Smoky Mountain Stages, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 13, 1968

169 N.L.R.B. 777 (N.L.R.B. 1968)

SMOKY MOUNTAIN STAGES, INC. 777
Smoky Mountain Stages, Inc. and Amalgamated
Transit Union, AFL-CIO, Local 1531. Case
11-CA-3336
February 13,1968
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND ZAGORIA
On November 27, 1967, Trial Examiner
Frederick U. Reel issued his Decision in the above-
entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent
had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices within the meaning of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommend-
ing that it cease and desist therefrom, and take cer-
tain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached
Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Re-
spondent filed ';a statement of exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.'
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the statement of excep-
tions, and the entire record in the case, and hereby
adopts the findings, t conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby or-
ders that the Respondent, Smoky Mountain Stages,
Inc., Charlotte, North Carolina, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.
The Trial Examiner did not decide the question of whether the
dispatchers were supervisors as alleged in the complaint. We find, on the
basis of the facts in the record, that the dispatchers have authority to as-
sign, transfer, suspend, and discipline drivers, and that they responsibly
direct them in a manner requiring the use of independent judgment. We
find, therefore, that the dispatchers are supervisors within the meaning of
Section 2(11) of the Act. In concluding that Wells' employment was ter-
mtnated for discriminatory rather than disciplinary reasons, we rely not
only on the circumstances of the discharge, as described by the Trial Ex-
aminer, but also on the statements made by the dispatchers indicating
union animus, and especially the statements made by Jones to Wells at the
time of the discharge
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
FREDERICK U. REEL, Trial Examiner: This case, tried
at Charlotte, North Carolina, on October 3, 1967, pur-
suant to a charge filed the preceding June 9 and a com-
plaint issued July 31, presents the question whether
Respondent, herein called the Company, discharged one
Edgar L. Wells, a busdriver, on January 18, 1967,
because of his union activity or for lawful cause.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of
the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY AND THE LABOR
ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Company, a North Carolina corporation engaged
in the operation of an interstate busline, annually derives
over $50,000 in the course and conduct of the interstate
portion of its operations, and is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act. The Charging Party, herein called the Union, is
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
A. The Employment History and Union Activity of
Edgar L. Wells
Edgar L. Wells, whose discharge on January 18, 1967,
gave rise to this litigation, was a busdriver who had
worked for the Company in that capacity since 1946, ex-
cept for a brief hiatus of about a year , from 1950 to early
1952. In his 20 years of service for this Employer, Wells
had driven well over 1 million "safe" miles, and his
record was apparently unblemished in any respect until
May 1966 , when the Company received a report from a
private investigator that Wells had been speeding on an
interstate highway. Wells denied the charge , but was
placed on a year 's probation.
During the years 1965 and 1966, Wells had been an ac-
tive supporter of the Union in its efforts , eventually suc-
cessful, to obtain the right to represent the employees. In
1965, it was Wells who first got in touch with union
representatives and urged them to organize the men, and
Wells talked to all but 3 of the 30 drivers in the Atlanta
Division, urging them to sign cards. The Union lost the
election in 1965, but won an election early in December
1966.
The record is clear that the Company opposed the ad-
vent of the Union. For example , Wayne Wright , the divi-
sion manager in Atlanta , in discussing Wells' union activi-
ty or lack thereof, testified that Wells "led me to believe
that he was for the Company ," i.e., against the Union.
Vincent Batts, supervisor of drivers and equipment, used
the same expression , stating that he told Wells "during
the union campaigns ... that when [Wells] voted [ Batts]
hoped that he would see fit to support the company...."
Much less clear, however, as the foregoing quotations
suggest, is whether the Company had knowledge of
Wells' union activity or sympathies.
According to Wells, the only witness called by General
Counsel, the Company was well aware of his prounion
views. As already noted, he signed up a large number of
employees for the Union . Wells further testified that
between the two elections he told Division Manager
Wright that the Union would win the second election
because the Company had reneged on promises made to
the men prior to the first election. After the second elec-
tion, according to Wells, he told Wright that he wanted
169 NLRB No. 114
778 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Wright to know that he (Wells) was "going to belong to
the Union one hundred percent."
Wells also testified to certain conversations with
dispatchers, whose alleged supervisory status is placed in
issue in this connection. Early in November 1966, an At-
lanta dispatcher, Ray Scism, told Wells that if Wells did
not "leave this union alone" he was "going to get run off,"
as "Wayne Wright is not going to let you nor nobody else
come in here and tear up what it has took him his life to
make." The next day Wells was conversing with several
other men, including Charlotte Dispatcher Herman
Jones, when the Union was discussed, and Jones said,
speaking of Wells, "he won't [vote for the Union], he
knows better." On November 17, according to Wells,
Jones in the presence of Supervisor Batts told Wells he
"had better go upstairs and turn [his] union card in," at
which point Batts said, "you had better not have a union
card in your pocket." A few days later, according to
Wells, Jones told him that if he "joined up with that union
bunch" Jones "was going to kick [Wells'] butt," adding
that "you boys don't have any business in the union ...
you will only lose your good runs to Charlotte, and some
of you are going to get fired." Wells also testified that a
few minutes after he was discharged on January 18, 1967,
he saw Jones, who said that he knew Wells "was going to
be fired," and asked him, "Wells, don't you wish you had
took five hundred dollars for your union card? ... You
know Hutto [a driver discharged some 10 or 12 days
earlier] wouldn't take five hundred dollars for his."
Cornpany witnesses Wright, Batts, and Jones substan-
tially contradicted Wells' testimony concerning his al-
leged conversations with them. Wright testified that in his
conversations with Wells concerning the Union, Wells
had indicated his opposition to the Union, and Wright
specifically denied that after the Union won the election
Wells had said he was a union supporter. Batts testified
that he also thought Wells was "for the Company" and
not for the Union, and Batts specifically denied telling
Wells that he had better not have a union card. Finally,
Dispatcher Herman Jones denied the statements at-
tributed to him by Wells, admitting only that he and Wells
"kidded about the Union a lot, just ragging each other,"
and averring that he never knew Wells had a union card.
Indeed, Jones testified that Wells had said he was against
the Union.
As usual, the credibility issues raised by these conflicts
in testimony are both extremely difficult and extremely
important . I have little hesitancy in crediting Wells over
Jones, for although Wells' memory in some respects was
faulty (see infra), I formed the distinct impression that he
was trying to tell the truth as he remembered it. Jones'
demeanor, however, was that of an employee determined
to testify in the way best calculated to injure Wells and
help the cause of Jones' employer, without regard for the
truth.' I credit Wells over Jones, particularly with respect
to what Jones said when he heard Wells was discharged,
and also with respect to Jones' threats and comments to
Wells as to what would happen if Wells "joined up with
that union bunch."
I have more difficulty in assessing the credibility of
Batts and Wright , as against Wells, than I have in the case
I This is a harsh judgment , and the Trial Examiner is well aware that he,
like Jones and everyone else, is a fallible human being. I may be in error,
but my considered judgment based on my observation of the two men as
well as on the content of the testimony is that Wells tried to tell the truth
and Jones did not.
of Jones. That is to say, I am less certain of my ultimate
judgment that Wells testified truthfully, and Wright and
Batts testified falsely. I note and credit Wells' testimony
that union representatives advised him to make notes in
his logbook of any conversations he had with company
representatives about the Union. Wells did make such
notes, and used them at the hearing to refresh his recollec-
tion., Of course, this does not settle the matter, for if
Wells testified falsely he could just as easily, or even
more easily, have invented the episodes and entered them
in his logbook. It is also possible in any conversation that
the parties to it-even at the time, to say nothing of
months later-do not carry away identical impressions of
what was said. But upon considering the entire record,
the demeanor of the witnesses, and the details of the in-
terview as described by Wells, I am satisfied that on or
about December 8, 1966, Wells told Wright in unequivo-
cal terms that he (Wells) was for the Union.
In the light of this finding that the Company knew at
the time of Wells' discharge of his support of the Union,
I see no need to go into the question of the alleged super-
visory status of the dispatchers in general. The role of
Dispatcher Jones in Wells' discharge is discussed below.
B. The Discharge of Wells
On January 18, 1967, when Wells was getting ready for
his scheduled departure on the Charlotte-to-Atlanta run,
he received a message to see Batts in the latter's office.
Upon Wells' arrival there, Batts said to him: "I am going
to have to let you go.... Your work is not satisfactory,
any more." To quote Batts' testimony, Wells "made the
statement that he didn't know why [his services] were
unsatisfactory, and I believe he asked me if I could tell
him why they were unsatisfactory, [to] which I replied I
could not."3
Wells, leaving Batts' office, encountered Dispatcher
Jones. Wells (whose version I credit over Jones' denial)
testified as follows concerning their conversation:
I turned around, and I said, Herman, did you know
that I was going to be fired? And he said, yes, didn't
you? And I said, no.
He said, I will tell you, Wells, he said, we have had
several heart attacks in the last year or two. And he
said, they are going to get shed of all of you old folks,
and get some young ones. And of course , he laughed,
see, as if he was joking.
Q. Was there anything said in that conversation
about why you were being fired?
A. No, I can't recall right now. I do remember
when I left out of there, Herman Jones came over to
the bus, and driver Phillips took the bus to Atlanta,
the schedule that I rode, which was my schedule, up
until then.
And he walked over to me, and he said, Wells,
don't you wish that you had took five hundred dollars
for your union card? He said, you know Hutto
' The notes themselves are not in evidence as I sustained the Com-
pany's objection when General Counsel offered them as exhibits.
' The Company has a rule against telling anyone why he is discharged.
The rule was adopted , Batts testified , "to avoid all unpleasantries " includ-
ing "threatened suits."
SMOKY MOUNTAIN STAGES, INC.
wouldn't take five hundred dollars for his, and, of
course, I was already mad at Herman.
And I said, let me tell you something, Herman, I
said, this is a free country, and I said, I am going to
keep my union card.
I said, no, I wouldn't take five hundred dollars for
it right now, even if I am fired. I said, as a matter of
fact, you couldn't buy it for a thousand dollars.
So, that was about all that was said.
Q. Do you know whether or not Mr. Jones had
any knowledge that you were going to be terminated
before you were terminated?
A. Well, I don't know. I don't know.
Q. Well, did you ever have a conversation with
him about that?
A. Oh, yes, when I came back after I was
dismissed, I asked him, and he said, yes, he knew
that I was going to be fired.
Q. All right.
A. And he asked me, said, didn't you? And I said,
no, I haven't done anything to be fired over.
Q. And now, who is Hutto?
A. Hutto was another driver that was dismissed
about ten or, twelve days maybe -maybe before I
was.
Wells (and the Charging Party and the General Coun-
sel) did not know until the afternoon of the trial before me
(i.e., after General Counsel had concluded his direct ex-
amination of his only witness) in what respect the Com-
pany considered his work was "unsatisfactory." Further,
if the Company's own witnesses are to be credited, Wells
was never informed at any time before his discharge that
the Company regarded any conduct of his as ground for
discharge, or was investigating him in anyway. At the
hearing, however, it developed that the Company was re-
lying on the events of January 10, 1967, as the "un-
satisfactory work" for which Wells was discharged, and
it also developed that the Company had made some "in-
vestigation" of the matter between January 10 and 18,
although never discussing it with Wells. We turn, there-
fore, to the events of January 10, and the subsequent in-
vestigation.
C. The Episode Alleged as the Ground for the
Discharge
On Tuesday, January 10, 1967, Wells was about to de-
part on his regular 11:15 a.m. run from Charlotte to At-
lanta. This scheduled departure coincided with the
scheduled arrival of a Carolina Coach bus from Raleigh.
Under standard procedures, of which Wells was fully
aware, the departure of his bus was often delayed as
much as 30 minutes to permit passengers on the incoming
bus to connect with his bus. Several other buses also
"connected" with the 11:15 a.m. to Atlanta, but the
Raleigh bus just mentioned was the "closest" connection.
On the day in question, Wells asked Dispatcher Jones
sometime between 11:15 a.m. and 11:30 a.m. if Wells'
bus could leave. Jones, in the hearing of two other men,
Sales Representatives Tom Davis and C. W. Spratlin,
told Wells, "You have one more connection," or "You
4 The record does not indicate what investigating if any was done by
Ray.
5 Italics supplied in all cases.
779
have got another connection to come in." The connection
to which Jones referred was the Raleigh bus mentioned
above, for Jones had been informed earlier by one Purser,
the dispatcher for Carolina Coach, that that bus would be
25 minutes late. About 11:30 a.m. Wells left with his bus,
and a number of incoming passengers on the bus from
Raleigh missed their connection and had to be rerouted at
considerable inconvenience to themselves.
Wells testified that he never left the Charlotte terminal
without being told to go by the dispatcher, and that the
latter would be of assistance in helping guide the bus out
of the somewhat cramped conditions prevailing at the ter-
minal. He also testified that he did not leave until 11:45
a.m. that day, but I am satisfied from an examination of
the company records that Wells left about 11:30. Wells
further testified that he saw another driver, Phillips,
getting ready to take the Raleigh bus out on the continua-
tion of its run, so that he (Wells) knew the bus had come
in. Phillips did sign out on that run as of 11:45 a.m., the
scheduled departure time. It is thus highly unlikely that
the bus was 25 minutes late, and arrived as late as 11:40,
although it is possible Phillips signed out some minutes
before he left. In any event, the record is reasonably
clear, and I find, that Wells did leave that day before the
incoming passengers had made their connection with his
bus.
Dispatcher Jones reported to Supervisor Batts that
Wells had left without being dispatched, and upon Batts'
inquiry told him that Davis and Spratlin were witnesses
to the fact that Wells had been instructed to wait. During
the next few days, Batts and Company Counsel Ray "in-
vestigated" the matter. The investigation began with
Batts' interviewing Jones and concluded with his inter-
viewing Davis and Spratlin. They did not in their in-
vestigation speak about the episode to Wells. Davis and
Spratlin confirmed Jones' report that he had told Wells a
connection was not in. They both told Batts that they did
not know whether that connection had come in at the time
hat Wells left, and they did not know whether the
dispatcher had in fact given Wells a release to go.
According to Batts, Ray told him on January 16 that
"as far as he was concerned the investigation was
completed." 4 Batts and Ray then "sat down and dis-
cussed all of the things that we had before us, and then
]Batts] took all of this into consideration ... and decided
that Mr. Wells would be discharged." As stated above,
Wells was discharged on his next visit to Charlotte 2 days
later, but was not told the reason for the action until the
hearing before me.
In failing to interview Wells about the episode, Batts
apparently departed from his usual practice. Testifying in
Case 11-RC-2376 on June 1, 1966 (the transcript of
record of which was introduced into evidence before me),
Batts was attempting to support the Company's position
in that case that dispatchers were not supervisors. The
following excerpts from his testimony 5 suggest that Batts'
investigation in the Wells case differed from that which
he usually undertakes in discharge cases 6
Of course, if the dispatcher knows why he didn't
go, I would expect him to tell me, but I mean, I don't
assign him to investigate the reason for it. I just get
6 Two of the four cases discussed in Batts' testimony were discharge
cases, and the other two (Young and Bridges) were probation cases
780 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
a statement from him as to what occurred, and then
I will talk to the driver-driver and get what oc-
curred. And then I will make my own decision.
But, I assume that I would be in a position to make
some sort of decision to hold him off, until I did get
back, or to allow him to go back on his run, until I got
back, at which time, I would talk to him, depending
on the circumstances.
* * * * *
Q. Well, would there be circumstances on which
you would rely on a dispatcher's report?
A. I don't know of any, without just taking his re-
port, and then taking any action without
talking- without talking to the employee involved.
* * * * *
Q. All right, now, excluding the case of Young,
regarding the other three, the dispatcher reported the
conduct leading to the discipline in each case, is that
correct?
A. Yes sir.
Q. And did you participate in the discipline or ad-
minister the discipline in each of these three cases?
A. I did.
Q. And what procedures, sir, did you follow in
each of these cases? Once the dispatcher reported to
you.
A. Investigation was made.
Q. Now, when you say an investigation was
made-
MR. ALEXANDER: I object, let him finish his
answer, please sir.
Q. Surely, excuse me.
A. Statements were taken or made by, I talked
with each one of the drivers involved. And received
a statement from them . As to what took place.
Another driver was also talked to in one case for in-
formation.
Q. Dispatchers in none of these three cases par-
ticipated in your investigation?
A. None other than me talking with them to get
the facts, and then I talked with the other driver in-
dividually, and the dispatcher was never present, in
any of these discussions.
Q. But you did talk to the dispatchers in each of
these three cases after the first report was made to
you?
A. I am sure that I did.
Q. Did you rely upon the facts that they reported
to you in any way , in deciding on the discipline to be
administered?
A. I relied on all of the facts, theirs, the drivers or
any one else -else that was connected with it, or had
any information on it.
Q. What weight, if any , did you give to the
dispatcher 's report to you in these three cases?
' Batts at the hearing testified that "it might could have been " a misun-
derstanding between Wells and Jones as to whether the signal to go had
been given. He felt that it was primarily the driver's responsibility to make
A. Actually none - none because they just re-
ported the incident that happened, and really the in-
formation that we received from other sources in-
cluding the drivers was considered and governed the
decision.
D. Concluding Findings
I have found that Wells left Charlotte about 11:30 a.m.
on January 10, 1967, and that several passengers missed
their connection to his bus. Dispatcher Jones testified
that he did not tell Wells to go; Wells testified that he
never left Charlotte without being dispatched. As Wells
put it on the witness stand: "Yes, I got dispatched. If I
hadn't, I would have still been there." I find it unnecessa-
ry to resolve the conflict between Jones and Wells on this
issue . I have no doubt that Jones told Batts that Wells left
without being dispatched.
Obviously, the Company could lawfully discharge an
employee for the offense of which Jones accused Wells.
The fact that Wells was a union member, that the Com-
pany knew it, and that the Company opposed the Union
would not establish a violation of the Act in Wells' case
if the Company discharged him for leaving the terminal
without being dispatched. Even if Wells was in fact told
to go by Jones, or by some other dispatcher, or even if
Wells honestly misunderstood some word or signal from
Jones or someone else,7 the discharge would be lawful if
the Company was not motivated by union animus but by
its belief that Wells had transgressed.
And yet, why would the Company fire a man after 20
years of service without even an inquiry of him as to why
or how he happened on this solitary occasion to leave
without being dispatched? Why would the Company de-
part in this instance from its regular practice of talking to
the employee involved? What was there in Wells' case
that produced this discriminatory treatment? The Com-
pany suggests that he was on probation, as some 8
months before he had been accused of speeding. But the
Company admits that it does not automatically discharge
a man for an offense merely because he is on probation.
And in a sense this defense begs the question, for how did
the Company know that Wells was guilty of the new "of-
fense." True, it knew that he had left the terminal early.
But only Jones - not Spratlin and not Davis - said that
Wells had not been told to go. The Company's readiness
to accept Jones' version without ever giving Wells a
chance to explain suggests that the Company was looking
for a ground to discharge Wells, and had no desire to let
this longtime employee explain, or even to know of, his
isolated dereliction.
Does the unusual treatment of Wells - the apparently
unprecedented failure to get his version before firing
him-establish that a motivating force in the Company's
action was its desire to eliminate a union adherent? Such
an inference would seem appropriate under the language
of the Ninth Circuit in Shattuck Denn Mining Corpora-
tion v. N.L.R.B., 362 F.2d 466, 470. To what did Batts
refer when he said that he and Ray "discussed all of the
things that we had before us" when they decided to
discharge Wells? Dispatcher Jones, whose role in this
was far from passive, told Wells that Jones knew the
sure all connections were in and all passengers so desiring had been trans-
ferred.
SMOKY MOUNTAIN STAGES, INC. 781
discharge was imminent, and also said, "Wells, don't you
wish you had took five hundred dollars for your union
card."
This is not an easy case. It is no business of the Labor
Board if an employer chooses not to tell employees, even
those of 20 years' service, why they are being fired. To
discharge such an employee without giving a reason and
without giving him a chance to explain the episode on
which (unknown to the employee) the employer is relying
may offend common decency, without offending the
statute. But on the other hand we have been repeatedly
told that the issue in these cases is not whether the con-
duct complained of is ground for discharge but whether
the employer acted not "upon it [but] for reasons
prohibited by the Act." D. W. Onan & Sons v. N.L.R.B.,
139 F.2d 728, 730 (C.A. 8). "The existence of some
justifiable ground for discharge is no defense if it was not
the moving cause." N.L.R.B. v. Wells, Incorporated, 162
F.2d 457, 460 (C.A. 9); N.L.R.B. v. Texas Independent
Oil Company, Inc., 232 F.2d 447, 450 (C.A. 9). In
Edward G. Budd Manufacturing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 138
F. 2d 86, 90-91, the Third Circuit sustained a finding of
unlawful discharge after observing the employee in
question. "If ever a workman deserved summary
discharge, it was he." Little purpose is served in
proliferating examples; each case must stand on its own
facts.
In brief, Wells' offense was grave (unless, of course, he
misunderstood Jones or thought he had received a later
order to go). The Company could lawfully fire him for it.
But on this record I am constrained to find that the Com-
pany in this case departed from its usual practice of
getting a statement from the employee involved before
deciding to discharge him. The sole reason I can find for
this departure from practice is the Company's desire to
weed out a union adherent. I therefore conclude that in
discharging Wells without making any effort to get his
version of the alleged offense, the Company violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
By discharging Edgar Wells because of his union activi-
ty, the Company engaged in an unfair labor practice af-
fecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(1)
(3) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY '
I shall recommend that the Company cease and desist
from its unfair labor practices, that it reinstate Wells with
backpay (computed'under the methods set forth in F. W.
Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing
& Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716), and that it post an ap-
propriate notice.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and upon the entire record in this case, I therefore
recommend, pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, is-
suance of the following:
ORDER
Respondent, Smoky Mountain Stages, Inc., its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against
any employee because of membership or activity in
Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO, Local 1531, or
any other labor organization.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing any employee in the exercise of
his right to join or assist the above-named or any other
labor organization.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to reinstate Edgar Wells to his former or sub-
stantially equivalent position without prejudice to his
seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him
whole in the manner described in the portion of the Trial
Examiner's Decision entitled "The Remedy" for any loss
of earnings suffered by reason of the discrimination
against him.
(b) Notify Edgar Wells if presently serving in the
Armed Forces of the United States of his right to full
reinstatement upon application in accordance with the
Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Train-
ing and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the
Armed Forces.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Recommended Order.
(d) Post at its terminals at Charlotte, North Carolina,
and Atlanta, Georgia, copies of the attached notice
marked "Appendix."8 Copies of such notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 11, after
being duly signed by an authorized representative of the
Respondent, shall be posted immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to in-
sure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in
writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision,
what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.9
8 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further
event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap-
peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order "
9 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director,
in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respond-
ent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Ex-
aminer of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our em-
ployees that:
WE WILL offer Edgar L. Wells his former job and
pay him for wages lost since his discharge in January
1967.
782 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
All our employees have the right to join or assist
Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO, Local
1531, or any other union . They also have the right
not to join or assist any union.
WE WILL NOT take or threaten to take any action
against them for engaging in union activity or in any
like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or
coerce them in their exercise of those rights.
SMOKY MOUNTAIN STAGES,
INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
NOTE: We will notify the above-named employee if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United
States of his right to full reinstatement upon application
in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the
Universal Military Training and Service Act, as
amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board' s Regional Office, 16th Floor,
Wachovia Building , 301 North Main Street, Winston-
Salem , North Carolina 27101, Telephone 723-2911.