Specialty Crushing, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 21, 2000

331 N.L.R.B. 369 (N.L.R.B. 2000)

OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 3 (SPECIALTY CRUSHING) 369
Operating Engineers, Local Union No. 3, Interna-
tional Union of Operating Engineers, AFL–CIO
and Specialty Crushing, Inc. Case 32–CB–4847
June 21, 2000
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS
HURTGEN AND BRAME
On May 5, 1998, Administrative Law Judge Jay R.
Pollack issued the attached decision. The Respondent
Union filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and brief and, for the reasons
set forth below, has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings,
findings, and conclusions, and to adopt the recommended
Order.
The judge found that the Respondent violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) by threatening to discipline, and disciplining,
members John Hillman, Ruben Serrano, David Knapp,
and Preston Pope because those members continued to
work for a nonunion employer, Specialty Crushing, Inc.
Specifically, the judge found that the Respondent’s
threats and discipline were unlawful efforts to impose
representation on a unit of employees who recently had
rejected the Respondent in a Board-conducted election.
We agree.
It is well settled that unions are prohibited under Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A) from coercing employees in the exercise
of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. Although
the proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) permits labor organiza-
tions to prescribe their own rules regarding the acquisi-
tion and retention of membership,1 the scope of the pro-
viso is limited. As set forth in Scofield v. NLRB, 394
U.S. 423, 430 (1969), a union may enforce properly
adopted internal rules against its members only where
those rules: (1) reflect a legitimate union interest; (2)
impair no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor
laws; and (3) are reasonably enforced against union
members who are free to leave the union and escape the
rule. Here, the Respondent has not satisfied the third
element of the Scofield test. Thus, without deciding
whether the Respondent had a properly adopted rule pro-
hibiting members from working for a nonunion em-
ployer,2 we agree with the judge that—even were there
such a rule—it was not reasonably enforced against the
four members. Rather, that rule was disparately enforced
against these members.

1 The proviso specifies that: Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) “shall not impair the
right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to
the acquisition or retention of membership.”
2 At the time that the Respondent disciplined Knapp, Hillman,
Serrano, and Pope, it had no express rule prohibiting members from
working nonunion. Such a rule was enacted on October 12, 1997, after
the instant unfair labor practice charge was filed. It did have a rule that
specified that members must “conform and abide by the hours, wages,
and conditions of employment provided for in agreements negotiated
by this Local Union.”
As fully set forth in the judge’s decision, since at least
1996, the Respondent has sought recognition from, and a
collective-bargaining relationship with, Specialty Crush-
ing, Inc., a nonunion construction industry employer.3 In
April 1997, the Respondent sought voluntary recognition
from the Eployer, based on a proffered card check assert-
edly showing majority employee support for the Union.
The Employer rejected this request. In June 1997 the
Respondent sought recognition through a Board-
conducted election, which the Union lost by a 5 to 5
vote.4
After the election the Respondent devised another
strategy for obtaining recognition from the Employer. In
July 1997 it decided to pull its members off the Em-
ployer’s jobsites in order to pressure Specialty Crushing
into recognizing and bargaining with it.5 Towards this
end, the Respondent’s agents visited various employer
jobsites between July 28 and 30, 1997, and ordered
members David Knapp, Tom Brown, John Hillman,
Ruben Serrano, and Preston Pope to cease working for
Specialty Crushing. The agents told these members that
if they did not leave, they would face fines, suspensions,
or expulsion from membership with “attendant loss of
membership privileges and or benefits.” When Knapp,
Hillman, Serrano, and Pope remained on their jobsites, or
later returned to them, the Respondent filed internal
charges against each for “refus[ing] to comply with the
lawful orders of the local Union.” The Respondent also
directed Knapp, Hillman, Serrano, and Pope to appear
before its trial committee. When the four members de-
clined, they were tried in their absence and fined. Only
after the instant 8(b)(1)(A) charge was filed, did the Re-
spondent notify the four members that the charges
against them had been dismissed and that their fines had
been rescinded.
3 As found by the judge, on occasion Specialty had entered into pro-
ject-only agreements with the Union or worked as a subcontractor on
jobs requiring it to be bound to the terms of the extant union collective-
bargaining agreement. At all relevant times, however, Specialty had
declined union overtures to recognize it and sign an agreement.
4 Among the eligible voters were five union members. Of course,
we do not know, and will not inquire into, how any employee voted in
the election.
Hillman did not vote in the election. Although Hillman described
himself as a supervisor, there was no allegation or finding that he was a
Sec. 2(11) supervisor or that he was not covered by Sec. 7 of the Act.
5 The Respondent concedes that its object was recognitional. Busi-
ness Representative Michael Dunlap testified that the Union’s objective
in pulling members from the jobsites was to “get [Specialty] to sign this
signatory agreement.” Union organizer Jay Bosley similarly testified
that the Respondent’s object was to “apply economic pressure that
would encourage [Specialty] to come to terms with us.” Respondent’s
counsel at hearing and in his brief to the judge further conceded this
object. In the latter, counsel stated that:
Despite the loss in the representation election, the Union still sought to
establish a comprehensive collective bargaining relationship with the
Employer. In order to put economic pressure on the Employer to sign
a pre-hire agreement, the Union devised a strategy to deprive the Em-
ployer of skilled labor.
331 NLRB No. 60
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 370
The Respondent’s July 1997 directive that these mem-
bers cease working for the Employer was the first such
directive that any of them had received. Although
Knapp, Hillman, Serrano, and Pope had been union
members and employees of nonunion Specialty Crushing
for significant periods,6 none previously had been told
that he was prohibited under the Union’s constitution or
bylaws from working for Specialty Crushing. Neither
had any of these members been told that he could not
work for any other nonunion employer. Michael Dunlop,
the Respondent’s business agent who ordered the mem-
bers to leave the jobsites, admitted that he knew of no
other situation where any of the Union’s approximately
35,000 members had been cited for working nonunion.
Further, the Respondent adduced evidence of only one
other instance in the preceding 5 years where members
had been cited for working nonunion. That incident,
which occurred in 1994, involved three members work-
ing at a single site. Under these facts, we find that the
Respondent failed to establish that it lawfully disciplined
the four members pursuant to a validly enforced rule.
See generally Electrical Workers IBEW Local 1579, 316
NLRB 710 (1995). Accordingly, the discipline was not
protected under Scofield principles.7
Further, to the extent that the Respondent argues that
its discipline of Knapp, Hillman, Serrano, and Pope was
privileged because it was undertaken for the lawful pur-
pose of obtaining recognition from Specialty Crushing,
we find this defense lacks merit. Thus, based on the June
1997 election, the Respondent was foreclosed from ob-
taining another representation election in July 1997,8
or—under the principles of Section 8(a)(2)—from com-
pelling Specialty Crushing to recognize it as a 9(a) repre-
sentative.9 As to the Respondent’s argument that its dis-
cipline was privileged because it was undertaken for the
lawful purpose of obtaining 8(f) recognition from the
Employer, we find that this defense lacks merit. John
Deklewa & Sons, 282 NLRB 1375, 1385 (1987), and
Luterbach Construction Co., 315 NLRB 976, 978
(1994).10

6 Knapp had been a union member and Specialty employee since
July 1996. Hillman, a 20-year union member had been employed by
Specialty for more than 5 years. Serrano joined the Union in August
1995, a few months before commencing work for the Employer. Pope
had worked for the Employer since 1989 and joined the Union in 1993.
7 Members Hurtgen and Brame agree with this conclusion. They also
note that the Respondent did not rely on the rule cited in fn. 2 above at
the time of the events here.
8 Sec. 9(c)(3) prohibits elections in any bargaining unit, where—in
the preceding 12 months—a valid election has been held.
9 Nor does the Respondent claim that, following the election, it
achieved majority support among the Employer’s employees.
10 As the Board held in Deklewa: “A vote to reject the signatory un-
ion will void the 8(f) agreement and will terminate the 8(f) relationship.
In that event, the Board will prohibit the parties from reestablishing the
8(f) relationship covering unit employees for a 1-year period.” Where,
as here, the employees voted to reject a 9(a) status, we find that the
Deklewa principle likewise precludes parties from establishing an 8(f)
relationship during the year following the election.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Operating Engineers Local
Union No. 3, International Union of Operating Engi-
neers, AFL-CIO, it officers agents and representatives
take the action set forth in the Order.

Valerie Hardy-Mahoney, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Timothy Sears, Esq., of Alameda, California, for the Respon-
dent.
Paul Simpson, Esq. (Simpson, Aherne & Garrity), of San Fran-
cisco, California, for the Employer.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAY R. POLLACK, Administrative Law Judge. I heard this
case in trial at Oakland, California, on January 26, 1998. On
August 1, 1997, Specialty Crushing, Inc. (the Employer) filed
the charge alleging that Operating Engineers, Local Union No.
3, of the International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL–CIO
(Respondent or the Union) committed certain violations of
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act (the
Act). On October 9, 1997, the Acting Regional Director for
Region 32 of the National Labor Relations Board issued a
complaint and notice of hearing against Respondent alleging
that the Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by threat-
ening employees with union discipline for working for the Em-
ployer. The complaint was amended at the hearing. Respon-
dent filed a timely answer to the complaint, denying all wrong-
doing.
The parties have been afforded full opportunity to appear, to
introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, and to file briefs. On the entire record, from my
observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and having con-
sidered the posthearing briefs of the parties, I make the follow-
ing
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Employer is a California corporation with offices and a
principal place of business located in Oakland, California,
where it is engaged in the processing of recycled materials.
During the 12 months prior to issuance of the complaint, Re-
spondent sold goods or provided services valued in excess of
$50,000 directly to customers who themselves meet one of the
Board’s jurisdictional standards, other than the indirect inflow
or indirect outflow standards. Accordingly, Respondent admits
and I find that the Employer is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
Respondent admits and I find that at all times material Re-
spondent has been a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
The Employer is a rock-crushing contractor with operations
throughout Northern California. It is not signatory to any col-
lective-bargaining agreement with the Union, although on oc-
OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 3 (SPECIALTY CRUSHING) 371
casion it has signed “project agreements” with the Union or has
worked as a subcontractor on construction projects binding it to
the terms of an agreement between its general contractor and
the Union. The subcontracting clause under which the Em-
ployer agreed to be bound to the terms of the collective-
bargaining agreement between its general contractors and the
Union reads in pertinent part:

That if an Individual Employer shall contract on-site
work as herein defined, such subcontract shall state in
writing that such subcontractor agrees to be bound by and
comply with the terms and provisions of this Agreement in
the performance of his subcontract.

Pursuant to project agreements and subcontractor clauses,
the Union has referred union workers to the Employer for work
on covered jobsites. Apparently, employees so referred have
continued to work for the Employer on nonunion jobsites.
Respondent has been interested in organizing the production
and maintenance employees of the Employer since at least
1996. On April 17, 1997, Respondent made a demand for rec-
ognition and bargaining. The Union offered to prove its major-
ity status through a card check. The Employer refused to vol-
untarily recognize the Union. That same date, the Union filed a
representation petition with the Board in Case 32–RC–4287.
Pursuant to that petition, an election was held on June 5, 1997.
The tally of ballots shows that five employees voted for represen-
tation by the Union and five employees voted against union repre-
sentation. Five of these 10 voters were members of the Union.
The instant case involves actions taken against union mem-
bers by agents of Respondent, in July 1997. The General
Counsel contends that Respondent did not have any internal
union rule barring members from working for nonsignatory or
nonunion employers and has not uniformly required members
not to work for such nonsignatory or nonunion employers. The
General Counsel further argues that Respondent was motivated
by the employees’ rejection of union representation in Case 32–
RC–4287. Respondent, on the other hand, contends that it has
interpreted its rules as barring employees from working under
wages or conditions less than those provided in its collective-
bargaining agreement. Respondent contends that it, and not the
Board, should be the sole arbitrator of internal union rules.
Further, Respondent argues that it had no intention of retaliat-
ing against employees for the representation election. Respon-
dent asserts that it had no reason to believe that the five Union
members did not vote for union representation. Respondent
argues that it simply sought to withhold union labor from the
Employer in hopes of obtaining recognition and bargaining.
Despite the loss in the June 5 election, the Union still sought
to establish a collective-bargaining relationship with the Em-
ployer. On July 14 Respondent’s organizers and business
agents decided to put economic pressure on the Employer to
sign a prehire agreement by ordering union members to with-
draw from the Employer’s jobsites and expelling any member
who did not comply with union directives to cease working for
the Employer.
On July 28 Michael Dunlap and Walt Powers, business
agents for Respondent, visited the Employer’s jobsite in An-
tioch, California. Dunlap read a prepared statement to employ-
ees David Knapp and Tom Brown—“I am ordering you to
cease work for this employer and withdraw from this jobsite.
Failure to abide by this lawful order may result in your being
fined, suspended or expelled from membership in the local
union with the attendant loss of membership privileges and
benefits.” Both Knapp and Brown had quit working that day.
Knapp returned to work the next day but Brown sought em-
ployment elsewhere.
Also, on July 28 Dunlap visited the Employer’s Oakland job-
site, where union members John Hillman and Ruben Serrano
were working. Dunlap read the prepared statement to Hillman,
a supervisor for the Employer. Dunlap similarly read the pre-
pared statement to Serrano. Serrano told Dunlap that he needed
the job and asked if Dunlap would find another job for him.
Dunlap replied that he would see what he could do but that if
Serrano did not leave the job, Serrano would be subject to un-
ion expulsion and fines. Neither Hillman nor Serrano left the
jobsite that day.
Dunlap filed a grievance on July 28 alleging that Serrano
violated section III(j) of the Union’s bylaws, which provides
that members shall not refuse to comply with the “lawful or-
ders” of Respondent. Here, Respondent relies on article III,
section 1, of the Union’s bylaws which provides in relevant
part:

Every Member will be required:

(a) To conform to and abide by the hours, wages and
conditions of employment provided for in agreements ne-
gotiated by this Local Union.
(b) No Member may enter into an individual or per-
sonal contract or agreement with his Employer which
serves to lower the wages, hours or conditions of employ-
ment negotiated by this Local Union.
(c) No Member shall engage in conduct discreditable
to this Local Union.
(d) No Member shall refuse to comply with the lawful
orders of the Local Union.

While Respondent contends that these provisions prohibit
union members from working for nonsignatory employers, it
could produce evidence of only three employees on one jobsite
in 1994, that were disciplined under these provisions within the
past 5 years. Dunlap admitted that while Respondent had over
35,000 members, he was not aware of any member being cited
for working for a nonsignatory employer prior to this case.
On July 29 employee Knapp returned to work at the Antioch
jobsite. Powers also returned to the jobsite that day and in-
formed Knapp that there would be “consequences” because
Knapp had been working for the Employer. On July 29 griev-
ances were filed against Hillman and Knapp for working in
violation of section III(j) of Respondent’s bylaws.
On July 30 Dunlap found union member Preston Pope work-
ing at the Employer’s Oakland jobsite. Dunlap read the same
prepared order requiring the employee to cease working for the
Employer. Pope declined to leave the jobsite and a grievance
was filed against him that same date.
Following the filing of the internal union grievances against
Hillman, Knapp, Serrano, and Pope, each were cited to appear
before a trial committee of the Union. None of the employees
appeared and their cases were heard in their absence. The trial
committee imposed fines on each of the four employee-
members.
Knapp, Hillman, Serrano, and Pope had all been members of
the Union and working for the Employer prior to the June 5
election. David Knapp began working for the Employer in July
1996 and joined the Union at that time. John Hillman had
worked for the Employer for over 5 years and had been a union
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 372
member for 20 years. Ruben Serrano started working for the
Employer in November 1995 and joined the Union in August
1996. Preston Pope has worked for the Employer since 1989
and joined the Union in 1993. Not one of these employees had
been notified by the Union, prior to July 1997 that working for
the Employer or any nonsignatory contractor was a violation of
the Union’s bylaws.
On August 1 the unfair labor practice charge in this case was
filed. Thereafter, on October 3 Respondent’s business manager
dismissed the union grievances against the four members and
rescinded the fines that had been imposed. On October 12
Respondent’s executive board adopted a rule which prohibits
members from working for nonsignatory employers. The rule
specifically provides that members shall not perform work for
nonsignatory employers except where such employment is au-
thorized by the Union for purposes of organizing or other legiti-
mate union objectives. The new rule was published in Respon-
dent’s newspaper and was posted by Respondent in its hiring
halls. The four employees involved in this case were given written
notice of the new rule.
Analysis and Conclusions
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act provides that it shall be an un-
fair labor practice for a labor organization “to restrain or coerce
. . . employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.” The proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) states
that the Section “shall not impair the right of a labor organiza-
tion to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or
retention of membership therein.”
In Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 430 (1969), the Supreme
Court stated that Section 8(b)(1)(A) leaves a union free to en-
force “a properly adopted rule, provided that the rule (1) “re-
flects a legitimate union interest,” (2) “impairs no policy Con-
gress has imbedded in the labor laws,” and (3) “is reasonably
enforced against union members who are free to leave the un-
ion and escape the rule.”
The inquiry here is whether the rule was properly adopted
and whether the rule was reasonably enforced, within the mean-
ing of Scofield. Further at issue is whether the Union’s attempt
to enforce the rule after it lost the Board conducted election
impairs a statutory labor policy.
In its Scofield decision, the Supreme Court explained that by
a properly adopted rule it meant “a union rule, duly adopted
and not the arbitrary fiat of a union officer.” 394 U.S. at 429.
Here the Union did not have a rule which expressly prohibited
its members from working for nonunion employers, until after
the charge in this case was filed. The rule which Respondent
relied on stated that employees could be disciplined for violating
the orders of a union official. Such a rule makes an employee
subject to the arbitrary fiat of a union officer.
In Electrical Workers IBEW Local 1579, 316 NLRB 710
(1995), the Board found that a properly adopted union rule
against working for a nonunion employer was enforced in vio-
lation of Section 8(b)(1)(A). The Board found that the respon-
dent-union enforced the rule against a traveler, a member of a
different local of the IBEW, but not against its own members.
The Board held that enforcement of the rule did not meet the
Scofield test because it was “not reasonably enforced.” In the
instant case, all of the employees who were disciplined had
worked for the Employer with the Union’s knowledge for at
least a year. John Hillman had worked for the Employer for 5
years. Respondent did not enforce its rule, or even notify the
employees of the existence of the rule. Respondent chose to
enforce its rule only after the Employer’s employees voted
against union representation. Under these circumstances, I con-
clude that Respondent did not reasonably enforce a duly
adopted rule within the meaning of Scofield.
The Supreme Court stated, in Scofield, that if the union rule
invades or frustrates an overriding policy of the labor laws the
rule may not be enforced even by fine or expulsion, without
violating Section 8(a)(1). 394 U.S. at 429. The General Coun-
sel contends that the rule was enforced in retaliation for the
failure of the employees to select the Union as their representa-
tive in the Board-conducted election. The Union received five
votes in the election; the same number of votes as it had mem-
bers. There was no reason for the Union to suspect that any mem-
ber voted against representation. I find that the Union’s motive
was clear; it was determined to withhold skilled union labor from
the Employer in attempt to force the Employer to recognize and
bargain with the Union.
However, the fact that Respondent did not intend to retaliate
against its members because the election does not resolve the
issue of whether Respondent’s conduct frustrates an overriding
policy of the labor laws. Section 9(c)(3) provides “no election
shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any subdivision
within which, in the preceding 12-month period, a valid elec-
tion has been held.” Here the Union sought to apply its alleged
rule shortly after it lost a valid election in hopes of obtaining
recognition despite the election results. Such action appears to
contradict the policies of the Act. The Act does not permit
another election for 12 months after a valid election. This pro-
tects an employer from having successive election campaigns.
However, this provision also protects employees who have
voted against representation from having successive election
campaigns. Section 8(a)(2) of the Act protects employees from
having a union, that does not represent a majority of the em-
ployees, imposed on them. In the instant case, Respondent
attempted to use intraunion discipline against its members to
force the Employer to recognize it as the exclusive collective-
bargaining agent of employees who had just rejected the Union
in a Board-conducted election. In my view, such conduct is
contrary to the labor policy embodied in Section 9(c) and Sec-
tion 8(a)(2) of the Act that the employees and not the labor
organization choose whether the employees are to be repre-
sented by a union.1 By enforcing its bylaws in attempt to im-
pose representation on a unit of employees that had just re-
jected such representation in a valid election, the Union vio-
lated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Specialty Crushing, Inc. is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
2. Operating Engineers, Local Union No. 3, International
Union of Operating Engineers, AFL–CIO is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by fil-
ing internal grievances and citations against Hillman, Knapp,
Serrano, and Pope and threatening them with reprisals.

1 Sec. 8(f) permits a labor organization in the construction industry
to enter into a prehire collective-bargaining agreement. However, such
an agreement does not bar employees from voting against such repre-
sentation.
OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 3 (SPECIALTY CRUSHING) 373
4. Respondent’s acts and conduct above constitute unfair la-
bor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices, I recommend that Respondent be ordered to cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended2
ORDER
Respondent Operating Engineers, Local Union No. 3, Inter-
national Union of Operating Engineers, AFL–CIO, its officers
agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Filing internal grievances against members or otherwise
disciplining or threatening to discipline members because they
have worked for Specialty Crushing, Inc., in the absence of a
properly adopted rule which impairs no policy Congress has
imbedded in the labor laws.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of
the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Regional Director
post at its Northern California hiring halls, meeting rooms, and
office copies in English and Spanish of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”3 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 32, after being signed by
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
Respondent and maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees and members are customarily posted.

2 All motions inconsistent with this recommended Order are denied.
If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
3 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice “Posted By Order Of The National
Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant To A Judgment Of
The United States Court Of Appeals Enforcing An Order Of The Na-
tional Labor Relations Board”
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by other material.
Additional copies of said notices shall be provided to Specialty
Crushing for posting, if it is willing, in such places as Specialty
Crushing shall deem necessary. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, Respondent ceased operations
or closed any of the hiring halls or union offices involved in
these proceedings, Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current and former
employees employed by the Specialty Crushing, Inc., at any
time since July 28, 1997.
(b) Within 21 days after service by the Regional Director,
file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to
the steps that Respondent has taken to comply.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the
National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide
by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected con-
certed activities.

WE WILL NOT file internal grievances against members or
otherwise discipline or threaten to discipline members because
they have worked for Specialty Crushing, Inc., in the absence
of a properly adopted rule which impairs no policy Congress
has imbedded in the labor laws.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or co-
erce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by
Section 7 of the Act.

OPERATING ENGINEERS, LOCAL UNION NO.
3, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING
ENGINEERS, AFL–CIO