May 8, 2015

12877335 (P.T.A.B. May. 8, 2015)

Trials@uspto.gov Paper 36
Tel: 571-272-7822 Entered: May 8, 2015

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_______________
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
_______________
SQUARE, INC.,
Petitioner,
v.
J. CARL COOPER,
Patent Owner.
_______________

Case IPR2014-00158
Patent 8,490,875 B2
_______________

Before JAMESON LEE, GEORGE R. HOSKINS, and
KRISTINA M. KALAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

HOSKINS, Administrative Patent Judge.

FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73

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I. INTRODUCTION
Square, Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 2, “Pet.”) requesting
an inter partes review of claims 1–14 and 16–34 of U.S. Patent
No. 8,490,875 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’875 patent”). Petitioner submitted the
Declaration of Henry N. Dreifus (Ex. 1011) in support of the Petition.
J. Carl Cooper (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 8,
“Prelim. Resp.”). On May 15, 2014, we instituted an inter partes review of
claims 1–7, 9–14, 16–31, 33, and 34 on four of the six unpatentability
grounds alleged in the Petition. Paper 10 (“Inst. Dec.”).
After institution of trial, Patent Owner filed a Patent Owner Response
(Paper 18, “PO Resp.”). J. Carl Cooper, the Patent Owner in this proceeding
and the sole inventor of the ’875 patent, executed a Declaration (Ex. 2004)
in support of the Response. Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 20, “Pet.
Reply”). An oral hearing was held January 9, 2015. Paper 35 (“Tr.”). The
Board has jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6.
For the reasons provided below, Petitioner has shown, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1–7, 9–14, 16–31, 33, and 34 of
the ’875 patent are unpatentable. Further, Patent Owner’s Motion to
Exclude Evidence (Paper 22) is dismissed.
A. Related Proceedings
Petitioner and Patent Owner have identified two district court
proceedings that would affect, or be affected by, a decision in this
proceeding: eCharge Licensing, LLC v. Square, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-06445
(N.D. Ill.), and SCVNGR, Inc. v. eCharge Licensing, LLC, No. 1:13-cv-
12418 (D. Mass.). Pet. 7–8; Prelim. Resp. 2–3; Paper 5, 2.
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B. The ’875 Patent
The ’875 patent discloses a “universal credit card” apparatus for
allowing “access to numerous accounts, services, features, etc. with just one
card thereby eliminating the need to carry, store or retain numerous cards.”
Ex. 1001, Title, 3:42–46. Such an apparatus may also perform other
functions, for example, telephone functions. Id. at 3:46–50. Figure 8 of the
’875 patent is reproduced below:

Figure 8 shows a telephone embodiment of the invention. Id. at 2:46–47.
The telephone embodiment includes control circuit 11, display 12, operator
interface 13, input/output interface 14, and power source 15. Id. at Fig. 8.
Control circuit 11 includes a memory (not shown in Figure 8) and controls
the other components of the apparatus. Id. at 4:9–13. Information stored in
the memory may include “several sets of data corresponding to account
related information or patterns for different credit cards, identification cards
and the like.” Id. at 3:10–13.
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Input/output interface 14 includes an emitter and a receiver. Id. at
5:15–21, 5:40–43. The emitter may, for example, be an infrared LED, an
antenna, a coil, a transducer, or a display. Id. at 5:15–17, 5:25–26. The
receiver may, for example, be a photo transistor, a magnetic reader strip, or
an operator interface. Id. at 5:18–21, 5:23–24, 4:39, 5:30.
C. Illustrative Claim
Claim 1 is illustrative of claims 1–7, 9–14, 16–31, 33, and 34:
1. An apparatus comprising:
in a telephone:
a control circuit;
a memory coupled to the control circuit, the memory
configured to store information related to at least one
credit card account;
a designator for selecting the information from the
memory;
a display coupled to the control circuit and configured to
display at least part of the information upon selection of
the designator; and
an emitter coupled to the control circuit and configured to
transmit a signal relating to the information, the emitter
comprising at least one of an antenna, coil, a
transducer, the display, and an infrared LED.
Ex. 1001, 9:60–10:7.
D. Prior Art Supporting Instituted Unpatentability Grounds
Kikinis U.S. Patent No. 5,835,732 Nov. 10, 1998 Ex. 1005
Gutman U.S. Patent No. 5,221,838 June 22, 1993 Ex. 1006
Pitroda U.S. Patent No. 5,590,038 Dec. 31, 1996 Ex. 1008
Hennige U.S. Patent No. 5,276,311 Jan. 4, 1994 Ex. 1009
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E. Instituted Unpatentability Grounds
We instituted an inter partes review of the ’875 patent based on the
following four unpatentability grounds alleged in the Petition. Inst. Dec. 31.
Basis Reference Claims Challenged
§ 102(e) Kikinis 1–7, 9–14, 16–21, 23–31, 33, and 34
§ 102(b) Gutman 1–7, 9–14, 16–21, 23–31, 33, and 34
§ 102(e) Pitroda 14 and 16–24
§ 102(a) Hennige 14, 16–21, 23, and 24

II. ANALYSIS
A. Claim Construction
In an inter partes review, a claim in an unexpired patent is given its
broadest reasonable construction. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2014). However,
the parties have agreed that the ’875 patent expired on April 3, 2015.
Paper 15. We have previously indicated to the parties that, in the event the
’875 patent were to expire prior to a final written decision, the broadest
reasonable construction would not apply. Paper 13, 4 (citing In re Rambus,
694 F.3d 42, 46 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Therefore, we review the claims similarly
to how a district court would review them, giving the terms their ordinary
and customary meanings, as would be understood by a person of ordinary
skill in the art at the time of the invention, having considered the language of
the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history of record, pursuant
to Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See
Paper 13, 4. However, there is no presumption of validity in this
proceeding, and we will not apply a rule of construction with an aim to
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preserve the validity of the claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (Petitioner’s
burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability is a preponderance of the
evidence); Paper 13, 4.
1. “Telephone” (Claims 1–7, 9–13, 25–31, 33, and 34)
Patent Owner contends a “telephone,” as understood by a person of
ordinary skill in the art, must include at least a “microphone” and a
“speaker.” PO Resp. 19–20; Tr. 23:24–24:9. Patent Owner proffers two
evidentiary sources in support. The first is the dictionary definition of
“telephone set” found in The New IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical
and Electronics Terms 1345 (5th ed. 1993, Gedimas P. Kurpis chair).
Ex. 2001. The second is the testimony of Mr. Cooper. Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 130–
133; see also Ex. 1017, 170:3–172:8 (indicating a device is defined by its
function, and the main function of a telephone is to carry on conversations
between human beings).
Petitioner contends the Patent Owner’s proffered dictionary definition
defines “telephone set,” not “telephone.” Pet. Reply 4. Petitioner further
contends the appearance of “telephone” in parentheses after “telephone set”
in the definition “only indicates a descriptive category” of the defined term,
so the definition “does not equate” the two terms. Id. at 4–5.1

1 The Reply was accompanied by Exhibit 1014, an excerpt from the Wiley
Electrical and Electronics Engineering Dictionary (2004) defining several
terms relating to “telephone.” However, the Reply fails to explain the
significance of Exhibit 1014. We therefore decline to consider Exhibit 1014
in this proceeding. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2) (2014) (Petition must
explain significance of evidence).
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The intrinsic evidence pertinent to “telephone” is sparse. Ex. 1001,
9:60–10:7 (representative claim 1), 2:46–47, 3:46–50, Fig. 8. Therefore,
recourse to extrinsic evidence such as dictionary definitions is appropriate.
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1320–24. We determine, based on Patent Owner’s
proffered dictionary definition and the testimony of Mr. Cooper, that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would conclude a “telephone” includes a
microphone and a speaker.
Petitioner’s argument that the IEEE Dictionary definition is not
probative because “telephone” is only a descriptive category of the defined
term “telephone set” is not persuasive. In the ’875 patent claims and
specification, a “telephone” is one structural component of an overall
apparatus. Therefore, the issue presented is: What is the minimum
collection of structural components required to be the “telephone” structure
of the ’875 patent? In that context, it is appropriate to consider the IEEE
Dictionary definition of “telephone set.” The definition’s inclusion of
“telephone” as a “descriptive category” of “telephone set” does not mean
that the definition is irrelevant to the present inquiry. Further, the IEEE
Dictionary definition of “telephone set” as including a microphone and a
speaker is consistent with the common usage of “telephone” to mean “an
instrument or system for conveying speech over distances by converting
sound into electric impulses sent through a wire wholly or in part; it consists
of a transmitter and receiver, often with a dialing mechanism for connecting
lines.” Webster’s New World Dictionary of American English (3rd College
Ed. © 1988, Victoria Neufeldt ed. in chief) (Ex. 3002, emphases added). In
order to transmit and receive electric impulses to convey speech, the
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telephone instrument or system would include structural components, i.e., a
microphone and a speaker.
For the foregoing reasons, we determine a “telephone” as recited in
the ’875 patent includes a microphone and a speaker.
2. “Emitter . . . Configured to Communicate a Signal”
(Claims 14 and 16–24)
Patent Owner contends the ’875 patent specification confirms that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would know the “emitter” in claim 14
“must communicate to ‘outside devices.’” PO Resp. 23–24 (emphasis
added, citing Ex. 1001, 5:15–17, 5:25–26); Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 49–50, 70–79. We
determine, however, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would conclude
an “emitter,” as that term is used in claim 14, is not limited necessarily to
communication with outside devices.
That determination is supported, firstly, by the language of the claims.
Claim 14 recites an emitter “configured to communicate a signal.”
Claim 16, which depends from claim 14, recites that the apparatus comprises
“a receiver configured to receive data from an external device.” Ex. 1001,
11:12–13 (emphasis added).2 Claim 16 indicates Patent Owner knew how to
limit communication to outside or external devices. There is no such
limiting language for the emitter in claim 14.
In light of that claim structure, we are not persuaded by Patent
Owner’s contention that the following passage from the ’875 patent

2 Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 6,764,005 B2, which issued from an application
to which the ’875 patent claims priority, similarly recites “an emitter . . . for
transmitting account identifying information to said host system.” IPR2014-
00156, Ex. 1001, 10:1–3 (emphasis added).
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specification requires limiting the “emitter” to communication with outside
devices:
Emitter 7 may be the preferred infrared LED, antenna,
coil, transducer, or any other device capable of conveying
information or patterns from the invention to outside devices,
and receiver 8 is preferred to be a photo transistor but may also
be any such apparatus or device capable of receiving
information or patterns from outside devices to be used by the
invention.
Ex. 1001, 5:15–21 (emphases added). Patent Owner does not explain
persuasively why that disclosure, which treats emitters and receivers on an
equal basis concerning communication with outside devices, would
necessarily mean “emitter” in claim 14 must communicate with outside
devices, when dependent claim 16 specifies that the receiver must
communicate with outside devices. We do not accept Patent Owner’s
suggestion that transmission to outside devices is required “implicitly” by
claim 14. Tr. 35:20–36:18.
Moreover, claim 14 recites that “the display” is a permissible
“emitter.” See also Ex. 1001, 5:25–26 (“the display 12 may be utilized to
provide the emitter function”). The ’875 patent specification discloses that
the signals communicated by the display may be communicated either to an
outside device (Ex. 1001, 8:49–58) or to a user of the claimed apparatus (id.
at 3:20–28, 6:6–17).
We do not construe the “emitter” of claim 14 as being limited to
communication to an outside device. That would impermissibly incorporate
a limitation from the specification into the claims. RF Delaware, Inc. v.
Pacific Keystone Techs., Inc., 326 F.3d 1255, 1263–64 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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3. “Transducer” (Claims 1–7, 9–14, 16–31, 33, and 34)
Before trial was instituted, Petitioner and Patent Owner disagreed
concerning the meaning of “transducer.” Inst. Dec. 6 (citing Pet. 11 and
Prelim. Resp. 12–13). In the Institution Decision, we did not construe
“transducer” because the meaning did not affect our reasons for instituting
review. Id. During the oral hearing, however, Patent Owner agreed with
Petitioner’s proposed construction that a transducer is “a device that
converts a signal from one form of energy to another form of energy.”
Pet. 11; Tr. 33:3–17; IPR2014-00156, Paper 37 (Hearing Transcript), 53–54.
When a claim limitation is defined in purely functional terms, as the
parties propose, it raises difficult questions. Halliburton Energy Services,
Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here, the parties
have not provided sufficient reasons to regard “transducer” as a purely
functional limitation. Thus, for the purposes of this opinion, we interpret the
term “transducer” as a device recognizable to one of ordinary skill in the art
as a transducer, and capable of converting a signal from one form of energy
to another form of energy.
4. “Information Related to at least one Identification Card Account”
(Claim 12)
In the Institution Decision, we concluded the term “identification” in
claim 12 refers to identifying a person associated with an account, and
construed “identification card account” to mean an account which has an
associated card, wherein the card identifies a person associated with the
account. Inst. Dec. 9–10. Neither party has disputed this construction
during trial.
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B. Prior Art References Considered During Prosecution
Patent Owner asserts “deference should be given” to the fact that
Gutman, Pitroda, and Hennige were considered by the Examiner during
prosecution of the ’875 patent, but does not indicate what form that
“deference” should take. PO Resp. 3 n.1. In our consideration of the
arguments and evidence presented in this proceeding, we recognize Gutman,
Pitroda, and Hennige were before the Examiner when the ’875 patent was
allowed.
C. Anticipation by Kikinis
Petitioner contends claims 1–7, 9–14, 16–21, 23–31, 33, and 34 of the
’875 patent are unpatentable as anticipated by Kikinis. Pet. 13–22.
1. Independent Claim 1
Claim 1 recites an apparatus comprising several components in a
telephone, including a control circuit, a memory, a designator, and a display.
Figure 11 of Kikinis is reproduced below:

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Figure 11 shows micro personal digital assistant (“μPDA”) 10 docked in
cellular or cordless telephone 45. Ex. 1005, 4:9–11, 14:26–29. We are
persuaded by Mr. Dreifus’s testimony that, when μPDA 10 is docked in
telephone 45, μPDA 10 is “in” telephone 45 as required by claim 1.3
Ex. 1011, 18–194; Ex. 1005, 3:20–35, 14:26–35.
We are persuaded also by Mr. Dreifus’s testimony that μPDA 10 has,
as claimed, a microcontroller (Ex. 1005, Fig. 3, 5:48–60), a memory (id. at
5:61–6:2, 14:33–35), a touch-sensitive input as one designator (id. at Fig. 3,
6:57–65, 14:33–35), a thumbwheel input as another designator (id. at Fig. 4,
7:31–34, 14:44–47), and a display (id. at Fig. 3, 5:33–35, 14:31–41).
Ex. 1011, 19–23. As shown in Figure 11 above, a user may operate
telephone 45 by accessing touch-sensitive I/O interface 16 of μPDA 10
through window 51 in telephone 45. Ex. 1005, 14:30–35, 6:57–65.
We are persuaded further that Kikinis expressly discloses the
μPDA 10 memory is configured to store information related to at least one
credit card account, as required by claim 1. Ex. 1011, 19–20. Specifically,
Kikinis states μPDA 10 memory stores “all of the user’s collection of phone
numbers, associated credit card numbers, access codes, etc.” Ex. 1005,
14:33–50.

3 The Institution Decision rejected a claim construction advanced by Patent
Owner, seeking to distinguish claim 1 from Kikinis by asserting “‘in a
telephone’ denotes a combination (not juxtaposition) of a telephone with the
rest of the invention’s circuit elements.” Inst. Dec. 8, 13, 14. Patent Owner
did not dispute, during trial, that Kikinis discloses the “in a telephone”
limitation of claim 1.
4 Although the Dreifus Declaration contains numbered paragraphs, this
opinion cites page numbers.
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Patent Owner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art would
understand that “associated credit card numbers” in Kikinis refers not to
credit card accounts, but rather to phone cards or calling cards. PO Resp. 8–
10; Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 92–119. We are not persuaded by this contention. It is
contrary to the plain language of the Kikinis disclosure, referring to “credit
card numbers” and “credit card information.” Ex. 1005, 14:39, 14:49.
Moreover, even if we accepted that “credit card” in Kikinis actually
means “phone card,” still the use of a phone card as described by
Mr. Cooper is merely one way a telephone company may extend credit to a
customer, thereby making the phone card account one example of a credit
card account as recited in claim 1. See Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 104–108. There is no
limitation in claim 1 requiring the credit card account to be issued by a
financial institution rather than a phone company.
Claim 1 further requires the display to be configured to display the
credit card account information upon selection of the designator. We are
persuaded by Mr. Dreifus’s testimony that Kikinis expressly discloses the
μPDA 10 display is so configured. Ex. 1011, 22–23. Kikinis states:
With the μPDA docked, all of the software and memory of the
μPDA is available to the telephone and a user may operate the
phone by I/O interface 16.
[1] In this aspect of the invention, unique control routines
and display configurations are provided to enhance use of the
cellular phone. For example, all of the user’s collection of
phone numbers, associated credit card numbers, access codes,
etc. are readily available and may be quickly and conveniently
accessed and used. [2] In one aspect, a simple input displays
alphabet letters to select, and once a letter is selected, a partial
list of parties that might be called is displayed. One may scroll
through the list by touch input or by use of the thumbwheel of
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the μPDA and select a highlighted entry. It is not required that
the telephone numbers be displayed.
Once a party to be called is selected, the μPDA dials the
call, including necessary credit card information stored in the
memory of the μPDA for this purpose.
Ex. 1005, 14:33–50 (emphases and “[1]” and “[2]” added). For ease of
reference in the following discussion, “[1]” identifies two sentences in the
quoted disclosure, and “[2]” identifies the following four sentences.
We find the disclosure at [1] expressly discloses that when μPDA 10
is docked in telephone 45, there are display configurations in which all of
the user’s associated credit card numbers are readily available to be accessed
and used. In particular, we find that disclosure reflects the action of
displaying credit card account information in the μPDA 10 display. The
disclosure at [2] goes on to describe “one aspect” of the control routines and
display configurations disclosed at [1], relating to selecting a party to be
called using telephone 45.
We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s assertion that the Kikinis
disclosure at [1] fails to disclose “display” of credit card account
information. PO Resp. 5–7; Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 102–113. First, we disagree with
Patent Owner’s assertion that Mr. Dreifus admitted in deposition testimony
that Kikinis fails to disclose the action of displaying credit card account
information. PO Resp. 5–7 (citing Ex. 2003, 87–93). Rather, Mr. Dreifus
testified that the “one aspect” of the Kikinis disclosure at [2], directed to
selecting a party to be called, does not include a display of credit card
account information. See Ex. 2003, 90:16–23, 91:7–18, 92:2–23. This does
not discredit or undermine Mr. Dreifus’s testimony concerning the
disclosure at [1]. Second, the testimony of Mr. Cooper cited in the Patent
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Owner Response similarly focuses on “when a phone call is being made,” as
reflected by the Kikinis disclosure at [2], rather than the more general
disclosure at [1]. Ex. 2004, ¶¶ 102–103, 108–109, 111; see PO Resp. 7
(citing Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 102–113).
Claim 1 lastly recites an emitter coupled to the control circuit,
configured to transmit a signal relating to the credit card account
information. We are persuaded by Mr. Dreifus’s testimony that Kikinis
expressly discloses an antenna emitter in the antenna of telephone 45.
Ex. 1011, 23. Specifically, Kikinis discloses μPDA 10 may be utilized to
select a party to be called using telephone 45, and then “the μPDA dials the
call, including necessary credit card information stored in the memory of the
μPDA for this purpose.” Ex. 1005, 14:36–50. Thus, the express disclosure
in Kikinis is that the necessary credit card information is included in the
dialing of the call, and therefore transmitted by the antenna.
Patent Owner argues Kikinis fails to disclose that the credit card
information stored in the μPDA 10 memory is transmitted by the
telephone 45 antenna. PO Resp. 10–11; Ex. 2004 ¶ 121. Mr. Cooper
testifies the Kikinis disclosure at column 14, lines 48–50, is “ambiguous”
and is consistent with things happening other than transmission of credit
card account information using the antenna. Ex. 2004 ¶ 121.
We are not persuaded of ambiguity in the Kikinis disclosure. We
further disagree with Patent Owner’s interpretation of Mr. Dreifus’s
testimony as stating Kikinis does not disclose transmitting credit card
account information using the antenna. PO Resp. 10–11 (citing Ex. 2003,
94). Rather, Mr. Dreifus testified that “the credit card information is
included as part of the process of initiating and setting up the call” and “in
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the process of dialing that call, it’s also saying including necessary credit
card information.” Ex. 2003, 93–95.
Patent Owner also argues the μPDA 10 controller is not “coupled to”
the telephone antenna, as claim 1 requires. PO Resp. 12–13; Ex. 2004
¶¶ 123–129. Patent Owner cites the Kikinis disclosure at column 2,
lines 12–22, that the μPDA 10 controller is “effectively disable[d]” to
provide a direct access to the μPDA 10 software and data storage by the
CPU of the host unit, i.e., telephone 45. PO Resp. 12; Ex. 2004 ¶ 123. That
disclosure, however, relates to “an aspect” of the Kikinis invention, and
Kikinis further provides “[i]n other embodiments many other cooperative
operating modes may be accomplished between the two CPUs and
accessible memory devices.” Ex. 1005, 2:12–13, 5:48–60. One such other
embodiment is Figure 11, in which “the μPDA dials the call . . . .” Id. at
14:48–50. Thus, when read as a whole, the Kikinis disclosure provides
alternate embodiments disclosing a controller coupled to the telephone
antenna.
Moreover, at the oral hearing, Patent Owner agreed with Petitioner
that the “transducer” converts a signal from one form of energy to another
form of energy. Tr. 33:3–17. Based on our construction of “transducer”
provided above, we are persuaded by Mr. Dreifus’s testimony that Kikinis
discloses a transducer in its IR interface 94. Ex. 1011, 23–24; Ex. 1005,
Fig. 13, 13:21–27, 15:60–16:11. The signal emitted by IR interface 94 may
transfer data from the μPDA 10 memory to a host computer, which would
include the credit card account information stored in the memory. Ex. 1011,
23–24; Ex. 1005, 5:49–58, 16:6–11. Thus, Kikinis discloses two structures,
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each separately satisfying the “emitter” limitation of claim 1: antenna of
telephone 45, and IR interface 94.
For the foregoing reasons, a preponderance of the evidence establishes
that claim 1 is unpatentable as anticipated by Kikinis.
2. Independent Claim 12
Claim 12 is substantially identical to claim 1, except the information
of claim 12 relates to an “identification card account” rather than a “credit
card account.” A preponderance of the evidence establishes that Kikinis
discloses the common limitations in claims 1 and 12. See supra Part II.C.1.
An “identification card account” is an account that has an associated card,
wherein the card identifies a person associated with the account. A credit
card account is such an account. Therefore, a preponderance of the evidence
establishes that claim 12 is unpatentable as anticipated by Kikinis.
3. Independent Claim 13
Claim 13 is substantially identical to claim 1, except claim 13 contains
an additional limitation: “a console configured to communicate with the
control circuit and receive data to provide access to at least one of an
account, a service, and a feature.” A preponderance of the evidence
establishes that Kikinis discloses the common limitations in claims 1 and 13.
See supra Part II.C.1. We are persuaded by Mr. Dreifus’s testimony that
Kikinis expressly discloses the console of claim 13 as expansion bus
interface 20 or host interface 14 of μPDA 10, or docking port 49 of
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telephone 45.5 Ex. 1011, 46–48. Therefore, a preponderance of the
evidence establishes that claim 13 is unpatentable as anticipated by Kikinis.
4. Independent Claim 14
Claim 14 is substantially identical to claim 1, except that it does not
recite “in a telephone.” A preponderance of the evidence establishes that
Kikinis discloses the common limitations in claims 1 and 14. See supra
Part II.C.1. Therefore, a preponderance of the evidence establishes that
claim 14 is unpatentable as anticipated by Kikinis.
5. Independent Claim 25
Claim 25 recites a method comprising four steps, each one of which
finds a corresponding apparatus component in claim 1 for performing the
step. A preponderance of the evidence establishes that claim 25 is
unpatentable as anticipated by Kikinis, based on the analysis already
provided for claim 1. See supra Part II.C.1.
6. Dependent Claims 2–7, 9–11, 16–21, 23, 24, 26–31, 33, and 34
As already discussed, a preponderance of the evidence establishes that
Kikinis discloses the limitations of independent claims 1, 12, 13, 14, and 25.
Petitioner further contends Kikinis discloses the additional subject matter
recited in claims 2–7, 9–11, 16–21, 23, 24, 26–31, 33, and 34, each of which
depends directly or indirectly from claim 1, 14, or 25. Pet. 20–22. We have

5 The Institution Decision rejected a claim construction advanced by Patent
Owner, seeking to distinguish claim 13 from Kikinis by asserting the
console is a separate, outside device with respect to the telephone. Inst.
Dec. 7–8, 15–16. Patent Owner did not dispute, during trial, that Kikinis
discloses the “console” limitation of claim 13.
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reviewed the claim charts presented in the Petition and the Dreifus
Declaration asserting that the additional subject matter of the dependent
claims is disclosed in Kikinis. Id.; Ex. 1011, 26–30, 55–60, 67–71. Patent
Owner’s Response relies solely on its arguments and evidence contesting the
independent claims. The Scheduling Order cautioned Patent Owner that any
arguments for patentability not raised in the Response would be deemed
waived. Paper 11, 3. Accordingly, after due consideration of the argument
and evidence advanced by Petitioner (see, e.g., Inst. Dec. 16–18), we find a
preponderance of the evidence establishes Kikinis expressly discloses each
and every limitation of dependent claims 2–7, 9–11, 16–21, 23, 24, 26–31,
33, and 34, and conclude those claims are unpatentable as anticipated by
Kikinis.
D. Anticipation by Gutman
Petitioner contends claims 1–7, 9–14, 16–21, 23–31, 33, and 34 of the
’875 patent are unpatentable as anticipated by Gutman. Pet. 22–31.
1. Claims 1–7, 9–13, 25–31, 33, and 34
Each one of claims 1–7, 9–13, 25–31, 33, and 34 requires “a
telephone.” As construed above, a telephone includes a microphone and a
speaker. See supra Part II.A.1. For the following reasons, Petitioner has not
established by a preponderance of the evidence that Gutman’s electronic
wallet includes a telephone.
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Figures 1, 2A, and 2B of Gutman are reproduced below:

Figure 1 shows electronic wallet 100. Ex. 1006, 4:36–39.

Figures 2A and 2B show block diagrams of several components in electronic
wallet 100. Id. at 6:41–43. As shown in Figure 2B, electronic wallet 100
has telephone interface circuitry 230 connected to modem 232, Dual Tone
Multi-Frequency transceiver 234, and controller 205. Id. at 9:10–13.
Petitioner and Mr. Dreifus cite the Gutman written description at column 9,
lines 10–26 as disclosing that electronic wallet 100 has “telephonic
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capabilities.” Pet. 23–24; Ex. 1011, 72–73. Petitioner further relies, in the
Reply, on other portions of the Gutman disclosure. Pet. Reply 6 (citing
Ex. 1006, Fig. 2A, Fig. 3, 8:43–64, 9:10–22, 9:45–52). We find, however,
nothing in the cited disclosures of Gutman that would indicate to a person of
ordinary skill in the art that electronic wallet 100 includes a telephone
microphone and a telephone speaker.6
Petitioner also relies on Gutman’s disclosure concerning U.S. Patent
No. 4,831,647 to D’Avello et al. (Ex. 1007, “D’Avello”), which Gutman
incorporates by reference. Pet. 24; Ex. 1011, 73. Gutman’s disclosure in
this regard is reproduced here:
Furthermore, a financial card reader 122, such as a
magnetic card reader having a slot 124 capable of receiving a
financial card (e.g., a MasterCard or Visa card) 126, for reading
a representation of a financial information from the financial
card 126 is included [in electronic wallet 100]. Such a
financial card reader 122 may serve to read financial
information from most or all of one’s personal cards using
known standards . . . and known techniques. . . . The financial
information may subsequently be stored into the electronic
wallet 100. An exemplary communication system incorporating
a financial card reader at a mobile radio-telephone unit is
discussed in U.S. Pat. No. 4,831,647, issued May 16, 1989, to
D’Avello et al. and entitled “Radiotelephone Credit Card Data
Communications”, which is assigned to the assignee of the
present invention and which is incorporated by reference
herein.

6 Electronic wallet 100 does have speaker 110 for generating an “audible
alert.” Ex. 1006, 4:55–63, 8:19–26. Mr. Dreifus testified, however, he
“cannot conclude whether the speaker is or isn’t a telephone speaker” and he
“did not see a telephone mike” disclosed in Gutman. Ex. 2003, 63:2–64:20.
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Ex. 1006, 5:44–65 (emphases added). Petitioner concludes from this
disclosure that “[t]he financial reader of electronic wallet 100, Gutman
explains, can be incorporated to the radio-telephone unit of D’Avello.”
Pet. 24. Further, Petitioner argues, “[b]y incorporating D’Avello, Gutman
fully references the content of the material in D’Avello as if the material was
set forth in Gutman” and “[a]ccordingly, Gutman discloses a telephone.”
Pet. Reply 6 (citing Harari v. Lee, 656 F.3d 1331, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir.
2011)).
We are not persuaded that Gutman’s discussion and incorporation of
D’Avello leads to anticipation of the ’875 patent claims at issue here.
“[U]nless a reference discloses within the four corners of the document not
only all of the limitations claimed but also all of the limitations arranged or
combined in the same way as recited in the claim, it . . . cannot anticipate
under 35 U.S.C. § 102.” Net MoneyIn, Inc. v. Verisign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359,
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphases added). D’Avello does disclose a
telephone communication system including a financial card reader.
Ex. 1007, Fig. 5, 1:1–10, 5:23–28. Petitioner relies, however, upon
Gutman’s electronic wallet 100 as including all elements of the claims. See,
e.g., Pet. 22–29 (analysis of independent claims). Although Gutman at
column 5, lines 44–65, discusses D’Avello’s telephone and financial card
reader, Gutman does not indicate that electronic wallet 100 may include a
telephone. Gutman indicates that the financial card reader of D’Avello’s
telephone may be used in electronic wallet 100, but not that the telephone
components (e.g. a microphone or speaker) of D’Avello’s telephone may be
used in electronic wallet 100. Ex. 1006, 5:44–65.
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For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has not established by a
preponderance of the evidence that Gutman’s electronic wallet 100 includes
a telephone microphone and a telephone speaker. Therefore, we conclude
claims 1–7, 9–13, 25–31, 33, and 34 of the ’875 patent have not been shown
to be unpatentable as anticipated by Gutman.
2. Claims 14, 16–21, 23, and 24
Claims 14, 16–21, 23, and 24 do not require a telephone. For the
following reasons, Petitioner has established by a preponderance of evidence
that Gutman discloses the limitations in these claims.
Claim 14 recites an apparatus comprising a control circuit, a memory,
a designator, a display, and an emitter. Referring to Gutman Figures 1, 2A,
and 2B, reproduced above, we are persuaded by Mr. Dreifus’s testimony that
Gutman’s electronic wallet 100 has the claimed control circuit in
controller 205, and the claimed memory in memory 206 and non-volatile
memory 207. Ex. 1011, 100–102; Ex. 1006, 6:49–7:6. We further are
persuaded Gutman’s wallet 100 has the claimed designator in user input
controls 209, and the claimed display in display 108. Ex. 1011, 102–103;
Ex. 1006, 4:55–60, 7:41–44, 8:19–29. We also agree Gutman’s wallet 100
has the claimed emitter in antenna 202 and/or display 108. Ex. 1011, 105–
106; Ex. 1006, 6:43–46, 8:43–64.
Patent Owner contends Gutman fails to disclose that wallet 100
displays or emits credit card account information, as recited in claim 14. PO
Resp. 13–18; Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 134–143. Patent Owner concedes memory 206
stores, and display 108 displays, and antenna 202 emits, information relating
to a “financial account,” but disputes that the financial account is a credit
card account. PO Resp. 14. According to Patent Owner, although
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wallet 100 reads financial information from financial cards such as a
MasterCard or Visa card (Ex. 1006, 5:44–54), Gutman does not disclose that
such credit card account information is ever stored in memory 206, or
displayed, or emitted. PO Resp. 14–15. Patent Owner contends the credit
card account information instead is stored in a microprocessor EEPROM.
Id. at 15–16 (citing Ex. 1007, 5:14–16, 5:64–6:2, 7:18–20). Patent Owner
further contends Mr. Dreifus testified that it is possible that the credit card
storage memory in Gutman is different from memory 206 for display and
emitting. PO Resp. 15–16 (citing Ex. 2003, 79, 83–84). Patent Owner
contends the Institution Decision erred in finding that column 6, lines 16–20
of Gutman establish that the “financial institution account” information
stored in memory 206 includes the credit card account information read by
wallet 100. PO Resp. 17–18; Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 136, 140; see Inst. Dec. 19–20.
Patent Owner’s contentions are not persuasive. The Gutman
disclosure, as a whole, indicates that the “account at a financial institution”
discussed at column 7, lines 34–54 may be a credit card account. In the
Background of Invention section, Gutman discusses “a number of
unfortunate limitations” encountered with “[c]ontemporary financial
communications systems.” Ex. 1006, 1:16–26. The Background section
identifies a “second example” of such a system that includes use of “a
financial card (e.g. a credit card).” Id. at 1:60–2:25. Gutman indicates the
limitations of known credit card systems include that the financial
information is maintained only at the financial institution, thus requiring a
redundant paper trail, as well as an error-prone manual financial log
maintained by the user. Id. at 2:57–3:2.
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Gutman discloses that electronic wallet 100 reads financial
information from multiple financial cards (e.g. credit cards) for storage in
wallet 100, so that “the financial information from multiple financial cards
may be better organized and secured in one place (i.e., within the electronic
wallet 100)” as “subsequently more fully discussed.” Id. at 5:44–6:20.
Thereafter, Gutman discloses how electronic wallet 100 maintains
information from an “account at a financial institution” such as balance and
transaction activity, by storing such information in memory 206, displaying
such information on display 108, and emitting such information via
antenna 202. Id. at 7:34–54, 8:21–29, 8:43–64. Thus, when Gutman is read
as a whole, the disclosure of financial institution account information in
column 7 includes credit card account information.
For the foregoing reasons, a preponderance of the evidence establishes
that Gutman expressly discloses each and every limitation of independent
claim 14. Petitioner further contends Gutman discloses the additional
subject matter recited in claims 16–21, 23, and 24, each of which depends
directly from claim 14. Pet. 29–31. We have reviewed the claim charts
presented in the Petition and the Dreifus Declaration asserting that the
additional subject matter of the dependent claims is disclosed in Gutman.
Id.; Ex. 1011, 105–111. Patent Owner’s Response relies solely on its
arguments and evidence contesting claim 14. The Scheduling Order
cautioned Patent Owner that any arguments for patentability not raised in the
Response would be deemed waived. Paper 11, 3. Accordingly, after due
consideration of the argument and evidence advanced by Petitioner (see,
e.g., Inst. Dec. 21–22), we find a preponderance of the evidence establishes
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Gutman expressly discloses each and every limitation of dependent
claims 16–21, 23, and 24.
We conclude claims 14, 16–21, 23, and 24 are unpatentable as
anticipated by Gutman.
E. Anticipation by Pitroda
Petitioner contends claims 14 and 16–24 of the ’875 patent are
unpatentable as anticipated by Pitroda. Pet. 31–38.
1. Independent Claim 14
Figure 3 of Pitroda is reproduced below:

Figure 3 shows a block diagram of a universal electronic transaction
(“UET”) card. Ex. 1008, Abs., 8:28–29.
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Claim 14 recites an apparatus comprising a control circuit, a memory,
a designator, and a display. We are persuaded by Mr. Dreifus’s testimony
that the UET card has the claimed control circuit and memory in micro
controller 327 with associated RAM and ROM, as well as additional non-
volatile RAM 34. Ex. 1011, 123–124; Ex. 1008, 11:19–23. We further are
persuaded Pitroda has the claimed designator and display in touch screen
display 30. Ex. 1011, 125–129; Ex. 1008, 11:13–19. Touch screen
display 30 may be used to select credit card account information from the
UET card memory, to be shown in display 30. Ex. 1011, 124–129;
Ex. 1008, 11:29–53, 13:59–14:9, 16:22–24.
Patent Owner contends Pitroda’s micro controller 32 fails to meet all
the requirements of claim 14, because an “external device operating via the
contacts 13” and not micro controller 32 writes credit card account
information in the UET card memory. PO Resp. 27–28; Ex. 2004 ¶ 179.
This argument is not persuasive, because it misconstrues the scope of
claim 14. The claim requires that the control circuit (i.e. Pitroda’s micro
controller 32) is “coupled to” the UET card memory; it does not specify that
the control circuit performs the storage of data into the UET card memory.
Pitroda’s micro controller 32 is coupled to the UET card memory because,
as Patent Owner concedes, micro controller 32 reads credit card account
information from the UET card memory. PO Resp. 27–28 (micro
controller 32 is “the device used for reading credit card account information
from the UET memory to be displayed”); Ex. 2004 ¶ 179.

7 There is some confusion in Pitroda concerning whether micro controller is
“32” or “33.” Ex. 1008, Fig. 3, 11:19–23. We will use “32.”
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Claim 14 further recites an emitter configured to communicate a
signal relating to the credit card account information. We are persuaded by
Mr. Dreifus’s testimony that Pitroda discloses such an emitter in its
display 30, which can display bar code patterns. Ex. 1011, 129–130;
Ex. 1008, Fig. 9, 8:43–44, 13:23–38. In particular, Pitroda states: “It is also
possible to display basic card information such as the name, the card
number, the date of issue, the date of expiration, etc., in the form of a bar
code pattern to be read by a bar code reader in a predetermined area” of
the display. Ex. 1008, 13:33–38 (emphases added).
Patent Owner contends the Pitroda disclosure reflecting display of
“basic card information” does not relate to credit card account information
as recited in claim 14, but rather relates to other kinds of information, such
as a medical card, an ID card, a phone card, an airline travel card, a car
rental card, or the UET card itself. PO Resp. 24–25; Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 164–166.
Patent Owner, however, does not provide any persuasive reason why
Pitroda’s “basic card information” should refer to one or more of those other
kinds of information, to the exclusion of credit card account information.
We are persuaded by Mr. Dreifus’s reading, whereby credit card account
information is included on the display, especially because such information
is one of the two principal embodiments (along with health care information)
in the Pitroda disclosure. E.g., Ex. 1008, 1:21–36, 2:1–26, 6:16–43.
Patent Owner further contends the entire bar code display
functionality of Pitroda “is disclosed as a mere ‘possibility.’” PO Resp. 26.
In Patent Owner’s view, Pitroda fails to disclose that the bar code display is
“configured to communicate a signal” as claimed, and merely having the
capability to be so configured is insufficient to establish anticipation. Id. In
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short, according to Patent Owner, “Pitroda’s bar code description is a
hypothetical possibility, not an actual disclosed configuration.” Id. We are
not persuaded by these arguments, and maintain our preliminary finding that
the Pitroda disclosure at column 13, lines 33–38, reflects that the UET card
in fact is configured to display basic card information via a bar code, not
merely that it might be possible to modify the UET card to incorporate such
a display.
Moreover, at the oral hearing, Patent Owner agreed with Petitioner
that the “transducer” converts a signal from one form of energy to another
form of energy. Tr. 33:3–17. Based on our construction of “transducer”
provided above, we are persuaded by Mr. Dreifus’s testimony that Pitroda
discloses a transducer in its infrared or radio frequency communication
option 39. Ex. 1011, 129; Ex. 1008, Fig. 3, 9:54–63, 11:24–26. The signal
emitted by IR/RF option 39 relates to credit card account information.
Ex. 1011, 130; Ex. 1008, 16:35–41. Thus, Pitroda discloses two structures,
each separately satisfying the “emitter” limitation of claim 14: display 30
and IR/RF option 39.
Patent Owner further argues Pitroda fails to anticipate because “there
is no teaching to select information related to a credit card account causing
the display of credit card account related information (in text or other
recognizable form) to a person and display that same information in a bar
code to a device.” PO Resp. 27. This argument is not persuasive, because it
misconstrues the scope of claim 14. The claim requires that the “display” of
information is performed “upon selection of the designator,” but does not
specify that the “communicat[ion]” of information by the emitter is tied in
any way to the selection. See, e.g., Tr. 30:13–31:7. As set forth above,
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Pitroda displays credit card account information upon selection of the
designator. Ex. 1008, 11:29–53, 13:59–14:9, 16:22–24.
For the foregoing reasons, a preponderance of the evidence establishes
that claim 14 is unpatentable as anticipated by Pitroda.
2. Dependent Claims 16–24
As already discussed, a preponderance of the evidence establishes that
Pitroda discloses the limitations of independent claim 14. Petitioner further
contends Pitroda discloses the additional subject matter recited in claims 16–
24, each of which depends directly from claim 14. Pet. 36–38. We have
reviewed the claim charts presented in the Petition and the Dreifus
Declaration asserting that the additional subject matter of the dependent
claims is disclosed in Pitroda. Id.; Ex. 1011, 130–139. Patent Owner’s
Response relies solely on its arguments and evidence contesting claim 14.
The Scheduling Order cautioned Patent Owner that any arguments for
patentability not raised in the Response would be deemed waived. Paper 11,
3. Accordingly, after due consideration of the argument and evidence
advanced by Petitioner (see, e.g., Inst. Dec. 24–26), we find a preponderance
of the evidence establishes Pitroda expressly discloses each and every
limitation of dependent claims 16–24, and conclude those claims are
unpatentable as anticipated by Pitroda.
F. Anticipation by Hennige
Petitioner contends claims 14, 16–21, 23, and 24 of the ’875 patent
are unpatentable as anticipated by Hennige. Pet. 38–43.
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1. Independent Claim 14
Figure 1a of Hennige is reproduced below:

Figure 1a shows electronic multi-function card 10. Ex. 1009, 4:19–21.
Claim 14 recites an apparatus comprising a control circuit, a memory,
a designator, and a display. We are persuaded by Mr. Dreifus’s testimony
that card 10 has the claimed control circuit in “the usual electronic circuit
means which are regarded as standard today,” such as a microprocessor.
Ex. 1011, 140–141; Ex. 1009, 4:39–44. Further, we agree card 10 has the
claimed memory. Ex. 1011, 141; Ex. 1009, 3:64–67, 4:43–45, 6:17–23. As
to the claimed designator and display, we agree card 10 has alpha-numeric
input keys or separate selection input keys, as well as display 11 and
signature display 12. Ex. 1011, 141–142; Ex. 1009, Figs. 1a–1b, 4:35–38,
5:55–65. The card 10 memory contains a data set for multiple credit card
accounts, each including the special information or logo of the issuing
company or bank, the card number and the date of expiry, any stored photos
or, if desired, other machine-readable data and the user’s signature.
Ex. 1011, 140–143; Ex. 1009, 3:28–32, 3:63–67, 5:55–6:11.
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Claim 14 further recites an emitter configured to communicate a
signal relating to the credit card account information. We are persuaded by
Mr. Dreifus’s testimony that Hennige discloses such an emitter in its
“contactless means” for wireless communication “for example inductively,
or serially by means of photoelectric elements, or the like.” Ex. 1009, 4:49–
53; Ex. 1011, 144 (citing Ex. 1009, 7:35–37). In particular, Hennige
discloses that the contactless communication means may be utilized by
checking terminal 20 “to inquire the general data of the card [10]
organization” during a credit card payment transaction, which would include
credit card account information stored in card 10. Ex. 1009, 7:9–45.
Patent Owner contends the Hennige disclosure at column 7, lines 9–
45, fails to disclose the transmission of credit card account information from
card 10 to checking terminal 20. PO Resp. 20–23. According to Patent
Owner, Hennige’s indication that checking terminal 20 may “inquire the
general data of the card organization” is ambiguous and can mean many
things unrelated to communicating credit card account related information.
PO Resp. 22–23; Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 150–158. Further, Hennige indicates that the
salesperson (not card 10) inputs “the invoice data” into checking
terminal 20, which in Patent Owner’s view “suggests a salesperson enters
credit card information.” PO Resp. 23; Ex. 1009, 7:39–41.
We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contention that the Hennige
disclosure is ambiguous as to the data communicated from card 10 to
checking terminal 20. For example, Hennige indicates the data may include
a digitally-stored signature of the user to permit authentication for the credit
card transaction (Ex. 1009, 9:48–63), as well as data read from credit cards
for transfer to card 10 (id. at 10:53–62, 11:29–38), both of which relate to a
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credit card account. This reading is consistent with Hennige’s suggestion
that an advantage of card 10 is that there is no need for the magnetic stripe
normally existing on single-purpose cards (id. at 7:50–55), because the data
is communicated instead by the contactless means. The “invoice data”
entered into checking terminal 20 by the salesperson (id. at 7:39–41) is the
data for the underlying sales transaction, not the credit card data used to pay
for the transaction (id. at 7:9–13).
We further do not agree with Patent Owner that the claimed emitter
must communicate to outside devices. See supra Part II.A.2; PO Resp. 23–
24. We, therefore, find that Hennige’s display is an additional emitter,
alternative to Hennige’s contactless communication means. Ex. 1009, 4:21–
34, 5:55–6:5. Hennige’s display may include credit card account
information in the form of the credit card company’s logo, the account
number, and the authorized user’s photo and signature. Id. at 5:55–6:5,
Figs. 1a–1b.
For the foregoing reasons, a preponderance of the evidence establishes
that claim 14 is unpatentable as anticipated by Hennige.
2. Dependent Claims 16–21, 23, and 24
As already discussed, a preponderance of the evidence establishes that
Hennige discloses the limitations of independent claim 14. Petitioner further
contends Hennige discloses the additional subject matter recited in
claims 16–21, 23, and 24, each of which depends directly from claim 14.
Pet. 42–43. We have reviewed the claim charts presented in the Petition and
the Dreifus Declaration asserting that the additional subject matter of the
dependent claims is disclosed in Hennige. Id.; Ex. 1011, 145–148. Patent
Owner’s Response relies solely on its arguments and evidence contesting
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claim 14. The Scheduling Order cautioned Patent Owner that any arguments
for patentability not raised in the Response would be deemed waived.
Paper 11, 3. Accordingly, after due consideration of the argument and
evidence advanced by Petitioner (see, e.g., Inst. Dec. 27–29), we find a
preponderance of the evidence establishes Hennige expressly discloses each
and every limitation of dependent claims 16–21, 23, and 24, and conclude
those claims are unpatentable as anticipated by Hennige.
G. Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence
Patent Owner filed a Motion to Exclude Evidence (Paper 22, “the
Motion” or “Mot.”), to which Petitioner filed an Opposition (Paper 26,
“Opp.”), and Patent Owner thereafter filed a Reply and a Corrected Reply
(Paper 28, “Corr. Reply”). Petitioner has not filed any Motions to Exclude
Evidence.
The Motion requests exclusion from evidence of Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary. Mot. 1–2. We need not decide this portion of the
Motion, because Petitioner has not submitted or relied upon that dictionary
in this proceeding. Opp. 3.
The Motion requests exclusion from evidence of Exhibit 1014, an
excerpt from the Wiley Electrical and Electronics Engineering Dictionary.
Mot. 2. We have declined to consider Exhibit 1014 based on Petitioner’s
failure to explain its significance, so we need not decide this portion of the
Motion. See supra Part II.A.1.
The Motion requests exclusion from evidence of Exhibit 1015, a copy
of an article from the New York Times, and Exhibit 1016, an excerpt from
The IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical and Electronics Terms (6th ed.
1996, Jane Radatz chair). Mot. 3–4. We have not relied upon either
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Exhibit 1015 or 1016 in reaching the present decision, so we need not decide
these portions of the Motion.
For the foregoing reasons, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude
Evidence (Paper 22) is dismissed.
III. CONCLUSION
Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that:
A Claims 1–7, 9–14, 16–21, 23–31, 33, and 34 are invalid under
35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Kikinis;
B. Claims 14, 16–21, 23, and 24 are invalid under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as anticipated by Gutman;
C. Claims 14 and 16–24 are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as
anticipated by Pitroda; and
D. Claims 14, 16–21, 23, and 24 are invalid under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) as anticipated by Hennige.
IV. ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, it is:
ORDERED that Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence is
dismissed;
FURTHER ORDERED that claims 1–7, 9–14, 16–31, 33, and 34 of
the ’875 patent are unpatentable; and
FURTHER ORDERED that, because this is a final decision, parties to
the proceeding seeking judicial review of the decision must comply with the
notice and service requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 90.2 (2014).
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FOR PETITIONER:
Erika Arner
Aaron Capron
FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP
erika.arner@finnegan.com
aaron.capron@finnegan.com

FOR PATENT OWNER:
Robert P. Greenspoon
Joseph C. Drish
FLACHSBART & GREENSPOON, LLC
rpg@fg-law.com
jcd@fg-law.com