Spartan Aircraft Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 13, 1952

98 N.L.R.B. 73 (N.L.R.B. 1952)

SPARTAN AIRCRAFT COMPANY 73
if shall .therefore further recommend that the Respondent cease and desist
therefrom.
The unfair labor practices found herein indicate a purpose to limit the lawful
-concerted activities of the Respondent's employees. Such purpose is related to
other unfair labor practices, and it is found that the danger of their commission
is reasonably to be apprehended. I shall therefore recommend abroad cease-and-
desist order, prohibiting infringement in any niaunerupon the rights guaranteed
in Section 7 of the Act.
For the reasons stated in the subsection entitled "The alleged violation of See-
t2on 8 (a) (3)," I shall recommend that the complaint. be dismissed insofar as it
.alleges the discriminatory discharge of Whitfield and Davis.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, CIO, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2 By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Viola
Smith, Mabel Pollock, Cora Hazel, Mary Green, Hazel Miller, and Estelina
Raynor, thereby discouraging membership in the Union, the Respondent has
engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
.Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
By such discrimination and by interrogating, threatening, and promising
benefits to its employees in connection with union activities, thereby interfering
with, restraining, and coercing them in the exercise of rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section S (a) (1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 2 (G) and (7) of the Act.
5. The Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning
of the Act by discharging Gladys Whitfield and Clara Belle Davis.
'[Recommendations omitted from publication in this volume.}
SPARTAN AIRCRAFT COMPANY and TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF
AMERICA, CIO, PETITIONER. Case No. 16-RC-x444. February 13,
195?
Decision and Order
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, a hearing was held before Elmer Davis, hearing officer.
The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from preju-
dicial error and are hereby affirmed.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Chairman Herzog and Members Houston and Murdock].
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds:
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the
Act.
98 NLRB No. 19.
74 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. The labor organizations involved claim to represent employees-
of the Employer.
3. No question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa-
tion of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section 9:
(c) (1) and Section 2- (6) and, (7) of the Act, for the following-
reasons:
The Employer and the Intervenor, Local Lodge 790, International`
Association of Machinists, AFL, contend that an existing contract is
it bar to the present proceeding.
The Intervenor has been the recognized bargaining representative-
of the Employer's production and maintenance employees for a num-
ber of years. A bargaining agreement signed in 1949 terminated on
August 1, 1951. A new contract, which states that it was signed one
August 20, 1951, will not expire until August 1, 1952. The Petitioner
filed its petition on August 30, 1951.
The Petitioner asserts that the existing contract is not a bar because'
(1) the contract was actually signed on August 31, 1951, after the
filing of the present petition, instead of on August 20, 1951, (2) the-
contract of August 20 is not a complete agreement, and (3) it con-
tains unlawful union-security provisions.
All six signatories to the 1951 contract, both Employer and Inter-
venor representatives, testified without contradiction that they had'
signed the agreement on August 20, 1951. ' The only evidence to the
contrary is the testimony of several witnesses that at an organizational
meeting of the Petitioner held on August 31, 1951, H. D. Jarrard, one
of the committeemen who had signed the 1951 contract in behalf of-
the Intervenor, told the audience that the contract had been signed
that morning. Jarrard denied making this statement. On the basis,
of the preponderance of the evidence, the Board finds that the contract
was signed on August 20, 1951.
The 1951 agreement is a complete collective bargaining contract, ex-
cept that in its provision for wages it provides :
The wage rates which shall be effective during the term of this,
Agreement shall be set forth in Appendix "A" and made a part
hereof. The Company and the Union will endeavor to agree upon
the proper classification and hourly rate ranges as soon as pos-
sible, and shall incorporate a merit plan of progress.
The appendix covering wage rates was not signed until October 22,
1951, approximately 2 months after the filing of the present petition-
The August 20, 1951, agreement is a detailed bargaining agreement
of 34 articles covering such subjects as hours of work, union security,
overtime shift differentials, holidays, vacations, sick leave, seniority,
grievance procedure, and cost-of-living adjustments. It is thus much
more than a mere recognition agreement. On the contrary, it is so
SENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION 75
complete as to substantially stabilize labor relations between the
parties, even though it leaves the wage provision for future negotia-
tion. The 1951 contract therefore constitutes a bar.'
The contract provides that employees covered by the agreement
shall :
within thirty (30) days after the date of execution of this Agree-
ment, or in the case of new employees , within thirty ( 30) days
after the date of employment, become members in good standing
in the Union... .
The Company will, within three ( 3) working days after receipt.
of notice from the Union, discharge any employee who is not in.
good standing in the Union, as required in the preceding para-
graph.
The Petitioner argues that both these clauses are unlawful. Although
the contract uses the phrase "within thirty ( 30) days" rather than the
statutory phrase, "on or after the thirtieth day following " in desig-
nating an employee 's grace period for joining the Intervenor, we be-
lieve that the former phrase grants to employees the full statutory
period in which to join the incumbent union.2
The further contention that the second clause is unlawful because
it permits discharge on some ground other than an employee 's failure
to tender the periodic dues and initiation . fees uniformly required as
a condition of acquiring or retaining membership is also without
merit. This argument assumes illegality , whereas the proper as-
sumption is one of legality : that the obligation to discharge extends
only to situations recognized as valid by statute.
As the petition was filed after the signing of the 1951 agreement,,
we find that it is a bar to the present proceeding . We shall- therefore
dismiss the petition.
Order
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition filed herein be, and it hereby
is, dismissed.
2 Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 92 NLRB 172; Pullman Standard Car Manufacturing Co.,.
51 NLRB 661.
2 Owens-Illinois Glass Company , 96 NLRB 640.
XENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION and CONRAD H. ROGERS, PETITIONER..
Case No. 33-R-279. February 13,1952
Decision and Order
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, a hearing was held before Byron E. Guse, hearing offi-
98 NLRB No. 14.