Smith, J. Carey. et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 3, 2020

15384361 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 3, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/384,361 12/20/2016 J. Carey Smith 1527-508 Div. II CIP 5690
1009 7590 02/03/2020
KING & SCHICKLI, PLLC
800 CORPORATE DRIVE, SUITE 200
LEXINGTON, KY 40503
EXAMINER
FREAY, CHARLES GRANT
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3746
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/03/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
laura@iplaw1.net
uspto@iplaw1.net
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte J. CAREY SMITH, RICHARD A. OLESON,
RICHARD M. AYNSLEY, RICHARD W. FIZER, JOHN B. LANGSTON,
MARK A. TOY, and ELIOS KLEMO
Appeal 2019-002161
Application 15/384,361
Technology Center 3700
Before STEFAN STAICOVICI, JEREMY M. PLENZLER, and
LISA M. GUIJT, Administrative Patent Judges.
PLENZLER, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–3 and 5–12. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Delta T, LLC,
f/k/a Delta T Corporation. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a fan system. Claim 1, reproduced below,
is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A fan system, wherein the fan system comprises:
(a) a hub, wherein the hub is configured to rotate;
(b) a plurality of fan blades mounted to the hub;
(c) a motor, wherein the motor is in communication with the
hub, wherein the motor is operable to rotate the hub;
(d) a motor controller in communication with the motor,
wherein the motor controller is configured to control operation
of the motor; and
(e) a control panel in communication with the motor
controller, wherein the control panel comprises an input port for
receiving data relating to operation of the fan system such that
the control panel communicates with the motor controller to
control the fan based on the data received via the input port.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Mehta US 5,528,229 June 18, 1996
Richmond US 2009/0212939 A1 Aug. 27, 2009
Knibbe US 2010/0214948 A1 Aug. 26, 2010
REJECTIONS
Claims 1–3 and 6–9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Mehta and Richmond.
Claims 5 and 10–12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Mehta, Richmond, and Knibbe.
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OPINION
Mehta and Richmond
Claim 1
The Examiner finds that Mehta teaches the limitations recited in claim
1, but “does not disclose that [its] control panel comprises an input port
configured to receive data relating to operation of the fan system or that the
data is received from an external electronic device in the form of an external
controller or an HVAC centralized controller.” Final Act. 6–7. The
Examiner finds that “Richmond discloses a control panel (Figs. 1 and 2) in
the form of a remote controller which has an input port (205) for receiving
data relating to operation of the controlled device (such as a ceiling fan or an
HVAC unit, [0003]) and a display 106.” Id. at 7. The Examiner reasons that
it would have been obvious . . . to modify the control panel of
Mehta to include a control panel/ port remote control and
centralized or external control system as taught by Richmond in
order to allow for the simple portable control of a remote device,
such as a ceiling fan, while also allowing for the expanded
advanced control of any connected devices by an external
controller (see abstract of Richmond).
Id. The Examiner considers the remote controls in both Mehta and
Richmond to correspond to a “control panel” as recited in claim 1. See Ans.
9–10.
The Examiner explains that “the whole disclosure and purpose of the
Richmond reference is to provide and allow for the more advanced control
of a controlled system (such as a ceiling fan or HVAC system) beyond the
limited capabilities of prior art standalone remote controls, i.e. control
panels.” Ans. 9–10. The Examiner finds that “Richmond teaches that an
external electronic device/control system can be connected, by a port, to a
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control panel which is in communication with and controlling an associated
controlled device, such as a fan or HVAC.” Id. at 11 (citing Richmond
¶ 29). The Examiner additionally cites paragraphs 20, 31, 32, 34, 46, and 53
of Richmond as supporting this finding. Id. at 11–13.
Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s findings related to Mehta.
Appellant contends that “Mehta already includes a ‘remote control and
centralized (?) or external control system,’ so this cannot be a reason for
combining the reference teachings.” Appeal Br. 4. In its Reply Brief,
Appellant contends that the Examiner’s rationale changed in the Answer.
See Reply Br. 1 (referring to “[t]he Examiner’s undesignated new grounds of
rejection”), 2 (addressing the “more advanced control” provided by
Richmond). Appellant contends that “‘allowing for the expanded advanced
control of the fan or HVAC system by an external electronic device/control
system’ is not a ‘reason why’ a skilled artisan would combine the features,
but rather simply a statement of what happens if A+B are combined.” Id. at
2.
As for Richmond’s teachings, Appellant contends that
[w]hile receiving and storing data from the controlled device is
described, nowhere is there any mention whatsoever in
Richmond of an input port for “receiving data relating to
operation of the fan system such that the control panel
communicates with the motor controller to control the fan based
on the data received via the input port.”
Final Act. 4 (emphasis omitted); see also Reply Br. 3 (repeating same).
We agree with the Examiner that Richmond’s dockable remote
control with “USB interface 205” teaches a “control panel compris[ing] an
input port for receiving data relating to operation of the fan system such that
the control panel communicates with the motor controller to control the fan
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based on the data received via the input port,” as required by claim 1.
Richmond explains that its remote control “a USB interface 205 allows the
computer to communicate with microprocessor 204, and read and write the
flash memory contained within microprocessor 204.” Id. ¶ 39. “This
internal flash memory contains the executable program, configuration
settings, and data to or from the controlled system,” and “[w]hen the unit is
docked to a computer, USB interface 205 allows the computer software to
utilize radio 202 to perform advanced capabilities and control functions with
the controlled system.” Id.
As for the rationale for the proposed combination, we agree that
Richmond, itself, provides motivation. As noted above, Appellant
acknowledges that Mehta teaches a remote control for its system. Richmond
is directed to “[i]mprovements in a portable hand-held radio frequency
wireless remote control,” including “software control of remote devices
when connected (docked) to a computer by way of a direct electrical I/0
connection . . . to expand the capabilities of portable compact radio
frequency wireless remote controls . . . for advanced control functions
without significantly compromising their small size or low cost.”
Richmond, Abstract. Richmond specifically references its applicability to
“HVAC control.” Id. ¶ 3. That is, Richmond expressly explains that it is
desirable to improve existing remote controls, such as Mehta’s remote
control, in the manner described in Richmond because those improvements
enhance control functionality.
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For at least these reasons, we are not apprised of error in the rejection
of claim 1.2
Claim 3
Claim 3 depends from claim 1, and further recites that “the input port
is configured to receive data from the motor controller.” The Examiner
finds that Richmond’s “remote control has a radio 202 allowing for two-way
communication (claim 3) and a microprocessor 204 and memory 211 which,
as detailed in [0029], can receive both software and data used to control the
fan or other remotely controlled device.” Final Act. 7. Appellant responds
that “[n]owhere does this account for the requirement that the input port
receives and provides data (via control panel) to a motor controller of a fan.”
Appeal Br. 5. We agree with Appellant.
Without further explanation, the Examiner has failed to establish
sufficiently that Richmond teaches USB interface 205, which the Examiner
finds corresponds to the recited input port, “is configured to receive data
from the motor controller.” The Examiner does not cure this deficiency in
the Answer. Rather, the Examiner simply states that “[t]he Mehta base
reference already teaches the ceiling fan having a motor controller
communicating with a control panel.” Ans. 14. The Examiner does not
propose modifying Mehta in any manner where the input port (USB
interface 205 from Richmond) is used to communicate with the motor

2 The Examiner determines that although the “‘motor controller . . .
configured to control operation of the motor’ in claims 1 and 10” “do[es] not
use the word ‘means,’” it is “nonetheless being interpreted under 35 U.S.C.
112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph.” Final Act. 4. Appellant
does not dispute that construction.
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controller in Mehta. Nor does the Examiner address the deficiency
identified by Appellant relative to the findings made in the Final Action
regarding Richmond teaching the features of claim 3. “[A] radio 202
allowing for two-way communication” in Richmond is not an “input port . . .
configured to receive data from the motor controller,” particularly where the
Examiner already made a finding that Richmond’s USB interface 205
corresponds to the recited input port.
For at least these reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner’s decision
to reject claim 3.
Claim 6
Claim 6 is similar to claim 1, but recites “means for receiving data
relating to operation of the fan system from a remote source and transmitting
the data to the motor controller,” rather than a “control panel.” Appellant
contends that “the ‘means plus function’ limitation and functional
requirements are not discussed on pages 6–7 of the final Office Action.”
Appeal Br. 6; see also Reply Br. 4 (repeating similar contentions). In the
Answer, the Examiner explains that “the ‘means for receiving . . . and
transmitting . . .’ of claim 6 . . . will be referred to as control panel.” Ans. 3–
4. That is, the Examiner treats the limitation like the control panel recited in
claim 1.
We agree that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 applies to the “means for receiving
data . . . and transmitting the data” recited in claim 6. When 35 U.S.C. § 112
¶ 6 applies, “the ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ that an examiner may
give means-plus-function language is that statutorily mandated in paragraph
six.” In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 1194–95 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
A means-plus-function limitation “shall be construed to cover the
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corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph. “[T]he PTO [i]s
required by statute to look to [the] specification and construe the “means”
language recited in the . . . claim . . . as limited to the corresponding
structure disclosed in the specification and equivalents thereof.” In re
Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1195.
Although the Examiner did not set forth a rigid analysis of the
“means-plus-function” language in the claim, we are not apprised of
reversible error because, as noted above, the Examiner explains that the
“means for receiving data . . . and transmitting the data” is a control panel
like that recited in claim 1. The structure described in the Specification that
corresponds to the means-plus-function limitation is that from claim 1. See,
e.g., Spec. ¶ 125 (describing remote control 500, with the remote control
functionality corresponding to the “means for transmitting, and port 501,
generally, and without detail, which corresponds to the “means for
receiving”). Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s findings regarding
these particular elements or the rationale provided for the proposed
modifications.
For at least these reasons, we are not apprised of error in the rejection
of claim 6.
Mehta, Richmond, and Knibbe
Claim 5
Claim 5 depends from claim 1 and further recites that “the input port
couples the fan with a centralized HVAC control system.” In the rejection
of claim 5, the Examiner relies on the finding from the rejection of claim 1
regarding Richmond’s USB interface 205 corresponding to the recited input
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port. See Final Act. 8 (“As set forth above Mehta in view of Richmond
disclose the invention substantially as claimed” including “a control panel
and an external controller [which] can control a fan, such as a ceiling fan, or
an HVAC system.”). The Examiner acknowledges that “Mehta in view of
Richmond do not specifically discuss controlling both a fan and an HVAC
system with an external controller/HVAC controller.” Id. (emphasis
omitted).
The Examiner finds that “Knibbe et al disclose an expanded
environmental control system including a number of controlled elements
including both a fan 5 and HVAC system (see [0025]) that are controlled by
a control panel 7, 9 that is also communicating with a central/HVAC control
system 10.” Id. The Examiner reasons that
it would have been obvious . . . to utilize the control panel and
the external electronic controller of Mehta in view of Richmond
to control multiple devices, such as a fan and an HVAC system,
in order to have greater control over an environment by
controlling additional multiple devices which effect the
environment.
Id. Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s rationale for the rejection of
claim 5. Rather, Appellant contends that “the inclusion of the Knibbe
reference fails to offer any additional teachings related to the use of the input
port as described in the claim.” Appeal Br. 6.
In the Answer, the Examiner clarifies that Knibbe teaches the recited
input port connection required by claim 5. See Ans. 16 (referencing the
direct connection discussed in paragraph 25 of Knibbe). The Examiner
explains that Knibbe “makes clear that the control panel 7, 9 communicates
with an external electronic device/control system 10 to control and variety of
devices or nodes which include ceiling fans and HVAC systems at the same
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time.” Id. at 15 (citing Knibbe ¶ 25). Appellant responds that “[t]he
Examiner’s position regarding claim 5 still fails to account for the express
requirement that the input port couples the fan with a centralized HVAC
control system, which may then be used to control the fan” and “overlooks
the point that none of the cited references disclose, teach, or suggest an input
port that couples a fan with a centralized HVAC control system.” Reply Br.
4.
Appellant’s contentions are not persuasive of Examiner error. Knibbe
discusses “a central controller 10.” Knibbe ¶ 25. The Examiner finds that
“the skill level of one of ordinary skill in the art is high and this person
would recognize the central controller 10 which controls the HVAC system
to be a centralized HVAC control since it performs this function.” Ans. 15.
Appellant acknowledges this finding, and responds that the Examiner has
failed to provide evidence supporting the finding. Reply Br. 4. Appellant
however, does not offer any explanation as to why one skilled in the art
would not consider Knibbe’s central controller 10 to be a centralized HVAC
control. The Examiner’s evidence is paragraph 25 of Knibbe, which
expressly describes controller 10 as a central controller for “any type of
luminaire, sensor, switch, HVAC (heating, ventilation and air-conditioning)
device or window blind [that] may be included in the network.” Appellant’s
general allegations do not identify error in the Examiner’s findings.
For at least these reasons, we are not apprised or error in the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 5.
Claims 10–12
Independent claim 10 and is similar to claim 1, with the “control
panel” recited being broader in scope than that recited in claim 1.
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Specifically, claim 10 recites that the “control panel [is] in communication
with the motor controller and the HVAC control system” and “includ[es] an
input port,” without any further limitation regarding the “input port.” The
Examiner finds that “in Knibbe the control panel is represented by control
module 9 and the external electronic device/centralized HVAC controller is
represented by the central controller 10.” Ans. 16. The Examiner again
cites paragraph 25 of Knibbe as supporting this finding. See, e.g., id.
Appellant contends that “Knibbe . . . at best describes a control for a
fan and an HVAC unit, not one for communicating with both a fan and an
HVAC control system.” Appeal Br. 7. Appellant does not dispute the
Examiner’s finding that Knibbe’s control module 9 is a “control panel” or
that Knibbe’s central controller 10 is a “HVAC controller.” Knibbe explains
that “local control module 9 stores control data and instructions for
controlling the nodes of the network” and that local control module 9 and
central controller 10 communicate with one another. Knibbe ¶ 25. Without
further explanation from Appellant, we are not apprised of error in the
Examiner’s findings.
For at least these reasons, we are not apprised of error in the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 10.
Claims 11 and 12 depend from claim 10. Appellant’s sole contention
regarding those claims is that the Examiner “does not identify these features
in any of the cited references.” Reply Br. 5; see also Appeal Br. 7. This is
not persuasive of error because these features are accounted for in the
Examiner’s rejection. See, e.g., Final Act. 8 (“Knibbe . . . disclose[s] an
expanded environmental control system including a number of controlled
elements including both a fan 5 and HVAC system (see [0025]) that are
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controlled by a control panel 7, 9 that is also communicating with a
central/HVAC control system 10.”).
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 2, and 5–12 are affirmed.
The Examiner’s decision to reject claim 3 is reversed.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–3, 6–9 103(a) Mehta, Richmond 1, 2, 6–9 3
5, 10–12 103(a) Mehta, Richmond,
Knibbe
5, 10–12
Overall
Outcome
1, 2, 5–12 3

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART