Southern California Gas Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 31, 2006

346 N.L.R.B. 449 (N.L.R.B. 2006)

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA GAS CO.
346 NLRB No. 45
449
Southern California Gas Company and John Lewis,
International Chemical Workers Union Coun-
cil/UFCW, Local 47C, Local 78C, Local 350C,
and Local 995C and John Lewis International
Chemical Workers Union Council/UFCW, Local
350C and Local 995C. Cases 21–CA–36590 and
21–CA–36603
January 31, 2006
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN
AND SCHAUMBER
On October 20, 2005, Administrative Law Judge Jo-
seph Gontram issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief and the
General Counsel filed limited cross-exceptions and a
supporting brief. The Respondent and General Counsel
also filed answering briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order as modified below.1
The judge found and we agree that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing to furnish the
Chemical Workers Union (the Union) with information
regarding an employee training program that the Re-
spondent had negotiated with the Utility Workers Union
of America (UWUA) which, with the Union, jointly
represents Respondent’s employees in a single bargain-
ing unit. The training program was referenced in a set-
tlement agreement between the State of California Public
Utilities Commission (CPUC), the Respondent, the
UWUA and other interested parties who participated in a
CPUC proceeding to consider the Respondent’s request
for a rate increase for natural gas service. In adopting the
judge’s finding of a violation, we agree that the subject
matter of the Union’s information request pertained to
employee training which, as a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining, is presumptively relevant to the Union’s repre-
sentational duties. As such, the Union was not required
to independently establish the relevancy of the training
program, and the Respondent’s failure to furnish the in-

1 In par. 2(b) of his recommended Order, the judge ordered the Re-
spondent, among other things, to post the notice to employees at its
facility in Los Angeles, California. The General Counsel argues in his
limited cross-exceptions that because the violations committed by the
Respondent affected all unit employees and were not limited to the
single Los Angeles facility, the notice should be posted at all locations
where they work. We find merit in the cross-exceptions and modify
par. 2(b) of the judge’s Order, as set forth herein.
formation was thus unlawful. Quality Building Contrac-
tors, 342 NLRB 429, 431 (2004).
In any event, the record shows that the Union did pro-
vide the Respondent with an independent explanation for
the relevancy of its information request. In a letter ac-
companying its request, the Union reminded the Respon-
dent that “training is an integral part of the collective
bargaining agreement . . . [and that] the issues we have
concerns about and the information we requested are
relevant to collective bargaining.” As the judge correctly
observed, the Union essentially was “attempting to learn
relevant aspects of [that] training program so that it
[could] make a determination whether to seek a similar
or different program, or no program at all.”2 We agree
that this establishes the relevancy of the Union’s request.
In sum, we find, as in Quality Building Contractors,
supra, that “under the Board’s liberal standard for rele-
vance,” the information pertaining to the training pro-
gram was relevant to the Union’s representational func-
tions and the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) by
refusing to furnish it.3
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Southern
California Gas Company, 555 West Fifth Street, Los
Angeles, California, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order as
modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(b).
“(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its facilities where bargaining unit employees regularly
work, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”4
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional

2 We note that this explanatory letter and the nature of the informa-
tion sought by the Union focus on the issue of employee training gener-
ally, and its relation to the collective-bargaining process. It appears
that the training program negotiated with UWUA was confined to
training persons who might become employees of the Respondent. We
do not pass on whether such a training program is a mandatory subject.
There is no indication that the Union would limit a bargaining proposal
to such a program.
3 Although we adopt the judge’s finding that the Respondent unlaw-
fully refused to provide the Union with the requested copy of the set-
tlement agreement detailing the training program, we do not rely on his
finding that the version of the settlement agreement posted on the Re-
spondent’s website was insufficient because it may not have been the
final version agreed to by the parties. Regardless of whether the web-
site version was the final agreement, a “union’s ability to obtain re-
quested information elsewhere does not excuse an employer’s obliga-
tion to provide the requested information.” King Soopers, Inc., 344
NLRB 842, 845 (2005).
Finally, we disavow the judge’s comments in the penultimate para-
graph of sec. III,A. of his decision regarding the Respondent’s litigation
position in refusing to provide a copy of the settlement agreement.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD450
Director for Region 21, after being signed by the Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days
in conspicuous places including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the no-
tices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material. In the event that, during the pendency of these
proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed a facility involved in these proceedings, the Re-
spondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former
employees regularly employed by the Respondent at that
facility at any time since August 20, 2004.”
Steve L. Hernandez, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Larry I. Stein, Esq., of Los Angeles, California, for the Re-
spondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOSEPH GONTRAM, Administrative Law Judge. This case was
tried in Los Angeles, California, on May 16, 2005. The charge
in Case 21–CA–36590 was filed by John Lewis of the Interna-
tional Chemical Workers Union Council/UFCW, Locals 47C,
78C, 350C, and 995C (the Union or the Charging Party)1 on
November 3, 2004, and was amended on January 26, 2005.
The charge in Case 21–CA–36603 was filed by the Chemical
Workers Union on November 12, 2004.2 The complaint was
issued on January 28, 2005. The complaint charges that South-
ern California Gas Company (the Respondent) violated Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) by
failing and refusing to produce information requested by the
Union, information which was allegedly necessary and relevant
to the Union’s duties as one of two, joint, collective-bargaining
representatives of the Respondent’s bargaining unit employees.
The second union comprising the joint representative of the
bargaining unit employees is the Utility Workers Union of
America, AFL–CIO (Utility Workers Union; both unions to-
gether, the Unions). The questions presented are:
1. Whether the Respondent is obligated to provide to the
Union information relating to the Respondent’s agreement to
fund a training program for prospective bargaining unit em-
ployees, where (a) the agreement was made with only one of
the two Unions, and (b) the agreement was made pursuant to
the Respondent’s settlement of its California Public Utility
Commission (CPUC) proceeding.
2. Whether the Respondent is obligated to provide to the
Union the personnel file of a bargaining unit member, Joshua
Barnes, where (a) Barnes is a part-time worker who was dis-
charged under a provision of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment that does not allow a protest or grievance, and (b) the

1 The Union is alternately referred to in the complaint as Interna-
tional Chemical Workers Union Council of the UFCW, AFL–CIO.
2 All dates are in 2004, unless otherwise indicated.
Union seeks the file in connection with its protest of Barnes’
discharge.
3. Whether the Respondent is obligated to provide to the
Union information relating to the dates on which a bargaining
unit member, Jaime Berridy, was on disability, the date he was
cleared for return to work, and the date he was certified as be-
ing permanent and stationary, where (a) Berridy is a member of
the Utility Workers Union and has not consented to the produc-
tion of any information, and (b) the Union seeks the informa-
tion in connection with its processing of a grievance on behalf
of a bargaining unit member, Anita Logan.
On the entire record,3 including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the Acting General Counsel and the Respondent,4 I make the
following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Southern California Gas Company, a corporation, is a
public utility engaged in the generation and distribution of natu-
ral gas, and maintains a principal place of business located at
555 West Fifth Street, Los Angeles, California. During the 12-
month period ending January 26, 2005, a representative period,
the Respondent derived gross revenue in excess of $250,000
from its business operations, and purchased and received goods
valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the
State of California. The Respondent admits and I find that it is
an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. The Respondent admits and I
find that the Unions are labor organizations within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act, and that the Unions are the joint,
exclusive collective-bargaining representatives of the employ-
ees in the appropriate bargaining unit described in section
2.2(A) of the collective-bargaining agreement between the
Respondent and the Unions which was effective from April 1,
2002 to December 31, 2004.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The facts are not disputed. The Unions are jointly certified
as the exclusive representatives of the employees in the bar-
gaining unit. Under the joint certification, the respondent bar-
gains with a joint steering committee, which consists of ap-
proximately 15–20 representatives of the two unions. Although
there are several locals and two unions, there is one collective-
bargaining agreement. After 6 months of employment,5 an
employee chooses whether to become a member of the Utility
Workers Union or the Chemical Workers Union. With respect
to bidding for open jobs, the successful bidder is chosen based

3 The Acting General Counsel’s unopposed motion to correct tran-
script exhibits is granted.
4 The Acting General Counsel’s motion to strike Respondent’s
posthearing brief is denied. The Respondent filed its brief 1-business
day after the deadline. The Respondent states that it did not read the
Acting General Counsel’s brief before filing its own brief, and that its
late filing was due to excusable neglect. Although the question is not
free from doubt, I am exercising my discretion to consider the matters
raised by the Respondent in its posthearing brief.
5 This period was recently changed to 30 days.
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA GAS CO. 451
on the contractual terms, primarily seniority. The successful
bidder could be from either union.
The Union’s three, unrelated requests for information will be
considered in the order presented above.
A. Training Program
The Respondent is a public utility. Periodically, the Respon-
dent is required to justify its cost of service, including rate in-
creases, through a cost-of-service proceeding before the Cali-
fornia Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). Parties who have
an interest in the case may submit a request to participate in the
proceeding. The presiding administrative law judge will decide
such requests at a prehearing conference.
In December 2002, the Respondent filed an application with
the CPUC for authority to update its gas revenue requirement
and base rates. The Respondent notified the Unions of the
application and of their opportunity to intervene. The Utility
Workers Union and one of its Locals intervened in the proceed-
ing. The Chemical Workers Union did not.
On December 19, 2003, the parties to the rate case proceed-
ing, including the Respondent and the Utility Workers Union,
signed a settlement agreement. (R Exh. 1.) In the settlement
agreement, the Respondent agreed to join the Western States
Utility Workers Industry Apprenticeship and Training Trust
Fund, described as a “joint management/union multi-employer
training trust fund. The fund will be utilized to further the
training programs associated with UWUA represented job clas-
sifications within the western United States.” Id. pp. 16–17.
The Respondent further agreed to provide funding of $500,000
to assist the Utility Workers Union in establishing the Western
States Utility Workers Industry Apprenticeship and Training
Trust. The Respondent also agreed to hire the first 10 gradu-
ates from the training program established by the trust.
After the Union learned of the settlement agreement, it had
internal discussions on the impact of the settlement agreement
on the Union and its organizing efforts, whether the Union
should try to get involved in the training program, or whether
they should try to get a similar training program. On August
20, 2004, Lewis sent a letter to the Respondent requesting a
copy of the agreement and additional information relating to the
training program provisions of the settlement agreement be-
tween the Respondent and the Utility Workers Union. The
requested information included:
1. The amount of any funds to be provided by the Re-
spondent for any apprentice or training program adminis-
tered by the Utility Workers Union, or any of its affiliated
local unions.
2. A copy of any criteria for eligibility standards for
participation in any apprentice or training program, the
funding for which, in total or in part, was provided by the
Respondent to the Utility Workers Union, or any of its af-
filiated local unions.
3. A copy of the training curriculum to be utilized in
any training or apprentice program the funding for which,
in total or in part, will be provided by the Respondent to
the Utility Workers Union, or any of its affiliated local un-
ions.
4. Who would be eligible to participate in any training
set up by the Utility Workers Union, or any of its affiliated
local unions, using funds supplied by Respondent or Sem-
pra?6
5. Has there been a commitment made by Respondent
to employ those individuals who successfully complete the
apprentice or training program administered by the Utility
Workers Union, or any of its affiliated local unions?
(Jt. Exh. 1; consolidated complaint, p. 8.) At the time this letter
was sent, a copy of the settlement agreement was available on
the Respondent’s website. On September 10, the Respondent
replied to Lewis’ letter by refusing to provide any of the infor-
mation requested, and by stating that the requested information
was not relevant because the CPUC proceeding did not change
the provisions of the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement.
However, the Respondent offered7 to discuss with Lewis “the
process of the proceeding and the subsequent settlement
agreement to help clarify any concerns you may have on this
issue.” (Jt. Exh. 2.) On October 15, Lewis replied to the Re-
spondent’s letter by stating that it was willing to meet, but
would need to review the requested information before such a
meeting. (Jt. Exh. 3.) The Respondent has failed and refused
to provide any of the information requested by the Union, al-
though it did advise the Union that the settlement agreement
was available on the Respondent’s website.
B. The Grievance of Joshua Barnes
Joshua Barnes was a part-time meter reader with the Re-
spondent. Barnes is a member of the Union. The Respondent
discharged him in late 2003, allegedly in connection with his
absence from work after he reported to his National Guard unit.
After Barnes’ discharge and after he contacted Sempra Energy
Company, Sempra intervened in the matter, with the result that
the Respondent reinstated Barnes with backpay.
The Respondent again discharged Barnes in September
2004. This discharge was made under section 6.3A of the col-
lective-bargaining agreement. Part-time employees, such as
Barnes, have the right to grieve discharges under section 6.3B
of the collective-bargaining agreement (discharges for miscon-
duct), but have no right to grieve discharges under section 6.3A
of the agreement (discharges for unsatisfactory job perform-
ance).
On September 5, 2004, Lewis filed a protest or grievance8 on
behalf of Barnes concerning the September discharge.9 On

6 The Respondent is a subsidiary of Sempra Energy Company.
7 The Respondent states in the letter that “I would offer to have a
discussion with you. . . .” Thus, an offer was not actually made. How-
ever, an offer was apparently intended, and the Chemical Workers
Union considered that an offer had been made. Accordingly, the find-
ings are consistent with the parties’ intent and understanding, notwith-
standing the conditional language of the “offer.”
8 The Respondent’s and the Union’s practice has been to label some
claims as grievances and other claims as protests. Despite the labels,
the parties do not contend that protests involve different procedures
than grievances.
9 Lewis credibly testified that he filed a protest on behalf of Barnes.
Although the General Counsel was unable to present the protest or
grievance letter, a similar letter was received in evidence. (Jt. Exh. 6.)
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD452
September 13, Lewis sent a letter to the Respondent requesting
a copy of Barnes’ personnel file. (Jt. Exh. 7.) Attached to that
letter was a handwritten authorization signed by Barnes author-
izing the Union to obtain a complete copy of his personnel file.
On September 23, Leonard Prymus, employee disputes man-
ager for the Respondent, replied to Lewis’ letters of September
5 and 13. Prymus denied the Union’s request for a hearing on
Barnes’ grievance and refused to turn over Barnes’ personnel
file on the ground that Barnes was discharged pursuant to sec-
tion 6.3A of the collective-bargaining agreement, not section
6.3B, and therefore had no right to union representation. In a
letter dated September 25, Lewis explained to Prymus that the
same supervisors who were involved in Barnes’ earlier termina-
tion had harassed Barnes after his reinstatement. Thus, Lewis
was seeking Barnes’ personnel file in an attempt to determine
the real reason for the discharge, including whether Barnes’
2003 discharge and reinstatement had any influence on the
2004 discharge. This determination would affect whether the
Union could properly represent Barnes in the grievance and
whether Barnes was properly discharged.
After receiving Lewis’ letters, Prymus contacted Barnes, told
him of the Union’s request for his personnel file, and advised
Barnes that his personnel file would be sent to him upon his
payment of a fee. Prymus subsequently sent the file to Barnes.
However, there was no documentation of or reference to Bar-
nes’ earlier discharge in late 2003 in the file that Prymus sent to
Barnes. In a letter dated October 7, Lewis again explained to
Prymus that he was seeking Barnes’ complete personnel file,
including the information relating to Barnes’ 2003 discharge
and reinstatement. The Respondent did not provide any further
information.
C. The Grievance of Anita Logan
Anita Logan is employed by the Respondent at its Alhambra
facility and is a member of the Union. In approximately May
2004, Logan submitted a bid for a job opening in the Respon-
dent’s Pasadena facility. Her bid was not successful. Jaime
Berridy, who had more seniority than Logan, was awarded the
job. Berridy is a member of the Utility Workers Union. On
May 27, the Union filed a grievance on Logan’s behalf.
Logan believed that Berridy was on disability at the time he
submitted his bid for the Pasadena job, and it is the Union’s
position that employees on disability are only allowed to bid on
jobs they are able to fill. Accordingly, on October 1, 2004,
Lewis sent Prymus a letter in which he requested (1) the date
Berridy was certified for disability; (2) the date the doctor
cleared Berridy for return to work; (3) the date Berridy was
certified as being permanent and stationary;10 and (4) a list of

That Lewis did file a protest of Barnes’ discharge on September 5 is
corroborated by Prymus’ reply to Lewis’ “letters dated September 5
and 13, 2004,” in which Prymus also states, “we must deny your re-
quest for a protest hearing and copies of the Personnel File.” The Sep-
tember 13 letter made no explicit reference to the protest; it simply
requested a copy of Barnes’ personnel file. Moreover, the Respondent
does not dispute that Lewis filed a protest of Barnes’ discharge on
September 5.
10 “Permanent and stationary” was not fully explained at the hearing,
but Lewis did explain that the Union and the Respondent have disputed
all employees off work and on disability during the past year,
and the dates the employees returned to work. (Jt. Exh. 4.)
Prymus refused to provide any of the information Lewis had
requested. Prymus claimed that the information was private
medical information and that the requested information could
not be provided without the consent of all the employees who
had been on disability, including Berridy.
Since 1987, the Respondent has regularly provided the Un-
ion with a list, by quarter, of all employees who are off work
and on disability. The list includes the employees’ names, their
addresses, and the dates the employees went off work and on
disability. The list does not include the dates the employees
returned to work or the dates the employees became permanent
and stationary.
III. ANALYSIS
“There can be no question of the general obligation of an
employer to provide information that is needed by the bargain-
ing representative for the proper performance of its duties.”
NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435–436 (1967).
These duties encompass the union’s responsibilities as bargain-
ing representative for employees under the Act. The em-
ployer’s obligation extends to information involving labor-
management relations during the term of an existing collective-
bargaining agreement and in preparation for negotiations in-
volving a future contract. The employer’s obligation also ex-
tends to information in furtherance of, or which would allow
the union to decide whether to process, a grievance. Id. at 436;
Bickerstaff Clay Products, 266 NLRB 983 (1983).
The standard for relevancy is a liberal, “discovery-type stan-
dard.” NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., supra at 437. Accord-
ingly, information that is “potentially relevant and will be of
use to the union in fulfilling its responsibilities as the employ-
ees’ exclusive bargaining representative” must be produced.
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 301 NLRB 1104, 1104–1105
(1991). The requested information need not be dispositive of
the issue for which it is sought, but need only have some bear-
ing on it. Id. at 1105. “An employer must furnish information
that is of even probable or potential relevance to the union’s
duties.” Conrock Co., 263 NLRB 1293, 1294 (1982).
Information pertaining to employees within the bargaining
unit is presumptively relevant. Postal Service, 332 NLRB 635
(2000). On the other hand, the union must show the relevance
of information that does not concern employees in the bargain-
ing unit. In keeping with the liberal standard of relevance, this
burden is not a heavy one and only requires the union to dem-
onstrate more than a mere suspicion of the matter for which the
information is sought. Sheraton Hartford Hotel, 289 NLRB
463 (1988).
A. Training Program
The training program not only involved funding of a training
trust for the benefit of the Utility Workers Union, but also in-
volved a program administered by the Utility Workers Union
from which the Respondent agreed to hire graduates. Thus, the
program did concern employees in the bargaining unit, both

the bidding rights of employees who have been placed on “permanent
and stationary.” (Tr. 34–35.)
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA GAS CO. 453
because it provided funds for their bargaining representative to
train potential members, and because the training program in-
volved the source and placement of accretions to the unit.
Moreover, the Union wanted to address the possibility of ob-
taining a training trust and program similar to the one that the
Respondent had partnered with the Utility Workers Union. See
Crest Litho, Inc., 308 NLRB 108 (1992) (the funding of benefit
funds, such as training funds, is a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing); Allied Mechanical Services, 332 NLRB 1600 (2001).
By virtue of the CPUC settlement agreement, the Respon-
dent is providing substantial assistance to only one of two, joint
exclusive bargaining representatives of its employees. The
Union is not seeking to invalidate that settlement agreement or
to intervene in the CPUC proceeding or to obtain information
for another CPUC proceeding. It is attempting to learn relevant
aspects of the training program so that it can make a determina-
tion whether to seek a similar or different program, or no pro-
gram at all.
The Respondent makes no claim that the CPUC proceeding
is confidential or that the requested information is confidential.
Rather, the Respondent argues that CPUC proceedings are not
mandatory subjects of bargaining, and failure to provide infor-
mation concerning those proceedings is not an unfair labor
practice. This argument misses the point. The Union’s infor-
mation request concerns the training program, not the CPUC
proceeding. The Respondent agreed to fund and join a training
trust and to hire graduates from the trust’s training program.
The mere fact that the Respondent made its agreement pursuant
to a settlement of a CPUC proceeding, rather than in a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement, does not insulate that training pro-
gram from disclosure to the employees’ bargaining representa-
tive.
The Respondent also argues that the Board has never ruled
whether sponsorship of an apprenticeship program is a manda-
tory subject of bargaining, citing Building Trades Employers’
Educational Assn. v. McGowan, 311 F.3d 501, 512 (2d Cir.
2002). The Respondent further contends that the facts in the
present case warrant a finding that its sponsorship of the train-
ing program is a permissive subject of bargaining. However,
the Respondent’s argument does not prove enough. The Re-
spondent has done more than sponsor a training program with
the Utility Workers Union. The Respondent has funded the
training program, it has joined the trust that administers the
program, and it has agreed to hire graduates from the program.
Thus, whether sponsorship of an apprenticeship program has
been determined to be a mandatory subject of bargaining is
inapposite to the present case where the Respondent has done
so much more.
The Respondent’s funding of the training program, without
more, would render the program a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining. See, e.g., Crest Litho, Inc., supra; Allied Mechanical
Services, supra. Besides, apprenticeship and training are man-
datory subjects of collective bargaining. E.g., DFV Electric
Corp., 306 NLRB 24, 25 (1992). Moreover, even where a un-
ion is simply preparing for contract negotiations, the Respon-
dent must furnish the union with sufficient information, on
request, to enable it to represent employees adequately in con-
tract negotiations. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61,
68 (3d Cir. 1965); J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 253 F.2d 149, 153–
154 (7th Cir. 1958). In the present case, the Union sought the
requested information to determine whether it wanted to nego-
tiate a similar or different training program as the program the
Respondent was providing to and for the Utility Workers Un-
ion.
The Respondent argues that the sole concern expressed by
the Union was that graduates of the training program would be
more likely to join the Utility Workers Union rather than the
Chemical Workers Union, which shows that the requested in-
formation did not concern a mandatory subject of bargaining.
The Respondent cites no authority for this proposition, and I
reject it. Moreover, whether new, bargaining unit employees
will join the Union is a matter that affects the continuing viabil-
ity of the Union and the terms and conditions of employment of
the present employees who are members of the Union.
The Respondent also argues that the training program is a
“one-shot pilot program,” which supports a finding that it is a
nonmandatory subject of bargaining. Whether the training
program is, in fact, a “one-shot” program is a conclusion that
only the Respondent, and perhaps the Utility Workers Union,
knows. By refusing to provide the requested information, the
Respondent assumes facts to which it, but not the Union, is
privy. Also, the Respondent again provides no authority for its
contention, and I reject it.
The Respondent argues that the training program is not its
exclusive method of recruitment, that it is committed to hire
only 10 graduates from that program, and accordingly, that the
training program is a nonmandatory subject of bargaining.
Again, the Respondent provides no support for this contention,
and I reject it. The selection of a source from which to hire
employees is a mandatory subject of bargaining. See
McClatchy Newspapers, 307 NLRB 773, 775 (1992). The
Respondent’s commitment to hire 10 applicants from a dedi-
cated source is not an insignificant number or commitment.
The Respondent may hire no graduates from the program be-
yond its original commitment, or it may hire many subsequent
graduates. In either event, the commitment is substantial, and
the results could be considerably greater.
The Respondent acknowledges that it has ready access to
copies of the settlement agreement. Nevertheless, the Respon-
dent states that it posted the settlement agreement on its website
and it advised the Union of this posting. Citing Cincinnati
Steel Castings Co., 86 NLRB 592 (1949), the Respondent con-
tends that it is not required to produce the information in the
form requested by the Union, and its direction that the Union
could obtain a copy of the settlement agreement on the web
satisfied its obligation to produce the information. In Cincin-
nati Steel Castings, the company refused to provide the union
with a written list of the employees in the bargaining unit, in-
cluding their wage rates and classifications, but it did orally
provide the information sought by the union. The Board held
that “the employer is [not] obligated to furnish such informa-
tion in the exact form requested by the representative. It is
sufficient if the information is made available in a manner not
so burdensome or time-consuming as to impede the process of
bargaining.” Id. at 593.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD454
Cincinnati Steel Castings is inapposite because there the
company produced the exact information the union sought, but
in a different form. Here, the Respondent has not produced the
exact information the Union seeks. The Union seeks a copy of
the settlement agreement. The agreement is a written document
that became an agreement when the parties signed it. The Re-
spondent does not claim that the document posted on its web-
site contains the signatures of the parties. The Union sought
the settlement agreement, which necessarily means the agree-
ment containing the signatures of the parties. Thus, the Re-
spondent’s website does not contain the agreement sought by
the Union.
It may be that the document on the Respondent’s website is
the exact agreement that contains the parties’ signatures, but
this is merely an assumption. It may also be that the signed
agreement would provide additional assistance to the Union,
such as the names of the persons who actually signed the
agreement on behalf of the various parties. But the assumption
and speculation are beside the point. The Respondent did not
produce the agreement requested by the Union when it referred
the Union to a document on the Respondent’s website. More-
over, the Respondent has failed to produce any of the additional
information relating to the training program that the Union
requested in its letter of August 20, 2004.
The Respondent argues that it is not required to produce the
information in the exact form requested by the Union. The
General Counsel argues that the Respondent is required to pro-
duce the information even though the Union could obtain the
information from another source. Bel-Air Bowl, Inc., 247
NLRB 6, 11 (1980); see also Kroger Co., 226 NLRB 512, 513
(1976) (“The union is under no obligation to utilize a burden-
some procedure of obtaining desired information where the
employer may have such information available in a more con-
venient form.”); Illinois-American Water Co., 296 NLRB 715,
724 (1989), enfd. 933 F.2d 1368 (7th Cir. 1991) (even though
the requested information is available to the union through
other sources, including its own records, an employer is not
relieved of its bargaining obligation to supply the requested
information to the union in a convenient form). Insofar as the
settlement agreement is concerned, the Respondent could have
avoided litigating this question by making a copy of the agree-
ment to which it had ready access. It is likely that the Respon-
dent’s cost of this aspect of the litigation is substantially in
excess of the nominal cost of making a copy of the settlement
agreement and sending it to or handing it to the Union. Where
compliance would be so simple and effortless, the Respon-
dent’s positions are not enhanced by its insistence on litigating
the propriety of its actions in this regard. In any event, I need
not resolve the apparent conflict between the Respondent’s and
the General Counsel’s respective positions because, as ex-
plained above, the Respondent’s website does not contain the
agreement requested by the Union or the additional information
requested by the Union.
The settlement agreement in which the Respondent’s and the
Utility Workers Union’s training program was established, as
well as the details regarding the training program, is informa-
tion relevant and necessary for the Union in its role as the col-
lective-bargaining representative of Respondent’s employees.
The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act
when it refused to provide this information to the Union.
B. The Grievance of Joshua Barnes
Information in furtherance of, or which would allow the un-
ion to decide whether to proceed with, a grievance or arbitra-
tion must be provided as it falls within the ambit of the parties’
duty to bargain. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., supra. As the
Supreme Court explained:
Arbitration can function properly only if the grievance proce-
dures leading to it can sift out unmeritorious claims. For if all
claims originally initiated as grievances had to be processed
through to arbitration, the system would be woefully overbur-
dened. Yet, that is precisely what the respondent’s restrictive
view would require. It would force the union to take a griev-
ance all the way through to arbitration without providing the
opportunity to evaluate the merits of the claim. . . . Nothing in
[F]ederal labor law requires such a result.
Id. at 438–439. The Union filed a protest or grievance on Bar-
nes’ discharge, and it sought his complete personnel file from
the Respondent in order to evaluate the merits of that grievance
and to determine whether the grievance should be pursued.
When the Union made its request for Barnes’ personnel file, it
provided the Respondent with a release signed by Barnes.
The information requested by the Union concerned a bar-
gaining unit member, and accordingly, the information is rele-
vant. A-Plus Roofing, Inc., 295 NLRB 967 (1989). Once this
showing of relevance has been made, the employer has the
burden to prove a lack of relevance or to provide adequate rea-
sons why the request for information should be denied. Id.
The Respondent claims that Barnes’ personnel file is not rele-
vant to the Union’s duties as the collective-bargaining represen-
tative, and it presents several bases in support of that position.
First, the Respondent claims that the Union did not have the
right to grieve Barnes’ discharge because part-time employees
are terminable at will. This contention ignores the grievance
rights granted to part-time employees by section 6.3(B) of the
collective-bargaining agreement, and is rejected.
Second, the Respondent claims that there are safeguards, in
addition to the grievance procedure, to minimize the chance of
an unfair labor practice. In particular, the Respondent cites its
office of diversity, which presumably deals with claims of dis-
crimination for reasons other than antiunion animus. It is suffi-
cient to observe that other procedures to vindicate claims unre-
lated to the collective-bargaining agreement have no impact on
the Respondent’s statutory obligation to provide relevant in-
formation to the Union. Whether these other safeguards would
minimize the chance of an unfair labor practice, which is ques-
tionable at best, does not diminish the Respondent’s collective-
bargaining obligation to provide relevant information.
Third, the Respondent claims that Barnes was discharged
pursuant to section 6.3(A) of the agreement, dealing with dis-
charges for unsatisfactory performance, and that such dis-
charges of part-time employees are not grievable. The General
Counsel replies that Barnes had been discharged in late 2003,
he was then reinstated after the intervention of Sempra Energy
Company, the Respondent’s parent company, but Barnes’ su-
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA GAS CO. 455
pervisors treated him poorly after his reinstatement. Thus, the
Union contends that Barnes may not have been discharged for
performance, or at least solely for performance, but for a reason
associated with his earlier discharge and reinstatement. The
Union advised the Respondent of this contention when it re-
quested Barnes’ personnel file.
The Respondent’s position unilaterally requires the Union to
accept, without question or supporting information, the Re-
spondent’s bald claim that Barnes was discharged under section
6.3(A) of the collective-bargaining agreement for performance
reasons. The Union is entitled to challenge that bald claim, and
its request for Barnes’ personnel file was made pursuant to that
challenge. See Ohio Power Co., 216 NLRB 987 (1975), enfd.
531 F.2d 1381 (6th Cir. 1976). As the administrative law judge
observed in Taylor Hospital, 317 NLRB 991, 994 (1995), “If
the Union were to accept Respondent’s claim without request-
ing to see available verifying documentation, it would not be
properly representing its members.” In the present case, the
Union is properly representing its members by requesting veri-
fying information on Barnes’ discharge.
Fourth, the Respondent states that Barnes’ personnel file was
sent directly to Barnes, that the Union then had access to the
file, and that, in effect, the same result occurred as would have
occurred if it had complied with the Union’s request.11 This
“no harm-no foul” contention ignores the Union’s statutorily
protected status as the employee’s collective-bargaining repre-
sentative. The Respondent did not fulfill its obligation by sub-
mitting the information to the employee rather than directly to
the requesting Union with whom it must bargain in good faith.
Assn. of D.C. Liquor Wholesalers, 300 NLRB 224, 229 (1990).
Barnes’ personnel file was relevant and necessary to the Un-
ion’s performance of its representative obligations. In refusing
to comply with the Union’s request for information and in deal-
ing directly with the employee, the Respondent compounded its
violation of its duty to bargain with the Union. Moreover, it is
no defense to an unfair labor practice charge to claim that the
Respondent committed another unfair labor practice charge.
See Plumbers Local 457 (Bomat Plumbing & Heating), 131
NLRB 1243, 1246 (1961) (“One unfair labor practice does not
excuse another.”)
The Respondent claims that the Union’s request for informa-
tion in the possession of its parent corporation, Sempra, is im-
proper and irrelevant. The employer has a duty to request any
information not in its possession from its parent corporation
and to show that its request has been refused. Arch of West
Virginia, 304 NLRB 1089 (1991). Accordingly, the Respon-
dent’s contention, that the Union’s request for information in
the possession of Sempra Energy Company is improper and
irrelevant, is without merit.
It is neither necessary nor proper to address the merits of the
parties’ conflicting contentions of the reason or reasons con-
cerning Barnes’ discharge. The reason for Barnes’ discharge is

11 However, it is not at all clear that the Respondent provided Barnes
with a complete copy of his personnel file because there was no refer-
ence in the file provided to Barnes regarding his earlier termination and
reinstatement. In any event, whether a complete file was provided is
not decided and is irrelevant to the violation found herein.
a matter to be resolved in a grievance, if it is pursued, or arbi-
tration. The requested information is relevant to the grievance,
the Respondent has not met its burden of proving that the in-
formation is not relevant, and it has provided no other reasons
why the information should not be provided to the Union. Ac-
cordingly, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of
the Act when it refused the Union’s request for a complete copy
of Barnes’ personnel file.
C. The Grievance of Anita Logan
Substantial claims of confidentiality may justify conditional
or redacted disclosure of otherwise relevant information. De-
troit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979); Detroit News-
paper Agency, 317 NLRB 1071 (1995). In resolving a claim of
confidentiality, the Board first determines if the employer has
established a “substantial and legitimate” confidentiality inter-
est in the information, and then balances that interest against
the Union’s need for the information. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., 261 NLRB 27, 30 (1982), enfd. sub nom. Oil Work-
ers v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 348 (DC Cir. 1983). The party asserting
confidentiality has the burden of proving it. Pennsylvania
Power & Light Co., supra. Moreover, blanket claims of confi-
dentiality will not be upheld, and the party asserting confidenti-
ality has a duty to seek an accommodation that addresses both
its concerns and its bargaining obligation. Detroit Newspaper
Agency, supra at 1072; Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., supra,
301 at 1105.
The Respondent has failed to meet its initial burden of prov-
ing a substantial and legitimate confidentiality interest in the
information. The Union requested no medical information
about Berridy or other employees. The Union sought informa-
tion on Berridy’s disability status, but no information on his
medical condition or why he was on disability status. More-
over, the Respondent has demonstrated its lack of a confidenti-
ality interest in this information by regularly providing to the
Union since 1987 information on the disability status of its
employees. This nonconfidential information includes the
names and addresses of employees who are placed on disabil-
ity, and there is no evidence of any conditions on the disclosure
of this disability information nor any evidence that the Respon-
dent or the employees considered the information to be confi-
dential. The Union seeks herein the date Berridy was placed on
disability (which had already been provided to the Union in the
Respondent’s quarterly report, and thus could hardly be confi-
dential), and additional information relating to his disability
status, such as the date he was cleared to return to work and the
date he was certified as being permanent and stationary. This
latter information is not confidential because (1) it is not medi-
cal information, (2) it is closely related and similar to the non-
confidential, disability information provided to the Union on a
quarterly basis, and (3) the information is open to all employees
and management, at least by inference, because it would be
reflected by Berridy’s return to work at his same or a different
job.
The Respondent has also failed to establish a substantial and
legitimate confidentiality interest in the requested information
pertaining to other employees. As noted, on a quarterly basis,
the Respondent provides to the Union the names and addresses
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD456
of employees on disability. The Union herein seeks the dates
those employees returned to work, and this information has not
been shown to be medical information, or confidential, or sub-
stantially different from the nonconfidential information volun-
tarily provided to the Union.
The Respondent argues that the Union should have the bur-
den of proving the relevance of the requested information even
though the information concerns a member of the bargaining
unit. This argument is based on the Respondent’s claim that
the Union is seeking the information to use in connection with a
grievance proceeding, which, if successful, would result in
Logan obtaining the job that the Respondent had awarded to
Berridy. Because the information would not be helpful to Ber-
ridy, the Respondent argues it is not relevant. The Respondent
offers no authority for this contention, which is without merit.
The Board’s placement of the burden of proof is a function of
the relevance of the information, not on whether another em-
ployee could be adversely affected by the information. The
requested information concerns a bargaining unit member and
is sought in connection with a grievance on behalf of another
bargaining unit member. Accordingly, the information is pre-
sumptively relevant, and this relevance is not affected by the
chance that another bargaining unit member might object to its
production. See Wayne Memorial Hospital Assn., 322 NLRB
100 (1996); Pfizer, Inc., 268 NLRB 916 (1984). Moreover, and
without regard to a presumption, I find that the Union has es-
tablished that the information is relevant.
The Respondent replied to the Union’s request for informa-
tion by requiring the Union to obtain a release from Berridy.
Of course, Berridy has not provided a release, which is hardly
surprising since the Union was challenging his selection for the
position over Logan. Conditioning the turnover of the re-
quested information on Berridy’s consent and release is unrea-
sonable. The information is directly relevant to the Union’s
determination of whether Berridy rather than Logan was prop-
erly selected for the job they both bid on. In addition, the in-
formation is not confidential, and the Respondent’s failure to
produce the information in response to the Union’s request
violated its bargaining duty under Section 8(a)(1) and (5).
Moreover, if the information were deemed to be confidential,
“the Board is required to balance a union’s need for the infor-
mation against any ‘legitimate and substantial’ confidentiality
interests established by the employer.” Pennsylvania Power &
Light Co., supra at 1105. I find that the relevance of the re-
quested information to the Union’s determination of whether to
pursue the grievance on Logan’s behalf outweighs the limited
confidentiality interest in the information.
The Respondent contends that the information is not relevant
because the Union’s theory in Logan’s grievance has no merit.
However, “the Board, in passing on an information request, is
not concerned with the merits of the grievance.” Pfizer, Inc.,
supra at 918. The Respondent also contends that the Union’s
position in Logan’s grievance violates the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. Since a worker’s
qualification for disability status with the Respondent is not
necessarily coterminous with the definition of a disabled person
under the Federal statute, the Respondent’s contention appears
to be misplaced. Nevertheless, the contention may not be con-
sidered in this proceeding. Pfizer, Inc., supra.
In conclusion, the Respondent has failed and refused to fur-
nish the Union all of the information requested by the Union,
including (1) information requested in its letter of August 20,
2004 relating to the training program; (2) Joshua Barnes’ com-
plete personnel file requested in the Union’s letter of September
13, 2004; and (3) information relating to the grievance of Anita
Logan requested in the Union’s letter of October 1, 2004,
which is necessary for and relevant to the Union’s performance
of its statutory duties and responsibilities as the employees’
collective-bargaining representative. By doing so, the Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent, Southern California Gas Company, is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union, Chemical Workers Union Council/UFCW,
Local 47C, Local 78C, Local 350C, and Local 995C are labor
organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Union is the joint, exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of the employees in the appropriate unit de-
scribed in section 2.2(A) of the collective-bargaining agreement
between the Respondent and the Unions, which was effective
from April 1, 2002, to December 31, 2004.
4. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
Act because the Respondent failed and refused to bargain in
good faith with the Union as the joint, exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees in the above appropriate unit
by refusing to provide to the Union all of the information re-
quested by the Union, including (1) information requested in
the Union’s letter of August 20, 2004, relating to the training
program; (2) Joshua Barnes’ complete personnel file requested
in the Union’s letter of September 13, 2004; and (3) informa-
tion relating to the grievance of Anita Logan requested in the
Union’s letter of October 1, 2004, information which is neces-
sary for and relevant to the Union’s performance of its statutory
duties and responsibilities as the employees’ collective-
bargaining representative.
5. The unfair labor practices set forth above affect com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act. The Respondent will be directed to
turn over to the Union the requested information described in
this decision.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended12

12 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA GAS CO. 457
ORDER
The Respondent, Southern California Gas Company, a cor-
poration, with a principal place of business located at 555 West
Fifth Street, Los Angeles, California, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to bargain in good faith with the Un-
ion as the joint, exclusive bargaining representative of its em-
ployees in the appropriate bargaining unit described above by
failing and refusing to furnish the Union with the information
described in this decision.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section
7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Provide and give to the Union all of the information re-
quested by the Union, including (1) information requested in
the Union’s letter of August 20, 2004, relating to the training
program; (2) Joshua Barnes’ complete personnel file requested
in the Union’s letter of September 13, 2004; and (3) informa-
tion relating to the grievance of Anita Logan requested in the
Union’s letter of October 1, 2004.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Los Angeles, California, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”13 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 21, after being signed by
the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of
business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings,
the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former employ-
ees employed by the Respondent at any time since August 20,
2004.

13 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed inso-
far as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
In recognition of these rights, we hereby notify employees that:
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively and in good faith
with the Chemical Workers Union Council/UFCW, Local 47C,
Local 78C, Local 350C, and Local 995C (the Union) by refus-
ing to give the Union information that it needs to represent you.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL provide the Union with the information it requested
regarding the training program agreed to between the Southern
California Gas Company and the Utility Workers of America,
AFL–CIO.
WE WILL provide the Union with the information it requested
in connection with its processing of the grievance or protest on
behalf of Joshua Barnes.
WE WILL provide the Union with the information requested
in connection with its processing of the grievance on behalf of
Anita Logan.
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA GAS COMPANY