Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 8, 1980

247 N.L.R.B. 171 (N.L.R.B. 1980)

SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company and Commu-
nications Workers of America, AFL-CIO. Case 14-
CA-12529
January 8, 1980
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND TRUESDALE
On September 28, 1979, Administrative Law Judge
Stanley N. Ohlbaum issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board'has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that the Respondent, Southwestern Bell Tele-
phone Company, Saint Louis, Missouri, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the said recommended Order, except that
the attached notice is substituted for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
I The Administrative Law Judge found that Respondent refused to arbitrate
a grievance because it was untimely filed. However, the evidence establishes
that Respondent was willing to arbitrate the grievance but it intended to
argue, as an affirmative defense, that the grievance was untimely. This
erroneous finding does not detract from the other findings of the Administra-
tive Law Judge, which we adopt.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
fail or refuse to bargain or impede or interfere
with the efforts of our employees' exclusive
representative to bargain collectively on their
behalf in accordance with the provisions of the
Act.
WE WILL furnish to our employees' collec-
tive-bargaining representative, Communications
Workers of America, AFL-CIO, timely informa-
tion listing job vacancies filled by name and
service date, as well as the names and addresses of
all employees currently on file for those vacan-
cies.
WE WILL bargain in good faith with our
employees' Union concerning matters arising out
of the information so furnished.
SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COM-
PANY
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STANLEY N. OHLBAUM, Administrative Law Judge: This
proceeding' under the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended (29 U.S.C. § 151, et seq.), herein called the Act,
was heard before me in St. Louis, Missouri, on July 9, 1979.
All parties were represented throughout by counsel or other
representative, who were afforded full opportunity to present
evidence and arguments, as well as to file post-trial briefs.
Briefs were received on September 19, 1979.
The basic issue is whether Southwestern Bell Telephone
Company, herein called Respondent, has violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act through its conceded failure to
provide to the Union information which the Union asserts is
required for its representation of a bargaining unit of
Respondent's employees.
' The complaint was issued by the Regional Director for Region 14 on May
30, 1979, growing out of charge filed by Communications Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, on April 23, 1979.
247 NLRB No. 27
171
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Upon the entire record and my observations of the
testimonial demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
At all material times Respondent has been and is a
Missouri corporation with its principal office and place of
business in St. Louis in that State, and with other places of
business in the States of Arkansas, Kansas, Oklahoma, and
Texas, and is engaged in providing telephone communica-
tion services and related products and services. In the
representative 12-month period ending April 30, 1979,
Respondent's gross business volume exceeded $100,000, and
in the course thereof Respondent purchased and caused to
be transported to and delivered at its St. Louis, Missouri
location directly in interstate commerce from places outside
of Missouri, goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000.
I find that at all material times Respondent has been ad
is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act; and that at all of those
times the Union has been and is a labor organization as
defined in Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Respondent and the Union are parties to a 1977-80
collective-bargaining agreement under which the Union
represents a bargaining unit of Respondent's employees.
Since mid-February 1979, the Union has been requesting
that Respondent furnish it with a weekly list of unit job
vacancies filled, by name and service date, together with the
names and service dates of unit employees having requests
on file for those vacancies. Respondent's failure to supply
the requested information, at least in the form and with the
periodicity requested, is the basic issue here. Subordinate
issues presented are whether the Union is entitled to the
information it has requested, whether it has waived its right
to the information, and whether it is entitled to the
Respondent merely issued a "transfer plan activity report" (e.g., G.C.
Exh. 7) each 90 days, after the event, ostensibly listing jobs filed in certain
classifications (5-15) without identification of personnel by names or
addresses.
' Among other things, the Union pointed out that, lacking the requested
information, it would be unable to process and take action on grievances-
which have in fact arisen (G.C. Exhs. 8-19-within the timeframes prescribed
by the collective-bargaining agreement (G.C. Exh. 3) ). Disagreeing with this
contention, Respondent indicated its willingness only to "meet on an informal
basis" to "consider" the "complaint" of a particular named employee
(Simmons), but without supplying or agreeing to supply the requested
information. The record establishes that in the Simmons matter Respondent,
in rejecting the grievance, did indeed take the position that "this grievance
was not filed on a timely basis ... within 45 days of the action complained
of," as required by the collective-bargaining agreement (G.C. Exh. 13); and
that Respondent subsequently rejected the Union's contention that it acted
within 45 days after it learned or should have learned of the action
complained of (i.e., filling of a job) (G.C. Exhs. 14-18). Thereafter,
Respondent even declined to go to arbitration. on the ground that the
grievance was untimely and therefore no requirement to arbitrate existed
(G.C. Exh. 19)-a position Respondent continued to take at the instant
hearing. It is difficult to understand how a person can take a matter to
information in the form and with the time periodicity it
seeks. These issues will be considered seriatim.
B. The Unions Entitlement to the Information
Until January 1979, Respondent, a multistate public
utility, was bound to maintain a "transfer and upgrade plan"
for nonmanagerial employees under the terms of a United
States district court consent decree in a proceeding to which
the Union was not a party, participant, or invitee. Upon
expiration thereof, Respondent promulgated an amended
affirmative action plan containing no reporting procedure to
the Union as bargaining representative.' The Union there-
upon, on February 16, 1979, requested Respondent to
supply it with data, on a weekly basis, concerning job
vacancies filled, by names and service dates, as well as the
names and service dates of employee applicants therefor,
pointing out in detail its need therefor and raising certain
questions in order properly to police its existing collective-
bargaining agreement (G.C. Exh. 2). By its March 12 letter,
Respondent in effect declined or deferred action on the
Union's request (G.C. Exh. 4). On April 4 the Union again
requested this information, reiterating its need therefor,
additionally pointing out its inability to process grievances
properly as unit representative under the collective-bargain-
ing agreement (G.C. Exh. 5).' Disagreeing with this view
(G.C. Exh. 6), Respondent in reply again failed to supply the
requested information, and that is where the matter stands.
It is to be observed that, in addition to the necessity for
access to information in order to process grievances in
accordance with the collective-bargaining agreement', that
agreement links promotions to seniority (G.C. Exh. 3, App.
B, par. 3, p. 75).
It is well understood that a core function-indeed, duty-
of the bargaining representative is to administer the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement. This includes policing compli-
ance, monitoring implementation of nondiscrimination pro-
visions (G.C. Exh. 3, art. X, p. 222) and affirmative action
programs, investigating and pressing grievances, and engag-
ing in such collective-bargaining negotiations as may be
desirable. These responsibilities cannot be properly per-
formed without access to the information which Respondent
here continues to deny to the Union, since the data requested
grievance before he even knows about it, or when Respondent's after-action
"transfer plan activity report" (G.C. Exh. 7) is. as it plainly shows on its face.
issued after the expiration of the required 45 days to institute a grievance
under the collective-bargaining agreement.
' See fn. 3, supra. In addition to the facts there set forth, it is to be noted
that under Respondent's promotional job-bidding procedures, only the
successful-and not the unsuccessful-job bidder is notified; that Respon-
dent's after-action "transfer plan activity report," delayed and tardy as it is, is
not supplied to unsuccessful bidders nor at any rate timely circulated or
publicized by Respondent among its employees; that that "report" contains
no names or addresses; and that in the case of grievant Simmons, a male black
person, he was one member of a unit of 65,000 employees, rendering it
impracticable for him or his Union to attempt to ascertain the facts.
particularly since the union-security provision of the collective-bargaining
agreement was inapplicable in 3 of the 5 States it covered (and that even in
Simmons' State of Missouri. where it was applicable, it covered 15,000
employees). Additionally, the "net credited service date" set forth on
Respondent's after-action "report" (G.C. Exh. 7) consists of a seniority date
determined by Respondent's own committee without union representation and
without union access to any method of assuring its accuracy-particularly in
the absence of identification thereon of the persons involved.
172
SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY
are central to the tenure, terms, and conditions of the unit
members' employment and to important provisions and
aspects of the collective-bargaining agreement and collec-
tive-bargaining relationship. "There can be no question of
the general obligation of an employer to provide information
that is needed by the bargaining representative for the
proper performance of its duties." N.L.R.B. v. Acme
Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-436 (1967), citing
N.L.R.B. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). Data, as
here, concerning how unit jobs are filled promotionally are
central to the life and interest of the unit, and thus at the
very least "presumptively relevant to bargainable issues."
N.LR.B. v. Rockwell-Standard Corp., Transmission and
Axle Division, Forge Division, 410 F.2d 953, 957 (6th Cir.
1969). An employer who declines to provide such informa-
tion to the bargaining representative thereby not only
violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, but also thereby fails to
bargain as required by Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Id. In-
plant promotions (involving as they do, wage changes) and
transfers, as well as nondiscrimination provisions, are of
course mandatory bargaining subjects. Fibreboard Paper
Products Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203, 209-210, 222
(1964); N.L.R.B. v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp.,
356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958); N.L.R.B. v. Laney & Duke Storage
Warehouse Co., Inc., 369 F.2d 859, 866, 869 (5th Cir. 1966);
General Motors Corporation, 243 NLRB 186 (1979); White
Farm Equipment Company, A Subsidiary of White Motor
Corporation, 242 NLRB 1373 (1979); Westinghouse Electric
Corporation, 239 NLRB 106 (1978). Denial of union access
to accurate, timely lists of current unit applicants for
promotion, in terms of their seniority and other descriptive
data, may be regarded as inhibiting the bargaining represen-
tative's access to "information that is needed by the
bargaining representative for the proper performance of its
duties" (N.L.R.B. v. Acme Industrial Co., supra) and
essential to analysis of data contained in Respondent's
"transfer plan activity report[s]." See N.L.R.B. v. Reed &
Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 135 (Ist Cir. 1953), cert.
denied 346 U.S. 887; N.L.R.B. v. Gulf Atlantic Warehouse
Co., 291 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1961); Southwest Chevrolet Corp.,
194 NLRB 975, 984-985 (1972), enfd. 82 LRRM 2620, 70
LC 1 1,371 (7th Cir.); Kayser-Roth Hosiery Co., Inc., 187
NLRB 562, 565 (1970), enfd. in material part 447 F.2d 396,
400-401 (6th Cir. 1971). The same may be said in this case
for the addresses of the individuals on the list. While, to be
sure, "[t]here is no general rule requiring an employer to
give the bargaining agent a list of the unit employees' names
and addresses," nevertheless "courts have imposed such a
requirement when the information is relevant and necessary
to the Union's performance of its duties. See United Aircraft
Corp. (Pratt & Whitney) v. N.L.R.B., 434 F.2d 1198, 1204-
05 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 993 (1971);
Prudential Insurance Company of America v. N.L.R.B., 412
F.2d 77, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1969), cert denied 396 U.S. 928;
Standard Oil Co. of California, Western Operations, Inc. v.
N.L.R.B., 399 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1968). The existence
of a duty thus depends on the factual circumstances in each
case." N.L.R.B. v. Pearl Bookbinding Company, Inc., 517
F.2d 1108, 1113 (Ist Cir. 1975). Under the circumstances
here shown, involving a bargaining unit of 65,000 employees
dispersed over 5 States, with 15,000 in Missouri and 5,000 in
St. Louis alone, it is not unreasonable to request addresses as
well as names, and no showing or contention is made that
such an added requirement would impose a hardship upon
Respondent, who undoubtedly has the information readily
at hand. See Pearl Bookbinding Company. Inc., supra;
Prudential Insurance Company of America v. N.L.R.B.,
supra: Standard Oil Co. of California, Western Operations.
Inc. v. N.L.R.B., supra; Henry M. Hald High School Assn..
213 NLRB 463 (1974); Reserve Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Coit
Eagle, 210 NLRB 495, 496 (1974); Magma Copper Compa-
ny, San Manuel Division, 208 NLRB 329 (1974); United
Aircraji Corporation v. N.L.R.B., supra; Southern Counties
Gas Company of California, 174 NLRB 19 (1969); General
Electric Company, 176 NLRB 605 (1969).
So well settled is the bargaining representative's right to
obtain from the employer job, promotion, and wage-related
data concerning bargaining units and their members that as
long as a generation ago it was observed that "a union's right
to such information cannot be seriously challenged." Inter-
national Woodworkers of America, Local Unions 6-7, and 6-
122, AFL-CIO[Pine Industrial Relations Committee, Inc., et
al.] v. N.L.R.B., 263 F.2d 483, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1959). And,
with regard to these, it has been declared that "[u]nilateral
action by an employer without prior discussion with the
union does amount to a refusal to negotiate about the
affected conditions of employment . . . and must of necessi-
ty obstruct bargaining, contrary to the congressional poli-
cy.... It will rarely be justified by any reason of
substance." N.L.R.B. v. Benne Katz, etc., d/b/a Williams-
burg Steel Products Co., 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962). Under this
principle, even union audits of employer books to substanti-
ate employer claims have been authorized. N.L.R.B. v.
Truitt Mfg. Co., supra at 152-153. Indeed, once data
relevance is established, refusal to furnish the same is per se a
refusal to bargain. Curtiss-Wright Corp., Wright Aeronauti-
cal Division v. N.L.R.B., 347 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1965); Puerto
Rico Telephone Co. v. N.L.R.B., 359 F.2d 983 (Ist Cir.
1966); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. N.L.R.B.. 325 F.2d 746
(6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 376 U.S. 971 (1964). In
upholding the right to the data, court emphasis appears to be
on its necessity or importance in the contract administration.
As stated in Curtiss- Wright, supra at 68-70:
The Board . . . holds the proper rule to be that if the
requested data is relevant, and therefore reasonably
necessary, to a union's role as bargaining agent in the
administration of a collective bargaining agreement, it is
an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section
8(a)(5) of the Act for an employer to refuse to furnish
the requested data. With that conception of an employ-
er's duty to bargain this court is in agreement....
Without the disclosure of relevant information both
contract negotiations and the institution of grievance
and arbitration procedures under existing agreements
would be hampered. Merely meeting and conferring
without a prior exchange of requested data, where such
is relevant, does not facilitate effective collective bar-
gaining and, therefore, does not meet the requirements
of Section 8(a)(1) and (5). Because of the need to
facilitate effective collective bargaining, a refusal to
furnish data is an unfair labor practice notwithstanding
the good faith of an employer in rejecting the request.
173
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
This has been the declared policy of many of the circuit
courts . . .
It is well within the responsibility of the Union in the
instant case in executing its duty to protect the interests
of the employees in the bargaining unit it represents to
closely scrutinize all facets relating to any encroach-
ment upon the rights of those unit employees to the end
that a stable employment structure for the members of
the bargaining unit may be maintained."
It is found that the data here requested by the Union and
withheld by Respondent are relevant and essential to proper
administration of the Union's responsibilities as bargaining
agent, and that the Union is therefore entitled thereto; and
that Respondent's failure to provide such data was and is in
violation of its bargaining obligation, constituting an unfair
labor practice under Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
C. Waiver of the Right to the Information
Respondent contends that the Union has waived its right
to the requested information through its acquiescence in not
receiving it in the past, its alleged acquiescence in the
procedure followed under the expired "consent decree" (to
which it was not a party) alluded to above, its unsuccessful
attempt to negotiate and include such a requirement in the
collective-bargaining agreement, and the fact that the subject
continues under unresolved negotiation. I reject all of these
contentions as without merit.
To begin with, a waiver must, if not express, be clear and
unequivocal. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. N.L.R.B., supra,
and cases there cited. A waiver "is not to be readily inferred
and it should be established by proof that the subject matter
was consciously explored and that a party has 'clearly and
unmistakably waived its interest in the matter' and has
'consciously yielded' its rights." Tucker Steel Corp., and
Steel Supply Company, 134 NLRB 323, 332 (1961), and
cases there cited. Accord: C & C Plywood Corporation, 148
NLRB 414, 416-417 (1964), enforcement denied 351 F.2d
224 (9th Cir. 1965), reversed 385 U.S. 421 (1967). See also
General Electric Company v. N.L.R.B., 414 F.2d 918, 923-
924 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 1005 (1970);
Fafnir Bearing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 362 F.2d 716, 722 (2d Cir.
1966); N.L.R.B. v. Gulf Atlantic Warehouse Co., 291 F.2d
475, 477 (5th Cir. 1961); N.L.R.B. v. Item Company, 220
F.2d 956, 958-959 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 905;
Cloverleaf Division of Adams Dairy Co., 147 NLRB 1410,
1412-13 (1964); American Smelting and Refining Co.,
Tacoma Plant, 115 NLRB 55 (1956).
Nor may the fact that the parties have been unsuccessful
in reducing to writing in their collective-bargaining agree-
ment, or in negotiating since then, an understanding as to
the information to be supplied be transmuted by some
legerdemain into a "waiver" of the right to the information.
If anything, it demonstates the opposite. Failure to incorpo-
rate a statutory right in a collective-bargaining agreement
does not justify an inference of waiver thereof. Cloverleaf
Division of Adams Dairy Co., supra; New York Telephone
' The Union seeks supply of the data weekly, but this has been eased in the
remedy, as has what otherwise might be the burden of supplying the initial list
of currently pending job applicants.
Company, 219 NLRB 679, 680 (1975). As stated in J. I. Case
Company v. N.L.R.B., 253 F.2d 149, 153 (7th Cir. 1958):
The[se] contentions [of Respondent that union com-
plaints in regard to wage rates must be handled within
the context of precontract negotiations or as grievances
under the contract] stem from a basic disagreement
between petitioner [i.e., Respondent] and the Board as
to the proper conception of the Union's role as
representative of the employees and of the very nature
of the collective bargaining process. The contention that
the Union's right to data is limited to pending wage
negotiations overlooks the fact that collective bargaining
is a continuing process which, "[a]mong other things
. . . involves day to day adjustments in the contract
and other working rules, resolution of new problems
not covered by existing agreements, and the protection
of employee rights already secured by contract." Conley
v. Gibson, 1957, 355 U.S. 41, 46 .... See also
Aeronautical Industrial District Lodge 727 v. Campbell,
1949, 337 U.S. 521, 525 .. .. A collective bargaining
agreement thus provides "the framework within which
the process of collective bargaining may be carried on."
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 1947, 1 Cir.,
161 F.2d 949, 955. The Union not only has the duty to
negotiate collective bargaining agreements but also the
statutory obligation to police and administer the exist-
ing agreements.
It is crystal clear here that no waiver has been established;
indeed, the Union's consistent pursuit of its insistence upon
the information attests to its nonrelinquishment of its
position. Cf. Georgia Power Company, 238 NLRB 572
(1978), enfd. 597 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1979); Columbus
Foundries, Inc., 229 NLRB 34 (1977), enfd. 84 LC 10,645
(5th Cir. 1978); New York Telephone Company, 219 NLRB
679; New York Telephone Company, 219 NLRB 685 (1975).
It is accordingly found that no waiver by the Union of its
right to the requested information has been established.
D. The Union's Entitlement to the Information in the
Form Requested and With the Time Periodicity Sought
Enough has been said to indicate that the Union was
entitled to the data sought. No precise form that that data
should take has been required or suggested. It is clear that
the requested data could be supplied in various utilizable
forms, and no precise form need be here spelled out beyond
the general requirements laid down in the section of this
Decision entitled "The Remedy."
It should be emphasized that it is not only established by
Union Official Lovett's testimony, but undisputed if not
conceded by Respondent's Labor Relations Executive
Ravas' testimony, that Respondent has never taken the
position that furnishing the requested information would be
unduly burdensome or costly. Cf. Food Employer Council,
Inc., et al., 197 NLRB 651 (1972). Notwithstanding this,
reasonable alternatives are provided in the remedy, infra, to
ameliorate any possible burden as to quantity or periodicity.'
174
SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY
Since it would be utterly unreasonable, particularly in
view of the huge size and geographic dispersal of the
bargaining unit, to require the Union to ferret out through
other means the information it seeks, which is readily at
hand with Respondent, supply of that information, in the
manner and with the periodicity delineated in the remedy
portion of this Decision, is warranted and should be
required.
In view of the foregoing, there are accordingly, upon these
findings of fact and the entire record, hereby stated the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Jurisdiction is properly asserted in this proceeding.
2. By its failure and refusal to provide the Union with the
aforedescribed requested information, Respondent has en-
gaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices in violation
of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
3. Said unfair labor practices have affected, are affecting,
and, unless permanently restrained and enjoined, will con-
tinue to affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Respondent, having been found to have violated Section
8(aX5) and () of the Act in the respects enumerated, should
be required to cease and desist from continuing or commit-
ting further such violations and to take appropriate affirma-
tive actions to repair such violations, including the posting of
the usual notice to employees in cases of this nature.
As was disclosed at the hearing, the parties have been
unable to arrive at a modus operandi for providing the
information in question. I have already indicated what its
scope should be. In order to provide guidance to the parties
and to avoid or minimize possible complications which
might otherwise delay implementation, or arise on enforce-
ment, of the proposed Order herein, it is deemed expedient
and proper to include in the recommended Order certain
specific provisions in equitable modification of the Union's
demand and at the same time clarification of the require-
ment and how it may be satisfied without need for further
litigation. Cf. Food Employer Council, Inc., supra. These
provisions will require that, unless the parties otherwise
agree in writing, Respondent shall supply the requested data
to the Union as follows: (I) as to job vacancies applied for, at
Respondent's election either promptly (a) furnish to the
Union a current actively pending list thereof (including
adequate descriptions of the jobs and their locations) and
thereafter continue promptly to supply the Union with
supplements thereto as such vacancies occur and applicants
apply therefor, or (b) make its records as to the foregoing
data available for the Union's inspection and copying at the
Union's own expense to assemble, copy, and thereafter
update and currently maintain, in either case (a) or (b) to
include names and addresses; (2) as to job vacancies filled,
supply the Union with the names and addresses of all
' In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules
and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board. the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48
persons appointed to fill such jobs (with adequate descrip-
tions of such jobs and their locations) within 15 days after
they are filled. This time requirement should provide ample
time for the Union to process any grievances within the 45-
day period required under the collective-bargaining agree-
ment. Respondent should additionally be required to bargain
collectively in good faith with the Union concerning the data
furnished and matters touching the same.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER'
The Respondent, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company,
St. Louis, Missouri, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Failing or refusing to bargain collectively with Com-
munications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclu-
sive representative of Respondent's employees in the appro-
priate unit by failing and refusing to furnish to that labor
organization relevant information and data concerning
Respondent's job-transfer plan activities and jobs filled by
transfer, promotion, or otherwise, including descriptions of
such jobs and their locations, when they are supposed to be
filled and when they are actually filled, and identification by
name, address, sex, and race of all current applicants as well
as persons selected to fill said jobs. The appropriate
bargaining unit is that set forth in article I, section 1, of the
August 7, 1977-August 9, 1980, collective-bargaining agree-
ment between Respondent and said Union.
(b) Failing or refusing to bargain collectively with the
aforesaid Union after supplying or making available to it in
the manner described in the section of this Decision entitled
"The Remedy" said information which Respondent had
been obliged heretofore to furnish.
(c) In any like or related manner failing or refusing to
bargain or impeding or interfering with the efforts of its
employees' exclusive representative to bargain collectively
on their behalf in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary
to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Promptly supply or make available to Communica-
tions Workers of America, AFL-CIO, in the manner
described in the section of this Decision entitled "The
Remedy" the data requested by said labor organization in its
letter of February 16, 1979, to Respondent relative to lists of
job vacancies filled and of applicants therefor, including
identification by name, address, and service date, and
appropriate job descriptions.
(b) Upon request, bargain collectively in good faith with
the aforesaid Union with regard to the information so
provided and matters touching upon the same, and, upon
request, reduce to signed writing any understanding reached.
(c) Post at its St. Louis, Missouri, headquarters at 1010
Pine Street, St. Louis, Missouri, and at each of its locations
of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its
findings. conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
175
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employing persons in the aforedescribed collective-bargain-
ing unit copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."'
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 14, after being duly signed by Respon-
dent's authorized representative, shall be posted by Respon-
dent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by
it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are custom-
arily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent
' In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words in the Notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(d) Furnish to said Regional Director signed copies of the
notice, in a quantity to be designated by the Regional
Director, for posting by the aforementioned Union at said
Union's locations, if so desired by the Union.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 14, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply therewith.
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor R:lations Board."
176