Spandsco Oil & Royalty Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 28, 1942

42 N.L.R.B. 942 (N.L.R.B. 1942)

k
In the Matter of SPANDSCO OIL & ROYALTY COMPANY and INTER-
NATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, STATIONARY LOCAL 460,
AFFILIATED WITH THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR
Case No C-2131.-Decided July 28, 1942
Jurisdiction . oil pioduci ig industry
Unfair Labor Practices.
Discrimination discharge of three employees because of their union membership
and concerted activities to avoid bargaining with the union by destroying its
majoiity, although Board found without merit employer's contention that these
employees were discharged because they had filed an "unmerited and unfounded"
wage suit against it, such action would have been discriminatory even if conten-
tion were' true, since the joint action of employee bore directly on their wages,
and working conditions and constituted concerted actin ity protected by the Act
Remedial Orders : reinstatement and back pay awarded
Mr. V. Lee McMahon, for the Board
Mr. N. T. Bowyer and Mr. Morris I. Jaffe, of Dallas; Tex., for the
respondent
Mr. G. 0. Nokes, of Corsicana, Tex , for the Union.
Mr Harry H Kuskin, of counsel to the Board.
DECISION
AND
ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges duly filed by International Union of Operating Engi-
neers, Stationary Local 460, affiliated with the American Federation of
Labor, herein called the Union, the National Labor Relations Board,
herein called the Board, by the Regional Director for the Sixteenth
Region (Fort Worth, Texas), issued its complaint dated January 22,
1942, against Spandsco Oil & Royalty Company, Dallas, 'I exas, herein
called the respondent, alleging that the respondent had engaged in and
was engaging in unfair labor practices aflectrng commerce, within the
meaning of Section 8 (1) and (3) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat 449, herein called the Act
Copies of the complaint and of notice of hearing thereon were duly
served on the respondent and the Union
42 N L R B, No 179
942
SPANDSCO OIL & ROYAIJT'Y COMPANY 943
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleged in
substance (1) that the respondent discharged'G W Ward on Sep-
tember 22, 1941, and J A Scruggs and Reece Jones on September 30,
1941, and thereafter refused to reinstate them, because they had joined
or assisted the Union, or engaged in other conceited activities for the
purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection;
(2) that since about January 1, 1941, the iespondent, by its officers and
agents, has urged, persuaded, and warned its employees to refrain from
aiding, becoming, or remaining members of the Union, and has threat-
ened its employees with discharge or other reprisals if they aided the
Union; and (3) that the respondent, by the foregoing and other acts,
interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act
The respondent filed an answer to the complaint on January 28,
1942,,denying that it had engaged in any unfair labor practices, aver-
ring that the alleged unfair labor practices did not affect commerce
within the meaning of the Act, and alleging affirmatively that Ward,
Scruggs, and Jones had been discharged for cause.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held at Corsicana, Texas, on Feb-
ruary 9 and 10, 1942, before C W. Whittemore, the Trial Examiner
duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner The Board and the
respondent were represented by counsel, and the Union by its repre-
sentative, all participated in the hearing Full opportunity to be
heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evi-
dence bearing on the issues was afforded all parties At the opening
of the hearing, the Trial Examiner denied an application by the re-
spondent for the exclusion of piospectiye witnesses from the hearing.
During the hearing, the Trial Examiner granted a motion by counsel
for the Board to amend the title of the complaint in certain respects 1
At the close of the Board's case, the Trial Examiner denied the respond-
ent's motion to dismiss the complaint At the close of the hearing,
the Trial Examiner granted a joint motion of counsel for the Board
and counsel for the respondent to conform the pleadings to the proof
in such matters as spellhn and dates At the close of the hearing, the
respondent renewed its motion to dismiss the complaint The Trial
Examiner reserved ruling on this motion and thereafter denied it in
his Intermediate Report During the course of the hearing, the Trial
Examiner made rulings on other motions and on objections to the
admission of evidence The Board has reviewed the rulings of the
Trial Examiner and finds that no prejudicial errors were committed 2
' The Union was incoi teetly designated as "International Union of Operating Enginers,
Local 460," and the complaint was amended to read "International Union of Operating
Engineers, Stationary Local 460, affiliatd with the American Fedeiation of Labor "
z in its exceptions and supporting brief, the respondent argued that the Trial Examiner
acted unfairly and piejudicially to the respondent at the hearing The eziticism of the
Tiial Examiner zelated to his zefusal to exclude witnesses from the hearing , to the manner
944 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The rulings are hereby affirmed At the close of the hearing, counsel
for the Board and counsel fox the respondent argued orally before the
Trial Examiner Subsequently the respondent submitted a brief to
the Trial Examiner
Thereafter, the Trial Examiner issued his Intermediate Report dated
March 10, 1942, copies of which were duly served upon the Iespondent
and the Union He found that the Iespondent had engaged in and
was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce, within the
meaning of Section 8 (1) and (3) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act,
and recommended that the respondent cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act, including the reinstatement with back pay of Sciuggs, Jones, and
Ward
On April 10, 1942, the respondent filed its exceptions to the Inter-
mediate Repoit and, on the following day, it filed a supporting brief.
The Board has considered the exceptions and the brief submitted
by the iespondent and, insofar as the exceptions are inconsistent with
the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and oider set forth below,
finds them to be without merit
Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
I THE BUSINESS OF 'THE RESPONDENT
Spandsco Oil & Royalty Company, a Texas corporation with Its,
principal office in Dallas, Texas, is engaged in the production of crude
oil Its operations are cars red on in the so-called Powell Field near
Corsicana, Texas, and in the so-called East Texas Field, near Hen-
derson, Texas. The respondent also has an undetermined number of
undeveloped leases scattered throughout the State of Texas Only the
Powell Field is involved in this proceeding At this field the re-
spondent has leased about 100 acres `on\ which it open ates' 13 wells
The respondent employs 6 individuals at the Powell Field In 1941,
the respondent's wells at the Powell Field produced 39,324 38 barrels
of oil valued at $36,345 44 All the oil produced at the Powell Field
is sold by the respondent to the Sinclair Refining Company and is
delivered on' the leased property, of the respondent to a pipe line
operated by the Sinclair Refining Company Pipe Line Department,
in which he interrogated one of the respondent ' s witnesses , and to his luhngs on the
admission of evidence We ImAe fully revie n ed the Tiial Lrammei's rulings and his
conduct of the hearing and we find the respondent 's contentions to be without merit
Cf National Labor Relations Board V Ed Friedrich, Inc, 116 F (2d) 888 (C C A 5)
enf'g as mod 17 N L R B 387, Matter of Delaware-New Jersey Ferry Company and
United Marine Division, Local No 833,_ affiliated with the A F L and the I L A, 30
N L R B 820 , Matter of Fo,d Motor Company and II C McGarity, an individual, et at,
26 N L R B 322, enfoiced as mod 119 F (2d) 326 (C C A 5)
SPANDSCO OIL & ROYALTY COMPANY 945
from which it thereafter flows into a trunk line leading ,to the Sinclair
Refining Company's refinery at Houston, Texas At a point about 6
or 7 miles from the Powell Field, oil from the respondent's wells is
commingled with oil gathered from other fields neaiby and loses its
identity The mane trunk line into which the respondent's oil flows
extends across the State line into Oklahoma Although all oil flow-
ing through this trunk line presently originates in Texas and goes to
the Houston refinery, the diiection of the flow can be, and ip the past
has been, reversed to transmit the oil produced in the Texas fields to
a Sinclair refinery in Oklahoma The trunk line through which the
respondent's oil flows is 1 of 3 leading, to the Sinclair refinery in
Houston Approximately 61 percent of all crude oil received at the
Sinclair refinery, through the main trunk line taking the respondent's
oil, is refined at Houston; approximately 39 percent is shipped to a
Sinclair refinery in Pennsylvania About 93 percent of the products
refined at the Houston refinery are shipped out of the State of Texas
into other States '
The respondent denies that it is engaged in commerce, 'within the
meaning of the Act The respondent maintains that it loses owner-
ship and control of its oil while the oil is still on-its leases, that the
oil is commingled with other oil, thereby losing its identity, and that
the Sinclair Refining Company, which refines the oil, is unable to
determine whether or not any oil produced by the respondent leaves
the State of Texas. `
We find the contention to be without merit. The respondent dis=
poses of a substantial amount of crude oil annually which, although
commingled with other oil, flows in Inter state commerce. It is clear
that the production of crude oil is an essential part of the process of
producing various grades of gasoline, kerosene, fuel oils, lube oils,
and paraffin The arrangement between the respondent and the Sin-
clan Refining Company as to ownership and control does not change
the essential fact that the operations of the respondent and the
Sinclair refinery together constitute a direct and continuous flow of
commerce across State lines 3
II THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Union of Operating Engineers, Stationary Local,460,
is a labor organization affiliated with the American Federation of
Labor It admits to membership employees of the respondent at its,
Powell Field.
3 See Santa Cruz Packing Co v National Labor Relations Board , 303 U S 453 , National
Labor Relations Board v Sunshine Mining Co, 110 F (2d) 780 (C C A 9) , St John,
at at v Brown, at at, (District Court N D Texas, Fort worth Division) 38 F Supp 385 ,
and Divine v Levy, at at, (District Court, W D Louisiana, Shreveport Division) 39 F
Supp 44
472814-42-vol 42-G0
946 ' DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
III THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
During the period of time involved in this proceeding the iespondent
employed at its Powell Field a total of six employees, including one
J M McCoy, a foreman McCoy was the highest paid of the six em-
ployees and, except during the brief and infrequent visits of the re-
spondent's president to the Powell Field, was in full charge of pump-
ing and maintenance work and of assigning the men to various tasks
He prepared, and signed as superintendent, time slips showing the work
performed by the other employees, distributed pay checks to the em-
ployees, and hired and discharged employees Scruggs and Jones
McCoy testified that he was a foreman and that he was so designated
on the respondent's pay roll. Although Jacob Beren, the respondent's
president; denied that McCoy had the power to hire or discharge, and
that the title of foreman or other supervisory title had been confei red
upon McCoy, he admitted that he would accept the recommendations
of McCoy, as to hire and discharge if he considered them to be well-
founded. In addition, the respondent did not attempt to rebut McCoy's
testimony by'producing its pay roll. We find, as did the Trial Exam-
iner, that McCoy was, in fact, a foreman.4
Ward started to work for the respondent in December 1939 Scruggs
was employed by the respondent on June 3, 1937, and Jones, in the
latter part of 1933 Ward was employed as a pumper Scruggs and
Jones were employed as roustabouts
All three men joined the Union on January 9, 1941 ' The next
morning, according to their uncontradicted and credible testimony,
Scruggs informed McCoy, in the presence of the other two union mem-
bers, that they had joined the Union. Further, according to their testi-
mony, McCoy thereupon- inquired as to what the Union could do for
them and Scruggs remarked that he hoped the Union would Improve
their hours and conditions of employment On January 15, the Union
sent to the respondent a letter requesting recognition as collective bar-
gaining agent for the employees in the Powell Field Having received
no reply, the Union, on March 3, filed with the Board's Regional Office
a petition for investigation and certification of representatives.
that it represented three of the respondent's five employees in an
appropriate unit. Ward, Scruggs, and Jones testified that, on March
9, in the course of a discussion of strokes which were then occurring in
the State of California, McCoy stated that he "wished every one of the
unions would fall through in the next 30 minutes " They testified fur-
ther that on March 11, while they were discussing occurrences at a
recent union meeting, McCoy remarked that the Union was a "good
4 See Matter of Press Wireless, Inc and Ame, scan Communications Association, 28
N L R B 348, Matter of Gulf Refining Company and Federal Labor Union No 22191,
affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, 25 N L R B 745
SPANDSCO OIL & ROYALTY, COMPANY 947
thing' to get three good men fired " Although McCoy denied having
made any of the remarks thus attributed to him, he admitted that he
had discussed the Union with the three employees in January. The
Trial Examiner, who heard and observed the witnesses, did not credit
the denial of McCoy We credit the testimony of Scruggs, Jones, and
Ward and find, as did the Trial Examiner, that McCoy made the state-
ments attributed to him by them.
On September 15, 1941, a healing was held in the representation pro-
ceeding instituted by the Union on March 3 At that hearing, the re-
spondent contended that McCoy should be included in the appropriate
unit, while the Union insisted upon his exclusion. The parties were in-
formed by the Trial Examiner during the course of the hearing in that
proceeding that it was the Board's usual practice to determine voting
eligibility on the basis of the pay roll for the period next preceding the
date of the Board's Direction of Election.
Ward testified that when he reported for work on September 22,
1942, he was told by McCoy that his employment had been terminated
and that an "older" employee was being transferred from the respond-
ent's East Texas Field to take his place He was paid for a period up to
and including September 30. Employee French started to-work at the
Powell Field the next day At fin st, he was assigned to Ward's job
as-pumper, but was soon found incompetent by McCoy and was assigned
to do the work of a roustabout Beren't&stified that French had been a
roustabout and that he was mistaken in thinking that he would qualify
as a pumper A signed statement made by McCoy to counsel for the
Board prior to the hearing, which McCoy acknowledged at the hearing
as true and which was read into the record,,corioboiates the fact that
'French had never pumped and that there was doubt as to whether
French could do the job adequately Scruggs and Jones testified that
when Ward's position again became vacant, McCoy offered it fist to
Jones and then to Scruggs Both Jones and Sciuggs were eainnng
$85 00 a month at the time as compared with the $80 00 paid to Ward.
McCoy did not assure them that the transfer would not result in a
reduction in their salary Neither employee wanted the job, but agieed
to take it if McCoy so ordered However, McCoy did not repeat the
offer, nor did he request his son, Ralph McCoy, who had been hired
at about the same time as Ward and considerably later than either
Jones or Scruggs, to accept the position.
On September 30, Scruggs and Jones wei e discharged by McCoy.
Scruggs and Jones testified without contradiction that no reason was
assigned to either of them for the discharge, and that when McCoy
was asked to explain, he replied that they probably knew more about
it than he did. During the next week or 10 days the three employees
sought in vain an interview with Beien in an effort to ascertain the
season for their discharges They did, however, locate Irvin Beren, son
948 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of the respondent's president and owner of a half interest in two of
the wells on the Powell Field Irvin Beren informed them that they
had been discharged for bringing suit against the respondent, that
Jones and Scruggs had been disehai ged for the additional reason that
they had refused to take the pumper's job vacated by Ward and his
successor, and that Ward had been dismissed in order to make room
for an "older man
The respondent alleges that it discharged Scruggs, Jones, and Ward,
for the reason, among others, that they filed an "unmerited and un-
founded" suit against it Sciugg3 testified as follows concerning the
events leading to the institution of the suit In July 1939, he asked
McCoy about receiving payment fox accumulated overtime which lie
believed was due him under the Fair Labor Standards Act McCoy
informed him several days later that the respondent had refused his
request Thereupon, he visited a local office of the Wage and Hour
Division and made inquiry with respect to overtime back pay The
matter remained with the Wage and Hour Division until sometime in
1941, when McCoy was advised by the Division to consult an attorney
Sometime prior to July 5, 1941, he, together with Waid and Jones,
who also believed that they had accumulated overtime pay, placed then
claims in the hands of an attorney By letter of July 5, 1941, their
attorney made demand upon the respondent for the overtime pay
alleged to be due the three men The letter stated that `suit is now
in process of preparation, and will be filed within the next two or three
days unless you write me that you wish to make some soi t of settlement
with these claimants for their money " Beren testified that, upon
receipt of the letter, he conferred with Morris I Jaffe, counsel for the
respondent, who undertook an investigation of the claim Jaffe testi-
fied that he consulted McCoy and the respondent's bookkeeper and
examined semimonthly time slips purporting to bear the signatures of
the respective claimants By letter dated July 10, 1941, Jaffe advised
counsel for the claimants that the three men "are not entitled to any
overtime compensation," and that the respondent was consequently
refusing their request. On September 19, suit was filed by the three
men in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, and on September 25, the respondent was served with notice
thereof The complaint alleged that overtime back pay was due and
owing to each one in specified amounts In January 1942, the case
came to hearing At its opening, counsel for the three employees asked
for a dismissal of the suit and the Court ordered that it be dismissed
with prejudice
Although suit was filed on September 19, the respondent was put on
notice as early as July 6 or 7 of the probability of such suit if no settle-
ment was effected of the claim for overtime back pay The refusal by
the respondent caused the three men to seek satisfaction of their
SPANDSCO OIL & ROYATJTY COMPANY , , 949
asserted claim by filing suit Their action in seeking overtime back
pay'bore directly on their wages and working conditions , If the dis-
charges were, as claimed by the respondent, the immediate result of
this action by the employees, we ai e of the opinion and find that the
joining of the three union members in the suit constituted concerted
activity protected by the Act and that their discharge, for this reason,
was violative of the Act.
The respondent contends further that Ward was laid off to make
room for an "older" employee The evidence does not support this
contention The respondent's records show that French, the employee
transferred from the East Texas Field to replace Ward, had never been
a regular employee and had, in any event, less seniority than Ward.
During 1940, French worked during parts of 2 months, while Ward
had worked steadily In 1941, when Ward was employed without
lay-off until September 22, French had worked only from July until the
time of his transfer Moreover, French was admittedly incompetent
to perform the work previously done by Ward In addition, although
Beren testified that it was necessary to transfer French because work
had-slackened at the East Texas Field, the respondent's records show
that French was replaced by a new employee a week after his transfer.
The respondent maintains further that it discharged Ward, Scruggs,
and Jones because they were unreliable In his signed statement made
to counsel for the Board prior to the hearing, which he acknowledged
at the hearing as tine and which was read into the record, ,McCoy
asserted that he laid Ward off because he talked too much and was not
to be believed McCoy conceded, however, in that statement that
Ward's talking did not interfere with his work and that he found no
fault with Ward's work As to the three employees, the respondent
contends that the fact that they had instituted an "unmerited and
unfounded suit," despite then having signed time slips showing no
overtime, demonstrated their unreliability There is no evidence to
show that the men did not sincerely believe that they had a cause of
action against the respondent On the contrary, their resort to legal
advice and their institution of a suit through counsel indicates the
genuineness of their belief, regardless of the outcome of the proceeding.
The fact that they signed slips, showing no overtime, can be regarded
as nothing more than a formal prerequisite for obtaining their regular
bi-weekly wages
The respondent maintains further that ,it discharged Scruggs and
Jones because they refused to obey instructions Its only evidence in
support of this defense is the refusal of these men to take the job vacated
by Ward Aside from the fact that the men were not assured that the
change would not have resulted in a decrease,in pay for them, they ad-
vised McCoy, as we have found, that, they would accept the transfer if
950 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
McCoy instructed them to,do,so Since there had been no instruction to
that effect, there could have been no iefusal We are convinced, as was
the Trial Examiner, that this contention is without mei it
The reason for the discharge of these three employees appears from
an analysis of the succession of events beginning with their joining the
Union. Ward, Sciuggs, and Jones joined the Union on January 9,
1941, and the following day made known that fact to the respondent
through McCoy. On January 15, the Union requested recognition as
sole bargaining agent On March 3, having received no reply to its
request, the Union filed a petition with the Regional Office On March
9 and 11 McCoy demonstrated his hostility toward the Union by stating
to the three union men that he "wished every one of the unions would
fall through in the next 30 minutes" and that the Union was a "good
thing to get three good men fired " On July 5, the concerted activity
of the three men was brought forcibly to the attention of the respondent
by a letter from their attorney asserting a claim for overtime pay On
September 15, a hearing was held on the Union's petition The re-
s pondent was confionted with two choices in the event the Board should
decide that the appropriate unit consisted of five men Ward, Scruggs,
and Jones constituted the required majority in such a unit. The re-
spondent could either recognize and deal with the Union, which alterna-
tive i t had previously refused, or it could rid itself of one or more of
these three employees and thus destroy the Union's majority. The
respondent chose the latter course 5 For within a week of the hearing
on the petition and almost immediately after notice of the institution
of suit for overtime pay Ward was discharged and McCoy had, by
offering Scruggs and Jones the job vacated by Ward, created a pretext
by which the respondent hoped to justify the discharges of Scruggs and
Jones 6 We are convinced and we find that the respondent discharged'
Ward, Scruggs, and Jones because of their union membership and their
concerted activity
Upon the basis of the entire record, we find that, by thus discharg-
ing Ward, Scruggs, and Jones, the respondent discriminated against
them in regard to their hire' and tenure of employment, thereby dis-
couraging membership in the Union, and interfei ing with, restrain-
ing, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed in Section 7 of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
We find that the activities of the respondent set forth in Section
III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of the re-
5 See Matter of F S Frost and F M Netzel, a partnership doing business'as The Frost
Rubber Woihs and Independent Union of Opehating Engineers, 23 N L R B 1071
6 Decision in the representation proceeding, Case No R-3022, has been withheld pending
disposition of the instant case
SPANDSCO OIL & ROYALTY COMPANY 951
spondent described in Section I, above, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relation to ti ade, ti affic, and commerce among the several
States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow of commerce
V. THE REMEDY
Hiving found that the respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8 (3) of the Act, we must
order the respondent to cease and desist therefrom. As we have
found, the respondent has discriminated in regard to the hire ,and
tenure of employment of G `V Ward, J A Scruggs, and Reece Jones
because of their union activity This discrimination not only violates
Section 8 (3) of the Act, but reveals a purpose to defeat the basic
rights of self-organization and collective bargaining which the -Act
was designed to protect Because of the respondent's unlawful con-
duct and its underlying purpose, we are convinced that the respond-
c,nt may seek to accomplish its unlawful purpose by unfair labor
practices other than those in which it has engaged, and that the danger
of the commisison of such related unfair labor practices in the future
"is to be anticipated from the course of [the respondent's] conduct in
the past " 7 The pieventive purposes of the Act will be thwarted
unless the terms of our order are coextensive with the threat In
order, therefore, to make effective the inteidependent guarantees of
Section 7, to prevent a recurrence of unfair labor practices, and
thereby to minimize industrial strife which burdens and obstructs
commerce, and thus to effectuate the policies of the Act, we shall order
that the respondent cease and desist from in any manner infringing
the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act We shall also order
the respondent to take certain affirmative action, which we find nec-
essary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Moreover, to effectuate the policies of the Act, we shall order the'
respondent to offer the three men full and immediate reinstatement
to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without preju-
dice to their seniority and other rights and privileges, and to make
them whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason,
of the respondent's discrimination by payment to each of them of a
sum of money equal to the amount he would normally have earned
as wages from the date of the discharge to the date of the offer of
iemstatement, less his net earnings during such period 8 The re-
I See National Labor Relations Board v Express Publishing Company, 312 II S 426,
American Enka Corp V N L R B , 119 F (2d) 60 (C C A 4) , National, Labor Relations,
Board v Bersted Manufacturing Company, decided June 6, 1942 (C C'A' 6), amending
its decision of January 7, 1942, (124 F (2d) 409)
8 By "net earnings" is meant earnings less expenses, such as for transportation, room,
and board, incurred by an employee in connection with obtaining work and working else-
where than for the respondent, which would not have been incurred but for the unlawful
952 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
spondent contends that it should not be requested to reinstate the
men, as they had instituted an un neritoiious suit against it Since
we have found that the filing of the suit constituted legitimate con-
certed activity, the respondent's contention is without merit.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire
record in the case, the Boaid makes the following
CONOLUSION S OF LAW
1 International Union of Operating Engineers, Stationary Local
460, affiliated, with the American Federation of Labor, is a labor or-
ganization, within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act
2 By discriminating in iegard to the hire and tenure of employ-
ment of G W Waid, J A Scruggs, and Reece Jones, and thereby
discouraging membership in International Union of Operating En-
gineers, Stationary Local 460, affiliated with the Anieiican Federation
of Labor, the respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices, within the meaning of Section 8 (3) of the Act
3 By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the respondent
has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices, within the
meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act.
4 The afoiesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices
affecting commeice, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the
Act '
ORDER
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law,
and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act,'
the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the respondent,
Spandsco Oil & Royalty Company, Dallas, Texas, and its officers,
.agents, successors , and assigns , shall:
' 1 Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in International Union of Operating
Engineers , Stationary Local 460, affiliated with the American Federa-
tion of Labor , or in any other labor organization of its employees, by
discharging any of its employees or in any other manner discriminat-
ing in regard to their hire and tenure of employment or any term or
condition of their employment;
(b) In any other manner interfering with , restraining , or coercing
its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization , to form,
ti
discharge and the consequent necessity of his seeking employment elsewhere See Matter
of Crossett Lumber Company and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America, Lumber and Sawmill Workers Union, Local 2590, 8 N L R B 440 Monies
received for cork performed upon Federal , State, county, municipal , or other work-relief
projects " shall be considered as earnings See Republic Steel Corporation v N L R B,
311U.S7
SPANDSCO OIL ROYALTY COMPANY , 953
join, of assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted ac-
tivities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act
2 Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to G W. Ward, J A Scruggs, and Reece Jones immediate
and full reinstatement to their former of substantially equivalent posi-
tions, without prejudice to their senioiity and other rights and
privileges;
(b) Make whole G W Waid, J A Scruggs, and Reece Jones for
any loss of pay they have suffered by reason of the respondent's dis-
crimination against them, by payment to each of them of a sum,of
money equal to that which he would normally have earned as wages
during the period from the date of his discharge to the date of the
respondent's offer of reinstatement, less his net earnings during said
period ;
(c) Post immediately in conspicuous places on its Powell Field prop-
erties, and maintain for a period of at least sixty (60) consecutive days
from the date of posting, notices to its employees stating (1) that the
respondent will not engage in the conduct from which it is ordered to
cease and desist in paragraphs 1 (a) and (b) of this Order; (2) that
the respondent will take the affirmative action set forth in paragiaphs
2 (a) and (b) of this Order; and (3) that the respondent's employees
axe free to become or remain members of International Union of Oper-
ating Engineers, Stationary Local 460, affiliated with the American
Federation of Labor, and that the respondent will not discriminate
against any employee because of membership or activity in that
organization ;
(d) Notify the Regional Director for the Sixteenth Region in writ-
ing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the
respondent has taken to comply herewith.
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