Special Machine and Engineering, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 6, 1980

247 N.L.R.B. 884 (N.L.R.B. 1980)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Special Machine and Engineering, Inc. and William
Rzeszut. Case 7-CA- 15301
February 6, 1980
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND TRUESDALE
On June 4, 1979, Administrative Law Judge Hutton
S. Brandon issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions2 of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that the Respondent, Special Machine and
Engineering, Inc., Southfield, Michigan, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the said recommended Order.
' Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule
an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the
clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the
resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products. Inc., 91 NLRB 544
(1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the
record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
' Member Truesdale agrees with his colleagues and with the Administrative
Law Judge that Respondent violated Sec. 8(aXI) of the Act by ordering that
information concerning wage rates paid by another employer be removed
from a bulletin board maintained by the Union on Respondent's premises. In
so doing, however, he notes that this is not an instance when posted material
amounted to a classified want ad for employment with another employer, or
in any way solicited job applications from Respondent's employees. Member
Truesdale also notes that the Board's decision in Container Corporation of
America, 244 NLRB 318 (1979), which issued after the Administrative Law
Judge's Decision in the instant case, is fully consistent with and supports the
result reached here.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HUTTON S. BRANDON, Administrative Law Judge: This
case was heard before me in Detroit, Michigan, on March
28, 1979.' The charge was filed by William Rzeszut, an
individual, on June 27, and the complaint was issued on
August 31.2 The issues presented are whether Special
Machine and Engineering, Inc. (herein called Respondent or
the Employer), violated Section 8(a)( ) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended (herein called the Act), by
ordering Rzeszut to remove a wage and classification scale
of another employer which was posted by Rzeszut on a
bulletin board in Respondent's plant reserved for union
business, and by threatening employees with disciplinary
action in the event of similar future postings.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of the
brief filed by Respondent, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
Respondent is a Michigan corporation with an office,
plant and place of business in Southfield, Michigan, where it
is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of
plastic molds, die cast dies, special machines for automation,
and related products. During the fiscal year ending February
28 Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business,
manufactured, sold, and distributed products valued in
excess of S100,000, of which products valued in excess of
$50,000 were shipped from its plant directly to points
located outside the State of Michigan. Respondent admits,
and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
1. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges that Local 157, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America
(UAW) (herein called the Union), is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. Respondent
admits the allegation, and I find that the Union is a labor
organization as alleged.
' All dates are in 1978 unless otherwise stated.
: The complaint as originally issued was consolidated with the allegations of
another charge filed by Rzeszut on July 24. However, on February 2, 1979,
the Regional Director for Region 7 issued an order approving withdrawal of
the other charge and severing the instant case therefrom.
247 NLRB No. 77
884
SPECIAL MACHINE AND ENGINEERING, INC.
I1. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
The facts in this case are not in significant dispute.
Rzeszut had been an employee of Respondent since 1972
and worked as a diemaker. The Union was the collective-
bargaining representative of Respondent's employees and
was party to a series of collective-bargaining agreements
with Respondent, the latest effective from August 3, 1977,
until August 21, 1980. Rzeszut had been a committeeman
(steward) for the Union beginning around May 10 and
served in that capacity with one other committeeman and a
chief steward on the day shift.
While there was no specific contractual provision on the
subject, Respondent for several years allowed the Union use
of a bulletin board in the plant. The board was under glass
and remained locked, but was accessible by key to the union
committeemen. The Union's bulletin board was located near
the timeclock and was flanked by bulletin boards used by
Respondent. It was the testimony of Rzeszut, supported by
other General Counsel and Respondent witnesses, that the
union bulletin board was utilized for the posting of matters
having "anything to do with union activities." This included
information about union meetings, union education classes,
and union recreational activities.
Around June 11 or 12 Pat Gazzarota, a former union
committeeman, showed Rzeszut a wage and classification
scale of another employer, La Salle Machine Tool, Inc., and
asked Rzeszut to show it to other employees in Respondent's
shop. The La Salle employees were represented by Local
155, a sister local of the Union. While La Salle was not a
product competitor of Respondent, it did employ employees
in the same classifications and utilizing the same skills as
those employed by Respondent. The La Salle wage scale
shown Rzeszut reflected higher minimum wage rates,
particularly with respect to the "laborer" classification.
After securing another copy of the La Salle wage rates
from Local 155, Rzeszut asked Chief Steward Anthony
Barchock if he might post the rates on the Union's bulletin
board in Respondent's plant. Barchock agreed, but told
Rzeszut that George Bihler, Respondent's president and
general manager, might not "appreciate" it. Thereafter,
sometime in the morning of June 13, Rzeszut posted the La
Salle wage rates on the Union's bulletin board. A short time
later Bihler approached Rzeszut and, in the presence of
Barchock, complained to Rzeszut that he did not think it
was fair that the La Salle wage list was posted, since
Respondent did not post wage rates of employers paying less
than Respondent. Rzeszut declined Bihler's request to
remove the La Salle rates from the board, and Bihler then, in
the presence of additional witnesses-Al Kaake and Fred
Kawaelde' for Respondent and employee Ed Bunt called
over by Rzeszut--ordered Rzeszut to remove the La Salle
wage list. Rzeszut did as he had been ordered, and while
Rzeszut was in the process of removing the La Salle wage
list, Bihler told Rzeszut that he did not want to ever see it up
' Kaake was plant supervisor, and Kawaelde was manufacturing manager.
' It appears that there was an additional area, in the plant toolcrib, where
employees could post notices regarding lost tools and the sale of personal
items.
there again or anything of that nature. Bunt was more
specific in his testimony and related that Bihler had said that
any further action of this type by any member of the
committee would result in "very drastic disciplinary action."
Bihler in his testimony admitted the threat.
Rzeszut testified that he was not aware of any rules or
regulations regarding the use of the Union's bulletin board.
Bunt likewise testified that, in his 30 years as an employee at
Respondent and during his past experience as a committee-
man, he had never been advised that Respondent retained
the right to censor material posted on the union bulletin
board. Moreover, according to Bunt, he had never known
Respondent to require something to be removed from the
Union's bulletin board unless it was something posted on the
outside of the glass. The only restriction that Bunt was
aware of in the use of the Union's bulletin board was that the
posted material had to relate to wages, hours, and working
conditions of the unit employees.'
Chief Steward Barchock also testified he had never
received any advice or instructions on the use of the Union's
bulletin board. He did on one occasion in May encounter
objections from Manufacturing Manager Kawaelde regard-
ing the circulation of a union petition seeking congressional
approval of a 35-hour workweek. Upon the advice of Union
President Joe Danz, Barchock posted the petition on the
outside of the union bulletin board with a note saying the
men were not to read or sign the petition unless it was on
their break or lunch period. He encountered no further
opposition or objection from Respondent. On another
occasion Barchock had posted the results- of a grievance
conclusion reflecting that the grievance had been denied and
that the Union had withdrawn it without prejudice. On that
occasion Bihler had told Barchock that the committee had
not posted results of grievances in the past, and he did not
think they should start that because it would cause contro-
versy and work stoppages in the shop. Barchock testified
that a day or two later he removed the grievance decision
from the Union's bulletin board not because of Bihler's
objection but because it had been up long enough.
Rzeszut testified that his only reason for posting the La
Salle wage rates was "so that they [the employees] would
have the knowledge where they could make a better living if
they so chose." He also admittedly told Bihler when ordered
to remove the rates that Respondent had dropped "the
wages of these kids . . . three bucks an hour, and they have
a right to know where they can make a living."'
B. Contentions of the Parties
The General Counsel did not argue orally and did not file
a brief. From statements made at the hearing, however, it is
clear that the General Counsel contends that Rzeszut, in
posting the La Salle rates, was engaged in a protected
concerted activity and that Respondent's requirement that
he remove the posted rates under threat of discipline
interfered with that activity in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
' This appears to be a reference to an agreement between Respondent and
the Union dated August 3, 1977. and added as a supplement to the collective-
bargaining agreement, establishing "New Policy and Rates" for laborers who
could be hired in addition to apprentices.
885
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent, citing Armco Steel Corporation, 148 NLRB
1179 (1964), and Eastex Inc.., 215 NLRB 271 (1974),
enforced as modified 557 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1977), affd.
437 U.S. 556 (1978), contends that neither employees nor
unions which represent them possess a statutory right under
the Act to post materials on an employer's bulletin boards.
While the right to post material on a plant bulletin board
may be granted contractually or otherwise, limitations or
restrictions on such rights may also be imposed, and
Respondent argues that it had in the past directed the Union
to remove certain posted materials. Thus, no absolute license
to post all materals was ever granted by Respondent."
Moreover, the argument goes, Respondent had not allowed
"want ads"' to be posted in the past, and Rzeszut's posting
of the La Salle wage scale for the purposes stated by him was
no different from posting a want ad. Accordingly, Respon-
dent urges that it was acting consistently with its prior
regulation of the Union's bulletin board use in directing
Rzeszut to remove the La Salle wage scale and that it did not
therefore violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Finally, Respondent argues that Rzeszut's posting of the
La Salle rates was not protected under the Act, since such
action, for the purposes stated by Rzeszut, was an attempt to
destroy the employment relationship. As such, it was an act
of "disloyalty" which removed him from the protection of
the Act.
C. Conclusion
The existence of a violation of the Act in this case is
dependent, of course, upon whether Rzeszut's posting of the
La Salle rates was a protected concerted activity.' Whether
Rzeszut's actions were protected in turn depends upon the
extent of his right to post notices on the union bulletin board
on the Employer's premises.
As Respondent's brief contends, it appears to be well
settled that there is no statutory right of a union or
employees to post notices or otherwise utilize bulletin boards
on an employer's premises. Eastex, Inc.. supra; Armco Steel
Corp., supra. As the Administrative Law Judge said, with
Board approval, in Armco Steel Corp., supra at 1186,
"Employees have been deprived of no statutory rights by the
failure of the employer to give carte blanche authority to
them to use the boards for any purpose they may desire
including the posting of notices for a rival union."
The right to post material on an employer's bulletin
boards may arise out of a collective-bargaining agreement.
To the extent that the grant by an employer in a collective-
bargaining agreement of the right to utilization of bulletin
boards constitutes a concession, an employer may define the
parameters of its concession and may insist upon the
' Respondent also contends that there was even an agreement between
Respondent and the Union which precluded the posting of the wage rates of
Respondent's own employees. The existence of such an agreement was related
by William Stirton, manager of the Detroit Tooling Association, which
negotiated Respondent's contract with the Union. Stirton's testimony in this
regard is credited, since it was not specifically contradicted. Furthermore, the
testimony of Bunt implicitly acknowledged such an understanding, since he
testified that the current wages of Respondent's employees were kept by the
committeemen and shown to employees only upon request. The wages set
forth in the collective-bargaining agreement were only minimum rates.
' Bihler credibly testified that in July 1977 he had removed a newspaper
want ad for a job at another employer which had been taped to the outside of
imposition of limitations, restrictions, and regulations on
such rights. Eastex, Inc.. supra: Universal Life Insurance
Co., 169 NLRB 1118 (1968).
The existence of the right of employees or unions to post
notices on an employer's bulletin boards may also grow out
of practice or custom. In such cases any limitations or
restrictions on the right to post must be those which were
also established by practice or custom. But an employer may
not lawfully impose limitations on, or discriminate against,
the posting of notices relative to union matters while at the
same time allowing employees to post various other types of
notices on its premises. Challenge Cook Brothers of Ohio.
Inc., 153 NLRB 92 (1965), enfd. on this point 374 F.2d 147
(6th Cir. 1967). Moreover, an employer who permits union
notices and communications to its members which conform
to certain standards to be posted on its bulletin boards may
not thereafter discriminate against an employee who posts a
union notice which meets the employer's rule or standard,
but which the employer finds distasteful. Nugent Service.
Inc., 207 NLRB 158 (1973). However the Board on one
occasion has held that the writing of the announcement of a
union meeting on an employer blackboard constituted an
"appropriate exercise of Section 7 rights," even in the
absence of specific agreement or a past practice allowing the
posting of such announcements. East Bay Newspapers, Inc.,
d/b/a Contra Costa Times, 228 NLRB 692 (1977).
In the instant case it is clear that there was no provision in
the collective-bargaining agreement granting employees or
the Union the right to use of a bulletin board on Rspon-
dent's premises. It is no less clear that Respondent had
nevertheless in a longstanding practice granted to the Union
the right to the maintenance and utilization of a bulletin
board in the plant, and that bulletin board was accessible
only to the Union and its committeemen. It is undisputed
that Respondent had never insisted on prior approval of any
material posted by the Union. However, there was evidence
based on past practice that the Union's right to post material
was not without some restrictions.
Bihler testified that in 1968 a memo' was issued to then
Chief Union Steward Banks indicating that the Union's
bulletin board was provided for the posting of official notices
and was not to be used for the posting of miscellaneous items
of nonlocal union business, and reminded the steward that
the reading of any posted items "results in a great waste of
valuable time." Similarly, another memo"' was issued by
Bihler to Banks in 1969 contending that the posting by
Banks of warning slips and grievances was contrary to the
policy of settling grievances through the established griev-
ance procedure and requesting that he remove such material.
The material was removed the following day according to
Bihler's uncontradicted and credited testimony. It has
the Union's bulletin board. Kawaelde credibly testified that he removed
similar want ads wherever he saw them posted in the plant. Barchock
acknowledged in his testimony that want ads could not be posted on the union
bulletin board.
Sec. 7 of the Act grants to employees the right, among others, "to engage
in other concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection." Sec. 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in Section 7."
' Resp. Exh. 3. The memo was referred to in the record as an "AVO," an
abbreviation for "Avoid Verbal Orders."
" Resp. Exh. 4.
886
SPECIAL MACHINE AND ENGINEERING, INC.
already been noted above that Bihler also objected to
Barchock's posting of grievance results.
While Respondent submitted into evidence other memos
reflecting its objections to certain matters posted on the
union bulletin board, it appears that Respondent's objections
went to the accuracy of the material posted rather than the
type of material. Thus, in a 1969 memo" Bihler requested
the Union to remove from its bulletin board certain outdated
statements on Respondent's policies regarding vending
machines. A 1971 memo 2 from Bihler to the Union took
issue with certain contentions the Union had made in a
posting on its bulletin board to the effect that Respondent
had violated the collective-bargaining agreement. Accord-
ingly, I find such memos of no help in defining the
traditional or historical limitations imposed by Respondent
on the Union's postings.
The General Counsel's witnesses Bunt and Barchock
conceded in their testimony that they understood that
postings on the bulletin boards had to relate to union
business and wages, hours, and working conditions of
Respondent's employees. Traditionally, that was in fact
what the postings had related to. Wage rates had never been
posted, and classified want ads were admittedly not allowed.
Moreover, Barchock admitted that Bihler had told him in
conjunction with the dispute over Barchock's posting of the
grievance dispositions that he did not want anything
controversial posted. In fact, Barchock testified that he told
Rzeszut before the La Salle rates were posted that Bihler
would "figure it would be controversial." This supports
Bihler's testimony as to the existence of a restriction on the
posting of "controversial" matters. Bihler explained in his
testimony that Respondent felt that, since the union bulletin
board was in a busy work area, it was not appropriate to
have people "standing around looking, trying to decipher
something that's either very complicated or controversial,
upsetting, causing loss of productivity."
The foregoing demonstrates that, while the Union's right
to the posting of material on its bulletin board was not an
absolute one, the extent of Respondent's limitation or
restrictions on such postings is not altogether clear." I find
that a clear and understood limitation on posted material
was that it pertain to union business. In my view, the posting
of the La Salle wage rates by Rzeszut did constitute union
business in a broad sense. The other union committeemen
either supported or acquiesced in the posting of the material.
Wage rates have always been a fundamental interest and
concern of unions. The material was unquestionably a
matter of interest to employees here. To the extent that the
posted material invited comparison with Respondent's wage
rates, it must be observed that rate comparisons have always
' Resp. Exh. 5.
' Resp. Exh. 6.
' That the Union's right to post material was very broad is indicated by
Respondent's failure to insist upon a prior approval of posted material. which
it could have done (Eastex. Inc.. supra). and also by Respondent's relinquish-
ment of the key to the bulletin hoard to the Union, giving the Union complete
physical control over the bulletin board.
" The Board has held that a union's efforts to secure other employment for
employees of an employer represented by the union who desired to change
employment was protected under the "mutual aid or protection" provision of
Section 7. Boeing Airplane Company. Seattle Division. 110 NLRB 147 (1954).
While the Board's decision was not enforced, it appears that the decision has
not been reversed by either the Board or the Supreme Court and thus remains
been a matter of interest to employees. Unions have
traditionally obtained and supplied wage comparisons to
employees as helpful guides in establishing collective-bar-
gaining goals. Although the establishment of collective-
bargaining goals was not directly contemplated in the
posting here, it would have had an ultimate impact in that
area and to this extent, at least, was union business.
Moreover, even considering the posting of the La Salle rates
as an illustration that employees could make more money
working for La Salle, it must be observed that this would
amount to an act in furtherance of employee "mutual aid or
protection" under Section 7, which also is a union purpose
or function." As such, the posted material related to union
"business." Accordingly, I conclude that the La Salle rates
did constitute union business and therefore fell within the
scope of materials which Respondent had previously allowed
the Union to post."
The other limitation or restriction on the Union's right to
post material is less clear, but relates to Respondent's
objection to the posting of "controversial material." But past
practice and Bihler's testimony indicate that the term
"controversial" had been applied to material posted by the
Union which Respondent either disputed the accuracy of or
considered likely to disrupt or interfere with production.
There was no showing, however, that the material posted
here was inaccurate, that it was complicated, that it required
a substantial time for employees to read, or that it would
otherwise interfere with production. There was also no
evidence that the posted material caused, or was likely to
cause, altercations among employees or create disciplinary
problems for Respondent.' No dispute between employees
flowed from the posted material. It appears that the only
thing that made the posted material "controversial" was
Respondent's dislike of it, but that does not qualify it as
"controversial" as that term was previously applied to union
postings objected to by Respondent or as explained by Bihler
in his testimony. I therefore find that the posting of the La
Salle rates, without more, did not amount to the posting of
"controversial" material as that term had previously been
applied or interpreted.
I do not accept Respondent's argument that the posted
material here involved, even when posted for the reasons
related by Rzeszut, was equivalent to the posting of a
classified want ad for employment, the posting of which had
generally been barred in Respondent's plant in the past. The
La Salle rates were posted without any accompanying
explanation. There was no solicitation of applications, and
there was no attempt to persuade or convince employees to
forsake their employment with Respondent. There was no
offer of positions at La Salle and no suggestion that any
viable precedent. Insurance Agents' International Union. AFL-CIO (The
Prudential Insurance Company ofAmerica). 119 NLRB 768 (1957).
" It is true that there was no precedent for the posting here, but the absence
of precedent does not preclude the existence of the right to post the material in
the absence of either specific agreement not to post it or Respondent's
insistence on the right of approval prior to posting. Moreover, even if there
was a specific agreement not to post Respondent's own rates. that agreement
did not extend to the posting of rates ofother employers.
" In this respect the instant case is distinguishable from Nugent Service,
Inc.. supra, where it was found that an employer did not violate the Act when
it removed posted intraunion partisan campaign material because it caused
employee altercations and created disciplinary problems.
a
887
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
vacancies even existed there. I conclude that the posted
material was in no way equivalent to a classified want ad.
I also reject Respondent's arguments as to the "disloyal-
ty" of Rzeszut in posting the La Salle rates. Rzeszut did not
solicit employees to apply for employment at La Salle, nor
did he urge employees to leave Respondent's employment.
He simply posted information of interest to employees which
they could use to the extent they desired. At most, in posting
the La Salle rates Rzeszut invited a comparison of wages
between Respondent's employees and La Salle's. I am aware
of no authority which holds that such an act without more
constitutes "disloyalty.""
Considering all the foregoing, I conclude that the material
posted by Rzeszut was related to union business and that it
was not "controversial" within the meaning of that term as
previously applied by Respondent, and thus it conformed to
the standards imposed by Respondent. Accordingly, Re-
spondent was not privileged in banning Rzeszut's posting of
the La Salle rates. Therefore, I find that Rzezut's posting
constituted concerted activity for mutual aid or protection
within the meaning of Section 7 of the Act. It follows, and I
conclude, that Respondent, by barring the posted material
and by threatening disciplinary action for future occur-
rences, interfered with employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed them under Section 7 of the Act and thereby
violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Special Machine and Engineering, Inc., is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Local 157, United Automobile Aerospace and Agricul-
tural Implement Workers of America (UAW), is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By ordering the removal of the material posted by the
Union on the Union's bulletin board on June 13 and by
threatening employees with disciplinary action for any
subsequent posting of such material, Respondent engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
(a) Unlawfully ordering the removal from the plant union
bulletin board of material posted by the Union.
(b) Threatening employees with disciplinary action for the
posting on the plant union bulletin board of material which
conforms to standards previously applied to such postings.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action:
(a) Post at its Southfield, Michigan, plant copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix."' 9 Copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 7,
after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized repre-
sentative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
" I find Clinton Corn Processing Co., a Division of Standard Brand Inc.,
194 NLRB 184 (1971), cited by Respondent, to be factually distinguishable.
In that case the Board found that an employer did not violate Sec. 8(a)(l) of
the Act by barring from its premises the employee of subcontractor because of
the employee's "unprotected conduct in inducing the Respondent's employees
to quit." Id. at 186. Here I find Rzeszut's actions did not amount to an
inducement to quit.
'" In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
' In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
THE REMEDY APPENDIX
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that it be
ordered to cease and desist from such conduct and to take
affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of Law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER"
The Respondent, Special Machine and Engineering, Inc.,
Southfield, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial at which all sides had the opportunity to present
their evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has
found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and has ordered us to post this notice and to
comply with what it says.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully order the removal from the
plant union bulletin board of material posted by Local
157, United Automobile and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America (UAW).
0
888
SPECIAL MACHINE AND ENGINEERING, INC.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with disciplinary
action for the posting on the plant union bulletin board
of material which conforms to standards previously
applied to such postings.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
SPECIAL MACHINE AND ENGINEERING, INC.
889