Southern Waste Material Co., Inc.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsMay 17, 1957117 N.L.R.B. 1653 (N.L.R.B. 1957) Copy Citation SOUTHERN WASTE MATERIAL CO., INC. 1653 All findings of interference, restraint, and coercion, herein, are based entirely upon and derive from the conduct of Respondents in dominating and interfering with the election and administration of the Employee Committees, including the Central Committee, and in contributing financial and other assistance and support to them. Except for the unlawful conduct flowing from Respondents' relations to said Employee Committees and the Central Committee, a preponderance of the evidence and the record as a whole does not in my opinion support a finding that Respondents have engaged in any other unfair labor practices. Nor am I persuaded from the record in this case that any danger presently exists that the Respondents may in the future engage in other unfair labor practices proscribed by the Act, which are not directly related in kind to the unfair labor practices herein found to have been engaged in by them. Under the circumstances, I shall not recommend the issuance of the usual broad cease-and-desist order customarily issued where the future commission or continuation of such other unfair labor practices are reasonably apprehended. I shall, however, recommend that Respondents cease and desist from engaging in any like or related conduct by otherwise interfering with the representation of its em- ployees by or through a labor organization of their own choosing. Upon the basis of the. above findings of fact, and the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The International Chemical Workers Union, AFL-CIO, and the Employee Committees, including the Central Committee, named as interested parties in the complaint, are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 2. By assisting, supporting, dominating, and interfering' with the election and administration of the Employee Committees and the Central Committee, named as interested parties in the complaint, the Respondents Cabot Carbon Company and Cabot Shops, Inc., have engaged in and are engaging in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8 (a) (2) of the Act. 3. By such conduct the said Respondents have interfered with, restrained, and coerced their employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, thereby violating Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] Southern Waste Material Co., Inc . and United Packinghouse Workers of America , AFL-CIO , Petitioner. Case No. 16-RC- 1893. May 1 7,1957 SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVES Pursuant to a Decision and Direction of Election issued herein on July 20, 1956,1 an election by secret ballot was conducted on August 17, 1956, under the direction and supervision of the Regional Director for the Sixteenth Region, among the employees in the unit found appropriate by the Board. Following the election the parties were furnished a tally of ballots. The tally showed that there were approx- imately 52 eligible voters, and that 50 ballots were cast, of which 35 were for the Petitioner, 11 were for no union, and 4 were challenged. The challenged ballots were not sufficient in number to affect the results of the election. The Employer, on August 21, 1956, filed timely objections to the conduct of election. The Regional Director investigated the objec- 1 Not reported in printed volumes of Board Decisions and orders. 117 NLRB No. 213. 1654 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tions and, on September 18, 1956, issued and duly served upon the parties his report on objections in which he found that the Employer's objections lacked merit and recommended that they be overruled and a certification of representatives issue . On September 27, 1956, the Employer filed timely exceptions to the Regional Director's report. The Board has considered the Employer's objections, the Regional Director's report, and the Employer's exceptions thereto and finds no merit in the Employer's objections? However, there appeared in affidavits submitted in support of the objections a recitation of certain statements of a coercive character which, if made, may have consti- tuted interference with a free election. Accordingly, on December 12, 1956, the Board issued its Order directing a hearing before a Trial Examiner limited to whether such statements were in fact made. Pursuant to this Order of the Board, as amended on February 8, 1957,3 a hearing was held before Trial Examiner Reeves R. Hilton, on February 26, 1957. On March 29, 1957, the Trial Examiner issued, and caused to be served upon the parties, his Hearing Officer's Report and Recommendations on Objections to Election, a copy of which is attached hereto. The Trial Examiner found on credited testimony that such statements were not in fact made, recommended that the Employer's objections to the election be overruled; and, that the results of the election of August 17, 1956, be certified. On April 8, 1957, the Employer filed timely exceptions to the Trial Examiner's report. The Trial Examiner's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's report, the exceptions thereto, and the entire record in this case , and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner 4 Because the tally shows that a majority of the votes has been cast for the Petitioner, we shall certify it as the collective-bargaining repre- sentative of the employees in the appropriate unit. [The Board certified the United Packinghouse Workers of America, AFL-CIO, as the designated collective-bargaining representative of 2 The pendency of unfair labor practice charges does not preclude the holding of a fair election, and a waiver from the party who is the subject of the charge is not required under Board policy. See Milham Products Co., Inc., 114 NLRB 1544; Coffey's Transfer Company. 115, NLRB 888. a The Order Directing Hearing dated December 15, 1956, and the Order Denying Motion and Amended Order Directing Hearing dated February 8, 1957, are not reported in the printed volumes of Board Decisions and Orders $ The Employer's exceptions are directed toward the correctness of credibility resolu- tions made by the Trial Examiner-the sole reason for the hearing directed in this matter However, the Boaid is reluctant to disturb credibility resolutions as the Trial Examiner, unlike the Board, has the opportunity to observe the deportment and de- meanor of the witnesses as they appear before him. Therefore, the Board will not over- rule a Trial Examiner's resolution as to credibility unless a clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces the Board that such resolutions were incorrect. Upon the entire record such conclusion is not warranted here. Standard Dry Wall Products, 188 F. 2d 362 (C. A. 3) enfg. 91 NLRB 544; Universal Camera Corp . v. N. L. R. B., 340 U. S. 474, 492-497. SOUTHERN WASTE MATERIAL CO., INC. 1655 all production and maintenance employees at the Employer's Dallas, Texas, plant excluding office clerical employees, professional em- ployees, watchmen, guards, and all supervisors.] CHAIRMAN LEEDOM took no part in the consideration of the above Supplemental Decision and Certification of Representatives. HEARING OFFICER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON OBJECTIONS TO ELECTION On August 17, 1956, pursuant to the Decision and Direction of Election issued by the Board on July 20, 1956 , an election by secret ballot was conducted under the direction and supervision of the Regional Director for the Sixteenth Region, Fort Worth, Texas, among production and maintenance employees (with the usual ex- clusions) at the Dallas, Texas, plant of the Employer. The above-named Union won the election.l Thereafter, on August 21, 1956, the Employer duly filed Objections to the election or conduct affecting the results thereof alleging that charges of unfair labor practices , filed by the Union against the Employer, were pending at the time the election was held and although the Union submitted an appropriate waiver to any objections it might have to the conduct of the election based upon the charges, the Employer did not waive any such objection. The Employer further alleged that the Union used the charges for propaganda among the employees thereby affecting their freedom of choice in the election and that the holding of the election while the charges were pending constituted a violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) and (B) of the Act .2 Subsequently, about August 28 , the Employer submitted four affidavits in support of its allegation that the Union used the charges as propaganda. On September 18, the Regional Director issued his report on objections in which he stated, with respect to the question of the pending charges, that it is well estab- lished policy to proceed to election where an appropriate waiver has been filed and that investigation revealed no evidence to support that allegation that the Union used the charges as propaganda . The Regional Director further stated that the investigation revealed conflicting statements as to whether Frank J. Wallace, field representative of the Union , remarked at a union-meeting on August 16, to the effect that "if a worker did not belong to the union he could not work for the Employer." The Regional Director was of the opinion that it was not necessary to resolve the conflicting evidence on this point for , assuming the remark was uttered, it would afford no basis for sustaining the objections . The Regional Director recommended that the Board overrule the objections and that the Union be certified. About September 25, the Employer filed exceptions to the report on objections. On December 12, the Board issued an order wherein it stated that: . it appearing to the Board that the affidavits attached to the Employer's Objections raise substantial and material issues with respect to the conduct of the election that may best be resolved by a hearing . . . [par. 21 therefore, directed that a hearing be held before a Trial Examiner; the evidence adduced at the hearing to be limited to whether; the statements contained in the affidavits attached to the Employer's Ob- jections, [par. 31 and allegedly made by a union representative, to the effect that; (1) if the employees did not join the Union they would not be able to keep their jobs; (2) the Union would see to it that they lost their jobs; (3) if they did not "join up" the Union would make it so tough on them they could not get jobs anywhere else; (4) it did not make any difference if Charles Berg (plant manager) told them they did not have to join the Union to work at the plant; (5) Berg could be removed from the plant if he got in the Union's way; and (6) that the Union had ways of getting rid of Berg, were in fact made by a union representative at meetings specified in the affidavits. I The tally of ballots, duly issued and served upon the parties, shows that of the 52 eligible voters, 35 voted in favor of the Union, 11 against the Union, and 4 voters cast challenged ballots. 2 By telegram dated August 7, counsel for the Employer, on the basis of these con- tentions , requested the Board to stay the election until disposition of the charges. On August 10, the Board denied the request. 1656 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD On December 20, the Regional Director issued a notice of hearing setting - the matter for hearing on January 23, 1957. About January 14, 1957, the Union filed a motion to rescind the Board's Order, to withdraw the notice of hearing , to sustain the report on objections , to dismiss the Employer 's objections and to issue a certification on the basis of the election. In brief, the Union contended that the Employer 's objections were based solely on the pendency of certain unfair labor practices and not on the conduct on which the Board directed a hearing . The Union further contended that if the affidavits referred to in the Board 's Order constitute separate "objections ," it had no knowl- edge as to whether they were timely filed , for no copies were served upon the Union as required by Section 102.61, or at anytime. Alternatively , the Union argued that if the affidavits were attached to the objections when filed with the Regional Director and constitute an integral part of the objections , no service of the affidavits was eve: made upon it, consequently the objections or affidavits should be dismissed for that reason. On January 18, the Regional Director postponed the hearing indefinitely. On February 8, the Board issued an Order Denying the Motion and Amending the Order Directing Hearing. The Order amended paragraphs 2 and 3, of the previous Order to read: it appearing to the Board that the allegations in certain affidavits submitted during the course of investigation of the Employer 's Objections raise substantial and material issues with respect to the conduct of the election that may best be resolved by a hearing, ... such statements contained in the affidavits and allegedly made by a Union representative, . . . Pursuant to a second notice of hearing, and in conformity with the Order of February 8, a hearing was held at Dallas, Texas , on February 26, before the Trial Examiner, who presided as hearing officer under Rule 102.61 : All parties were represented by counsel at the hearing and were afforded opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce relevant evidence bearing on the issues . At the conclusion of the hearing counsel waived oral argument and were afforded an opportunity to file briefs . Thereafter counsel for the Union filed a brief which has been considered. Upon the entire record in the case, and from his observation of the witnesses, the hearing officer makes the following: FINDINGS OF FACT A. The issues It is undisputed , and the Trial Examiner finds, that on the evening of August 16, 1956, the Union held a meeting in Dallas which was attended by about 25 or 30 employees of the Company .3 The question to be resolved here is whether union representatives made the statements to the employees as set forth in the Board's Order of December 12, as amended by the Order of February 8. B. The Employer 's evidence Berg testified that about August 23 , Attorney Cornebleth informed him that it was necessary to obtain affidavits to support the objections which had been filed with the Regional Director . Accordingly, Berg immediately called four employees to his office individually , namely, Sherman Shead, Hubert Chaffin (who later quit his employment ), John H. Johnson, and Robert Jones. Berg said after talking to Jones he had a girl in the office prepare a typewritten statement, which he read to Jones 3 or 4 times, to be certain he understood the contents , and that Jones then signed it. Berg, upon being advised by Cornebleth that the statement should be in affidavit form, thereupon had the statement retyped, in that form , and had Jones sign it on August 27. Berg stated that Shead , Chaffin, and Johnson were interviewed on August 23, that statements were prepared and on August 27 they were called to the office where the statements, after being read to them , were signed by the individuals . Berg stated he read the statement to each individual about six times because it was, and is, his habit to repeat all instructions or directions to employees so that they would properly understand him. Berg explained that the four employees were called to his office separately and signed their respective statements in the presence of himself and Sam "The Union also held a meeting on July 25, but substantially all the testimony relates to the August 16 meeting. SOUTHERN WASTE MATERIAL CO., INC. 1657 Guilford, a notary public and an employee of the company. The statements were then given to Cornebleth, who forwarded them to the Regional Office. The original statements, which bear a stamp showing receipt at the Regional Office on August 28, were produced at the hearing, by counsel for the Board, upon request of Cornebleth, and were received in evidence. The statements are in affidavit form, each containing the usual opening paragraph that the affiant personally appeared before the notary public, the substance thereof, the signature and, on a separate sheet, the short form jurat, and signature and seal of the notary public. The statements by Jones and Chaffin are identical originals, except that Chaffin eliminated the phrase that he had attended a union meeting on July 25. The statements signed by Shead and Johnson are duplicate copies of Chaffin's statement, with the exception that they had attended the meeting of July 25, and Shead's statement has the last sentence crossed out, which refers to statements by union representatives to the effect that they had means of getting rid of Berg. Each of the four employees testified that when he was called to the office to sign his statement there was no one present but Berg and himself, and each specifically denied that Guilford was even in the office at that time. Guilford did not testify at thehcaring. Iii view of the uniform testimony of these employees concerning the circumstances under which they signed the statements, plus the fact that Guilford, although an employee, was not called to testify in this respect, the Trial Examiner accepts and credits the testimony of the four employees and finds that the statements were neither signed nor sworn to before Guilford, as they purport to be. The Trial Examiner therefore considers these documents as statements rather than as affidavits. The four employees were called as witnesses by the Employer and their testimony, concerning primarily, if not exclusively, the meeting of August 16, is summarized below. Shead stated that Frank Wallace, field representative, George Thomas, district director., and Atha Lee Brooks, an employee, spoke to the employees at the time in question. Shead, when asked by counsel if anything was said at the meeting (1) "about keeping your job if you didn't join the union," answered, "I don't remember anything about . . . I can't hardly remember that far back." He then asked (2) if anything was said about "the union seeing that you would lose your job if you didn't belong to the union," and (3) that it would be "tough on you to get a job anywhere if you didn't join the union," and Shead replied he did not hear any such statements. Shead was also asked if anything was said about Berg and he stated he could not remember anything in that respect. Shead was then presented with his statement and, after reading it, was asked whether it refreshed his memory as to what occurred at the meeting and he answered in the affirmative. Counsel thereupon propounded the substance of the above three questions and Shead repeated his previous answers. However, when he read specific phrases in his statement contrary to his oral testimony, he admitted that Wallace or Thomas had made the remarks set forth therein and that the matters contained in his statement were true and correct. According to the statement Wallace or Thomas told the employees that; (1) if they did not join the Union they would not be able to keep their jobs; (2) if they did not join up the Union would make it so tough on them they could not get a job anywhere; (3) the Union would see to it that they lost their jobs if they did not join the Union; and (4) it made no difference if Berg said they did not have to join the Union to work at the plant. On examination by counsel for the Board, Shead said that Wallace did not state that the employees had to join the Union or lose their jobs but he understood Wallace to say if the 'Union got into the plant all the employees would have to join. Shead stated that he was called to Berg's office and asked what was going on and he told him what he had heard. About 2 or 4 days later Shead was again called to Berg's office and presented with a state- ment, which he read and signed. Chaffin, at the outset of his testimony, was asked if he desired to refresh his memory by reading his statement and when he stated he wished to do so, the state- ment, without objection, was handed to him. Chaffin said he was not a member of the Union on August 16, but attended the meeting. On direct examination, Chaffin related a statement was made at the meeting that, "you had to belong to the union or I just couldn't work there." He further related that a statement was made that "we'd lose our jobs if we didn't join the union; if we didn't belong to the union we couldn't work there." Chaffin denied that he heard the remarks, as set forth in his statement, that the Union "would make it so tough on us that we could not get a job elsewhere," and that "Berg could be gotten out of the plant if he got in their way, that they. had ways of getting rid of him." On cross-examination Chaffin said that Wallace made the remark about joining the Union, but he could not recall 1658 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD whether it was in answer to a question put to Wallace, or part of his speech. He further stated that as best he could remember, Wallace said, "we had to belong to the union before we could work there, I mean if it came union ... if the union won" the election. Chaffin was interviewed by Berg in his office who told him he wanted him to sign a paper. A few days later he was again called in and signed a statement. On examination by counsel for the Board, Chaffin said Wallace did not make any statement that the Union would see that the employees lost their jobs. Johnson, a union member, when questioned concerning alleged statements made at the meeting to the effect that the employees had to join the Union in order to keep their jobs and that Berg could be removed from the plant if he got in the way, replied, "I don't remember." He also stated that he did not hear any remark that the employees would lose their jobs if they did not join the Union, and he denied that anything was said about getting Berg out of the plant. Johnson was given his statement which plainly contradicted his oral testimony. Johnson explained that he did not read the statement before signing it, but admitted that Berg read it, or parts of it, to him. Counsel then interrogated Johnson as to whether or not Berg read specific phrases from his statement covering the substance of the questions set forth above, and Johnson denied that such phrases were read to him, with the excep- tion that there was some mention of Berg. In this connection, Johnson stated that someone at the meeting asked Wallace if they could get rid of Berg but Wallace did not give an answer to the question. Johnson denied that anyone at the meeting said that they could get Berg out of the plant. He also denied that he was one of the union leaders but conceded that he was one of the employees named in the charge filed against the Employer, apparently, because he had been put on a 4-hour shift. When asked if his entire statement was untrue or just parts of it, Johnson, replied, "Not none of it is true." Johnson said he was at Attorney Cornebleth's office about 3 or 4 weeks before the hearing and he remembered counsel going over the statement but he "didn't say a thing." On cross-examination, Johnson stated he was called to Berg's office but he could, not remember whether Berg asked him what had happened at any union meetings. He further stated that this was the only time he was in Berg's office and that Berg had his statement already prepared and, after reading it to him, Johnson signed the same. He 'asserted the statement was not prepared on the basis of any information he had given to Berg and that he signed because Berg asked to do so. When asked if he signed the statement because he was afraid he might lose his job, he replied, "Probably I was at that time." In answer to a similar question pro-' pounded by counsel for the Board, Johnson said, "That's correct." On redirect examination he said he signed because, "I just do whatever he say for me to do and I was scared anyway." When further questioned as to whether Berg, threatened him with loss of his job, he said, "I can't talk about it," and the examination concluded on that note. Jones was questioned on the basis of two statements he signed, dated August 23 and 27, respectively, and since the pertinent parts thereof are identical, infra, the summary of his testimony is directed to the latter statement . Jones, who could not read well, said Berg read the statement to him and he made no objection to any portion thereof. Counsel then inquired if Jones had heard specific remarks con- tained in his statement to the effect that if the employees did not join up the Union would see that they lost their jobs; if they did not join up the Union would make it so tough that they could not get a job elsewhere, and it made no difference if Berg said they did not have to join the Union to work at the plant, the Union had ways of getting rid of him. Jones said the statements were made, with the exception of the one that the Union would make it so tough on the employees they could not get a job elsewhere. On cross-examination, Jones denied any statement was made that the Union had ways of getting Berg. He stated that someone asked a question about Berg but he could not remember the answer thereto. Jones admitted that subsequent to August 27 he gave a signed statement to a Mr. Renkel, field examiner assigned to the Regional Office. Counsel for the Board then asked Jones if he made the statement to Renkel that he did not remember the union representative saying, in effect, that the employees had to belong to the Union to work and Jones admitted making such a statement. Jones could not remember, but he imagined, he also told Renkel that he "got the idea about having to belong to the union to work there from some of the workers." - C. The Union's evidence Wallace testified that he attended the union meetings held on July 25 and August 16 and that he spoke to the employees on both occasions. In response to 'a series of questions Wallace denied that he, or anyone else, made any statements to the em SOUTHERN WASTE MATERIAL CO., INC. 1659 ployees, at either of the meetings, to the effect that; (1) if the workers'did not join the Union they would not be able to keep-their jobs; (2) the Union would see that they would lose their jobs; (3) if they did not join up, the Union would make it so tough on them they could not get a job elsewhere; (4) it made no difference if Berg said they did not have to join the Union to work at the plant; and (5) if Berg got in the Union's way he could be removed from the plant for the Union had means of getting rid of him. Wallace said that, in answer to a question by one of the employees as to whether the workers had to join the Union in order to work at the plant, he told the employees they could not be compelled to join the Union and mentioned the State right-to-work law, which prohibited a closed shop. While Wallace said it would be desirable for all the employees to join the Union, and that the Union wanted them as members, they were not required to become members in order to hold their jobs. Wallace further stated that one of the employees in- quired at the meeting if anything could be done about Berg and he replied that the Union could not do anything in this respect. He pointed out that he knew of cases, in union plants, where the employees had succeeded in removing a foreman or supervisor by petitioning management, but since Berg was the plant manager he did not believe the employees could do anything as far as Berg was concerned. Thomas was interrogated. on the same topics as Wallace and denied that either he or Wallace made any of the remarks as detailed above. Rose Ann Johnson, an employee of the company and trustee of the Union, and Brooks, a company employee and vice president of the Union, corroborated fully Wallace's testimony that neither he, nor Thomas, made the statements at either the meeting of July 25, or August 16, as claimed by the Employer, and which are set forth in the Board's Order of December 12, as amended. Concluding Findings The issue as framed by the Orders of the Board is whether Wallace or Thomas; or any other union representative, uttered coercive statements to the employees at either the meeting of July 25, or August 16, as -asserted in the objections filed by the Employer. It is, of course, well settled that a party filing objections to an elec- tion is obligated to adduce evidence in support thereof and unless such evidence is produced the objections must be overruled. (N. L. R. B. v. Huntsville Mfg. Co.,, 203 F. 2d 430, 433-434 (C. A. 5); The Rackle Company of Texas, 117-NLRB 462; Avon Products, Inc., 116 NLRB 1729; N. B. Liebman & Company, Inc., 112 NLRB 88, and J. Spevak & Co., Inc., 110 NLRB 954). The evidence adduced by the Employer is, in the opinion of the Trial Examiner, wholly inadequate to support the objections. In short, Shead denied that any coercive statements were made at the meeting of August 16, although he admitted signing a statement to the contrary. Johnson denied, inter alia, that he heard any statement to the effect that the employees would lose their jobs if they did not join the Union and, while he admitted signing a state- ment to the contrary he specifically testified that the contents thereof were not true. Chaffin was simply given his statement and on the basis of that document testified that certain remarks were made at the meeting. However, on cross- examination, he could not recall the events of August 16, without using his state- ment, and said that no one at the meeting warned the employees they would be fired if they did not join the Union, nor did any one state that the Union would make it so tough on the employees who did not join they would be unable to get jobs elsewhere. Chaffin did recall Wallace saying something to the effect that if the Union won the election the employees would be required to become members. Jones, like Chaffin, was questioned on the basis of two statements he gave to Berg and testified that the employees were told they had to join the Union in order to work at the plant. Although Jones admitted that prior to the hearing he had told Cornebleth his statement was correct, he specifically denied at the hearing that the union representatives stated the Union would make it tough on nonmembers so that they could not get a job elsewhere and that there were means of getting rid of Berg, if he got in the Union's way. It is also clear that Jones gave a third state- ment to Renkel and testified that he told Renkel he did not remember any remarks made by union representatives that the employees had to belong to the Union in order to work at the plant and that he "got the idea" they had to be union members to continue working from some of the employees at the plant. The Trial Examiner, from close observation of the demeanor and conduct of the Employer's witnesses, cannot accept or credit their testimony as proving the utter- ance of any coercive remarks by union representatives or employees at the meeting or meetings in question. In substance, Shead and Johnson flatly repudiated their 1660 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD statements concerning the making of such remarks, while Chaffin and Jones repudi- ated pertinent parts of their statements and conceded they had no independent recol- lection of what transpired at the union meeting. , Undoubtedly, the testimony of these witnesses as given at the hearing, on both direct and cross -examination, is in serious conflict with their written statements , but such conflicts do nothing more than discredit the, individuals , who were called as employer witnesses . In passing upon the weight to be given statements of witnesses which are in direct conflict with their testimony, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in the Quest-Shan Mark Brassiere case ( 185 F . 2d 285, 289), held that: "It is universally maintained by the Courts that Prior Self-Contradictions are not to be treated as having any substantive or independent testimonial value"; and this we can properly accept as the district court rule . . . . 3 Wigmore on Evi- dence 688 , § 1018, 3d Ed. 1940. Hence prior inconsistent statements are admissible not as affirmative evidence to prove the truth of what they affirm, but only as matter tending to show that the witness is not credible , because he has changed his story.4 Under the circumstances, and if the evidence did not go beyond this point, the Trial Examiner would find that the Employer has failed to establish its objections by credible evidence, as required in cases of this character . (See cases cited supra.) But the testimony goes beyond this point and the Union's witnesses, Wallace, Thomas, Johnson, and Brooks categorically denied that any coercive or threatening statements were made at either of the meetings , as urged by the Employer. It is true that these individuals cannot be considered as disinterested witnesses , but, in the opinion of the Trial Examiner, that fact did not detract from their desire and ability to answer fully all questions propounded to them and to present their testi- mony in an intelligent, fair, and honest manner. Accordingly, on the straight issue of credibility, as to whether to accept the repudiated or qualified statements of the Employer's witnesses , or the positive denials of the allegations therein by the Union's witnesses, the Trial Examiner has no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the testimony of the Union 's witnesses is far more persuasive and convincing and is, therefore, accepted and credited. The Trial Examiner finds that neither Wallace nor Thomas, nor anyone else, made the statements to the employees as contended by the Employer in its objections. IRecoamnendations omitted from publication.] 4 Seaboard Terminal and Refrigeration Company, 114 NLRB 754, footnote 1. Bluefield Produce & Provision Company and Chauffeurs, Team- sters and Helpers Local Union No. 175, International Broth- erhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO. Case No. 9-CA-1043. May 20,1957 DECISION AND ORDER Upon charges duly filed by Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local Union No. 175, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, here- in called the Union, the General Counsel of the National Labor Rela- tions Board, by the Regional Director for the Ninth Region, issued a complaint dated October 17, 156, against Bluefield Produce & Provi- sion Company, herein called the Respondent, alleging that the Re- spondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 117 NLRB No. 215. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation