South Point Barge Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 8, 1972

200 N.L.R.B. 173 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

SOUTH POINT BARGE COMPANY, INC. 173
South Point Barge Company , Inc., and South Point
Towing Company, Inc. and David Michael Lancas-
ter, and James Martin Lancaster. Cases
9-CA-6602-1, 2 and 9-CA-6840-1, 2
November 8, 1972
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND JENKINS
On June 27, 1972, Administrative Law Judge'
Almira Abbot Stevenson issued the attached Deci-
sion in this proceeding., Thereafter, Respondent filed
exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,2 and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt her recommended Order.
We agree with the Administrative Law Judge that
Respondent discharged David Lancaster on May 25,
1971, because of his suspected union activities.
According to Lancaster's credited testimony, Dallas
Bradshaw, Respondent's vice president and general
manager, told him that he would have to let him go
because "he had received a letter from the Labor
Board that every day he worked me, he had to pay
my brother, James Martin Lancaster." Bradshaw
also said, "You come back after this Union bit blows
over." The Administrative Law Judge discredited
Bradshaw's version of the discharge interview, that
David Lancaster was laid off for lack of work and
that he would be recalled if work picked up. It is
noted that the Respondent, during this same period,
had, as found by the Board, discriminatorily dis-
charged David's brothers, James Lancaster and
Charles Lancaster, as well as another employee,
James Corbin.3 In these circumstances, and in view
of no credible explanation for the discharge, we
agree with the finding of the Administrative Law
Judge that the Respondent suspected that David
Lancaster, along with his brothers, was engaged in
attempting to organize Respondent's operation, and
discharged him for the same reason it discharged
them. His discharge therefore violated Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Respondent, South Point Barge
Company, Inc., and South Point Towing Company,
Inc., of South Point, Ohio, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the said Order.
I The title of "Trial Examiner" was changed to "Administrative Law
Judge" effective August 19, 1972.
2 In the absence of exceptions, we adopt, pro forma, the finding of the
Admimstrative Law Judge that James Lancaster was discharged for cause,
and thus not in violation of the Act.
3 South Point Barge Company, Inc, South Point Towing Company, Inc,
195 NLRB No 168.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ALMIRA A. STEVENSON, Trial Examiner: This consolidat-
ed proceeding was heard at Huntington, West Virginia, on
May 17, 1972. A copy of the charge in Case 9--CA-6602-1,
-2, filed by David Michael Lancaster November 18, 1971,
was served on the Respondent November 22, 1971; the
complaint issued February 8, 1972. A copy of the charge in
Case 9-CA-6840-1, -2, filed by James Martin Lancaster
February 22, 1972, was served on the Respondent
February 28, 1972; the complaint issued March 23, 1972,
and was amended May 5, 1972. The cases were consolidat-
ed March 23, 1972.
The issues are whether the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, by (1) discriminatorily discharging or laying off
David Michael Lancaster May 25, 1971, because of his
interest in, sympathy for, and/or activities on behalf of
Inland Boatmen's Union of the Seafarers International
Union of North America, AGLIWD, AFL-CIO (herein
called the Union) and in order to discourage membership
in the Union; and (2) discriminatorily discharging James
Martin Lancaster February 21, 1972, because of his
sympathy for, membership in, and activities on behalf of
the Union and/or because of his protected activity in
protesting the Respondent's pollution of the waterways.
I find that the Respondent violated the Act as alleged in
discharging David Lancaster, but did not violate the Act in
discharging James Lancaster.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of
the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Respon-
dent, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. JURISDICTION
South Point Barge Company, Inc., an Ohio corporation,
is engaged in the business of cleaning and repairing barges
from its location at South Point, Ohio. During the year
preceding February 8, 1972, a representative period, it
performed services in interstate commerce for customers
located outside the State of Ohio valued in excess of
$50,000.
200 NLRB No. 28
174 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
South Point Towing Company, Inc., an Ohio corpora-
tion, is engaged in the business of fleeting and towing
barges from its location at South Point, Ohio. During the
12 months preceding May 1971, it performed services in
interstate commerce for customers located outside the
State of Ohio valued in excess of $50,000.
The Companies admit, and I find, that they constitute a
single employer, at all times material herein engaged in
commerce and in operations affecting commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. They are
referred to herein as the Respondent.
The Respondent also admits, and I find, that the Union
is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Chronology
The Respondent originally hired David Lancaster and
James Lancaster, brothers, in early 1970. David was a
deckhand and James was a pilot. A third brother, Edgar
Lancaster, was a supervisor for the Respondent.
David Lancaster testified that he got mad because of low
pay and no time off during long hauls and quit three or
four times. He always returned to the Respondent's
employ. His last absence was for a period unspecified in
the record and was caused by his being hospitalized for
alcoholism. His brother Edgar put him back on the payroll
May 16, 1971.1
On May 18, 1971, the Respondent fired James Lancaster
and another employee, James Corbin, because of their
union activity, as found by the Board in a prior proceeding
involving most of the parties here involved. 195 NLRB No.
168.
On May 25, 1971, Dallas Bradshaw, vice president and
general manager, terminated David Lancaster under
circumstances described below, alleged by the General
Counsel in this case to be in violation of the Act.
On May 29, 1971, the Respondent fired Charles
Lancaster, brother of the three Lancasters involved in this
case, because of his union activity, as found by the Board
in 195 NLRB No. 168.
About 7 months later, on December 10, 1971, the
Respondent reemployed James Lancaster as a laborer. On
February 21, 1972, the Respondent terminated James, also
alleged herein as a violation of the Act.
B. David Lancaster
David Lancaster testified that Dallas Bradshaw, on May
25, 1971, told him he would have to let him go because "he
had received a letter from the Labor Board that every day
he worked me he had to pay my brother, James Martin
Lancaster"; and that Bradshaw added, "You come back
after this Union bit blows over." 2
1 David Lancaster was uncertain as to the date he returned to work. I
credit the testimony of Vice President Dallas Bradshaw, which he stated was
based on company records, that the date was May 16, 1971.
2 The Trial Examiner's Decision adopted by the Board indicates that
David Lancaster gave substantially the same testimony in the prior
proceeding as to this conversation. However, this May 25 layoff was not
alleged nor found to be unlawful in that case. At the hearing herein, David
The General Counsel also presented evidence that
although the Respondent refused David's requests for any
kind of work, during the 4 months subsequent to David's
termination it hired four men consecutively for the night
watchman job which, the General Counsel contends,
David was qualified to fill.
Vice President Bradshaw testified that after David had
been off (Bradshaw did not know David had been in the
Hospital), Edgar Lancaster put David back to work on May
16. Bradshaw testified that he laid David off May 25, and
told him "we didn't need a deckhand because if I did I
would have to put Jim back on when an opening came
open. Jimmy was laid off. I had to put Jimmy back on .. .
before I could hire [David] back." It was Bradshaw's
testimony that he laid David off for lack of work, and that
he told David he would call him back if work picked up.
Bradshaw also testified that although David could have
done the work of night watchman, Bradshaw did not recall
him for that job as it was a salary job paying $90 for 48
hours' work.
The credibility of Bradshaw's testimony as to the
discharge interview is undercut by the finding of the Board
in the prior proceeding that James had not been laid off
but had been discriminatorily discharged. David's version
of the interview in which Bradshaw referred to a letter
from the Labor Board about James is difficult to interpret,
particularly as the charge alleging James' May 18 discharge
to be unlawful apparently was not served on the Respon-
dent until May 27, 2 days after David's discharge
interview, and the record does not suggest any other Labor
Board letter Bradshaw could have been talking about. As
the Respondent had discriminatorily discharged James,
however, I am inclined to believe that the statement was an
attempt at some kind of pretext. In these circumstances, I
credit David Lancaster, and discredit Bradshaw's testimo-
ny as to the discharge interview and as to the reason for the
discharge as well. We are left with no satisfactory
explanation by the Respondent for David's termination.
There is equally no satisfactory explanation for its failure
to offer David one of the successive night watchman
openings. The Respondent's counsel, at the hearing and in
his brief herein, indicates that David was considered
unsuitable for the job of night watchman because he drank
on the job. There is uncontroverted evidence, however,
that although David drank during his days off, he never
drank on the job. Moreover, neither Bradshaw nor any
other member of management testified that this was the
reason he was not offered one of these openings. As set
forth above, Bradshaw conceded that David was qualified
for the job, and gave an entirely different, and in my
opinion, very weak reason for failing to offer it to him.
It is thus clear that the reasons advanced by the
Respondent for its termination and refusal to rehire David
Lancaster were unsatisfactory, shifting, inconsistent, and
smacked of pretext. It is also clear that the discharge of
also testified that during one of several trips to the premises after this layoff,
President Mike Vighanco told him that his hands were tied but David could
return to work "after this Union stuff blowed over." As this testimony vanes
from that which the Decision shows David gave in the prior proceedings, I
do not credit it, even though Viglianco did not testify at the hearing in this
case.
SOUTH POINT BARGE COMPANY, INC. 175
David occurred during the same period of time in which
the Board has found that the Respondent committed
several unfair labor practices, including the discriminatory
discharge of James Lancaster I week before, and of
Charles Lancaster 4 days after, David's discharge. In these
circumstances, I am persuaded, and find, that although
there is no evidence that David Lancaster was engaged in
any union activities, the Respondent suspected he was
engaged, along with his brothers, in attempting to organize
the plant3 and discharged him for the same reason it
discharged them. His discharge therefore similarly violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act 4
C. James Lancaster
James Lancaster testified as follows:
On December 20, 1971, about 10 days after his return to
the Respondent's employ as a laborer, James observed
Vice President Viglianco pumping styrene out of a barge
into the river, and told Viglianco, "I couldn't permit this. It
was my duty to stop it due to the fact that I had a
tankerman's license . . . and I told him about the fine we
were subject to, $500 to $2500 or a year imprisonment" for
polluting the river. "And I told him I would have to report
this to the Coast Guard which I did..... James obtained
this tankerman's license from the Coast Guard and it
allowed him to pump, load, unload, and repair tank barges
without being supervised by one holding a pilot's or a
master's license.5 As the holder of a tankerman's certifi-
cate, it was his duty to report such activity to the Coast
Guard and he was subject to a fine if he were a party to
pollution of the waterways.
Bradshaw replied that "it was dirty of me that I would
stoop so low to report him to the Coast Guard. He said if
the Company didn't do these certain little jobs, how did I
expect him to many any money." That evening, Viglianco
told James not to report for work the next day as there was
no work for him.
James informed the Company four or five different times
that he could not allow it to pump barges into the river,
and on each occasion reported the Company to the Coast
Guard. On one of these occasions, in late January,
Viglianco asked James "why I always insisted on causing
him trouble."
Vice President Vighanco told James in late January he
would make a good foreman, but "you can't be faithful to
the company and the Union." James replied that he might
consider such an offer after the Union got in. After his 1-
day layoff of December 21,6 James was laid off 7 or 8 days
in January and 3 days in February before his termination.
On February 21, 1972, Bradshaw ordered James and
another employee to "put the blowers" on a tank barge.
James, however, pulled out the barge's "certificate of
inspection papers" and found the barge had had a caustic
soda cargo.? He then told Bradshaw he could not put the
blowers on because "it was too dangerous, it might explode
and caustic soda will burn you." James added that "we"
were subject to a fine and imprisonment. Bradshaw
thereupon went down through the barge opening up the
hatches, to see what was in the barge, and James followed
him closing the hatches because in James' opinion it was
dangerous cargo. When Bradshaw returned to topside, he
told James "if you are not going to help, punch your
timecard, go up the hill, you are fired." James replied that
Bradshaw could not fire him, only Viglianco could, and
that he was returning to the duty of throwing bricks out of
an old boiler, to which he had been previously assigned.
When Viglianco arrived, James asked him whether, in
order to keep his job, he had to put the blowers on that
tank barge "knowing that it might explode and you can get
severe burns from it." Viglianco replied in the affirmative,
and James told him, "I can't do it because of the danger of
it, of the $2500 fine and a year imprisonment if we are
caught." Viglianco said that caustic soda was not danger-
ous, and that "I had caused him more trouble than any
man he has ever known." James told Viglianco he would
have to report him to the Coast Guard. When Viglianco
affirmed that James was fired, James said he would see
Viglianco in court, and Viglianco replied, "Well, go get
your lawyers and your Union men."
James testified that he subsequently learned that caustic
soda will not explode. He insisted, however, that it is an
"acid" which will burn you if you blow it with the type of
portable electrical blowers not approved by the Coast
Guard, which he would have been required to use, and that
he refused to do so because he thought it was dangerous.
The Respondent presented no evidence contrary to the
above. Bradshaw testified that the Coast Guard visited the
Respondent several times during James Lancaster's last
period of employment, checking out complaints that it was
polluting the rivers. He testified that the Coast Guard
"found nothing," according to a report received from the
Coast Guard about the middle of April 1972.
It is the General Counsel's position, as I understand it,
that the Respondent seized on James' refusal to obey the
order that he blow out the barge as a pretext to get rid of
him because of his known union adherence and/or his
protests of the Respondent's pollution of the river. In my
opinion, the record does not support this contention.
There is no evidence that the Respondent tolerated a
refusal to obey a work order by any other employee or by
James Lancaster before his union sympathies were known.
The General Counsel's contention that the Respondent
failed to reinstate James to a substantially equivalent job as
ordered in the prior proceeding is not properly before me,
and was not fully litigated in this proceeding. James
3 Southern Household Products Company, 180 NLRB 369; Big Y
Supermarkets, 173 NLRB 405, 415.
4 In the prior proceeding, in which David Lancaster gave substantially
the same testimony as to what Bradshaw said in discharging him, the Board
found Bradshaw's remark about David's returning after the Union business
was over not i o be coercive under Section 8(a)(1) In my opinion, however,
it reveals an association between David and the Union in Bradshaw's mind.
5 Although James Lancaster had been employed in the past as a pilot, he
testified he did not have a pilot's or a master's license.
6 James also testified that he did not work December 28, but he did not
give the reason. He said he took off 2 days during this period.
7 I do not credit James Lancaster's testimony that the barge belonged to
American Chemical Barge Line and that it had 2 to 3 inches of liquid
caustic soda in its hold. It stands to reason that so much liquid could not
have been blown out but would have to be pumped out. The Respondent's
evidence that the tank was owned by Allied Chemical Corporation, had
already been emptied, and had only to be dried out by blowers is more
consistent with James' testimony that he was instructed only to "put the
blowers" on the barge.
176 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
expressed the opinion that the Respondent laid him off on
the occasions referred to above and assigned onerous tasks
to him as punishment for his union adherence. However,
there is no credible evidence that he was the only laborer
laid off during that period. There is also no credible
evidence that work was available for him during the times
he was laid off.8 As to the allegedly onerous tasks which
were assigned to him, some of them were performed by
others also, and it is equally possible that those tasks
represented make-work given in lieu of additional layoffs.
In these circumstances, I see no reason for construing
Viglianco's statement regarding James' foreman potential
to be "a subtle attempt by Respondent to take Lancaster
out of the bargaining unit . . . thereby affording immunity
to Respondent for his future discharge," as the General
Counsel contends. Unlike the layoff of David Lancaster,
which occurred in an immediate context of other unfair
labor practices, this discharge of James Lancaster occurred
some 9 months after such antiunion violations were
committed, in a context remote from any such conduct. I
conclude, therefore, that the evidence fails to show that
antiumon considerations played a part in James' discharge.
My conclusion is the same with regard to the contention
that James' discharge was caused by his protests against
the Respondent's purported pollution of the rivers. Thus,
according to James Lancaster's own testimony, he had
lodged such protests and had reported the Respondent to
the Coast Guard on several occasions. Although manage-
ment was well aware of this, and expressed annoyance, it
revealed no disposition to discipline him for this conduct.
It was not until James Lancaster flatly refused to obey a
direct work order that Bradshaw, subsequently supported
by Viglianco, fired him. The evidence establishes to my
satisfaction that James' refusal to obey the order to blow
out the barge was not in any way related to pollution of the
waterways. There is no evidence that blowing out the barge
would, or that James thought it would, pollute the
waterways.
Accordingly, I conclude that a preponderance of the
evidence fails to support the General Counsel's contention
that James Lancaster's discharge was motivated by either
his known union sympathies and/or his protesting the
Respondent's pollution of the waterways, novel and
interesting as the latter contention is.
I find that the Respondent discharged James Lancaster
because he refused a direct order to put the blowers on a
barge which had contained caustic soda. I further find that
the reason James refused was because he thought it would
explode and burn him.
The General Counsel does not contend that the
8 James ' testimony on the layoff of other employees was ambiguous His
testimony regarding the availability of work lacked specificity and struck
me as merely uninformed opinion . I therefore do not credit him on these
points
9 N.LRB v Kohler Company, 220 F.2d 3, 10-12 (C.A. 7); N.LR.B v.
Illinois Bell Telephone Co, 189 F.2d 124, 127 (C.A 7) Cf N.LRB. v
Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U S. 9
I would also be proscribed from finding that James Lancaster 's conduct
derived protection from Sec . 502 of the Act, which provides, in part. "
nor shall the quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good faith
because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of
employment of such employee or employees be deemed a strike under this
Act." Aside from other considerations , prior cases turning on this provision
discharge for the reason found was unlawful. The Respon-
dent rested its case without offering any evidence on the
issue, and the parties neither argued nor briefed it. I
therefore have considerable doubts that the issue was fully
litigated. Based on the evidence which is in the record,
however, I would conclude that James' conduct, for which
I have found he was terminated, was not protected by the
Act. Thus, as far as the record shows, James acted alone in
refusing to obey the order given him. Although he testified
that another employee was also ordered to "put the
blowers on," there is no evidence that that employee, or
any other, joined in or even knew about James' refusal to
carry out Bradshaw's order. Nor is there any indication
that James was concerned for the safety of any employee
other than himself. James' conduct was therefore not
concerted, and consequently not protected by Section 7.9
Accordingly, I conclude that James Lancaster was
discharged for cause, and recommend dismissal of the
complaint as to him.
REMEDY
In order to effectuate , the policies of the Act, I
recommend that the Respondent be ordered to cease and
desist from the unfair labor practices found , and in view of
the nature thereof and the prior unfair labor practices
found by the Board , to cease and desist from infringing in
any manner on its employees' rights guaranteed by the Act.
N.LR.B. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 532 (C.A. 4).
Having found that the Respondent discriminatorily
discharged David Lancaster , I also recommend that it be
ordered to offer him immediate and full reinstatement to
his former job, or if that job no longer exists, to a
substantially equivalent job, without prejudice to his
seniority and other rights and privileges , and to make him
whole for any loss of earnings suffered by the reason of the
discrimination against him, plus interest at 6 percent per
annum. F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289; Isis Plumbing
& Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. I also recommend the
posting of appropriate notices.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law and the entire record , and pursuant to Section 10(c) of
the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: 10
ORDER
The Respondent, South Point Barge Company, Inc. and
South Point Towing Company, Inc., of South Point, Ohio,
its officers , agents, successors , and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against any
deal with the status of employees who walk out in violation of no-strike
agreements . See Stop & Shop, Inc, 161 NLRB 75; Curtis-Mathes Mfg. Co.,
145 NLRB 473; Fruin Colnon Construction Co., 139 NLRB 894, set aside 330
F 2d 885 (C.A. 8); Knight-Morley Corp, 116 NLRB 140, enfd 251 F.2d 743
(C.A. 6) Cf. Redwing Carriers, Inc, 130 NLRB 1209, modified 137 NLRB
1545, enfd. 325 F.2d 1011 (C.A.D C.).
io In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings , conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall as provided in
Sec 102 48 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board
and become its findings , conclusions , and Order , and all objections thereto
shall be waived for all purposes.
SOUTH POINT BARGE COMPANY, INC.
employee because of his suspected interest in, sympathy
for, and/or activities on behalf of Inland Boatmen's Union
of the Seafarers International Union of North America,
AGLIWD, AFL-CIO, or any other union.
(b) In any manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under
Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer David Lancaster immediate and full reinstate-
ment to his former job, or if his job no longer exists to a
substantially equivalent job, without prejudice to his
seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him
whole for his lost earnings in the manner set forth in the
section of the Trial Examiner's Decision entitled "Reme-
dy
(b) Notify David Lancaster immediately, if presently
serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of his
right to full reinstatement, upon application, after dis-
charge from the Armed Forces, in accordance with the
Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training
and Service Act.
(c) Preserve, and upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Order.
(d) Post at its South Point, Ohio, location copies of the
attached notice.'1 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 9, after being duly
signed by an authorized representative of the Respondent,
shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
insure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director, in writing, within 20
days of the date of this recommended Order what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.12
IT Is FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint in Case
9-CA-6840-1, -2 be dismissed in its entirety.
' In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board"
12 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board
after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read:
"Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in writing, within 20 days from
the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith "
177
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial in which all parties had the opportunity to
present their evidence, it has been found that we violated
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and we
have been ordered to post this notice:
WE WILL NOT discharge any employee because of his
suspected interest in, sympathy for, and/or activities on
behalf of Inland Boatmen 's Union of the Seafarers
International Union of North America, AGLIWD,
AFL-CIO, or any other union.
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with, restrain,
or coerce our employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended.
WE WILL offer David Lancaster immediate and full
reinstatement to the job he held prior to his discharge
on May 25, 1972 or if his job no longer exists, to a
substantially equivalent job, without prejudice to his
seniority or other rights and privileges.
WE WILL make whole David Lancaster for any loss
of pay he may have suffered as a result of the
discrimination against him, plus interest at 6 percent
per annum.
SOUTH POINT BARGE
COMPANY, INC. AND SOUTH
POINT TOWING COMPANY,
INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
WE WILL immediately notify David Lancaster if presently
serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of his
right to full reinstatement upon application after discharge
from the Armed Forces in accordance with the Selective
Service Act and the Universal Military Training and
Service Act.
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. Any questions concern-
ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may be
directed to the Board's Office , Federal Office Building,
Room 2407, 550 Main Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
Telephone 513-684-3696.