Smoak LLC

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 18, 2019

87250448 (T.T.A.B. Jun. 18, 2019)

Mailed: June 18, 2019
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
————
In re Smoak LLC
_____
Serial No. 87250448
_____
Francis J. Ciaramella of Rick Ruz, PLLC
for Smoak LLC.

Karen K. Bush, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 108,
Steven Berk, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Mermelstein, Adlin and Larkin, Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Adlin, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Applicant Smoak LLC seeks a Principal Register registration for the proposed
stylized mark shown below
1
for “tobacco pipes” in International Class 34. The Examining Attorney refused
registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the

1 Application Serial No. 87250448, filed November 29, 2016 under Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act based on first use on April 1, 2016 and first use in commerce on May 5, 2016.
The application includes this description of the mark: “The mark consists of a text based logo
of which letter characters are spelled out as ‘SMOAK’ with the specific sans serif font of
Futura PT Bold with a kerning of -1.”
This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Serial No. 87250448
2
ground that Applicant’s mark so resembles the following commonly-owned stylized
marks registered on the Supplemental Register as to be likely to cause confusion:
for “Tobacco; Cigarettes containing tobacco
substitutes not for medical purposes; Electronic cigarettes
for use as an alternative to traditional cigarettes; Cigarette
tubes; Tobacco pipes, not of precious metal; Cigar cases;
Cigarette cases; Cigarette holders; Ashtrays for smokers;
Cigarette filters” in International Class 34;2 and
(PIPE disclaimed) for “Electronic cigarettes
for use as an alternative to traditional cigarettes;
Cigarettes containing tobacco substitutes, not for medical
purposes; Tobacco pipes, not of precious metal; Tips of
yellow amber for cigar and cigarette holders; Cigarette
filters; Cigarette holders; Cigar holders; Cigarillos; Cigar
cases; Cigarette cases; Cigars; Cigarette Tips” in
International Class 34.3

The Examining Attorney also refused registration under Section 2(e)(1) of the Act on
the ground that Applicant’s mark is merely descriptive of the identified goods. After
the refusals became final, Applicant appealed and filed a request for reconsideration
which was denied. After the appeal resumed, Applicant and the Examining Attorney
filed briefs.
I. Likelihood of Confusion
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the
probative evidence of record bearing on the likelihood of confusion. In re E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973) (setting forth

2 Supplemental Register Registration No. 4545449, issued June 3, 2014. The registration
includes this description of the mark: “The mark consists of ‘SMOK’ in stylized form.”
3 Supplemental Register Registration No. 4745395, issued May 26, 2015. The registration
includes this description of the mark: “The mark consists of Stylized wording ‘SMOK PIPE’.”
Serial No. 87250448
3
factors to be considered); see also In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65
USPQ2d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two key
considerations are the similarities between the marks and the similarities between
the goods. See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192
USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the
cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and
differences in the marks.”).
We focus our analysis on the cited registration of (Registration No.
4545449), because if we find confusion likely between that cited mark and Applicant’s
mark, we need not consider the likelihood of confusion between Applicant’s mark and
the other cited mark, while if we find no likelihood of confusion between Applicant’s
mark and , we would not find confusion between Applicant’s mark and the
other cited mark. In re Max Capital Grp. Ltd., 93 USPQ2d 1243, 1245 (TTAB 2010).
A. The Goods, Channels of Trade and Classes of Consumers
Turning first to the goods, they are in-part legally identical, because the involved
application and cited registration both identify “tobacco pipes.” It is irrelevant that
Registrant’s pipes are “not of precious metal,” because Applicant seeks registration
for “tobacco pipes” without limitation, meaning its goods could include those
identified in the cited registration, “tobacco pipes, not of precious metal.” We need not
go beyond our finding that Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods are legally identical in-
part. It is sufficient for a finding of likelihood of confusion if relatedness is established
for any item encompassed by the identification of goods in a particular class. Tuxedo
Serial No. 87250448
4
Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 209 USPQ 986 (CCPA 1981).
This factor weighs heavily in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.
Furthermore, where, as here, Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods are in-part
legally identical, we must presume that the channels of trade and classes of
purchasers for those goods are also the same. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358,
101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (even though there was no evidence
regarding channels of trade and classes of consumers, the Board was entitled to rely
on this legal presumption in determining likelihood of confusion); In re Yawata Iron
& Steel Co., 403 F.2d 752, 159 USPQ 721, 723 (CCPA 1968) (where there are legally
identical goods, the channels of trade and classes of purchasers are considered to be
the same); Am. Lebanese Syrian Associated Charities Inc. v. Child Health Research
Inst., 101 USPQ2d 1022, 1028 (TTAB 2011).
The legal identity (in part) of Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods and their
overlapping channels of trade and classes of consumers not only weigh heavily in
favor of finding a likelihood of confusion, but also reduce the degree of similarity
between the marks necessary to find a likelihood of confusion. In re Viterra, 101
USPQ2d at 1908; In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed.
Cir. 2010); Max Capital Grp., 93 USPQ2d at 1248.
B. The Marks
The marks are similar “in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation
and commercial impression.” Palm Bay Imps. Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin
Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
Serial No. 87250448
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(quoting du Pont, 177 USPQ at 567). In fact, as the Examining Attorney points out,
the marks would likely be pronounced identically, because an “o” followed by an “a”
is typically pronounced as a long “o,” as in “oak,” “toast” and “roam.” That
pronunciation is especially likely in this case, because in the context of Applicant’s
tobacco-related goods, consumers will perceive “smoak” as the phonetic equivalent of
“smoke.”
The marks also look similar, because they differ by only one letter. While the
marks are presented in different stylized forms, the differences in stylization are not
significant enough to prevent confusion, given consumers’ imperfect memories (as
well as the legal identity of the goods). Indeed, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side
comparison of the marks, but instead ‘whether the marks are sufficiently similar in
terms of their commercial impression’ such that persons who encounter the marks
would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Coach Servs., Inc. v.
Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(quoting Leading Jewelers Guild, Inc. v. LJOW Holdings, LLC, 82 USPQ2d 1901,
1905 (TTAB 2007)). We focus on the recollection of the average purchaser, who
normally retains a general rather than a specific impression of trademarks. In re
Binion, 93 USPQ2d 1531, 1534 (TTAB 2009) (citing Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper
Co., 190 USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975)). See Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc.,
438 F.2d 1005, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971) (finding a likelihood of confusion due
in part to “the fallibility of memory over a period of time”).
Serial No. 87250448
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The marks also convey similar, and quite possibly identical, meanings in the
context of Applicant’s and Registrant’s tobacco-related goods. Indeed, while neither
nor are spelled the same as the word “smoke,” that is obviously
the word the two marks are intended to evoke because they are each used for
smokable goods or goods used for smoking.
In short, the marks create similar overall commercial impressions ─ each is
merely a slight misspelling of the word “smoke,” presented in a modestly stylized font.
The similarity in overall commercial impression is heightened when the marks are
considered in the context of Applicant’s and Registrant’s smoking-related goods. This
factor also weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.
C. Fame/Strength of the Cited Mark
Applicant points out that “there is no evidence that the cited registrations are
famous or have acquired secondary meaning within the marketplace, or that
consumers associate the term SMOK or SMOKE with the owner of the prior-cited
registrations.” 7 TTABVUE 6 (Applicant’s Appeal Brief at 5). While Applicant is
correct that there is no evidence that the cited marks are famous, this is essentially
irrelevant. “[T]he owner of the cited registration is not a party to this ex parte appeal,
and the Examining Attorney is under no obligation to demonstrate the fame of a cited
mark. Thus, we find this du Pont factor to be neutral.” In re Integrated Embedded,
120 USPQ2d 1504, 1512 (TTAB 2016). See also, In re Majestic Distilling Co., 65
USPQ2d at 1205 (“Although we have previously held that the fame of a registered
mark is relevant to likelihood of confusion, DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361, 177 USPQ at
Serial No. 87250448
7
567 (factor five), we decline to establish the converse rule that likelihood of confusion
is precluded by a registered mark’s not being famous.”); In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd.,
92 USPQ 1198, 1204 (TTAB 2009) (“it is settled that the absence of [fame] evidence
is not particularly significant in the context of an ex parte proceeding”); In re Big Pig
Inc., 81 USPQ2d 1436, 1439 (TTAB 2006) (“It is not necessary that a registered mark
be famous to be entitled to protection against a confusingly similar mark.”); In re
Thomas, 79 USPQ2d 1021, 1027 n.11 (TTAB 2006).
As for the cited mark’s commercial strength, Applicant’s evidence is limited to
third-party registrations. February 22, 2018 Request for Reconsideration TSDR 18-
33. Generally, however, “third-party registrations are not evidence of third-party use
of the registered marks in the marketplace, for purposes of the sixth du Pont factor.”
Davey Prods., 92 USPQ2d at 1204 (citing Olde Tyme Foods Inc. v. Roundy’s Inc., 961
F.2d 200, 22 USPQ2d 1542, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); In re Thor Tech, Inc., 90 USPQ2d
1634, 1639 (TTAB 2009). See also AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Prods., Inc., 474 F.2d 1403,
177 USPQ 268, 269 (CCPA 1973) (“The existence of these registrations is not evidence
of what happens in the market place or that customers are familiar with them nor
should the existence on the register of confusingly similar marks aid an applicant to
register another likely to cause confusion, mistake or to deceive.”). Id.4 Therefore,
Applicant has not established that the cited mark is commercially weak.

4 While there are cases in which evidence of extensive third-party use and registration of a
term has been found to suggest commercial weakness, in this case Applicant has not
established any third-party use of similar marks for similar goods, and in any event Applicant
submitted a relatively modest number of third-party registrations. See In re Inn at St. Johns,
LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1745-46 (TTAB 2018) and In re Morinaga Nyugyo K.K., 120 USPQ2d
Serial No. 87250448
8
With respect to conceptual strength, however, Applicant’s third-party registration
evidence is competent and probative. Juice Generation, 115 USPQ2d at 1674-75
(“Third party registrations are relevant to prove that some segment of the composite
marks which both contesting parties use has a normally understood and well-
recognized descriptive or suggestive meaning, leading to the conclusion that that
segment is relatively weak.”) (quoting 2 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition § 11.90 (4th ed. 2015)). Here, the third-party registrations Applicant
introduced establish that the term SMOK in the cited marks is conceptually weak. In
fact, the third-party registrations each contain the term SMOKE, or a variation
thereof, for tobacco, electronic cigarette or other smoking-related products. The term
“smoke” is disclaimed in several of the registrations, and others are registered on the
Supplemental Register or with a claim of acquired distinctiveness. While the cited
marks in this case are therefore entitled to a relatively narrow scope of protection, it
is nevertheless settled “that likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception is to be
avoided as much between weak marks as between strong marks.” In re Colonial
Stores, Inc., 216 USPQ 793, 795 (TTAB 1982) (citing King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s
Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108, 109 (CCPA 1974)). Accordingly, while

1738, 1746 n.8 (TTAB 2016). Cf. Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. KGAA
v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363, 116 USPQ2d 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding
that Board “too quickly” dismissed “extensive evidence of third-party registrations” and
third-party uses of similar marks) (emphasis supplied) and Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS
Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1671 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

Serial No. 87250448
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we agree that Registrant’s mark is conceptually weak, it is not so weak that
Applicant’s similar mark is entitled to registration for legally identical goods.5
D. Absence of Actual Confusion
Applicant’s reliance on the absence of actual confusion is misplaced, because there
is no evidence regarding the extent of Applicant’s use of its marks, or the extent of
use of the cited mark. Therefore, we cannot gauge whether or the extent to which
there has been an opportunity for confusion to occur if it were likely to occur. See
Nina Ricci S.A.R.L. v. E.T.F. Enters. Inc., 889 F.2d 1070, 12 USPQ2d 1901, 1903 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) (“The absence of any showing of actual confusion is of very little, if any,
probative value here because (1) no evidence was presented as to the extent of ETF’s
use of the VITTORIO RICCI mark on the merchandise in question in prior years ….”);
In re Kangaroos U.S.A., 223 USPQ 1025, 1026-27 (TTAB 1984). Moreover, a lack of
evidence of actual confusion carries little weight in an ex parte case such as this.
Majestic Distilling, 65 USPQ2d at 1205. “[I]t is unnecessary to show actual confusion
in establishing likelihood of confusion.” Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc.,
710 F.2d 1565, 218 USPQ 390, 396 (Fed. Cir. 1983). This factor is neutral.
E. Conclusion Regarding Likelihood of Confusion
The goods are legally identical and we therefore must presume that the channels
of trade overlap and the classes of purchasers are the same. In addition, the marks
are more similar than dissimilar, notwithstanding the conceptual weakness of the

5 To the extent Applicant argues that the cited mark is descriptive (as opposed to merely
suggestive) of Registrant’s goods, this is an impermissible collateral attack on the cited
registration. See In re Fiesta Palms, 85 USPQ2d 1360, 1363 (TTAB 2007) (citing In re Dixie
Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1534-35 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
Serial No. 87250448
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cited mark. We therefore find a likelihood of confusion between Applicant’s mark
and Registrant’s mark .
II. Descriptiveness
The Examining Attorney bases the descriptiveness refusal, in part, on the
following dictionary definitions of the word “smoke”:
“When someone smokes a cigarette, cigar, or pipe, they
suck the smoke from it into their mouth and blow it out
again. If you smoke, you regularly smoke cigarettes, cigars,
or a pipe.”6

“The act of smoking a form of tobacco” and “To draw in and
exhale smoke from a cigarette, cigar, or pipe.”7

“something (such as a cigarette) to smoke” and “an act of
smoking tobacco”8

“an act or spell of smoking something, especially tobacco”
and “something for smoking, as a cigar or cigarette”9

March 13, 2017 Office Action TSDR 14; August 22, 2017 Office Action TSDR 28;
March 13, 2018 Denial of Request for Reconsideration TSDR 3, 5.
She also relies on third-party registrations of marks used for tobacco, electronic
cigarette or smoking-related goods or services in which the word SMOKE is
disclaimed.10 August 22, 2017 Office Action TSDR 7-27. The disclaimers support a
finding that SMOKE is merely descriptive of these types of goods. See Alcatraz Media

6 https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/smoke
7 http://www.thefreedictionary.com/smoke”>smoke
8 Merriam-Webster Dictionary.
9 Dictionary.com.
10 Registration Nos. 3966772, 3148017, 4221216, 4530674, 4717558, 4786683, 5127107 and
5085817.
Serial No. 87250448
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Inc. v. Chesapeake Marine Tours Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1750, 1762 (TTAB 2013), aff’d
mem., 565 Fed. Appx. 900 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Bass Pro Trademarks LLC v. Sportsman’s
Warehouse Inc. 89 USPQ2d 1844, 1851 (TTAB 2008).
Applicant counters that the proposed mark is suggestive rather than merely
descriptive, because “a potential customer does not easily discern the ingredients,
qualities, or characteristics of the goods.” 7 TTABVUE 10 (Applicant’s Appeal Brief
at 9). It also argues that the proposed mark “is a portmanteau of the words SMOKE
and OAK, as Applicant’s goods are fashioned from oak lumber,” making the term “a
unique and coined word that is, at most, merely suggestive” of Applicant’s goods. Id.
at 11 (Applicant’s Appeal Brief at 10). Finally, Applicant relies on the same third-
party registrations containing variations of the term SMOKE which it cited in
connection with the likelihood of confusion refusal, and argues that its analogous
mark should also be allowed to register. Id. at 12-13 (Applicant’s Appeal Brief at 11-
12); February 22, 2018 Request for Reconsideration TSDR 18-33.
We agree with the Examining Attorney that the record leaves no doubt that
Applicant’s proposed mark is merely descriptive, because it immediately conveys
knowledge of a quality, feature, function, characteristic or purpose of Applicant’s
tobacco pipes. In re Bayer AG, 488 F.3d 960, 82 USPQ2d 1828, 1831 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(quoting In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 3 USPQ2d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1987)); In re Abcor
Dev. Co., 588 F.2d 811, 200 USPQ 215, 217-18 (CCPA 1978).11 More specifically, we

11 Applicant’s reliance on the Third Circuit’s five-factor test for descriptiveness is misplaced.
See In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1511, 1514-15 (TTAB 2016). We apply the
Federal Circuit’s standard for descriptiveness.
Serial No. 87250448
12
agree with the Examining Attorney that “smoak” immediately conveys the purpose
of tobacco pipes, which is to “smoke” tobacco or other material.
While “smoke” and “smoak” are not identical, as the Examining Attorney correctly
points out, Applicant’s slight misspelling of “smoke” does not make non-
descriptive. Nupla Corp. v. IXL Mfg. Co., 114 F.3d 191, 42 USPQ2d 1711, 1716 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (“Nupla’s mark [CUSH-N-GRIP], which is merely a misspelling of
CUSHION-GRIP, is also generic as a matter of law”); In re Quik-Print Copy Shops,
Inc., 616 F.2d 523, 205 USPQ 505, 507 n.9 (finding QUIK-PRINT merely descriptive
of printing and copying services, stating “[t]here is no legally significant difference
here between ‘quik’ and ‘quick.’”); In re Carlson, 91 USPQ2d 1198, 1203 (TTAB 2009)
(“applicant’s applied-for mark, URBANHOUZING in standard character form, will
be immediately and directly perceived by consumers as the equivalent of the
admittedly descriptive term URBAN HOUSING, rather than as including the
separate word ZING”); In re Ginc UK Ltd., 90 USPQ2d 1472, 1475 (TTAB 2007) (“The
generic meaning of ‘togs’ is not overcome by the misspelling of the term as TOGGS in
applicant’s mark. A slight misspelling is not sufficient to change a descriptive or
generic word into a suggestive word.”). Furthermore, would likely be
pronounced exactly the same as “smoke,” because as explained above, generally when
an “o” is followed by an “a,” it is pronounced as a long “o.” More specifically, relevant
consumers will be likely to pronounce exactly the same as “smoke”
because, as Applicant points out, its mark is a portmanteau, and its goods are made
of oak.
Serial No. 87250448
13
Applicant’s argument that consumers would not “easily discern the ingredients,
qualities, or characteristics of the goods” is misplaced, because descriptiveness is
determined not in the abstract, but in relation to the goods for which registration is
sought, the context in which it is being used in connection with the goods, and the
possible significance that the mark would have to the average purchaser of the goods
because of the manner of its use. In re Bright-Crest, Ltd., 204 USPQ 591, 593 (TTAB
1979). In fact, “[t]he question is not whether someone presented with only the mark
could guess what the goods or services are. Rather, the question is whether someone
who knows what the goods or services are will understand the mark to convey
information about them.” DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Medical Devices Ltd.,
695 F.3d 1247, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1757 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Tower Tech
Inc., 64 USPQ 2d 1314, 1316-17 (TTAB 2002)). Here, someone who knows that the
goods are tobacco pipes will immediately understand that the proposed mark refers
to the purpose of the goods (to smoke tobacco), as well as the smoke which will
emanate from Applicant’s pipes when used.
This is especially clear when we consider what Applicant describes as a
“screenshot” of its product:
Serial No. 87250448
14

June 5, 2017 Office Action response TSDR 13, 36. Applicant’s promotional use of the
word “smoke” (in a hashtag with “trees”, on the same page as the proposed mark and
a photo of Applicant’s product) further supports a finding of descriptiveness. It is
settled that “[e]vidence of the context in which a mark is used on labels, packages, or
in advertising material directed to the goods is probative of the reaction of prospective
purchasers to the mark.” In re Abcor Dev. Co., 200 USPQ at 218; In re Promo Ink, 78
USPQ2d 1301, 1303 (TTAB 2006); see also In re N.C. Lottery, 866 F.3d 1363, 123
USPQ2d 1707, 1709-10 (Fed. Cir. 2017); In re Hunter Fan Co., 78 USPQ2d 1474, 1476
(TTAB 2006) (“applicant’s own use of the term ERGONOMIC … highlights the
descriptive nature of this term ….”).
As for the third-party registrations upon which Applicant relies, they in fact tend
to support the Examining Attorney’s position. February 22, 2018 Request for
Reconsideration TSDR 18-33. They each contain variations of the word “smoke” and
are used for tobacco- or electronic cigarette-related products. In many of them, the
Serial No. 87250448
15
term “smoke” is disclaimed,12 or subject to a claim of acquired distinctiveness under
Section 2(f) of the Act,13 or the mark is registered on the Supplemental Register.14 In
most of the rest, the term “smoke” or a variation thereof is part of a unitary
expression.15 The only exceptions (which do not have a disclaimer or claim of acquired
distinctiveness, are not on the Supplemental Register and are not unitary) are: the
mark in Registration No. 5043211 ( ), which the registration indicates
translates to “as if the smoke,” or “as if the mist;” Registration No. 4657011 for
AMERICAN SMOKE; and Registration No. 4082944 for FUMO. In any event,
“neither the Trademark Examining Attorney nor the Board is bound to approve for
registration an Applicant’s mark based solely upon the registration of other
assertedly similar marks for other goods or services having unique evidentiary
records.” In re Datapipe, Inc., 111 USPQ2d 1330, 1336 (TTAB 2014); see also In re
Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 57 USPQ2d 1564, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The Board
must decide each case on its own merit …. Even if some prior registrations had some
characteristics similar to Nett Designs’ application, the PTO’s allowance of such prior
registrations does not bind the Board or this court.”).
For all of these reasons, we find that Applicant’s proposed mark is
merely descriptive of “tobacco pipes.”

12 Registration Nos. 2254324, 4501162, 4612290 and 4717558.
13 Registration No. 4612290.
14 Registration Nos. 3769539 and 4200187.
15 Registration Nos. 3525278, 3691455, 4624440, 4674814, 4200187 and 4974020.
Serial No. 87250448
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Decision: The refusals to register Applicant’s proposed mark under Sections 2(d) and
2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act are affirmed.