South Shore Hospital

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 29, 1977

229 N.L.R.B. 363 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

SOUTH SHORE HOSPITAL
South Shore Hospital and Service Employees Interna-
tional Union, Local 880, AFL-CIO. Case I-CA-
10893
April 29, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, PENELLO, AND
WALTHER
On September 22, 1976, Administrative Law Judge
Max Rosenberg issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed
a brief in support of the Administrative Law Judge's
Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, except
as modified herein.
We find no merit in Respondent's contention that
the Administrative Law Judge erred in permitting the
General Counsel to amend the complaint on the first
day of the hearing to allege that on or about May 27,
1975, Supervisor Furgeson made a statement to
employee Conway which was violative of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. In its brief, Respondent acknow-
ledges receiving the General Counsel's "Notice of
Intent to Amend Complaint" 3 working days before
the commencement of the hearing, and, at the
hearing, Respondent's counsel stated on the record
that "[t]he surprise element can ... be compensated
during the extent of this trial." Under these circum-
i Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to
credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
We find no merit in Respondent's exception to the Administrative Law
Judge's finding that a statement by Associate Director Topham was
violative of Sec. 8(aXl) of the Act. In a conversation with assembled
employees in which he discussed the advantages and disadvantages of
unionization, Topham stated, in response to a question by an employee, that
"no matter what the union got the union employees, the hospital employees
would also get." As stated by the Administrative Law Judge. it is clear from
the record that the phrase "union employees" referred to the technical
employees represented by the Union, which had recently negotiated a
collective-bargaining agreement for them, and the phrase "hospital
employees" referred to the employees of Respondent who were unrepresent-
ed. Under these circumstances, we find that Topham's statement, when
considered in the context in which it was made, clearly meant that nonunion
employees would receive union contractual benefits without the need for a
229 NLRB No. 52
stances, we are satisfied that Respondent was not
prejudiced by the amendments
However, we disagree with the Administrative Law
Judge's finding that Respondent created an impres-
sion of surveillance by Furgeson's statement that she
"had just come from a meeting with Mr. Clark
[Respondent's director] and talk of central having a
union was all over the hospital." In determining
whether a respondent created an impression of
surveillance, the test applied by the Board is whether
employees would reasonably assume from the state-
ment in question that their union activities had been
placed under surveillance. Schrementi Bros., Inc., 179
NLRB 853 (1969). In the instant case, the statement
indicated, at most, that Respondent was aware of a
rumor or "talk," which "was all over the hospital,"
that the employees in the central service and
distribution department were interested in unioniza-
tion. In this connection, we note that Furgeson's
comment was made shortly after Associate Director
Topham had addressed the central service and
distribution department employees on the advantag-
es and disadvantages of unionization, and had been
asked by employee Marie Lyons "what percent of
people you needed to start a union and also how do
you go about starting a union." The central service
and distribution department employees had previ-
ously agreed to hear Topham discuss this topic in
order to learn more about the Union.
The Board has held that a respondent does not
create an impression of surveillance by merely
stating that it is aware of a rumor pertaining to the
union activities of its employees so long as there is no
evidence indicating that the respondent could only
have learned of the rumor through surveillance. G.
C. Murphy Company, 217 NLRB 34, 36 (1975). Since
a rumor is, by definition, talk or opinion widely
disseminated with no discernible source, employees
could not reasonably assume from a respondent's
knowledge of such a rumor, without more, that their
union, and was an implied promise of benefit made for the purpose of
discouraging employees from supporting the Union in violation of Sec.
8(aX I). See Casey Manufacturing Company, 167 NLRB 89(1967).
2 See N.L.R.B. v. Transport, Inc., of South Dakota. 453 F.2d 193, 196
(C.A. 8, 1971).
3 The dissent apparently tries to fit the facts of this case within the
exception to this rule by claiming that Respondent had "knowledge of very
limited union activity" on the part of employee Lyons. It is true, as stated in
the dissent. that the Administrative Law Judge found that Furgeson told
Conway's mother that Lyons had been investigating the Union for months
before her discharge on July 3. But, whether or not Lyons did, in fact.
conduct a "private investigation" of the Union is irrelevant to the
impression-of-surveillance issue because, at the time Furgeson's statement
was made, the central service and distribution department employees had
openly expressed their interest in the Union, as evidenced by their meeting
with Topham. Therefore, in view of the plain meaning of Furgeson's remark
and the circumstances in which it was made, we must disagree with our
dissenting colleague's characterization of the statement as indicating to
Conway that Furgeson's information was based on "limited and obscure"
union activity which "would have had to have been carefully observed to
have been noticed."
363
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
union activities had been placed under surveillance.
Certainly Furgeson's comment revealed Respon-
dent's anxiety over its feared unionization of the
central service and distribution department, but such
a communication to an employee by itself is not an
unfair labor practice within the meaning of the Act.
Similarly, in an earlier G. C. Murphy Company case,
216 NLRB 785, 792 (1975), the Board held that the
respondent did not create an impression of surveil-
lance by a supervisor's statement that he had "heard"
that two employees were engaging in union activities.
In that case, the Board found that it was reasonable
to assume that the respondent had learned of the
employees' union activities without having to seek
such information, and that the statement itself did
not suggest that the supervisor had solicited the
information or had engaged in spying.
In view of the foregoing, we shall dismiss the
complaint insofar as it alleges Furgeson's statement
to be violative of Section 8(a)(1).
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relation Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as
modified below, and hereby orders that the Respon-
dent, South Shore Hospital, South Weymouth,
Massachusetts, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said
recommended Order, as so modified:
1. Substitute the following for paragraph l(b):
"(b) Promising benefits to employees to discourage
them from engaging in union or concerted activities."
2. Delete paragraph l(c) and reletter the remain-
ing paragraph accordingly.
3. Substitute the attached notice for the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's notice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and
it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges violations
not found herein.
MEMBER JENKINS, dissenting in part:
The majority misconstrues the facts here by
viewing this case as involving no more than a
prevalent rumor of union activity, and a statement
by Respondent amounting to no more than an
acknowledgement of its awareness of the rumor. As
the Administrative Law Judge found, this part of the
case involves Supervisor Furgeson's telling a unit
employee, Conway, that the prospect of unionization
of her department was known to Respondent's
4 Contrary to the implication of the majority, the meeting at which
Topham addressed the employees on the advantages and disadvantages of
unionization was called by Respondent on its own initiative. There is,
therefore, no basis for assuming that Furgeson's comment to Conway
officials, and had just been discussed at a high level
management meeting.
The Administrative Law Judge found as a fact that
shortly after July 7 Furgeson told an employee that
Lyons, one of the two discriminatees herein, had
been investigating the Union for months before her
discharge on July 3. Although there was testimony
that overt union activity did not begin until Lyons
contacted the Union in early June, there is nothing in
the record which contradicts Furgeson's belief that
Lyons had been investigating the Union since at least
early May. It is also evident that Lyons and Conway
were the two employees who spearheaded the
organizational activity. Thus, a reasonable inference
can be drawn that on May 22 when Furgeson told
Conway that she had just returned from a high level
management meeting where there was a discussion of
the central service and distribution department's
interest in the Union, Conway would have received
the impression that Respondent was somehow
surveilling the employees' union activities. The
limited and obscure nature of this activity before
May 22 does not, contrary to the majority, under-
mine the Administrative Law Judge's finding that
Furgeson's statement was violative of Section 8(a)(l)
of the Act, but instead supports it since this activity
would have had to have been carefully observed to
have been noticed.4
The majority cites two prior Board decisions in
support of its position which are hardly relevant to
the completely different set of facts before us here. In
the G. C. Murphy case 5 first discussed by the
majority, the allegation of unlawfully creating the
impression of surveillance was premised upon an
incident where, in response to a question from an
employee to a supervisor as to whether the supervisor
had heard a rumor about the employee's union
activities, the supervisor acknowledged that he had.
The Administrative Law Judge in that case found
that there was nothing in this exchange which could
reasonably be interpreted by the employee as
establishing an effort on the employer's part to learn
about her union activities, and thus there was no
basis for finding a violation. On the other hand, in
this case, Furgeson's statement to Conway specifical-
ly links Respondent's purported knowledge of very
limited union activity by employees to a high level
management meeting where this knowledge was
discussed with the supervisors. Such a statement is
obviously more than a mere acknowledgement that
the fact of union activity or intentions is known.
When this knowledge is linked, as Furgeson did, to
referred to that meeting or that such a reference was understood by
Conway.
5 217 NLRB 34, 36 (1975).
364
SOUTH SHORE HOSPITAL
what appears from her statement to be a specially
called, high level management meeting where such
knowledge is discussed, it becomes clearly a message
that management is indeed interested in the employ-
ees' union activities and intends to keep an eye on
them.
The earlier G. C. Murphy case6 concerned a
supervisor's actions in warning two employees that
they were violating a no-solicitation rule based on
what he (the supervisor) had "heard" in one case and
what "complaints" he had allegedly received from
other employees in another, about the soliciting
activities of these employees. There the Administra-
tive Law Judge was forced to reconcile a situation
where an employer had certain plant rules which he
had a right to enforce (assuming the validity of the
rule) and which he could only have enforced if the
employer had kept informed as to whether or not the
employees were engaging in the proscribed conduct.
Since Respondent in the instant case was not
attempting to police any rule, Furgeson's statement
to Conway is unjustifiable under the earlier G. C.
Murphy case.
Accordingly, I would affirm the Administrative
Law Judge's finding that Furgeson's statement to
Conway was violative of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act as
it reasonably tended to create in Conway the
impression that Respondent was surveilling employ-
ees' union activities. In all other respects, I am in
agreement with the majority.
6 216 NLRB 785, 792 (1975).
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT discharge our employees, thereby
discriminating in regard to their hire and tenure
of employment, in order to discourage their
engagement in activities on behalf of Service
Employees International Union, Local 880, AFL-
CIO, or any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT promise benefits to our employ-
ees to discourage them from engaging in union or
concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the
exercise of their rights guaranteed them in Section
7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended.
WE WILL offer Marie Lyons and Ann Conway
immediate and full reinstatement to their former
jobs or, if such jobs no longer exist, to substantial-
ly equivalent positions, and WE WILL make them
whole for their lost earnings, plus interest.
SOUTH SHORE HOSPITAL
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MAX ROSENBERG, Administrative Law Judge: With all
parties represented, this proceeding was heard before me in
Boston, Massachusetts, on November 12, 13, 14, and 25,
1975, upon an amended complaint filed by the General
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board and an
answer interposed thereto by South Shore Hospital, herein
called Respondent.' At issue is whether Respondent
violated Section 8(aXl) and (3) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, by certain conduct to be
detailed hereinafter. Briefs have been received from the
General Counsel and Respondent, which have been duly
considered.
Upon the entire record made in this proceeding,
including my observation of the witnesses as they testified
on the stand, I hereby make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
I. THE EMPLOYER
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that
Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
I find that Service Employees International Union, Local
880, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section
8(aX3) of the Act by discharging employees Marie Lyons
and Ann Conway 2 on July 3 and 7, 1975, respectively,
because they joined and assisted the Union. The complaint
further alleges that Respondent offended the provisions of
Section 8(aXl) of the statute when, on or about May 21,
1975, Respondent Assistant Director Topham stated to
employees at a meeting conducted at the hospital that
nonunion employees would receive whatever benefits
union adherents obtained at the installation, and when, on
May 27, 1975, EKG Department Head Beryl Furgeson
informed Ann Conway that the entire hospital knew that
her central service and distribution department was
engaged in union activities.
Respondent operates a hospital in Weymouth, Massa-
chusetts. At the times material herein, the Union represent-
ed a unit of technical employees at the hospital. However,
I The complaint, which issued on August 26, 1975. is based upon charges
filed and served on July 18, 1975.
2 Ann Conway is also known as Andrea Conway.
365
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the central service and distribution department, in which
alleged discriminatees Lyons and Conway toiled prior to
their discharges and which housed approximately 25
employees, was unrepresented. Marie Lyons, who worked
as an aide in the department, had been employed by
Respondent in various departments on a sporadic basis
since 1968, but was employed full time at the hospital from
July 1974 until her discharge on July 3, 1975. Ann Conway,
who was also classified as an aide in the department, was a
full-time employee from June 1974 until her termination on
July 7, 1975.
I find that, either in late April or early May 1975, Bette
Hill, the manager of Respondent's central service and
distribution department and Lyon's supervisor, gave copies
of the Union's constitution and bylaws to Lyons, as well as
to employees Ann Conway and Joseph Murray, for their
perusal. Lyons took the document home that evening, but
did not read it. The next day, Hill inquired whether Lyons
was in possession of the items, and when Lyons replied in
the negative, Hill requested that Lyons return the material
to the former. After reading the material, Lyons gave it
back to Hill. Lyons testified and I find that, on this
occasion, Hill "asked me what I thought of it, and I said, I
had talked it over with my parents the night before and
that I was in agreement with what my parents thought and
that was that the hospital wasn't a place for a union. And
Ms. Hill said that she was glad to hear that I had that
opinion." 3
At a weekly meeting following this conversation, I find
that Hill asked the employees under her wing whether they
wished to meet Respondent Associate Director Topham in
order "To find out about the union, more about the union
because she didn't know that much." When a majority of
the employees opted to hear Topham discuss this topic, a
session was scheduled and held with him on May 21, 1975.
In his discourse, Topham reviewed the pros and cons of
unionization and answered questions put to him from the
floor. It is the uncontradicted testimony of Lyons, Conway,
and Murray, and I find that, in response to a query,
Topham stated that "no matter what the union got the
union employees, the hospital employees would also get." 4
At some point during the convocation, Lyons asked
Topham "what percent of people you needed to start a
union and also how do you go about starting a union." In
reply, Topham remarked that "he hoped it never got to
that."
On the evening of May 22, 1975, Mary Celestino
attended a business dinner which was also attended by
Hill. Based upon the credited testimony of Lyons and
Celestino, I find that, during the repast, Hill told Celestino
that "I [Lyons] was involved with the Union, that I had
union cards and I was trying to force people to sign them,
and that I was leading a hate campaign against Ms. Hill."
It is also uncontroverted and I find that, around this time,
Beryl Furgeson, the EKG department head and a statutory
supervisor, informed Ann Conway that the former "had
just come from a meeting with Mr. Clark [Respondent's
3 Lyons' mother, Mary Celestino, was employed by Respondent in the
purchasing division at the hospital.
I From letters which Respondent submitted into evidence, it seems clear
director] and talk of central [Hill's department] having a
union was all over the hospital."
On May 23, 1975, the day following the dinner
conversation between Hill and Celestino, Lyons tele-
phoned Hill to report that Lyons "didn't have any union
cards and that I never talked with anybody from the union
and that I wasn't trying to force people to sign them." Hill
replied that "this wasn't a matter about unions, and I said I
just want to straighten this out, because we thought that -
my mother and I thought it would be best that we
straighten it out with Ms. Hill. And she said that she had
lost her trust in me."
It is undenied and I find that, in early June 1975, Lyons
contacted the Union and was advised to schedule an
organizational meeting. In compliance with this suggestion,
both Lyons and Conway who were close friends and
shared their coffeebreaks, notified the departmental em-
ployees either during coffeebreaks or by telephone that a
meeting had been arranged at Lyons' apartment for June
19, 1975. Another meeting was held on July 2, 1975, at
Conway's home. At each session, approximately six
employees were in attendance and most of the employees,
including Lyons and Conway, executed union authoriza-
tion cards. On July 3, 1975, Respondent discharged Lyons.
On July 7, 1975, Conway was severed from Respondent's
employment rolls.
In defense of this action, Respondent contends that
Lyons and Conway were discharged, not because of any
known or suspected interest in or support of the Union by
these individuals, but solely for just cause. Thus, Respon-
dent claims that Lyons lost her job principally because of
"the demoralizing atmosphere of the department" created
by this employee, and that Conway was terminated for
having dallied 30 to 40 minutes in the bacteriology
laboratory. In my opinion, the testimony in support of
these defenses is too frivolous to warrant serious consider-
ation or acceptance. With respect to the discharge of Lyons
on July 3, 1975, Hill testified that she had drafted a written
warning on the day of Lyons' termination to support the
discharge, noting that the separation was triggered by the
tension caused by Lyons' conduct. In this connection, Hill
mentioned that Lyons mocked employee Cheryl Molisse
and called the latter names. Despite the fact that Molisse
and Lyons had worked together at the hospital since 1969
and enjoyed a friendly relationship until July 1, 1975, after
Lyons was suspected of favoring the Union, Hill asserted
that Molisse's harassment by Lyons was a moving force in
her discharge. However, when called as a witness, Molisse
confessed that she did not report these acts of harassment
to Hill. Regarding the termination of Conway, Hill claimed
that she relied upon a report by Supervisor Margaret
Fontaine that the latter had observed Conway tarrying in
the laboratory for almost 40 minutes. Nevertheless, Hill
then acknowledged that it was her understanding that
Fontaine was not in the laboratory for the full time that
Conway allegedly was there, and that she never bothered to
query Fontaine about the incident.
to me and I find that the phrase "union employees" was an obvious
reference to the unit of technical employees which the Union represents.
366
SOUTH SHORE HOSPITAL
In sum, I conclude that Respondent selected Lyons and
Conway for discharge on July 3 and 7, respectively, not
because they were derelict in their deportment or work
performance, but because they were either known or
suspected union adherents.5 By the discharge of these
employees, I conclude that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3) of the Act.
I have also found that, in a conversation with assembled
employees on May 21, 1975, Respondent Assistant Direc-
tor Topham told the unrepresented central service and
distribution department personnel that "no matter what
the union got the union employees [technical employees],
the hospital employees [unrepresented employees] would
also get." In my view, Topham's statement could reason-
ably be interpreted as emphasizing to the unrepresented
personnel the futility of joining or supporting the Union,
particularly in light of the facts that Topham's observation
was unsolicited and that the Union had recently won a
Board election among the technical employees at the
hospital and had obtained a collective-bargaining agree-
ment from Respondent.
Finally, I have heretofore found that, on or about May
22 or 23, 1975, Supervisor Beryl Furgeson informed Ann
Conway that, after a meeting with Respondent Director
Clark, the prospect of unionization of Conway's depart-
ment was known to Respondent's officials. By this
conduct, I find that Respondent created the impression
that Respondent had placed its central service and
distribution department employees' union activities under
surveillance, and I conclude that Respondent thereby
violated Section 8(a)(1).
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with Respondent's opera-
tions described in section 1, above, have a close, intimate,
and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow
thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
I have found that Respondent has interfered with,
restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed to them under Section 7 of the Act, and
thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the statute. I shall
therefore order that Respondent cease and desist there-
from.
I have also found that Respondent discharged Marie
Lyons on July 3, 1975, and Ann Conway on July 7, 1975,
because they joined and assisted the Union in its attempt
to gain exclusive representation status among the employ-
ees in the central service and distribution department at the
hospital, and thereby offended the provisions of Section
5 Ann Conway's mother was also an employee of the hospital. She
testified without contradiction and I find that, shortly after July 7. 1975. she
had a conversation with Supervisor Beryl Furgeson in which the latter told
the mother that Lyons had been investigating the Union for months before
her discharge.
6 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
8(aX3) of the Act. To remedy these violations, I shall
recommend that Respondent offer immediate and full
reinstatement to them in their former jobs or, if they no
longer exist, to substantially equivalent employment, and
make them whole for any loss of pay which they may have
suffered as a result of the discrimination practiced against
them. The backpay provided for herein shall be computed
in accordance with the Board's formula set forth in F. W.
Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest
thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum in the manner
prescribed in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716
(1962).
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions, and upon the entire record in this case, I
hereby make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By discharging Marie Lyons and Ann Conway,
thereby discriminating in regard to their hire and tenure of
employment, in order to discourage their adherence to and
activities on behalf of the Union, Respondent has engaged
in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
4. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(aX1)
of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices within the purview of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, I hereby
issue the following recommended:
ORDER 6
Respondent South Shore Hospital, Weymouth, Massa-
chusetts, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging employees, thereby discriminating in
regard to their hire and tenure of employment, in order to
discourage their engagement in union activities.
(b) Emphasizing to nonunion employees the economic
futility of joining or assisting the Union.
(c) Creating the impression of surveillance of employees'
union activities.
(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaran-
teed in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended.
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
367
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to Marie Lyons and Ann Conway immediate
and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if they no
longer exist, to substantially equivalent employment, and
make them whole for any loss of pay they may have
suffered as a result of the discrimination practiced against
them, in the manner set forth in the section of this Decision
entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security records, timecards, person-
nel records and reports, and all other records necessary to
analyze the amounts of backpay due herein.
7 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
(c) Post at its hospital in Weymouth, Massachusetts,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 7 Copies
of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 1, after being duly signed by Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by it immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region I, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps have
been taken to comply herewith.
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
368