Southeastern Pipe Line Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 30, 1953

104 N.L.R.B. 575 (N.L.R.B. 1953)

SOUTHEASTERN PIPE LINE COMPANY 575
SOUTHEASTERN PIPE LINE COMPANY and OIL WORKERS
INTERNATIONAL UNION, CIO. Case No. 10-CA-1360. April
30, 1953
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER
On March 6, 1953, the Board issued a Decision and Order in
the above-entitled proceeding.' Thereafter, on March 30, 1953,
the Respondent moved to reconsider the order and to limit the
scope thereof. The Board,' having duly considered the matter,
decides as follows:
The Respondent requests reconsideration of the finding that
the transfer of T. E. Barcroft was discriminatory, upon the
alleged authority of the Greeneville Cabinet case.' The two
cases do not present analagous situations. In Greeneville, the
Trial Examiner found, and the Board adopted his finding, that
the transfer of Waddell was not a "punishment intended to have
been visited upon him because of his known union activities.
Consequently, no constructive discharge has been shown." In
the present case, the Trial Examiner found, with Board
approval, that Barcroft's transfer was due to "Barcroft's
union membership and activity and Respondent' s desire to
remove him from proximity to employees interested in the
Union and to Respondent's desire to break up the Union." In
other words, the transfer of Waddell in the Greeneville case
was lawfully motivated, whereas that of Barcroftinthe present
case was made for unlawful reasons . The different motives
dictate different results.
The Respondent also moves to limit the scope of the Board's
order as follows:
(a) By eliminating the words "any other labor organization"
in paragraphs 1 (a), (b), and (c) of the order, which require the
Respondent to cease and desist from discouraging membership
in, threatening employees with reprisals because of member-
ship or activities in behalf of, and soliciting employees to
withdraw from, Oil Workers International Union, CIO, or "any
other labor organization." We believe that the evidence justifies
the inference that the Respondent's unlawful conduct was moti-
vated by hostility to labor organizations in general and not
merely to the Oil Workers Union. In these circumstances, the
prohibition against unlawful conduct directed at membership in
the Oil Workers Union or "any other labor organization" is
deemed necessary to reach the threat implicit in the Re-
spondent's unlawful conduct 4
1 103 NLRB 341.
Z Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers
in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman Herzog and Members
Houston and Murdock].
3 Greeneville Cabinet Co., Incorporated , 102 NLRB 1677.
4Associated Press v. N. L. R. B., 301 U.S. 103; Stokely Foods, Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 193
F. 2d 736 (C.A. 5); N. L. R. B. v. Tappan Stove Company, 174 F. 2d 1007 (C.A. 6); The
Canyon Corporation v. N. L. R. B.. 128 F . 2d 953 (C.A. 8).
104 NLRB No. 82.
576 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(b) By adding the word "discriminatorily" betweenthe words
"by" and "transferring" in the second line of paragraph 1 (a)
of the order. The Respondent contends that the order as written
is invalid in that it would prohibit all transfers of personnel.
We disagree with this interpretation. The paragraph prohibits
only discriminatory transfer of personnel. The Respondent's
proposed amendment is unnecessary.
(c) By adding the word "coercively" to paragraphs 1 (c) and
(d) which require the Respondent to cease and desist from
soliciting employees to withdraw from the Union and from
interrogating employees concerning union activities. We reject
this proposed amendment as unduly restrictive and misleading.
(d) By eliminating from paragraph 1 (a) the provision which
reads "or in any other manner discriminating against them in
regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment." The clause to which the Respondent
objects is practically a verbatim copy of Section 8 (a) (3) of
the Act, which is the section violated by a discrimination
against an employee. The Board regularly includes this language
in its cease-and-desist orders when it finds discrimination,
because discrimination as to some terms and conditions of
employment is likely to lead to discrimination as to others.
The courts have, in innumerable cases, enforced orders worded
in the manner which the Respondent considers objectionable.
(e) By eliminating the broad cease-and-desist order con-
tained in paragraph 1 (e). The Respondent's unlawful activities,
including the discriminatory transfer of Barcroft, go to the
very heart of the Act and indicate a purpose to defeat self-
organization of its employees. We are convinced that the unfair
labor practices committed by the Respondent are potentially
related to other unfair labor practices proscribed by the Act,
and that the danger of their commission in the future is to be
anticipated from the Respondent's conduct in the past. The
preventive purpose of the Act will be thwarted unless the
Board's order is coextensive with the threat. Accordingly, in
order to make effective the interdependent guarantees of
Section 7 and thus effectuate the policies of the Act, an order
requiring the Respondent to cease and desist from in any
manner infringing upon the rights of employees guaranteed in
the Act is deemed necessary.5
(f) By limiting the order to those pumping stations and ware-
houses where the unfair labor practices were found to have
been committed. The Respondent operates pipelines from
Point St. Joe, Florida, to various points within the State of
Georgia. In 1951, the Board found appropriate a unit of oper-
ating and maintenance employees employed by the Respondent
throughout its pipeline system.' The Union won the election
directed and was certified as bargaining representative of
employees in the appropriate unit. The unfair labor practices
SN. L. R . B. v. Globe Wireless , Ltd., 193 F. 2d 748 (C.A. 9); Stokely Foods, Inc., 91 NLRB
1267, enfd . 193 F . 2d 736 (C.A. 5); Standard Dry Wall Products , Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd.
188 F . 2d 362 (C.A. 3); N. L. R. B. v. Entwistle Manufacturing Co., 120 F. 2d 532 (C.A. 4).
® Southeastern Pipe Line Company , 94 NLRB 1177.
MISSION APPLIANCE CORPORATION 577
committed by the Respondent were aimed at undermining the
Union and destroying its majority status throughout the unit.
There is little doubt but that the impact of the unfair labor
practices was systemwide. The danger of future unfair labor
practices is as great in one part of the system as in another.
The Board therefore reaffirms the need for extending its order
to all parts of the Respondent ' s pipeline system.'
As the Respondent's motion is without merit, we shall deny
it.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Respondent' s motion to
reconsider the Board ' s order of March 6, 1953, and to limit
the scope thereof, -be, and it hereby is, denied.
TN. L. R. B. v. United Mine Workers of America, 195 F. 2d 961 (C. A. 6); N. L. R. B. v.
T. W. Phillips Gas & Oil Company, 141 F. 2d 304 (C.A. 3).
MISSION APPLIANCE CORPORATION and SHEET METAL
WORKERS' INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION , LOCAL 371,
AFL, Petitioner. Case No . 21-RC-2886 . April 30, 1953
DECISION AND ORDER
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before George H.
O'Brien , hearing officer . The hearing officer ' s rulings made
at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby
affirmed.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the
Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to
a three-member panel [ Members Houston , Styles, and Peter-
son].
Upon the entire record in this case , the Board finds:
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of the Act.
2. The labor organizations involved claim to represent
employees of the Employer.
3. No question affecting commerce exists concerning the
representation of em loyees of the Employer within the mean-
ing of Section 9 (c) (1 ) and Section 2 (6) and ( 7) of the Act, for
the following reasons:
The Intervenor (Association of Gas Appliance Workers)
contends that its current contract , which covers the produc-
tion , maintenance , and office clerical employees at the Em-
ployer ' s Los Angeles and Hawthorne, California, plants,
constitutes a bar to this proceeding . The Petitioner, which
seeks a unit of only production and maintenance employees
at these plants of the Employer , contends that the current
contract is not a bar because a schism has occurred within