Southern California Gas Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 29, 2004

342 N.L.R.B. 613 (N.L.R.B. 2004)

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIAGAS CO.
342 NLRB No. 56
613
Southern California Gas Company and Utility Work-
ers Union of America, Local 483. Case 31–CA–
25539
July 29, 2004
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS SCHAUMBER
AND WALSH
The question presented in this case is whether the
Southern California Gas Company (the Respondent) vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing and
refusing to provide Utility Workers Union of America,
Local 483 (the Union) with certain requested informa-
tion.1 For the reasons set forth below, we find that the
Respondent did not unlawfully fail and refuse to provide
the Union with the requested information. Contrary to
the dissent, the stipulated record plainly shows that the
requested information was not relevant or necessary for
purposes of collective bargaining, but was sought for an
entirely different reason. Accordingly, we find that the
Respondent was under no duty to provide the Union with
the requested information.
On the entire record in this case, the Board makes the
following findings.2
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent is a California corporation engaged in
generating and distributing natural gas, with offices and
places of business in various cities in California, includ-
ing, but not limited to, Los Angeles, Bakersfield, Delano,

1 The Charging Party filed an unfair labor practice charge on March
11, 2002. On May 31, 2002, the Regional Director for Region 31,
acting on behalf of the General Counsel, issued a complaint alleging
that Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor
Relations Act.
On August 26, 2002, the General Counsel, the Respondent, and the
Charging Party filed with the Board a stipulation of facts, with attach-
ments, and moved to transfer this proceeding directly to the Board for
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a Decision and Order. On
February 11, 2003, the Board issued an order granting the motion to
transfer and approving the stipulation of facts. Thereafter, the General
Counsel and the Respondent filed briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in
this proceeding to a three-member panel.
2 The Respondent filed a motion to correct misstatement of the stipu-
lated record. The General Counsel filed a response. Although styled as
a motion to correct a misstatement of the record, the Respondent is
actually seeking to strike portions of the General Counsel’s brief that
contain factual assertions not supported by the record. Specifically, the
Respondent objects to the General Counsel’s representation that the
Respondent told the Union that certain work orders were deleted and
could not be retrieved from the computer. The Respondent contends
that nothing in the record indicates that the Respondent told the Union
that the work orders were deleted. We agree with the Respondent and,
therefore, strike these portions of the General Counsel’s brief in ques-
tion.
Fontana, Glendale, and San Luis Obispo (jointly, the
“Facilities”). During the 12 months preceding the par-
ties’ execution of the stipulation of the facts, the Respon-
dent, in the course and conduct of its operations, pur-
chased and received goods in the State of California at
the Facilities valued in excess of $50,000 directly from
points outside the State of California. During the same
time period, the Respondent derived gross revenues in
excess of $500,000. The parties have stipulated, and we
find, that the Respondent is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act. We also find that the Union is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
A. Facts
At all times material, the Union has been the recog-
nized exclusive representative of a bargaining unit of the
Respondent’s employees.3 Such recognition has been
embodied in a series of collective-bargaining agreements,
the most recent of which covers the period of April 1,
2002 through March 31, 2005.
The parties stipulated that by letter dated February 9,
2001,4 the Union informed Bret Lane, the Respondent’s
director of labor relations, that it was “investigating a
class action grievance about work not being performed
throughout Transmission and Storage that can impact
employee safety.” The Union requested the following
information from the Respondent: (1) the most recent
“Overdue Report” and “Backlog Report” for all work
units in Transmission and Storage; and (2) a list or copies
of all Maximo orders5 that have been closed, deleted,
and/or removed from the Maximo Backlog without all
the work having been completed by represented employ-
ees. The Respondent, by letter dated February 23, re-
quested that the Union provide it with the “specific em-
ployee safety concerns as they relate to [the requested]
reports.” In a series of exchanges spanning some 4
months, the Union continued to request the information it
sought in the February 9 letter and the Respondent con-
tinued to adhere to its position.
Approximately 8 months later, by letter dated February
20, 2002, the Union made the information request that is

3 The Union represents the employees in the following appropriate
unit: All production, maintenance, and clerical employees employed in
the gas transmission divisions of Respondent, including the Spence
Street Headquarters, excluding the employees in Voting Group A and
all professional employees, confidential employees, watchmen, guards
and supervisors as defined under the Act.
4 Hereinafter all dates are in 2001 unless otherwise noted.
5 According to the March 11, 2002 charge filed by the Union,
“Maximo” is a work order tracking system.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 614
the subject of the General Counsel’s complaint. The
Union stated in this letter that it had filed a formal safety
complaint with the California Public Utilities Commis-
sion (CPUC) concerning incomplete Maximo backlog
orders and deleted Maximo orders. The Union also
stated that the CPUC had informed it that Maximo orders
could not be deleted, but were merely “cancelled” and
still available in the system. Therefore, the Union re-
quested copies of all cancelled Maximo orders for trans-
mission and storage for the last 2 years in order to “intel-
ligently represent the members of the Union before the
Commission.” Approximately 1 week later, the Respon-
dent notified the Union that because the requested infor-
mation did not relate to a grievance or to general negotia-
tions, the Respondent had no obligation to provide it.6
B. Issue
The parties stipulated that the central issue presented is
“[w]hether the Respondent, by its continued refusal since
February 27, 2002, to provide copies of all cancelled
Maximo orders for Transmission and Storage from Janu-
ary 1, 2000 to the present, violates Section 8(a)(1) and
(5) of the [Act].”
C. Contentions of the Parties
The General Counsel asserts that the Union’s “February
20, 2002, renewed request was for cancelled work orders
that detail and quantify the amount of unit work that is
being left undone.” According to the General Counsel, the
information requested, as stated in the Union’s 2001 let-
ters, would have enabled the Union to “intelligently de-
termine the effect of the cancelled work orders, including
the effect on the safety of its members.” Thus, the General
Counsel contends that the Respondent’s failure and refusal
to provide information relevant to the Union’s duties as
the recognized collective-bargaining representative of the
unit employees “constitutes a blatant violation” of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
The Respondent contends that, on February 20, 2002,
the Union’s sole stated reason for the requested informa-
tion was to assist the Union in addressing a complaint
before the CPUC. The Union, in its 2002 request, made
no reference to its earlier requests for information about
Maximo orders. According to the Respondent, because
the requested information was going to be used for the
purpose of pursuing a complaint with the CPUC, a third
party, it was under no obligation to provide the Union
with the requested documents. See WXON-TV, Inc., 289
NLRB 615, 617–618 (1988), enfd. 876 F.2d 105 (6th Cir.
1989).

6 The parties stipulated that “[t]o date, the Union has not filed a
grievance in relation to the information request[ed].”
D. Discussion
“Under the National Labor Relations Act, ‘[a]n em-
ployer has a duty to furnish requested information to a
union which is the collective-bargaining representative of
the employees if the requested information is relevant
and reasonably necessary to the union’s performance of
its responsibilities.’” LBT, Inc., 339 NLRB 504, 505
(2003) (quoting Allied Mechanical Services, 332 NLRB
1600, 1601 (2001)). The responsibilities referred to are,
once again, a union’s responsibilities as bargaining rep-
resentative for employees under the Act. NLRB v. Acme
Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 437 (1967). The standard
for relevancy is a liberal, “discovery-type standard.” Id.
Where a union requests information concerning the terms
and conditions of employment of bargaining unit em-
ployees, that information is “presumptively relevant” to
the union’s proper performance of its collective-
bargaining duties. The rationale for this presumption is
that such information is at the “core of the employer-
employee relationship.” LBT, Inc., supra at slip op. 2.
However, “when a union requests information which is
not ordinarily relevant to its performance as bargaining
representative, but which is alleged to have become so
because of peculiar circumstances, the union has the bur-
den of proving relevance before the employer must com-
ply.” NLRB v. George Koch Sons, Inc., 950 F.2d 1324,
1331 (7th Cir. 1991); Prudential Insurance Co. of Amer-
ica v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1969).
We find that the information requested by the Union in
2002 was not presumptively relevant to the Union’s per-
formance of its collective-bargaining duties. We further
find that the Union has failed to meet its burden of show-
ing that there are “peculiar circumstances,” which make
the requested information relevant to its role as collec-
tive-bargaining representative. NLRB v. George Koch
Sons, Inc., supra.
In its February 20, 2002 letter to the Respondent, the
Union simply stated that it had filed “a formal safety
complaint” with the CPUC concerning “incomplete
Maximo Backlog orders and deleted Maximo orders,”
and that it needed the Maximo orders to “intelligently
represent” its members before the CPUC. Contrary to
the dissent, the mere mention of the word “safety” is not
sufficient to warrant a conclusion that the requested in-
formation is presumptively relevant for purposes of col-
lective bargaining. The sole reason offered by the Union
for seeking the information was to support its complaint
before the CPUC. The Union’s letter made no reference
whatsoever to the Union’s earlier requests for informa-
tion regarding a potential grievance against the Respon-
dent. Nor does the letter in any other way suggest a con-
nection between the request for information and the Un-
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA GAS CO. 615
ion’s collective-bargaining relationship with the Respon-
dent. Instead, the Union’s request, on its face, relates
solely to an action outside the collective-bargaining con-
text—a complaint filed with a State agency.
Our colleague asserts that the information concerns the
safety of employees, and that this is sufficient to show
that the information is presumptively relevant. However,
the issue of relevance, whether presumptive or not, is
whether information is relevant to the collective-
bargaining relationship. Thus, if safety information is
sought for a grievance or for bargaining or for contract
administration, it may well be presumptively relevant.
However, the information sought here was for a matter
before a state agency. The Union was essentially seeking
discovery before that agency. The Respondent, in deny-
ing the information on February 27, relied on the fact
that the information was not related to a grievance or
negotiation. The Union gave no response to this valid
point.
The dissent contends that because an earlier request for
information, on June 28, referenced a threat to file com-
plaints with the NLRB and the CPUC, it is clear that the
instant request was relevant to the investigation of a
grievance. However, the June 28 letter was written at a
time when the Union was considering the filing of a
grievance, and thus the Union could go to the NLRB, and
perhaps the CPUC, to obtain the information. However,
as discussed above, by the time of the letter of February
20, 2002, the Union was not seeking information relating
to a possible grievance. Accordingly, the instant infor-
mation request made no reference whatsoever to the in-
vestigation of a grievance. Thus, the Respondent could
reasonably believe that the information was now being
requested only for the purpose of seeking discovery be-
fore the CPUC.
Nor does our dissenting colleague’s additional argu-
ment—that the Union’s 2002 information request was an
attempt to administer the collective-bargaining agree-
ment—establish the relevance of the Union’s request.
The dissent finds, inter alia, that by requesting the
Maximo orders for the purpose of representing its mem-
bers before the CPUC, the Union was attempting to “ad-
minister and police” section 2.5(c) of the parties’ collec-
tive-bargaining agreement.7 However, the Union did not
assert a link between the CPUC proceeding and section
2.5(c) of the collective-bargaining agreement. The Un-

7 Sec. 2.5(c) of the parties’ 2002 collective-bargaining agreement
provides: “The Union and the Company agree to cooperate in main-
taining safe working conditions. No employee shall be required to
work under conditions or operate equipment which does not meet the
requirements of the lawful orders of the State of California pertaining
to employee safety. . . .”
ion’s 2002 request is silent with respect to section 2.5(c).
Rather, the request clearly and unambiguously asserts
that the information is desired for the purpose of pursu-
ing a complaint before the CPUC. There was no sugges-
tion of an attempt to enforce section 2.5(c), or any other
section of the collective-bargaining agreement. To the
contrary, having only referenced the CPUC proceeding
in its request, the Union clearly conveyed that the infor-
mation was requested only for that limited purpose. The
dissent also states that there was no need to reference
section 2.5(c) of the collective-bargaining agreement
because the Union had informed the Respondent that “it
was appearing before the CPUC in its representational
capacity.” Even assuming the Union’s appearance be-
fore the CPUC was in a representational capacity, this
fact would not change the result herein. A union, in a
representative capacity, can appear before State tribunals.
The evidence here shows that the Union was exploring
this avenue. The evidence fails to show that the informa-
tion was being sought for bargaining, for administration
of any part of the contract, or for any other purpose rele-
vant to the collective-bargaining relationship. At best,
the dissent is engaging in mere speculation by conclud-
ing that the Union requested the information in order to
effectively administer the parties’ collective-bargaining
agreement. Speculation does not establish relevance.
Further, the General Counsel did not otherwise estab-
lish the relevance of the information the Union sought in
2002. In this connection, the General Counsel’s reliance
on the Union’s 2001 information requests is misplaced.
As discussed earlier, there is nothing in the 2002 request
that in any way refers to the 2001 requests. Therefore,
the 2002 request must be evaluated on its own terms,
and, for the reasons stated above, the relevancy of that
request has not been shown. In these circumstances, to
rely on the 2001 request to establish the relevancy that is
lacking with respect to the 2002 request would be to give
independent and controlling weight to events occurring
more than 6 months prior to the service of the charge in
contravention of Section 10(b) of the Act. As the Su-
preme Court stated in Local Lodge 1424 v. NLRB, 362
U.S. 411, 422 (1960), “a finding of a violation which is
inescapably grounded in events predating the limitations
period is directly at odds with purposes of the Section
10(b) proviso.” (Emphasis added.)
We agree that events outside the 10(b) period can be
used to shed light on critical events within the 10(b) pe-
riod. However, in this case, the evidence within the
10(b) period affirmatively shows that the Union opted for
State relief. There is no suggestion that the Union was
seeking state relief and grievance relief.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 616
Finally, we find instructive the Board’s decision in
WXON-TV, Inc., 289 NLRB 615 (1988), enfd. 876 F.2d
105 (6th Cir. 1989). There, the Board dismissed the al-
legation that the respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) by
refusing to provide the union with information concern-
ing, inter alia, the discharges of unit employees. The
Board observed that the information request was made
on the same day that the union filed unfair labor practice
charges against the respondent alleging, inter alia, that
the discharges violated the Act. In these circumstances,
the Board concluded that the union elected to pursue the
resolution of the matters sought in its information request
through the Board’s unfair labor practice procedures,
rather than through the collective-bargaining process.
The Board stated:

Further, apart from the information request itself, there
is no evidence that the Union initiated any contact
whatsoever with the Respondent in any bargaining con-
text regarding the matters contained in the information
request and the unfair labor practice charge. Thus, it is
evident that the Union chose to prosecute these matters
through the Board’s unfair labor practice procedures
rather than to bargain with the Respondent.

WXON-TV, Inc., supra at 617.
Here, too, there is no evidence that, within the 10(b)
period, the Union initiated any contact with the Respon-
dent in any bargaining context regarding the matters con-
tained in the information request. To the contrary, the
Union’s own letter shows that it was requesting the in-
formation in question in order to represent unit employ-
ees before the CPUC. It is clear that the Union here, like
the Union in WXON-TV, Inc., supra, requested informa-
tion for the purpose of pursuing a claim before a third
party and not for the purpose of collective bargaining.
In contending that the Respondent is obligated to fur-
nish the requested information to the Union, the dissent
relies on an erroneous premise. Suggesting that the Un-
ion “resorted” to the state commission after making sev-
eral “fruitless” requests to obtain this information from
the Respondent, the dissent finds that the Respondent
engaged in a “shameful course of conduct” to block the
Union’s “every attempt” to obtain certain requested in-
formation. Lost in all of this hyperbole, however, is the
fact that the Respondent’s prior refusals to furnish infor-
mation are simply not at issue in this case. There is no
complaint allegation as to this prior conduct. The ab-
sence is for good reason—the events occurred outside of
the 10(b) period. Thus, there is no basis on this record to
deem the prior conduct lawful, unlawful, or “shameful.”
These questions are not before the Board, and are simply
irrelevant to the issue presented in this case. Indeed,
even assuming that this prior conduct would have been
found unlawful had it been the subject of a timely alleged
complaint, this fact would not provide a sufficient basis
to find that the instant allegation has merit. Thus, while
our dissenting colleague may be personally appalled at
certain conduct that is not the subject of a complaint al-
legation, his feelings can provide no legal justification
for finding that the alleged refusal to furnish information
was unlawful.
Finally, even assuming that the information was pre-
sumptively relevant, the presumption has been rebutted.
The Respondent has affirmatively shown that the infor-
mation was not relevant to any grievance or bargaining
purpose.
In sum, we find that the General Counsel has not dem-
onstrated the relevancy of the information requested in
the Union’s February 20, 2002 letter to the Respondent
to the Union’s duties and responsibilities as collective–
bargaining representative under the Act. Instead, we find
that the Union’s request for Maximo orders was in fur-
therance of its pursuit of a safety complaint before a third
party, the CPUC. Therefore, the Act does not impose a
requirement on the Respondent to provide the Union
with the documents requested. This is not to say that the
requested information is irrelevant to the proceedings
initiated by the Union before the CPUC. We, of course,
do not reach or consider that issue or whether State law
makes such information available to the Union or the
CPUC by compulsory process. The requested informa-
tion is not, however, available to the Union through the
Board.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act by failing to provide the Union with the informa-
tion requested on February 20, 2002.
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed.

MEMBER WALSH, dissenting.
Safety has been historically a term and condition of
employment over which an employer is required to bar-
gain.1 Therefore, information regarding safety is pre-
sumptively relevant to a union’s role as collective-

1 E.g., Gulf Power Co., 156 NLRB 622, 625 (1966), enfd. 384 F.2d
822 (5th Cir. 1967).
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA GAS CO. 617
bargaining representative.2 In this case, the Union re-
quested from the Respondent information relating to the
safety of represented employees. Clearly, the Respon-
dent was obligated to provide this information. The ma-
jority nevertheless finds that the requested information
was not presumptively relevant because it related to a
safety complaint the Union filed with a state regulatory
commission. Never mind that the requested information
concerned the safety of the Respondent’s employees.
Never mind that the Union resorted to the state commis-
sion only after nearly a year of fruitless requests for the
information from the Respondent. And never mind that
the Union also needed the information to investigate a
possible class-action grievance.
The stipulated record in this case presents a shameful
course of conduct where an employer blocked a union’s
every attempt to get information necessary to protect the
safety of the employees it represents. Yet, the majority
effectively condones this conduct by a hypertechnical
reading of the information request and by refusing to
consider the events preceding the request. I dissent.
Background
The Union and the Respondent have been parties to a
series of collective-bargaining agreements since 1970.
The most recent collective-bargaining agreement was
entered into on April 1, 2002, and will expire on March
31, 2005. Section 2.5(c) of the 2002 agreement reads in
pertinent part:

The Union and the Company agree to cooperate in
maintaining safe working conditions. No employee
shall be required to work under conditions or operate
equipment which does not meet the requirements of the
lawful orders of the State of California pertaining to
employee safety. . . .

A brief chronology of the parties’ correspondence con-
cerning the Union’s information requests provides con-
text to the underlying issue:

February 9, 20013—The Union sent the Respondent a
letter stating that it was investigating a class action
grievance about work not being performed throughout
Transmission and Storage which could “impact em-
ployee safety.” The Union requested the most recent
“Overdue Report” and “Backlog Report” for all work
units in Transmission and Storage. The Union also re-
quested “a list or copies of all Maximo orders that have
been closed, deleted and/or removed from the Maximo

2 E.g., Goodyear Atomic Corp., 266 NLRB 890, 891 (1983), enfd.
738 F.2d 155 (6th Cir. 1984).
3 All dates are in 2001 unless otherwise noted.
Backlog without all the work having been completed
by represented employees.”4
February 23—The Respondent acknowledged receipt
of the Union’s February 9 request and asked for the
Union to provide it with “specific employee safety con-
cerns as they relate to these reports.”
February 26—The Union forwarded a copy of its Feb-
ruary 9 request and asked that the Respondent “[p]lease
respond without further delay.”
June 8—The Union wrote the Respondent stating, inter
alia, that its February 9 letter explained “that safety
equipment at Goleta was 183 days past due for inspec-
tion.” Furthermore, the Union noted that it “is entitled
to information about represented employees’ workload,
whether it be in ‘backlog’ or in ‘deleted’ backlog.”
June 25—The Respondent acknowledged receipt of the
Union’s June 8 letter and requested that the Union pro-
vide it with “specific concerns as they relate to these
reports so [that the Respondent] can determine whether
or not there is relevance to” the request.
June 28—The Union reiterated what was stated in its
February 9 letter to the Respondent, and further ex-
plained that “the postponement of work tied to safety
systems (as well as simply not doing the work – as de-
leted backlogs will show) is a concern that everyone
should share.” The Union further asserted that if the
Respondent “continued to delay [the Union’s] receipt
of this material,” the Union would “file appropriate
complaints with the National Labor Relations Board
and the California Public Utilities Commission’s Safety
Branch.”
Having failed to receive the requested information
from the Respondent, the Union filed a formal safety
complaint with the California Public Utilities Commis-
sion5 (CPUC) regarding incomplete Maximo backlog
orders and deleted Maximo orders. By letter dated Feb-
ruary 20, 2002, the Union wrote the Respondent that it
had learned from the CPUC that Maximo orders were
never “deleted” from the system, but were merely “can-
celled” and thus still remained in the system. The Union
requested that the Respondent provide it with “copies of
all cancelled Maximo orders . . . for the last two years”
so that the Union could “intelligently represent the mem-

4 According to the Union’s unfair labor practice charge, “Maximo”
is a work order tracking system.
5 The California Public Utilities Commission regulates privately
owned electric, telecommunications, natural gas, water, and transporta-
tion companies, such as the Respondent. Among other things, the
CPUC establishes safety rules and monitors the safety of utility opera-
tions. See http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/static/aboutcpuc/index.htm.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 618
bers of the Union before the Commission.” By letter
dated February 27, 2002, the Respondent stated that it
was under no obligation to provide the requested infor-
mation because it had no relation to a grievance or to
general negotiations.
Analysis
Pursuant to Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, an employer has
an obligation to provide requested information needed by
the bargaining representative of its employees for the
effective performance of the representative’s duties and
responsibilities. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S.
432, 435–436 (1967). Where the requested information
concerns the terms and conditions of employment of bar-
gaining unit employees, the information is presumptively
relevant, and the employer has the burden of proving
lack of relevance. Contract Carriers Corp., 339 NLRB
851, 858 (2003) (citing A-Plus Roofing, Inc., 295 NLRB
967, 970 (1989), enfd. 147 LRRM 2662 (9th Cir. 1990)).
The health and safety of employees are terms and condi-
tions of employment, and thus information concerning
these matters is presumptively relevant. Minnesota Min-
ing & Mfg. Co., 261 NLRB 27, 29 (1982), enfd. sub
nom. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Local 6–418 v.
NLRB, 711 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
In light of the foregoing legal principles, the requested
information concerned unit employees’ terms and condi-
tions of employment, and thus was presumptively rele-
vant. The Respondent has not rebutted the presumption
of relevance. Therefore, the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) of the Act by not providing the requested infor-
mation to the Union.
The Union’s February 20, 2002 information request,
on its face, establishes the presumptive relevance of the
requested documents. That request stated:

As you are aware, the Union has filed a formal safety
complaint with the California Public Utilities Commis-
sion Safety Branch about incomplete Maximo Backlog
orders and deleted Maximo orders . . . . In order for me
to intelligently represent the members of the Union be-
fore the Commission I will need to see copies of these
“cancelled” orders. Therefore, please supply me with
copies of all cancelled Maximo orders for Transmission
and Storage for the last two years. [Emphasis added].

The Union’s letter plainly identified the requested informa-
tion as related to the safety of represented employees.
Therefore, the information sought was presumptively rele-
vant. Allied Mechanical Services, 332 NLRB 1600, 1612
(2001); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., supra. The majority
avoids this obvious conclusion by asserting that the mere
mention of safety is not enough. But what would have been
enough? Surely, a formal safety complaint against the Re-
spondent concerning its facility unambiguously asserts that
the safety of the Respondent’s employees is at issue. For
the majority to conclude otherwise merely places form over
substance.
The relevancy of the information sought is also shown
by the Union’s 2001 letters to the Respondent, which
“shed light” on the 2002 request. See Local Lodge No.
1424 v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 416 (1960) (“[E]arlier
events may be utilized to shed light on the true character
of matters occurring within the limitations period; and
for that purpose Sec. 10(b) ordinarily does not bar such
evidentiary use of anterior events.”). Those letters indi-
cate that the Union was investigating a grievance and
sought the Maximo orders to determine whether the
safety of its employees was at risk due to either: (1) cer-
tain work not being completed; or (2) the equipment not
being inspected. The June 28 letter also asserts that if the
Respondent does not provide the safety information, the
Union will “file appropriate complaints with the National
Labor Relations Board and the California Public Utilities
Commission’s Safety Branch.” This letter, which was
the last communication from the Union to the Respon-
dent prior to the Union’s February 20, 2002 request,
shows that the 2002 request was connected to, and in-
deed caused by, the Respondent’s refusal to provide
throughout 2001 the safety information the Union needed
in order to decide whether to file a grievance. In sum,
the 2001 letters, culminating with the June 28 letter,
show that the “true character” of the February 20, 2002
request within the 10(b) period was not simply, as the
majority contends, a request for information in connec-
tion with a matter before a state agency; it also was a
request that was intimately connected to the Union’s
failed attempts to obtain safety information relevant to
the investigation of a grievance.
The Respondent was aware, from the 2001 letters, that
the requested Maximo orders concerned a possible safety
grievance, and that the Union was contemplating filing a
safety complaint with the CPUC if the Respondent failed
to provide it. Thus, when the Union requested those
same Maximo orders in connection with a CPUC pro-
ceeding in its February 20, 2002 letter, the Respondent
well knew the relevance of the requested documents. It
nevertheless refused to provide the information in dero-
gation of its statutory obligation to do so.6
The refusal to provide presumptively relevant informa-
tion, standing alone, establishes a violation of Section

6 The majority excuses this misconduct because the Union’s Febru-
ary 20, 2002 letter did not make express reference to the Union’s 2001
attempts to obtain safety information related to a possible grievance.
Again, this approach places form over substance.
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA GAS CO. 619
8(a)(5). However, the Respondent also had a duty to
provide the requested information because of its rele-
vance to an existing contract provision.
A bargaining agent is entitled to information relevant
to the performance of its duty to police the administra-
tion of an existing agreement. Contract Carriers Corp.,
supra at 858; Western Massachusetts Electric Co., 234
NLRB 118 (1978). If the requested information relates
to an existing contract provision, it thus is “information
that is demonstrably necessary to the union if it is to per-
form its duty to enforce the agreement . . .” A-Plus Roof-
ing, Inc., 295 NLRB 967, 970 (1989), enfd. 147 LRRM
2662 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting A.S. Abell Co., 230 NLRB
1112–1113 (1977)).
Under section 2.5(c) of the parties’ 2002 collective-
bargaining agreement, employees have a right not “to
work under conditions or operate equipment which does
not meet the requirements of lawful orders of the State of
California pertaining to employee safety.” There is a
direct link between the Union’s pursuit of the safety
claim before the CPUC and section 2.5(c) of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement. By filing the safety com-
plaint with the state commission, the Union sought to
administer and police the employees’ important contrac-
tual right to a working environment that comports with
state safety requirements. Because the Respondent is
under a duty to provide information that is pertinent to
the Union’s enforcement of a provision of the collective-
bargaining agreement, see Acme Industrial, 385 U.S. at
435–438, the Respondent’s failure to provide the re-
quested information violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
The majority asserts that the Union’s 2002 information
request made no “suggestion of an attempt to enforce
section 2.5(c), or any other section of the collective-
bargaining agreement.” However, the Union pursued the
safety complaint with the CPUC on the basis of its role
as exclusive collective-bargaining representative charged
with the responsibility of protecting the employees con-
tractual right to safe working conditions. Further, the
Union clearly informed the Respondent that it was ap-
pearing before the CPUC in its representational capacity.
Thus, there was no need for the Union to specifically
reference the collective bargaining in its 2002 informa-
tion request.
The majority claims that the information was not re-
quested for the purposes of collective bargaining. The
majority is incorrect. Thus, under either theory discussed
above, it is obvious that the Union was seeking informa-
tion that will enable it to properly perform its duties as
collective-bargaining representative.7
CONCLUSION
For nearly a year, the Respondent placed obstacles in
the Union’s path to gaining presumptively relevant safety
information and to vigorously protecting the rights of the
employees it represents. The Board’s decision today
effectively encourages such stalling techniques and adds
yet another barrier. The information should have been
provided long ago. By failing to do so, the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, and it should
now be ordered to provide the Union with the requested
information.

7 The majority relies on WXON-TV, Inc., 289 NLRB 615, 617–618
(1988), enfd. 876 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1989). That case is totally inappo-
site, as it involved a union attempt to circumvent the Board’s rule
against prehearing discovery. See Union-Tribune Publishing Co., 307
NLRB 25, 26 (1992) (explaining rationale of WXON-TV, Inc.), enfd. 1
F.3d 486 (7th Cir. 1993).