Southeastern Stages, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 18, 1969

174 N.L.R.B. 585 (N.L.R.B. 1969)

SOUTHEASTERN STAGES, INC. 585
Southeastern Stages, Inc. and Amalgamated Transit
Union , Division 1493 and Maurice N. Bussey and
Union Local Division 1493, Amalgamated Transit
Union , AFL-CIO-CLC. Cases 10-C A-6990,
10-CA-7155-2, and 10-CA-7386
February 18, 1969
DECISION AND ORDER
By CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND ZAGORIA
On October 30, 1968, Trial Examiner John P. von
Rohr issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices, and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He
also found that the Respondent had not engaged in
other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint
and recommended that such allegations be
dismissed. Therafter, the Respondent filed
exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a
supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and
the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner.'
ORDER
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOHN P. VON ROHR, Trial Examiner- Upon charges,
duly filed, the General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board, by the Regional Director for Region 10
(Atlanta, Georgia), issued an order consolidating cases
and complaint on July 17, 1968,' against Southeastern
Stages, Inc., herein called the Respondent or the
Company, alleging that it had engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 51 Stat.
136, herein called the Act. The Respondent's answer
denies the allegations of unlawful conduct alleged in the
complaint.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held in Augusta,
Georgia, on July 31 and August 1, 1968. All parties were
represented by counsel and were afforded opportunity to
adduce evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses
and to file briefs. Briefs have been received from the
General Counsel and the Respondent and they have been
carefully considered.
Upon the entire record in this case and from my
observation of the witnesses, I hereby make the following:
L THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent is a Georgia corporation with its
principal office located in Atlanta, Georgia, and a
terminal located at Augusta, Georgia, where it is engaged
in the interstate transportation by motor vehicle of
passengers. During the 12 months preceding the issuance
of the complaint herein, Respondent derived gross revenue
in excess of $50,000 from the interstate transportation of
passengers.
The Respondent concedes, and I find, that it is engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
IL THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Union Local Division 1493, Amalgamated Transit
Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, herein called the Union, is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and
orders that the Respondent, Southeastern Stages,
Inc., Atlanta, Georgia, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.
'we agree with the Trial Examiner that the Settlement Agreement here
involved did not, in the circumstances of this case , bar litigation of the
presettlement 8(a)(l) allegations It is well settled that independent or
continuing violations of the Act constitute a breach of the settlement
agreement and justify the Regional Director in setting aside the agreement
and proceeding with a complaint which covers both the presettlement and
postsettlement violations . Cf. Lion Knitting Mills Co., 160 NLRB 801,
804; Nitro Super Market , Inc., 161 NLRB 505; International Brotherhood
of Teamsters , Chauffeurs , Workmen and Helpers of America, General
Drivers and Helpers, Local 554, AFL-CIO v. N.L.R B, 262 F 2d 456, fn.
2 at 459, 461 (C.A D.C.), enfg 116 NLRB 1891
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Prefatory Statement
The Respondent, engaged in bussing passengers to
various points in Georgia and South Carolina, has
terminals in Augusta and Atlanta, Georgia, and employs
approximately 55 bus drivers. Beginning on about April
12, 1967, the Union commenced an organizing campaign
among Respondent's bus driver employees. Thereafter the
Union lost a Board conducted representation election
which was held at the Atlanta terminal on August 2 and
at the Augusta terminal on August 3, 1967.
Maurice M. Bussey was discharged by the Respondent
on November 15, 1967, and Paul Hammock was
discharged on April 27, 1968. The complaint alleges that
'This complaint consolidated the allegations in a previous complaint
issued by the Regional Director on July 9, 1968 , in Case 10-CA-6990 and
Case 10-CA-7155-2 The charges involved in the instant hearing were filed
on June l4, 1967, August 4, 1967, and on June 4, 1968.
174 NLRB No. 85
586 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
each of these employees, both bus drivers, were discharged
by the Respondent in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
of the Act, and further, that Respondent engaged in
conduct independently violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
B The Discharge of Maurice M. Bussey
Bussey was employed by Respondent at the Augusta
terminal as a bus driver from July 3, 1960, until his
discharge on November 15, 1967. He signed a union
authorization card on April 12, 1967. Although he also
spoke to other employees in favorable behalf of the
Union, there is no direct evidence that this activity or his
signing a union card came to the attention of the
Company.
Odell D. Shipman, Sr., is the Augusta manager and
supervisor of the drivers who work out of this terminal.
Bussey testified that on about June 5, 1967, during a
telephone conversation, Shipman asked if he was aware
that the Union was about to have an election and that he
replied in the affirmative. Bussey said that Shipman then
asked if he could depend on him for cooperation on the
Company's behalf. Although Bussey did not recall his
reply, he testified that Shipman then asked if he was
aware that he could borrow money from the Company
-without interest. The conversation then turned to a trip
assignment. When asked on direct examination, Shipman
denied that on June 5 he asked Bussey if he could depend
upon him for cooperation. On cross-examination he said
he did not recall having a conversation with Bussey on
June 5. As will be later set forth, this is not the only
instance where Shipman discussed the Union with Bussey
and there are additional instances where Shipman and
other supervisors discussed this subject with other
employees. Bussey impressed me as a believable witness
and I credit his testimony as aforesaid.
Bussey testified that on August 1 he had a second
conversation with Shipman, Sr. while having coffee with
Charlie McDaniel, another of Respondent's bus drivers, in
the cafeteria of the Greyhound station.2 Bussey testified
that Shipman, Sr., came up and stated, "Bussey, I don't
guess I'll see you anymore before the election, but I just
want to tell you that I sure wish you would change your
mind." According to Bussey, Shipman, Sr., then suggested
that he go down the street to the Trailways station and
compare salaries, stating that he then would be satisfied
and that he was making "a good average salary."
Shipman concluded by stating that "most of our drivers
are loyal drivers and I'm sure you can understand the'
circumstances." On direct examination , Shipman, Sr.,
denied that on August 1 he told Bussey he hoped that
Bussey would change his mind. On cross-examination, he
recalled having a conversation on about August 1 while
Bussey and McDaniel were in the cafeteria. He said that
at the time he sat at the table having coffee with these two
employees but that he only remembered stating to Bussey,
"If I don't see you again before the election, I hope we
can count on your support." McDaniel, who was called as
a Respondent witness, testified that there was no
conversation, as such, at the cafeteria on August 1.
However, he testified that as he and Bussey were getting
up from the table to leave, Shipman, Sr., came up and
told Bussey that "he didn't believe he would see him again
before the election and he hoped that he would see fit to
vote for his side at the election." McDaniel testified that
Shipman, Sr., did not make any of the other statements
attributed to him by Bussey. It appeared to me that
Bussey had a very good recollection of this conversation
and I credit his testimony concerning it.
A third conversation involving Bussey and Shipman,
Sr., took place at Respondent's Augusta office on August
3, the day of the election, about 2 hours before the polls
closed. C. A. Clifford, whose supervisory status is at issue
herein,3 was also present and A. L. Shelton, a Respondent
bus driver, was present for the first part of the
conversation. Bussey's version of the conversation which
occurred at this time is as follows: Shipman, Sr., began by
stating, "I sure do wish you fellows would have gone to
Atlanta and talked this over with my brother and ironed
out your difficulties, and then if you could not have gotten
the raises or benefits that you wanted, then you could
have took such a step as you are taking today."4 He then
went on to tell Bussey that Bussey had only one car when
he first knew him but that he now had two cars and a
brick home. Continuing, Shipman added that he knew for
a fact that Bussey would never have the same salary as a
Greyhound driver. He then stated, "Bussey, if this election
does go in favor of the Company, you will have to be a
perfect driver in order to hold your job." At about this
point Clifford spoke up, stating that he recalled when
drivers earned 3 cents per mile and he did not see why
anyone should complain about their present salary. Bussey
thereupon brought up the subject of driver pensions and
commented "the year I draw $127 a month will be the
year 1995." Thus Bussey's testimony concerning this
conversation. When asked about this conversation on
direct examination, Shipman, Sr., testified as follows:
Q. I'll ask you if on August 3, 1967, in a
conversation with Mr. Bussey and, perhaps, Mr.
Clifford, did you say if the election goes in favor of the
company you will have to be a perfect driver?
A. No, sir, I don't remember.
Q. Did you at any time say anything like that to Mr.
Bussey?
A. No, sir, I did not.
When asked about the August 3 conversation on
cross-examination, Shipman, Sr., said, "I had a
conversation with a lot of drivers, because they were all
there that day, and I don't remember exactly what was
said." C. A. Clifford, who testified for the Respondent,
said that he heard "quite a bit of conversation among
different drivers . on election day, Mr. Bussey
included." He testified that most of the discussion
concerned the mechanics of the election and that he did
not hear Shipman tell Bussey that he would have to be a
perfect driver if the election went in form of the
Company. From my observation of the witnesses,- I
believe that Bussey was truthful in relating the August 3
conversation and I accept his version concerning it.
Further relevant to Bussey's case is the testimony of
Charles T. Brumbeloe, employed by the Respondent as a
driver at its Atlanta terminal from November 21, 1965, to
September 12, 1967, when he was discharged. Brumbeloe
said that he had a conversation with Shipman, Sr., in
May 1967. Concerning this conversation, Brumbeloe
testified, "All it was, he was telling his side; that he was
against the union, and I was telling my side that I was for
the union and we were just bumping heads on our
'Although the Respondent shares the use of Greyhound's facilities, this is
not its headquarters in Augusta.
'Clifford is a mechanic but also relieves Shipman , Sr., when the latter is
absent The issue of Clifford' s status is discussed hereinafter
'The reference to the brother of Shipman, Sr , is to A. C. Shipman, the
president of the Company who is stationed in Atlanta.
SOUTHEASTERN STAGES, INC. 587
feelings." According to Brumbeloe, he 'had a second
conversation with Shipman, Sr., on August 2,
approximately 18 or 19 hours before the election in
Atlanta This occurred in a shop located across the street
from the bus station in Augusta. As to this conversation,
Brumbeloe testified, "It was just more or less going into
detail about how we felt about the union campaign, and
the people who were for it, and so forth. Of course, I
didn't say. He made some guesses, and so that's all that
discussion was." Brumbeloe testified that he had a third
conversation with Shipman, Sr., on about the third day
following the election in Atlanta. This occurred after he
pulled into the Augusta bus station. According to
Brumbeloe, Shipman, Sr., called him over to where he
was standing after the passengers got off the bus.
Brumbeloe testified that Shipman was angry and that the
following conversation then ensued: Shipman, Sr., began
by asking, "How come you went and told this stuff we
were talking about?" He then stated that charges had been
filed against him for talking union to Brumbeloe prior to
the 24-hour preelection period. Brumbeloe denied
Shipman's charge, stating that he "didn't tell anybody
about our conversation." Shipman stated, "You had to
because nobody heard our conversation. We were the only
two who had it; nobody was around." Brumbeloe again
denied that he had mentioned anything about the
conversation. Shipman thereupon stated, "If I knew you
said anything about that I would get you. I'm going to get
Bussey." Again denying that he had said anything,
Brumbeloe finally told Shipman, "As far as that goes, I
can stay squared away long enough while I come in this
bus station in Augusta that you won't have any reason to
fire me, and I'll be in and out before that could happen."
Shipman, Sr., did not deny discussing the Union with
Brumbeloe in May and on August 2, 1957, as Brumbeloe
testified. Concerning Brumbeloe's testimony with respect
to the conversation on about the third day after the
Atlanta election, Shipman, Sr., denied being aware of any
charges or objections filed against the Company at that
time. Other than this, his sole testimony concerning this
matter was as follows: (on direct examination)
Q. Did you have a conversation with Mr. Brumbeloe
at about that time in which you stated, if anything
happens, I am going to get Bussey?
A. No, sir, I did not say that.
Brumbeloe impressed me as being an honest and
forthright witness. I do not believe that he fabricated his
testimony concerning the conversation with Shipman, Sr.,
following the election. Furthermore, lending plausibility to
Brumbeloe's testimony is that fact that (1) Brumbeloe's
testimony concerning his conversation with Shipman, Sr.,
on the day before the election is undenied, and (2) an
unfair labor practice charge alleging a violation of Section
8(a)(l) of the Act was in fact filed against the Respondent
on August 4, 1967, a factor which ties in with the
conversation as testified to by Brumbeloe.s I credit
Brumbeloe's testimony conversation as narrated above.
Bussey was discharged about 4 p.m. on November 15,
1967. It is undisputed that at this time Shipman advised
Bussey that he had orders from Wilmer S. Dixon, the
supervisor of drivers in Atlanta, that he be discharged for
unsatisfactory work. When Bussey asked for an
explanation of the unsatisfactory work, Shipman, Sr.,
replied, according to Bussey's undenied testimony, that it
was "because of this transmission deal and other things."
'This charge was filed in Case 10-CA-6990. The Union did not, however,
file objections to the election.
Bussey also testified without contradiction that he told
Shipman, Sr., "You know this all involves around the fact
that I wanted to join the union," to which Shipman
responded, "I sure hope that you can get a job that is
union." Later that day Bussey telephoned Shipman, Sr.,
and requested a letter stating the reason for his discharge.
This was furnished him in a letter dated November 17,
1967, which stated as follows:
Mr M. N. Bussey
1810 Courtney Drive
North Augusta, S. C. 29841
Dear Mr. Bussey:
Recently you were checked at night and for a distance
of more than twenty miles, you were running beyond
the speed limit and driving recklessly. We have reports
from the State Highway Department showing you
record since 1960. For a period of one month in 1966,
your driver's license was suspended, but you did not tell
us and you continued to drive during this period. About
two weeks ago you damaged a transmission to
approximately $1,000.00 by running it without oil, and
you failed to report this on the shop card in the bus.
A record such as this is justifiable reason for discharge.
Very truly yours,
SOUTHEASTERN STAGES, INC.
A. C. Shipman
The reasons given Bussey for his discharge in the above
letter are essentially the same as those advanced by the
Respondent at the hearing as its defense to the alleged
discrimination against him. In presenting its case as to
Bussey, Respondent first introduced in evidence a
typewritten memorandum which Shipman, Sr., said he
prepared after having followed a bus driven by Bussey in
his own car on August 29. This memorandum, the
contents of which were not refused by Bussey, is set forth
in its entirety as follows:
M. N. Bussey
August 29, 1967
I followed bus 198 driver M. N. Bussey from Lurnpkin
road on highway 25 at 10:00 A.M. to Augusta, Ga.
arriving at 10:13 A.M. from Lumpkin road to Tubman
home rd. is 40 M.P.H. speed limit, top speed of bus
was 57 M.P.H. From Tubman home rd. to Augusta the
speed limit is 40 and 45 M.P.H. top speed of bus in 45
mile limit was 55 M.P.H. The blinker lights was on
while slowing down for RR crossing, did not come to
full stop at RR crossing. Traffic was light and he did
not change lanes many times.
O. D. Shipman
About October 31, 1967, Shipman, Sr., requested C. A.
Clifford, Jr., to accompany him because he wanted to
check Bussey while he was on the road. Clifford testified
that Shipman stated that this time he wanted to use a
truck because Bussey might recognize his (Shipman's) car.
Clifford further said, "He [Shipman] was not familiar
with the driving of a truck and he hadn't had much
experience in it, and he asked me to drive for him." The
results of this observation were reported in a letter dated
October 31, 1967, which Shipman, Sr., sent to A. C.
Shipman, the Company's president, in Atlanta. (Bussey
did not refute the statements made in this letter.)
588 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Dear Sir:
At 7:10 P.M. October 30, 1967 about two miles east of
Beech Island, S. C. on highway 278 we were traveling
at 50 M.P.H. when bus 179 came up behind the pick-up
truck that we were traveling in. The bus followed us
about 2 miles at the same speed, he then made a stop to
let a passenger off. We reduced speed to 40 M.P.H. the
bus caught us and past us. Then we increased our speed
to 60 M.P.H. and the bus left us behind. The bus
stopped at intersection of highways 19 & 278 (Johnson's
Cross Rd.) to let off a passenger and we were able to
catch up with the bus. The bus continued east on
highway 278, attaining a speed of 70 M.P.H. We
followed the bus at an average speed of 70 M.P.H. on
highway 278 to a point 2 miles east of it's junction with
highway 781.
We observed the bus from 7:10 P.M. to 7:32 P.M. The
bus traveled 22 miles in 22 minutes, for an average
speed of 60 M.P.H. It was dark and the speed limit was
55 M P.H.
Bus No. 179
Driver - M. N. Bussey
Schedule leaving Augusta at 6:45 P.M. to Savannah,
G a.
Signed /s/ O. D.
Shipman, Sr.
Signed /s/ C. A. Clifford,
Jr
On November 12, 1967, Bussey was operating a bus
from Charleston, South Carolina, to Augusta, Georgia.
After having traveled about 52 miles, Bussey testified that
the oil light on the dashboard turned red. Bussey said that
upon observing this danger signal he disengaged the gear
from high to neutral and coasted to the bus agency in St.
George, South Carolina, which was about 100 yards from
where the light came on. When Bussey got out and
checked the transmission he found the dust pan to be
covered with oil and that the oil plug had come out. He
thereupon telephoned Shipman, Sr., in Augusta to apprize
him of the situation and to ask for advice. Shipman said
that he would have C. A. Clifford, the mechanic, call him
back. Clifford did so shortly later and told Bussey to add
enough oil to fill the crankcase and to check the engine to
see if it was working properly. Bussey followed these
instructions and then proceeded to drive to Augusta.
According to Bussey, the red light did not come on again
and the engine appeared to operate in a normal condition.
Clifford was on the scene when Bussey arrived in Augusta.
He asked Bussey if the bus operated satisfactorily and
Bussey said that it had. Clifford testified that "I checked
the level of the oil and the transmission, and it was full."
Clifford thereupon tightened the oil plug and told Bussey's
relief driver to take the bus on to Atlanta. At this point it
should be noted that each bus has a "shop card" which
stays with it at all times. Bussey noted on this card that
he had put in 9 quarts of oil at St. George. Before the bus
left the Augusta station on its way to Atlanta, Clifford
further noted on the shop card, "Change oil in the
transmission on this bus, it does not have the same oil
that we use."
The driver assigned to drive the bus from Augusta to
Atlanta was J. C. Young. Called as a Respondent's
witness, Young testified that after having driven a few
hundred feet from the Augusta station he had trouble
shifting from one gear to another and that he heard some
noise in the transmission. When asked why he did not
turn around at this point, Young testified, "If Mr.
Clifford hadn't been around and checked the oil, and him
being the shop foreman, I would have, but he had already
advised me to take it onto Atlanta." Clifford did proceed
to Atlanta and upon arrival noted on the shop card: "I
don't believe this transmission will stay in bus much
longer. Try it out." As indicated hereinafter, the
transmission was replaced a few days later.
C. Additional Facts; Conclusions as to Bussey's
Discharge
Wilmer S. Dixon, the supervisor of drivers at the
Atlanta station, testified that it was he who recommended
that Bussey be discharged. Dixon's reasons for reaching a
decision to make this recommendation were given by him
as follows: Dixon said that he received the reports of
August 29 and October 31 concerning Bussey which
Shipman, Sr., had sent to the Atlanta office. He testified
that after receiving the latter report he checked Bussey's
file and ascertained "that he had one account of speeding
on the New Jersey turnpike. 116 Dixon said that he
thereupon decided to check Bussey's record with the
Georgia State Highway Patrol. He testified that he made
this check about 2 or 4 days after receipt of Shipman's
October 31 report. It is undisputed that the records of the
Highway Patrol reflected that Bussey had received fines
varying from $10 to $25 for four speeding offenses, these
having occurred one each in 1960, 1965, 1966 and the
latest in July 1967. In addition, the records reflected that
his chauffeur's license from the State of Georgia was
suspended for 1 month beginning on January 17, 1966.
Bussey admittedly drove a bus for the Respondent during
this period without reporting the suspension to the
Company.'
Dixon testified that on November 13 or 14 he was
advised by E. C. Shipman, the foreman of the repair and
parts shop in Atlanta, that the transmission in Bus 196
had been burned up and that Bussey had driven it without
oil.' Dixon testified that as soon as he received this report
he took Bussey's file to the office and "discussed
everything" with President A C. Shipman. He said, "I
recommend discharging him, which Mr. Shipman okayed
it." While still in the office of the president, Dixon
telephoned Shipman, Sr., in Augusta and instructed him
that Bussey be discharged.
I turn now to my conclusions. Considering first the
matter of company knowledge, it has heretofore been
noted that there is an absence of direct evidence to show
that the Company was aware of Bussey 's signing a union
card or that he espoused the Union's cause to other
employees. However, there is evidence which establishes,
as I find, that Respondent in fact knew or at least
suspected that Bussey was a pro-union adherent. This is
shown by (1) the statement by Shipman, Sr., to Bussey on
August 1, in the context of the entire conversation, that he
wished Bussey would change his mind, and (2) the
statement of Shipman, Sr., on August 3, the day of the
election, that he wished Bussey and other employees
would have spoken to his brother in Atlanta before
"taking a step as you are taking today." Further
indicative of Respondent's knowledge or suspicion that
Bussey testified that this occurred in 1962 and that he was questioned
about it at the time.
'Although Bussey retained a South Carolina driver's license at this time,
quite obviously this would not eliminate the requirement that he also have
a Georgia chauffeur 's license while driving a bus in Georgia.
E. C. Shipman (who did not testify at the hearing) is the son of
President A C. Shipman
SOUTHEASTERN STAGES, INC. 589
Bussey was a pro-union adherent was Shipman, Sr.'s
statement to Bussey on August 1 that he would have to be
a perfect driver if the Union won the election and
Shipman's threat to Brumbeloe shortly after the election
that he was going to "get Bussey."
Upon the entire record, I am persuaded and find that
Respondent gave meaning to its threat to "get Bussey" by
discharging him and that this action was taken for the
purpose of discouraging further union activity and
membership among its employees, In reaching this
conclusion, I first of all think it more than coincidence
that Shipman, Sr., would take it upon himself to conduct
a personal check of Bussey's driving on August 29 and
again on October 31. Aside from any checks made by
company personnel, Respondent has a policy of checking
its drivers through an outside agency which employs its
own checkers. It appears that this is its normal and usual
practice when making any such checks.' Although
Shipman, Sr., testified that he also checked drivers as to
their method of driving, he testified that he did this only
on those occasions "just when its my convenience, and I
think a driver - I get any report a driver driving,
anything other than careful. I make a check on him "
(Emphasis supplied.) Significantly, Smith did not give any
such reason for checking Bussey within 3 weeks after the
election, nor did he offer any other explanation therefor.
Further, in view of the unusual precautions which
Shipman, Sr., took in checking Bussey for the second time
on October 31, the evidence strongly suggests that he was
indeed attempting to build up a record against this
employee. As Respondent witness Clifford testified,
Shipman, who was not familiar with driving a truck, had
him (Clifford) drive the truck to follow Bussey in order to
avoid detection. From Clifford's testimony it is clear that
this was a most unusual procedure.10
Upon receiving the reports concerning Bussey from
Shipman, Sr., Dixon went to the Georgia State Patrol
where he was furnished with Bussey's record of traffic
violations." Although Bussey was not discharged
immediately upon receipt of this information, Dixon's
letter to Bussey asserts that this was a factor in his
discharge. The most serious infraction by Bussey was his
failure to report to the Respondent that his Georgia
chauffeur's license was suspended for 1 month in January
1966. However, Bussey was not the only driver who was
guilty of this infraction, for subsequent to his check on
Bussey, Dixon wrote to the Georgia State Patrol and
asked for the traffic reports of Respondent's other drivers.
He was then apprized that two other drivers had driven
while their Georgia chauffeur's license were under
suspension. These' employees were not terminated,
although Dixon said that he issued each a letter of
warning.' z As to various other traffic violations, such as
speeding, Dixon conceded that "numerous" other
Respondent drivers received tickets or summons for such
offenses. While testifying that "their record wasn't nothing
like Bussey's record" the Respondent offered no
documentary evidence, as it did in the case of Bussey, to
'As Dixon testified, "As far as the checker , I know the man that is head
of the [outside ] company . I call the Company and tell them to put a
checker on a certain bus leaving Atlanta, and he may go to Charleston.
Actually, I don't know who the driver is or anything about him."
"When asked if there was any particular reason why he checked Bussey
on October 31, Shipman, Sr , replied, "No, sir, no other than a routine
check." Clearly, the circumstances related above reflect that was not just a
"routine check."
Further, I think it strange that Shipman, Sr., did not warn or talk to
Bussey about the deficiencies noted in his August 29 report.
substantiate this testimony. In the absence of such
evidence, which surely was available to the Respondent,
there is no real basis for affording a comparison of
Bussey 's record with that of Respondent's other drivers.
Accordingly, I am constrained to give little weight to
Dixon's conclusionary testimony as aforesaid.
From the testimony of Dixon as previously related, it is
clear that Respondent utilized the transmission incident as
the asserted basis for the discharge of Bussey. Thus,
Dixon testified that he initiated steps to discharge Bussey
when advised by Edwin Shipman, the shop foreman, that
the transmission in the bus driven by Bussey had been
burned up and that Bussey "ran it without oil" Upon
consideration of the precipitous manner in which
Respondent thus discharged Bussey, I am convinced that
this incident was in fact utilized as a pretext to get rid of
Bussey, but was not the true motivation therefor. As to
my basis for this conclusion, some further facts are here
in order. It is undisputed that the actual work of replacing
the transmission in the bus was performed by E. P.
Milligan, the assistant shop foreman in Atlanta. Milligan
testified that the damage to the transmission had been
caused from a lack of oil. He said that he checked the
transmission and ascertained the damage only because he
noted the notation of driver Young on the bus shop card
to the effect that something was wrong with the
transmission . Milligan did not talk to Bussey or Young
but merely reported to Shop Foreman E. C. Shipman that
the transmission was burned out due to lack of oil.
Significantly, E. C. Shipman was not called upon to
testify by the Respondent, the record consisting only of
the aforementioned testimony by Dixon as to the report
he received from E. C. Shipman which led to his decision
to terminate Bussey. I do not doubt but that E. C.
Shipman ascertained from the shop card that Bussey
added 12 quarts of oil.' 3 This, however, was hardly a basis
for concluding that Bussey was responsible for the damage
to the transmission. In fact, other than the notation on the
shop card, the record does not reflect that Respondent
made any investigation to determine the cause of the
damage or who in fact was responsible therefor. I do note,
however, that Respondent asserts in its brief that E. C.
Shipman checked with Clifford in Augusta concerning the
matter and in so doing points to the following testimony
of Clifford:
"As previously shown, the August 29 report was in the form of a
memorandum whereas the October 31 report was in the form of a letter to
A C. Shipman from Shipman , Sr When asked to explain the different
nature of these reports, Shipman, Sr , testified , "Well, I think the reason is
there, anything minor I just drop a note taken from him, put it in his file,
but if it's a serious nature, then I go into it further, you know."
"These employees were Harvey Smith , Jr., and Bobby Holmes. After
receiving the warnings , these employees made a further check with the
Georgia State Patrol . Smith subsequently furnished Dixon with a letter
from the patrol reflecting that he had been suspended for 3 days rather
than for 2 months Holmes later furnished Dixon with a letter from the
patrol reflecting that the revocation of his license had been m error.
Nevertheless , it is clear that Respondent 's action in warning these
employees was taken on the information initially furnished it by the
Georgia State Patrol and prior to the corrections with which it was
subsequently furnished
Respondent also points out that it knew Smith to be active m the Union
but that it did not discharge him for this offense However, it is well
settled that the retention of some union adherents does not exculpate it for
discrimination against others . N.L.R.B. v W C. Nabors Company, 196
F 2d 272, 276 (C.A. 5).
"Milligan testified that E C Shipman was present when he made a test
to determine whether the oil light was operative after the new transmission
was installed.
590 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Q. Mr. Clifford, after November 12th, did you have
an occasion to again talk to Mr. Bussey about this
transmission incident?
A. Yes. Mr. Shipman called me and/or told me that
he wanted me to ask Bussey how far he drove that bus
after that red light came on.
Q. When was this, do you recall?
A. Well, I went over there, it was either the first or
second day after this occurred, I went over to the
station and saw Mr. Bussey over there. It was late in
the evening, and I just asked him, and he says, you
know, how far he drove after the light came on? He
said, well, I was coming into St. George and as I
approached the traffic light, said, I got a green light
and the light came on and I pushed it out of gear and
coasted to the station, which was a distance of about
the length of a football field; oh, about a hundred
yards
However, from the above testimony, including that
which preceded it, I am not at all sure whether Clifford
was referring to E. C. Shipman or to his immediate
superior in Augusta, Shipman, Sr.14 As indicated, E. C.
Shipman did not testify. But assuming arguendo that
Clifford was in fact referring to E. C. Shipman in his
above testimony, Clifford did not say that he subsequently
conveyed the result of this discussion to E. C. Shipman.
Moreover, even if he did, there is nothing he learned from
Bussey in the purported conversation that would
reasonably reflect that Bussey was negligent or that he
drove the bus at any length without oil. Indeed, it was
driver Young who relieved Bussey at Augusta and noted
on the shop card that there was some trouble with the
transmission. If Respondent was truly interested in fixing
the responsibility, why then did it not check with Young?
Further, Young testified that he had trouble shifting gears
within a block of leaving the Augusta terminal on his way
to Atlanta, yet he did not turn back. From what the
record discloses, I think it reasonable to believe that
Young was more responsible for any negligible damage to
the transmission than Bussey.
In short, and in view of all the foregoing, I am
convinced and find that Respondent, without having
conducted any investigation as to the responsiblity (or
lack thereof) for the damage to the transmission, seized
upon this incident to rid itself of Bussey When this is
coupled with Shipman, Sr.'s threat that the employees
would have to be "perfect drivers" if the Union won the
election, his threat that he intended to get rid of Bussey,
and the heretofore described unusual circumstances of his
trailing Bussey following the election, it becomes further
evident, and I find, that Respondent's discharge of Bussey
was motivated principally by his known or suspected
union activity and that Respondent thereby violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.15
D. The Discharge of Paul Hammock
Paul Hammock was employed as a bus driver out of
the Augusta terminal from August 6, 1943, to April 27,
1968. His discharge by the Respondent on the latter date
is alleged to have been in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of
"Bussey testified that he did not have any recollection of any such
discussion with Clifford.
"The more existence of a lawful cause will not justify a discharge if the
motivating , dominant , or substantial reason behind the discharge is a
discriminatory one. N L.R B V. Longhorn Transfer Service, Inc, 346 F 2d
1003, 1006 (C.A 5); N.L.K.B v. Symons Mfg., Co., 328 F 2d 835 (C.A.
7), N L R. B. v. Lexington Chair Co., 361 F 2d 283, 295 (C.A. 6).
the Act.
Hammock signed a union authorization card and spoke
to other drivers in favor of the Union during the
organizational campaign. He testified that he had a
conversation with Shipman, Sr. concerning the Union
several weeks before the election which went as follows.
Well, Mr. Shipman asked me about the Union; what I
thought of it? And I just told him we needed more
pension money. We needed a better pension plan. We
needed' more fringe beneifts . . . . He just asked how I
felt about it. I don't remember my answer I gave him. I
gave him something, I couldn't say exactly what it was.
Hammock impressed me as an honest witness.
Although Shipman, Sr., testified that he never asked
Hammock how he felt about the Union, I credit
Hammock's testimony as set forth above. J. W. Hughes is
chairman of the board of directors of the Respondent
Company. Although Hughes lives in Atlanta, it is
undisputed that about a week or two before the election
he came to Augusta at which time he had a talk with
Hammock. Hammock testified that on this occasion be
was at home when he received a telephone call in the
morning from Hughes asking him to come down to the
garage. Hammock said that he came down in the early
part of the afternoon, that Hughes then called him over to
the middle of the garage outside the presence of other
employees, and that the following conversation took place.
He just asked me if I was going along with the
company on this union. I said that's up to me, but I
think we needed better pension; we needed more fringe
benefits, and we have got two supervisors we don't need
. He told me that they were working on a pension
plan and had been working on it for several months, but
other than that, that's about what it amounted to.
Hughes testified that the above conversation began
when Hammock came up to him in the garage and said,
"You're not down here checking up on me; you know
damn well I'm for the Company." Hughes said he then
asked Hammock, "Paul, what's wrong. As I understand it
a lot of these boys are talking union. I said, what's wrong
with Southeastern Stages? I'd like to know. If we are not
operating as we should and treating our employees like we
should, we'd like, to know what the complaint would be."
Hughes said that Hammock then raised complaints about
the Company's retirement plan and that he also
complained about Supervisor Dixon. I credit Hammock's
version of this conversation. Conceding that he telephoned
Hammock at home on this occasion, Hughes testified that
he did so "more or less to pass the time of day with him."
Although first also conceding that he asked Hammock to
come down, he then changed this by stating that
Hammock asked where he was calling from and then said
that he would be right down. I have no hesitation in
crediting Hammock that he did not volunteer to come
down, but that he was asked to do so by Hughes. Aside
from my observation of the witnesses, I can hardly believe
that the chairman of the board of directors would come
from Atlanta to Augusta a week before the election and
go to the bother of calling an employee at home just to
pass the time of day.
Aside from an accident which occurred on April 22,
1967, which Respondent asserts was the reason for his
discharge, Hammock's record while employed with the
Respondent was as follows: He was suspended for 1 week
in April 1960, this due to an accident in which he was
involved. Also because of an accident, he was suspended
again for 2 days in October 1960. In October 1963, he
SOUTHEASTERN STAGES, INC. 591
was suspended for 3 weeks for drinking In September
1967, Hammock received a verbal warning from Shipman,
Sr.. for violating a company rule which prohibits drivers
from smoking while driving. On March 3, 1968,
Respondent received a report from an outside checking
agency that Hammock had again violated the no smoking
rule. However, he did not receive any reprimand on this
latter occasion.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, it is
noteworthy that several days after his discharge
Hammock received a safety award of $37.50 (as
alternative for a U.S. Savings bond) and also an 18-year
safety pin. While the record is not exactly clear as to the
criteria for the safety award, it appears that this is
awarded at yearly intervals to drivers who are not
involved in chargeable accidents during the year. It is
undisputed that Hammock's last award was earned prior
to his discharge and was due him on April 10, 1958. As to
the 18-year safety pin, this is given to drivers who have
driven a total of 18 years without a chargeable accident,
but this need not be for -18 consecutive years. Concerning
Hammock's 24 years of employment up to the time of the
accident which occurred on April 22, 1967, Respondent's
view of his record, as stated in its brief, is that "Such a
record is not too bad, but neither is it very outstanding."
There is no dispute as to the accident in which
Hammock became involved on April 22, 1968, the facts
concerning which were conceded by Hammock. At the
time in question, Hammock was driving a bus behind an
automobile driven by a lady driver when a school bus
approached from the opposite direction. The school bus
stopped and so did the lady driver. Hammock, however,
was unable to stop his bus in time and collided with the
rear of the passenger car driven by the lady ahead of him.
Although Hammock claimed that the school bus stopped
suddenly and without warning, it is obvious that
Hammock either followed the passenger vehicle too
closely and/or did not have his bus under control, else he
would not have struck the vehicle ahead of him. And
while Hammock testified that there was very little
damage, he conceded that there was "a dent in her
bumper and a dent in my bumper."
Hammock reported the above accident in accordance
with company rules. By letter dated April 24, 1968, an
attorney representing the lady driver advised the
Respondent that he was being retained by her and would
file a claim for personal injury and property damage.
On the evening after the accident, April 22, Hammock
received a telephone call from Shipman, Sr., advising that,
pursuant to instructions from Dixon, he was not to go out
on another run until further word was received from the
Atlanta office. On April 27, 1968, Hammock was called
to the office in Augusta and was advised by Shipman, Sr.,
that he was being terminated. At this time Shipman, Sr.,
showed him a letter he received from A. C. Shipman
which stated that his record had been reviewed and that
he was to be discharged because of the April 22 accident
which involved a school bus.16 -
Dixon, who was responsible for the decision to
terminate Hammock, testified that this action was taken
because the Company regarded any chargeable accidents
involving a school bus as a very serious offense.
Concerning the accident of April 22, Dixon testified, "if
"This letter contained instructions that Hammock , be discharged and
stated, inter alia . "His record shows that he has had other rear-end
collisions , but this recent rear-end collision is particularly bad on account
of the involvement."
the car hadn't been there it could have been a kid crossing
the road."
Thus the facts, as I find them, with respect to the entire
circumstances of Hammock's discharge. While the
circumstances here might indicate that Respondent acted
unreasonably or unfairly in terminating Hammock, an
employee who had been with the Company for over 24
years, I am unable to conclude on the basis of the
evidence before me that this action was prompted by
Hammock's union activities. Although Hammock signed a
union card and spoke in favor of the union campaign,
there is no evidence whatsoever that Respondent had
knowledge of any such activity. Even if it be assumed that
Respondent suspected him of being a prounion adherent,"
the fact remains that Hammock's discharge did not occur
until approximately 9 months after the representation
election. There is no claim that any union activity was
taking place at this time and I do not believe that the
record warrants a finding that Respondent harbored any
animosity toward this employee because of any union
activity for this length of time. In addition, and while I
have discredited certain testimony of Respondent
witnesses, I am unable to conclude that Respondent does
not view an accident involving a school bus (where as
here, its driver was quite apparently at fault) as a major
offense 11 Accordingly, and while the case is not above
suspicion, I conclude and find that the General Counsel
has not sustained his burden of proof that Hammock was
also a victim of discrimination. It is therefore
recomiisended that the 8(a)(1) and (3) allegation as to this
employee be dismissed."
E. Interference, Restraint , and Coercion
In addition to contemporaneous conduct which
occurred in connection with the discharges as heretofore
described, the evidence discloses the following:
In about the first part of January 1967, Dixon asked
driver Charles Brumbeloe if anyone had been talking
union to him. When Brumbeloe replied in the affirmative,
Dixon asked him who it was. Brumbeloe answered that it
had been some Greyhound drivers. Dixon then asked if it
had been any of Respondent's employees and Brumbeloe
responded that they were not involved.'"
Robert C. Shelton, employed as a driver with the
Respondent from November 1965 to September 1967,
testified that about 5 weeks before the election C. A.
Clifford asked him what he thought about the Union.
Shelton said he told Clifford that this was a matter for
each individual to decide. According to Shelton, Clifford
thereupon stated that he was against the Union and could
"This could be arguable from the fact that Chairman Hughes went to
the length of calling Hammock to the station to discuss the Union with
him a week or two before the election . On the other hand, Hammock
testified that he did not tell Hughes or any other supervisor that he was
"for the union."
"There is no evidence that other drivers were involved in similar
accidents and yet were retained.
"I do not deem it necessary to discuss testimony relative to Hammock's
withdrawing a charge as a condition to receiving his pension The General
Counsel does not allege that Respondent thereby violated Sec 8(a)(4) of
the Act. Further, since all this occurred after Hammock's discharge, this
testimony does not shed any light as to the motivation for his termination
''The credited testimony of Brumbeloe. Dixon testified merely that he
could not recall having a discussion with Brumbeloe in January
592 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
not see any reason why the drivers would need a union.',
As noted earlier, Respondent takes the position that
Shelton is not a supervisor within the meaning of the Act.
Although Shelton is the only mechanic employed at
Respondent's location, it is undisputed that he takes over
the duties of Shipman, Sr., whenever the latter is absent.
Clifford testified without contradiction that he has no
authority to hire, discharge or discipline employees or to
handle the grievances of drivers. However, the record
reflects that in the absence of Shipman, Sr., Clifford has
authority to grant employees time off and to, procure
replacement drivers. In view of such authority, and
particularly in view of the fact that Clifford is the only
person in charge when Shipman is gone, I find that
Clifford is a supervisor within the meaning of Section
2(11) of the Act. 22
Shelton also testified that about 4-6 weeks prior to the
election Julian Strickland, Respondent's station manager
in Athens, Georgia, asked him what he thought about the
Union. Testifying that he and Shelton were friends since
World War II, Strickland said that he probably did ask
Shelton how he felt about the Union.
Upon the entire record in this case , and in view of the
findings of fact heretofore made, I find and conclude that
Respondent in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
interfered with, restrained and coerced its employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act
by: (1) the conduct of Shipman, Sr., in telling Bussey that
the employees would have to be "perfect drivers" if the
Union won the election; (2) the conduct of Shipman, Sr.,
in threatening to "get" Brumbeloe• and Bussey, this in the
context of the entire conversation which Shipman, Sr.,
had with Brumbeloe; and (3) the conduct of supervisors,
Shipman, Sr., Wilmer Dixon, J. W. Hughes, C. A.
Clifford, and Julian Strickland23 in interrogating
employees as to their union sympathies and desires.24
"Clifford conceded discussing the Union with Shelton but said that he
never asked Shelton whether he was for or against the Union. Otherwise
he did not elaborate I credit the testimony of Shelton as set forth above.
'=Inasmuch as 22 drivers are employed out of the Augusta terminal, I
find it difficult to believe that Respondent would leave someone without
more than routine authority to act in the absence of Shipman, Sr
Although not in itself of controlling weight, I think it of some significance
that Shipman, Sr. , requested Clifford to accompany him when he trailed
the bus driven by Bussey on October 31, 1967 Clifford also signed the
letter of October 31 reporting this matter to President A. C. Shipman.
"Were this an isolated case of interrogation of Respondent 's employees,
I would not view Strickland's conduct in itself as violative of the Act.
24On August 28, 1967, the Regional Director approved a Settlement
Agreement signed by the parties and on November 3, 1967, notified
Respondent that the case was closed upon compliance . On June 11, 1968,
the Regional Director notified Respondent that his approval of the
settlement agreement was withdrawn . The Respondent recognizes that the
matters covered by the settlement agreement are admissable as background
evidence in support of the alleged 8(a)(3) violations . However, pointing out
(and correctly so) that the independent violations of Sec 8(a)(1) alleged in
the instant complaint are the same as those covered in the settlement
agreement , Respondent contends that the settlement agreement bars the
litigation of presettlement conduct and that there is no justification for
further remedial relief as to the said 8(a)(l) allegations . I would agree with
Respondent that no further relief would be in order if there proved to be
no merit to any of the 8(a)(3) violations . However, since there is merit to
Bussey's case and since his discriminatory discharge arose out of the same
situation in which the presettlement 8(a)(l) violations occurred, I think
further 8(a)(l) relief is warranted. Moreover, the discrimination against
Bussey was violative of Sec 8 (a)(l) as well as Sec . 8(a)(3) of the Act. Cf
Northern California District Council, et at (Joseph's Landscaping
Company), 154 NLRB, 1384 fn 1, and Mohasco Industries , Inc. (Laurens
Park Mill), 172 NLRB No 237, fn. 1.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with its operations set
forth in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among
the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, it will recommend that
Respondent cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action- designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
It will be recommended that Respondent offer to
Maurice N. Bussey immediate and full reinstatement to
his former or substantially equivalent position , without
prejudice to his seniority and other rights and privileges,
and make him whole for any loss ' of earnings he may have
suffered by reason of the unlawful discrimination against
him, by payment to him of a sum of money equal to that
which he normally would have earned, absent said
discrimination , from the date of his discharge to the date
of an offer of reinstatement , less his net earnings 'during
said period . Backpay shall be computed in the manner
prescribed by the Board in F . W Woolworth Co., 90
NLRB 289, and with interest thereon as prescribed in Isis
Plumbing & Heating Co ., 138 NLRB 716.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By discharging Maurice N. Bussey, thereby
discriminating in regard to his hire and tenure of
employment, in order to discourage membership in and
activity on behalf of the Union, the Respondent has
engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
4. By threatening employees with reprisals because of
their union activities and by coercively interrogating them
as to their union sympathies and desires, the Respondent
has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
6. Respondent's discharge of Paul Hammock was not
in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, it is recommended that Respondent Southeastern
Stages, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interfering with, restraining, and coercing its
employees by unlawfully interrogating them with respect
t
SOUTHEASTERN STAGES,
to their union sympathies and desires and threatening
them with reprisals because of their union activities.
(b) Discouraging membership in Union Local Division
1493, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, or
any other labor organization, by discharging employees or
discriminating against them in any other manner in regard
to their hire or tenure of. employment or any term or
condition of employment.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to
join or assist the Union, or any other labor organization,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to Maurice N. Bussey immediate and full
reinstatement to this former or substantially equivalent
employment and make him whole for any loss of pay he
may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against
him, in the manner set forth in the section of this Decision
entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Notify Maurice N. Bussey if presently serving in the
Armed Forces of the United States of his right to full
reinstatement upon application in accordance with the
Selective Service Act, as amended, after discharge from
the Armed Forces.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records necessary to ascertain any backpay due under the
terms of this Recommended Order.
(d) Post at its terminals in Augusta, Georgia, and
Atlanta, Georgia, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix."25 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by
the Regional Director for Region 10, shall, after being
duly signed by a representative of the Respondent, be
posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof,
and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter,
in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in
writing, within 20 days of receipt of this Decision, what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply therewith 26
(f) It is recommended that the complaint's allegation
charging Respondent with having committed an unfair
"In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "A Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "A
Recommended Order Of A Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further
event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of
Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a
Decision and Order."
'In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify said Regional Director, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
INC. 593
labor practice by its termination of Paul Hammock be
dismissed.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our
employees that:
WE WILL NOT ask our employees any questions
about their union sympathies or activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten to discharge any employee
because he has engaged in union activity.
WE WILL NOT tell our employees that they will have
to be perfect employees in the event a labor
organization wins an election.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in or activities
on behalf of Union Local Division 1493, Amalgamated
Transit Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, or any other labor
organization, by discriminating in regard to the hire
and tenure of employment of any of our employees
because of their concerted or union activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise
of their rights to self-organization, to form labor
organizations, or to join or assist the above-named
union or any other labor organization, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities.
WE WILL offer immediate and full reinstatement to
Maurice N. Bussey to his former or substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to his 'seniority or
other rights and privileges, and make him whole for
any loss of earnings he may have suffered because of
the discrimination against him.
SOUTHEASTERN STAGES,
INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
Note: We will notify the above-named employee if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United
States of his right to full reinstatement upon application
in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the
Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended,
after discharge from the Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, 730 Peachtree
Street, NE., Atlanta, Georgia 30308, Telephone
404-526-5741.