Southern Illinois Builders AssociationDownload PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsSep 30, 1980252 N.L.R.B. 750 (N.L.R.B. 1980) Copy Citation DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Local 90, Operative Plasterers and Cement Masons' International Association of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO (Southern Illinois Build- ers Association) and Steve Bovinett. Case 14- CB-3391 September 30, 1980 SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MI'.MBERS JENKINS AND PlNIt:I.O On November 9, 1977, Administrative Law Judge Jerry B. Stone issued a Decision in this pro- ceeding in which he concluded that Respondent had violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by refusing to refer Steve Bovinett, one of its members, through its exclusive hiring hall. The Administrative Law Judge recommended, in part, that Steve Bovinett be made whole for any losses suffered by reason of the discrimination against him. Respondent filed ex- ceptions and a supporting brief, and the Charging Party filed an answering brief. Thereafter, pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, on May 25, 1978, the Board issued a Decision and Order' adopting the findings and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge, and ordered that Respondent take the action pre- scribed in the recommended Order of the Adminis- trative Law Judge, as modified by the Board. On October 5, 1979, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued its judg- ment 2 enforcing the Board's Order. On January 29, 1980, the Regional Director for Region 14 issued and served on all parties a backpay specification and notice of hearing. Respondent filed an answer on February 11, 1980. On February 27, 1980, a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Hutton S. Brandon for the purpose of determining the disputed issues and the amount of money due to the Charging Party under the backpay specification. On June 18, 1980, Administrative Law Judge Brandon issued the at- tached Supplemental Decision fixing the amount of backpay due Steve Bovinett. The Charging Party filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Supplemental Decision in light of the ex- ceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the 236 NLRB 329 2 Docket No. 78 2071 rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Adminis- trative Law Judge only to the extent consistent herewith and to issue an order remanding this pro- ceeding to the Regional Director for determination whether Steve Bovinett has incurred medical ex- penses includable in the backpay award. We adopt the computation contained in the Sup- plemental Decision of the Administrative Law Judge and conclude that Respondent owes Steve Bovinett at least $4,267.41. The only issues we are required to resolve concern the exclusion from the backpay specification of medical expenses which Steve Bovinett may have incurred and for which, because of Respondent's discrimination against him, he may not have been appropriately compensated. With respect to Steve Bovinett's entitlement to insurance coverage, we agree with the Administra- tive Law Judge's characterization of the facts. The Administrative Law Judge found that, had Re- spondent not discriminated against him, Steve Bo- vinett would have worked 435 hours during the relevant period and would have been entitled to in- surance coverage under Respondent's health and welfare program if he had made personal contribu- tions to the health and welfare fund in addition to those made by his employers. The Administrative Law Judge concluded, however, that Steve Bovin- ett was not entitled to claim insurance coverage in the backpay proceeding because he had "provided no evidence . . . that he ever attempted to ascer- tain the amount of personal contributions necessary to insure his medical coverage or that he ever at- tempted to submit any necessary personal contribu- tions for such coverage charges." We disagree. At this stage of the controversy we cannot know that Steve Bovinett would have elect- ed to maintain his insurance coverage had he been given the opportunity, but this is not an issue upon which such assurance is required. In similar back- pay disputes we have consistently held that, when a respondent's unlawful discrimination had made it impossible to determine whether a certain event would have occurred absent the discrimination, "any uncertainty must be resolved against the wrongdoer, whose conduct made certainty impossi- ble." 3 We so hold here, and we conclude that Steve Bovinett was entitled to coverage under Re- spondent's medical insurance plan between Decem- ber 1, 1977, and November 30, 1978. The Charging Party claims that he actually in- curred medical expenses during 1978 in the amount of $1,695.50, for which he should be reimbursed under Respondent's health and welfare program. ' Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation, 180 NLRB 142. 143 (1969); Ozark lardwood Company. 119 NLRB 1130. 1131 (1957). 252 NLRB No. 108 750 I.()CAL 90. PLASTERERS The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the evidence presented at the hearing did not establish "the nature of the injury or illness giving rise to the expense, or whether the expense would have been one for which [Steve Bovinett] could have been compensated under the Union's health and welfare fund coverage." The Charging Party argues that neither the specific expenses claimed nor the details of the medical insurance plan need be proved at a Board proceeding. He contends that, having held that he is entitled to coverage under Respondent's program, we should direct that any medical claims be submitted to the insurance carrier to be settled outside the auspices of the Board. We do not follow the Charging Party's rec- ommendation in this regard, however, as the obli- gation for reimbursement of medical expenses to which a discriminatee may be entitled lies with Re- spondent.4 Thus the monetary amount of medical expenses owed is routinely included in the backpay specification issued by the Board. s Because we are convinced that this procedure most fully protects the rights of discriminatees and promotes the final settlement of backpay claims, we see no reason to depart here from our established practice. However, since the backpay specification in the instant case failed to include a claim for medical expenses, even though the Charging Party raised the matter with the Regional Office, and since it appears that the issue was not adequately consid- ered at the backpay hearing, we agree with the Administrative Law Judge that the record as it stands is not adequate to determine the amount of medical expenses, if any, for which Steve Bovinett is entitled to reimbursement. Accordingly, we have decided to remand this proceeding to the Regional Director for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether, during the relevant period, Steve Bovin- ett incurred medical expenses for which he is enti- tled to recovery under the terms of Respondent's health and welfare plan.6 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended 4 East Texas Steel Castings Company. Inc.. 116 NLR3 1336. 1377 (1956), enfd. 255 F.2d 284 (5th Cir 1958); Deena Artware. Incorporated, 112 NLRB 371, 375-376 (1955), enfd. 228 F.2d 871 (6th Cir.); NLRB Casehandling Manual (Compliance) Sec. 10552.1. 5 See, e.g., Famet, Inc, 222 NLRB 1180, 1182-83 (1976); Sam Tanksley Trucking Inc.., 210 NLRB 656, 658 (1974); .4rtim Transportation System, Inc., 193 NLRB 179, 184 185 (1971); East Texas Steel Castings Companv. Inc., supra. ' The amount of personal contributions, if any, which would have been required of Steve ovinel absent discriminalion is deductible from the total amount of reimbursement due him for medical expenses, if the medical expenses incurred exceed the amount of personal contributions required Sam TanklsIy TrucAing, Inc.. upra at 660, fn 19 Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Local 90, Op- erative Plasterers and Cement Masons' Internation- al Association of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the said recom- mended Order and make Steve Bovinett whole by payment to him of the amount set forth by the Ad- ministrative Law Judge in his attached Supplemen- tal Decision, with interest. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this proceeding be, and it hereby is, remanded to the Regional Direc- tor for Region 14 for further proceedings consist- ent with this Supplemental Decision and Order to determine whether Steve Bovinett has incurred medical expenses for which he is entitled to reim- bursement by Respondent and, if so, to include such expenses in an amended backpay award. Such further proceeding may include an additional hear- ing, should the Regional Director consider it neces- sary. SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION STTFEM NT OF THE CASEF HUTTON S. BRANDON, Administrative Law Judge: On May 25, 1978, the Board issued a Decision and Order (236 NLRB 329) against Local 90, Operative Plasterers and Cement Masons' International Association of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, herein called the Respondent. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued its judgment order (No. 782071) enforcing the Board's order on September 25, 1979. The Board's order, as enforced, directed the Respondent, inter alia, to make Steve Bovinett, herein referred to as Bovinett, or the Charging Party, whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits he may have suffered by reason of the Respond- ent's discriminatory refusal to refer Bovinett to employ- ment by employers having an exclusive hiring hall agree- ment with the Respondent. A controversy having arisen over the amount of back- pay, if any, due to Bovinett, the Regional Director for Region 14, on January 29, 1980, issued a backpay specifi- cation and notice of hearing. Respondent filed its answer to the specification on February 11, 1980. A hearing was held before me in St. Louis, Missouri, on February 27, 1980. All parties were afforded full op- portunity to participate, to call, to examine and cross-ex- amine witnesses, and to present evidence. Following the close of the hearing, the General Counsel and the Charg- ing Party filed briefs on the issues presented. Upon the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after due considera- tion of the briefs I make the following: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The backpay specification defines the backpay period as beginning on October 20, 1976, the date the Respond- ent first unlawfully refused to place Bovinett's name on 751 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD its "idle list" for employment, and ending on June 20, 1977, the date the Respondent began to refer Bovinett through its exclusive hiring hall arrangement on a non- discriminatory basis. The Respondent in its answer, how- ever, claimed that the period of discrimination ended on June 10, 1977. A reading of Administrative Law Judge Stone's Decision in the original proceeding reveals that the Respondent's June 10 offer of referral to Bovinett was considered and found to be a "charade," inasmuch as the offer was made to Bovinett at a time when the Re- spondent knew he was unable to accept the referral be- cause he was scheduled to attend the unfair labor prac- tice hearing. The finding of Administrative Law Judge Stone on this issue, approved by the Board, is res judi- cata in this backpay proceeding. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local Union No. 347, AFL-CIO (Newton Associates), 231 NLRB 688 (1977). Accordingly, I find that the first bona fide referral of Bo- vinett occurred on June 20, 1977, as set forth in the spec- ification, and urged by the General Counsel. The specification sets forth the formula for the compu- tation of the quarterly gross backpay due Bovinett as the average hours worked by those employees having the same employment classification as Bovinett, journeyman cement finisher, who actually worked during the back- pay period multiplied by the hourly wage earned by such employees at the rate specified in the collective-bar- gaining agreement in effect at the relevant time between the Union and the employer association, party to the hiring hall arrangement. The average hours of work available was computed by dividing the total hours worked per calendar quarter by employees in Bovinett's classification referred to jobs by the Union, with excep- tions discussed infra, by the number of employees re- ferred. The specification further sets forth that additional sums were due to the Employers and Cement Masons Local 90 Health and Welfare Fund in the amount of 60 cents per hour for each hour of lost employment suffered by Bovinett as well as a sum of money to the Employers' and Cement Masons Pension Fund in the amount of 50 cents per hour for each hour of lost employment suffered by Bovinett. The total net backpay due Bovinett as set forth in the specification, as amended at the hearing, was $3,865.63 while the amount due the health and welfare fund and the pension fund on Bovinett's behalf was $219.15 and $182.63 respectively.' The Respondent contests the appropriateness of the formula utilized and set forth in the specification to the extent that it is calculated on a calendar quarter basis. The formula appears to be an appropriate one and has been utilized by the Board in similar cases of hiring hall referral discrimination. See, e.g., International Association of Bridge, Structual & Ornamental Ironworkers, Local 45 (William Handley, et al.), 235 NLRB 211, 213 (1978); In- ternational Association of Bridge, Structual & Ornamental Ironworkers, Local 373 (Henry Arminas, et al.), 232 NLRB 504, 506 (1977); International Association of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Ironworkers, Local 45 (Ralph Bucci and Building Contractors Association of of New Jersey), 232 NLRB 520, 521 (1977). I find the for- G.C. Exh. 2. mula to be appropriate here. Both the Respondent and the Charging Party take issue with respect to the various inclusions and exclusions of employees and working hours in the application of the backpay formula. The Respondent contends that in calculating the aver- age individual working hours of employees referred through the hiring hall system, the total number of hours worked by those referred should be divided by the total number seeking referral through the Union for the entire backpay period rather than for each calendar quarter. I find no merit to the Respondent's position in this regard. The inclusion of all persons seeking referral in the calcu- lation of the average individual earnings would be inap- propriate since it would result in a distorted figure having no relationship to the average earnings of those actually referred. And it must be presumed that absent the discrimination against him, Bovinett would have been referred to an equivalent number of hours of work as those actually referred. Moreover, the inclusion in the computation of those on the "idle list," the list from which referrals were made but not referred, would fur- ther distort the average hours available because it would incorporate those who may have rejected referral for one reason or another. Accordingly, I conclude, consist- ent with the General Counsel's position, that the exclu- sion from the backpay computation of those on the "idle list" who were not actually referred was proper. The Respondent's argument against the calculation of backpay on a quarterly basis must be directed to the Board rather than myself, for the Board's Order in the initial decision provided that the loss of earnings to Bo- vinett "shall be computed in the manner set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950) .... " That case specifically provides for the computation of loss of earnings "on the basis of each separate calendar quarter or portion thereof," so that "liability for each quarter may be determined by reference to factors then current, and not subject to subsequent fluctuation." Id. at 292-293. Accordingly, the utilization of a quarterly com- putation of loss of earnings here is not only appropriate but required. The Charging Party also finds fault in the General Counsel's failure to include in the backpay computation the hours of work of certain categories of employees and union members who either worked during the backpay period or were referred out by the Union. In this regard, the compliance officer, Roy B. Hayden, testified that in arriving at the total hours available to persons referred by the Union, he excluded the hours worked by employ- ees in Bovinett's classification who; (1) were referred prior to the beginning of the backpay period but worked into the backpay period on the referral, (2) worked con- tinuously as "permanent employees" for one employer without being referred by the Union, (3) were referred to jobs pursuant to an affirmative action program for mi- nority groups,2 and (4) were referred upon request by name by an employer as allowed under the referral pro- cedure. The Charging Party contends that the exclusion of the hours worked by the first numbered category was 2 II is clear that Bovinett was not a member of any minority group for affirmative action purposes. 752 LOCAL 90, PLASTERERS appropriate, but that exclusion of the other categories was inappropriate. More particularly, with respect to the inclusion of the hours worked by persons requested from the Union by name, it is contended by Bovinett that he was requested by name during the backpay period, but was not re- ferred. This contention is based on Bovinett's vague testi- mony of a hearsay nature that indicated that on Septem- ber 20, 1977, after the conclusion of the backpay period, an individual named Mel Vandergriff, whose relationship to any particular employer was not explained, apparently told Bovinett that he had requested Bovinett by name. The testimony does not establish when the actual request was made. I regard such testimony as too vague and un- reliable to establish that an actual request for Bovinett by name was made by an employer. Accordingly, and be- cause the hours of work of those referred by name would not have been available to that group, including Bovinett, who were not referred by name, I conclude that the exclusion of that category of employees from the computation of available hours was appropriate. In regard to the exclusion from the computation of employees referred by the Union pursuant to an affirma- tive action program, the Charging Party argues that since the affirmative action program required referral of 20 percent minorities to certain highway jobs involving Federal funds, and since the Union's membership consist- ed of about 15 percent minorities, according to Union business representative Dean Turner's testimony, who would have been referred on a rotating nondiscrimina- tory basis in any event, it could be expected that the highway jobs would have been manned by 15 percent minorities without regard to the affirmative action plan. Thus, the Charging Party claims that the affirmative action plan required, in effect, only a one in four, in- crease in minority referrals so that 75 percent of the hours worked by such minorities should be included in the backpay computations for Bovinett. I find this argu- ment to be specious. The number of hours that would have been worked by those referred under the plan in the absence of the plan is too speculative to warrant in- clusion of any portion of the hours worked under the plan in the backpay computation herein. Thus, and since it is clear that Bovinett would never have been referred to work under the affirmative action plan, I conclude that it is proper to exclude from his backpay computa- tion the hours worked by those who were referred under such plan. I further find and conclude that the other categories excluded in the backpay computation, i.e., those referred prior to the beginning of the backpay period and "per- manent employees" were likewise appropriate. As the General Counsel contends, the inclusion of the hours of work of employees in such categories would in no way assist in determining the probable frequency of Bovinett's referrals absent the discrimination against him.3 a While the Charging Party questions the accurancy of the compliance officer's determinations regarding the Identity and number of "permanent employees" as a result of an amendment made at the hearing to exclude from the specification two persons named in the Respondent's answer as "permanent employees." there was no actual error shown on the part the compliance officer with respect to the identity of other "permanent em- The Charging Party also contends that the backpay specification is in error in that it does not compensate him for certain hospital and medical expenses incurred by him during the summer of 1978. Bovinett claimed that he would have been qualified for the Union's health and welfare plan during 1978 absent the Respondent's dis- criminatory failure to refer him during the backpay period. In support of his claim in this regard, Bovinett testified that in mid-1978 he incurred hospital and medi- cal expenses totaling $1,695.50. "However, the record does not establish the nature of the injury or illness giving rise to the expense, or whether the expense would have been one for which he could have been compensat- ed under the Union's health and welfare fund coverage." Moreover, the record does not establish that Bovinett would have been eligible for coverage by the funds' in- surance provisions during mid-1978, even if he had worked the average available hours during the backpay period. Thus, for coverage during the period December 1, 1977, to November 30, 1978, Bovinett, pursuant to the rules of the Union's health and welfare fund, would have had to work 1,000 hours during the qualifying period, August 1, 1976, to July 31, 1977. 4 Bovinett testified and union records indicate that an employee could be cov- ered, however, if he worked in excess of 250 hours so long as he made additional personal contributions to the fund. Based on union records not disputed by Bovinett, he actually worked 69-3/4 hours during the August 1, 1976, to July 31, 1977, qualifying period. The specifica- tion, as amended, sets forth that the average number of hours Bovinett could have expected to have worked in the fourth calendar quarter of 1976 was 102.6, while the number of such hours for the first and second quarters of 1977 were 91.01 and 171.64, respectively. Totaling the hours he actually worked during the qualifying period with the average hours he might have worked, but for the Respondent's discrimination, results in a figure of 435 hours which would have made him eligible for the health and welfare fund coverage only with the submis- sion of additional contributions. Bovinett provided no evidence herein that he ever attempted to ascertain the amount of personal contributions necessary to insure his medical coverage or that he ever attempted to submit any necessary personal contributions for such coverage charges. Under these circumstances, I am not persuaded that the record sufficiently establishes either Bovinett's entitlement to the insurance benefits or the extent of re- imbursement to which he would otherwise be entitled if he were covered by the Union's health and welfare fund when the medical expenses were incurred. Finally, it is the Respondent's position that Bovinett failed to "mitigate his damages" during the backpay period by failing to make reasonable efforts to secure other employment. Compliance Officer Hayden testified that Bovinett had reported to the Board that he had reg- ployees" for exclusion purposes Although the work of "permanent em- ployees" as not necessarily continuous. they were not required to go through the referral system for each period of employment with the same employ r The qualifying hours were reduced to 700 for the qualifying period of August I. 1975, to July 31, 1976, but his reduction did not extend into the subsequent qualifying period releant to this case 753 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD istered for unemployment benefits during the backpay period and had continued in his efforts to secure referral through the Respondent's hiring hall. Moreover, Bovin- ett testified herein that he had sought referrals out of a sister local in St. Louis, Missouri, during the backpay period, but found he could not be referred by that local without becoming a member of it, an alternative which he rejected. Bovinett conceded that he had not applied for any work outside of his special qualifications as a cement finisher, nor had he sought employment by any employer who was not either signatory to the Union's collective-bargaining agreement or who was not abiding by its terms whether or not signatory to it. According to Bovinett, as a member of the Union he was prohibited by union rules from seeking his own employment in derogation of the Union's exclusive hiring hall arrange- ment. And he explained his failure to seek employment with a nonunion employer because he did not "presume to be a scab." Moreover, he would have risked union censure for such employment. A discriminatee must make reasonable efforts to secure employment which is substantially equivalent to the posi- tion for which he was qualified and from which he was barred by discriminatory action. See N.L.R.B. v. Miami Coco-Cola Bottling Company, 360 F.2d 569, 575 (5th Cir. 1966). Substantial equivalency means suitability on the basis of the discriminatee's background and experience. A reasonable effort to secure equivalent employment does not require the highest standard of diligence in this regard. See N.L.R.B. v. Arduini Manufacturing Corp., 394 F.2d 420, 422-423 (Ist Cir. 1968). Under the circumstances of this case, and in agreement with the position of the Charging Party and the General Counsel, I am persuaded that the efforts of Bovinett were sufficient in seeking equivalent employment, and meets the reasonableness test. Bovinett, presumably a loyal union member, cannot be faulted for complying with union rules, which barred him from individually seeking employment with employ- ers who were signatory to the union contract. Indeed, he ran the risk of fine or expulsion if he did not comply with such rules. Furthermore, Turner admitted in his tes- timony that while members might secure their own jobs with employers who only had a "working agreement" with the Union as opposed to being signatory to the col- lective-bargaining agreement, the members were never generally told that this practice was acceptable to the Union. On the other hand, Turner testified that most em- ployers with "working agreement" with the Union, se- cured their men through the referral system and, occa- sionally, when they did not, the employee contacted di- rectly by the employer would seek Turner's approval before accepting the job. Turner named in his testimony a number of nonunion contractors in Bovinett's home area during the backpay period who employed people in Bovinett's classification. But Turner's testimony fell short of establishing that they had jobs available for union members during the backpay period. On the contrary, Turner's testimony suggests that at least some of the employers named were not amenable to knowingly hiring members of the Union. Finally, Turner did not establish the equivalency of the wages and working conditions of any jobs with such employers to those obtainable through the Union's referral system. Considering the foregoing, and since it is clear from the Board's initial decision that Bovinett aggressively sought referral through the Union at all times during the backpay period considering in effect, the Union to be his only source of available employment, 5 I cannot conclude that Bovinett willingly incurred any loss, or that his search for employment was not reasonably diligent. In view of the foregoing findings, I conclude that the total amount due Steve Bovinett by the Respondent is $4,267.41 computed as follows, including appropriate amounts for pension and health and welfare fund contri- butions: Backpay 10/11 thru 12/31/76 102.6 Avg. hours (of journeymen cement finishers)" at 10.775 per hr. Less supplemental dues for 97.97 hours at .20 per hour GROSS BACKPAY Less interim earnings NET BACKPAY Pension: 102.6 hours at .50 Welfare: 102.6 hours at .60 Backpay 1/1 thru 3/31/77 91.01 average hours at $10.775 per hour Less supplemental dues for 87.16 hours at .20 GROSS BACKPAY $1,105.52 19.56 1,085.96 0 1,085.96 51.30 61.56 $980.63 17.43 963.20 Interim earnings NET BACKPAY Pension: 91.01 hours at .50 Welfare: 91.01 hours at .60 0 $963.20 45.51 54.61 5 Cf. Seafarers International Union of North America, Atlantic, Gulf Lakes Inland Waters District. AFL-CIO (Ilthmian Lines. Inc.), 220 NLRB 698 (1975). where the Board held that a discriminatee's regular appearance at a hiring hall throughout the backpay period seeking em- ployment through the hall in a regular manner did not constitute willful idleness. Quarters 1976-4 1977-1 Quarrers 1977-1 754 LOCAL o0. PLASTERERS Backpay 4/1 thru 6/19/77 171.64 average hours at $10.775 Less supplemental dues for 164 77 hours at .20 per hour GROSS BACKPAY Interim earnings NET BACKPAY Pension: 171.64 hours at .50 Welfare: 171.64 hours. at .60 Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended. ORDER7 The Respondent, Local 90, Operative Plasterers and Cement Masons' International Association of the United Oerinlme hurs ,s ere cons ericd tO straight time hours ad added to regular straight time I In the event no exceptionls are filed as provided b Sec 102 40 of the Rules and Regulalilos of the National Labor Relations Board. he find- States and Canada, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall make whole Steve Bovinett by pay- ment to him or to his account the sum of $3,865.63 for wages, $182.63 for pension, and $219.15 for welfare. with interest as provided for in the Board's Order as enforced by the Court." Such interest shall continue to accrue until the date of payment for all backpay due. inrgs, conclutsions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provlded in Sec 10)2 4 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted b the Hoard and become its findings, conclusiotis. and Order, and all objections hereto shall he deemed waived for all purposes. I See Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 51 1977) 1977-2 S1,849.42 32.95 $1.816.47 0 1.816.47 85.82 102.98 755 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation