Skaggs Pay Less Drug Stores

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 24, 1971

189 N.L.R.B. 249 (N.L.R.B. 1971)

SKAGGS PAY LESS DRUG STORES 249
Skaggs Pay Less Drug Stores and Roberta Green.
Case 20-CA-5960
March 24, 1971
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND BROWN
On November 9, 1970, Trial Examiner Robert L.
Piper issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in
and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the
attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He also found
that Respondent had not engaged in certain other
unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and
recommended that those allegations be dismissed.
Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions to
the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief
and the Respondent filed cross-exceptions and a brief
in support of cross-exceptions and in answer to the
General Counsel's exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, cross-excep-
tions, briefs, and the entire record in the case, and
hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that
the Respondent, Skaggs Pay Less Drug Stores,
Oakland, California, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial
Examiner's recommended Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT L. PIPER, Trial Examiner: This proceeding,
under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, was heard at San Francisco, California on
September 1, 1970,1 pursuant to due notice. The complaint,
which was issued on June 19, on a charge filed March 3,
alleged as amended that Respondent engaged in unfair
labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) and (4) of the
Act. Respondent's answer denied the alleged unfair labor
practices. The General Counsel and Respondent filed
briefs. The General Counsel's and Respondent's unop-
posed motions to correct the official transcript of
proceedings are hereby granted.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my
observation of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS
Respondent is a California corporation engaged in the
retail sale of drugs, cosmetics, sundries, and dry goods, with
a place of business located in Oakland, California.
Respondent annually receives gross revenues in excess of
$500,000, and purchases and receives in California directly
from sources outside the State of California goods and
supplies valued in excess of $50,000. Respondent admits,
and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Professional & Clerical Employees Division of Freight
Checkers, Clerical Employees & Helpers, Local 856,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America (hereinafter called
the Union), is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction and Issues
During a prior Board proceeding (Cases 20-CA-5508,
5717, and 5718) involving this same Respondent, hearings
were held on February 17, 18, 24, and 25. During the course
of these hearings two employees and several former
employees testified as witnesses for the General Counsel.
On February 25 Respondent discharged Roberta Green,
one of its employees who had testified for the General
Counsel. On February 27, Respondent interviewed Victoria
Burgess, the other employee who had testified for the
General Counsel.
The issues as framed by the pleadings are: (1) the
discharge of an employee allegedly because she had given
testimony at a prior hearing under the Act or had engaged
in conduct sufficiently related to that hearing to possess a
protected status; and (2) interference, restraint, and
coercion allegedly by attempting to constructively dis-
charge another employee because she had given testimony
under the Act.
B. Chronology of Events
The parties stipulated that Roberta Green and Victoria
1 All dates hereinafter refer to 1970 unless otherwise indicated
189 NLRB No. 39
250 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Burgess, employed in Respondent's accounting depart-
ment , were called by the General Counsel and gave
testimony adverse to the interests of Respondent during the
hearings which were held February 17, 18, 24, and 25 in the
prior Board proceeding. Green testified on February 17 and
Burgess testified on both February 18 and 24. Kenneth Lett
was Respondent's controller and accounting manager, his
immediate superior was Rex Bowers, Respondent's vice
president of finance and corporate secretary, and Donald J.
Eaton was Respondent's vice president of administration
and company attorney. Lett was called by Respondent as a
witness in the prior proceeding on both February 24 and 25.
During a recess in the hearing on the afternoon of February
24 during the course of Lett's testimony, Green was
obtaining a drink at the water fountain in the hall outside
the courtroom. Lett was standing behind her waiting to get
a drink at the fountain. Green turned around, saw Lett
standing there and said to him: "You are a liar." Green
spoke in a normal and deliberate tone of voice. Either Lett
denied the accusation and Green repeated it, or nothing
further was said. In any event Lett returned to the witness
stand after the recess.
Lett was upset but said nothing about the incident until
after he was excused from the stand and the hearing
terminated at approximately 5 p.m. He then advised both
of the counsel for the General Counsel, Respondent's
counsel and Eaton, in a group, that Green had called him a
liar in the hall outside the courtroom during the recess. Lett,
Eaton, and Respondent's counsel, Don T. Hubner, Jr.,
proceeded to a nearby restaurant to discuss the incident.
Lett was understandably angry and upset, having been
accused of perjury, a serious offense. Lett told Hibner and
Eaton that Lett also was upset because he believed that he
would be unable to maintain discipline and morale in the
accounting department if it became known among the
employees that Green had with impunity called him a liar
under oath. Respondent knew that Green was one of the
most outspoken employees in the accounting department.
Lett had approximately 102 employees, 100 of whom were
women, in his department. For these reasons, Lett wanted
to fire Green immediately. However, Hubner advised
against it, pointing out that although Lett had adequate
cause to fire Green, her discharge would probably result in
the filing of a charge with the Board and expensive
litigation because the incident had occurred during a Board
hearing at which Green had been called as a witness.
Hibner advised instead that Respondent confer with Green
as soon as possible when she was no longer attending the
hearing , point out the seriousness of her accusation of
perjury, explain that honest witnesses frequently differ in
their recollection of the same event, and try to calm her
down, secure a retraction of her accusation and avoid the
potential departmental problem. Eaton was of the same
view and accordingly Respondent decided to follow
Hibner's advice. The record establishes, and I find, that
Respondent decided not to terminate or otherwise disci-
pline Green if she retracted her accusation, which in turn
would eliminate the disciplinary and morale problem which
concerned Lett. Because of numerous previous conflicts in
the testimony during the then-pending proceeding, Hibner
also recommended that Respondent obtain an accurate
transcript of the proposed conference with Green by use of
a tape recorder or stenographer.
The following morning, February 25, Green reported for
work at her office instead of returning to the hearing. Lett
was scheduled to resume the witness stand, but he and
Eaton were present at the office before the hearing was
scheduled to commence. In view of Hibner's advice, they
decided to call Green to the office immediately, explain the
situation, and attempt to secure a retraction. Pursuant to
Hibner's suggestion, Eaton arranged to have his legal
secretary, Mrs. Majorie Beaver, take the interview in
shorthand, at which she was accomplished, by listening on
an intercom or talk-a-phone system in an adjoining office.
Lett summoned Green to Eaton's office where the three
talked.
Eaton started the interview by advising Green that they
wished to discuss the incident that had occurred the
previous day during the recess in the hearing. Thereupon
Lett spoke up and told Green that they were referring to the
incident when she had called him a liar. Green replied that
she had been upset and knew she should not have said it,
but then said to Lett: "But you are a liar." She then turned
to Eaton and said to him: "You are a liar too." Lett, whom
I credit, testified that after those statements by Green, Lett
felt that the entire purpose of the meeting had been
frustrated. Green then described a specific instance in
Lett's testimony the previous day which she considered to
be untrue. Eaton tried to smooth the troubled waters by
telling Green that everyone was entitled to his opinion and
each one testified to what he honestly believed. During the
conversation Green referred to several items of Lett's
testimony which she considered untrue, and four or five
times reiterated that Lett was a liar. She also repeated that
Eaton was a liar. Lett asked Green how she could wish to
continue working for him if she considered him a liar. After
5 or 10 minutes of such discussion it became apparent to
both Lett and Eaton that Green was not only not going to
retract her accusation, but instead had reiterated it several
times and in addition had accused Eaton of being a liar.
Accordingly Lett terminated her. He testified that he
decided to fire Green because she had called him a liar
under oath the preceding day, and because she had again
called him and Eaton liars repeatedly during the interview.
Lett, whom I credit, also stated that Green's testimony at
the hearing had nothing to do with his decision to terminate
her, which was based solely on the fact that she had called
him a liar under oath, had reiterated her accusation and
had accused Eaton of lying also.
The substance of the foregoing interview was derived
from the testimony of Eaton, Lett, and Green and the first
3-1/4 pages of the transcript prepared by Beaver from her
shorthand notes, which transcript was received in evidence
as past recollection recorded. Beaver testified that she could
not recall the conversation, that reading her transcript did
not in fact refresh her recollection, but authenticated the
first portion of the transcript as true and accurate at the
time made, shortly after the interview, including certain
corrections made by Lett and Eaton. During the first
portion of the interview, before Green left the office and
returned, she was composed and spoke in a normal tone of
voice. After her termination, Green asked for a good
SKAGGS PAY LESS DRUG STORES 251
reference, which Lett agreed to give her. She thereupon left
the office. Within less than a minute she returned and
engaged in further conversation with Lett and Eaton in a
loud yelling voice. Beaver admitted that she was unable to
get an accurate transcript of this further conversation
because of the uproar and the fact that upon occasion all
three of them were talking at the same time. However she
testified credibly that the transcript prior to that interrup-
tion was substantially accurate although not verbatim. The
portion of the conversation after Green returned is not
significant, inasmuch as it consisted primarily of a
discussion between Lett and Green concerning incidents
involved in the prior proceeding, not relevant to the issues
in this proceeding, and Green again reiterating that both
Lett and Eaton were liars. I place no reliance upon that
portion of the transcript. The interview terminated by Lett
advising Green that he and Eaton would have to leave for
the hearing that day. Green then informed four employees
in her office that she had been fired because she had called
Lett a liar. Green after securing her paycheck also returned
to the Board hearing that day.
With one exception there is no substantial difference
between Green's testimony and that of Lett, Eaton, and
Beaver concerning the interview on February 25. Green
testified that she had been excused by the General Counsel
the previous day from returning to the hearing and
accordingly had returned to work on the morning of
February 25, at which time she was called to Eaton's office
by Lett. She admitted calling Lett a liar during the recess at
the hearing the preceding day. According to her, during the
interview Lett asked her if she realized that she had accused
him of perjury, a very serious offense, and she replied that
she was sorry but nevertheless he was a liar. Green
admitted reiterating four or five times during the interview
that Lett was a liar, and also calling Eaton a liar. The only
real difference between her testimony concerning the
interview and that of Lett, Eaton, and Beaver was that
Green contended that she did not refer to Eaton as a liar
until after her termination. In addition to the transcript,
Lett and Eaton, whom I credit, both testified that Green
accused Eaton of being a liar before her termination. The
record establishes, and I find, that at the outset of the
interview Green in her first statement reiterated that Lett
was a liar and then stated that Eaton was a liar too.
On February 27 Lett summoned Burgess to his office.
Bowers, Lett's superior, and Ray Vasques, a supervisor in
the accounting department, were also present. A week or so
earlier, Burgess had informed her supervisor that her
husband, who was employed by the State of California, was
considering transferring to a job in Los Angeles, in which
event she would be quitting and moving to Los Angeles.
Burgess had taken time off to make a trip to Los Angeles to
check possible living quarters. Lett wanted to ascertain the
status of Burgess' plans and asked whether and when she
was planning to leave Respondent's employ. Burgess
replied that her husband had decided to take the job in Los
Angeles and that they would be moving there about April
15, about which time she would be quitting Respondent's
employ.
According to Burgess, whom I credit, Lett then told her
that he was not going to fire her, but that he wished that she
would leave voluntarily because her presence at Respon-
dent was bothering the other employees and was annoying
to management. He also stated that she could not very well
be happy working there because it seemed that everytime
something came up she was always on the opposite side of
management . (In the just-completed Board proceeding,
Burgess and two other employees had testified about being
criticized and threatened with termination by Bowers for
engaging in extensive , allegedly prounion discussions with
other employees during work time . In this connection,
Bowers had testified that Respondent had an oral rule
known to its employees prohibiting solicitation during work
time . In rebuttal , Burgess had testified that Respondent had
permitted the solicitation of funds on behalf of a certain
religious organization and Girl Scouts and Camp Fire Girls
to sell cookies and candy in the office area during working
hours in the presence of supervisors.)
Burgess answered Lett by replying that she was happy
working for Respondent but had been subpenaed to the
hearing, and had to tell the truth because she believed that
there was more involved in being a witness than just the
possibility of perjury, because you had to live with your
own conscience, to which Lett agreed. Lett and Burgess
also discussed the incident testified to in the prior
proceeding for which Burgess and two other employees had
been criticized and threatened for engaging another
employee in conversation during work time, allegedly
advocating the Union. As Burgess was leaving the
interview, Lett referred to Burgess ' prior testimony
concerning buying candy from children soliciting in the
office, and told her not to buy any more candy in the office.
On the morning of March 5 Lett again called Burgess to
his office and criticized her for taking too much time on her
coffee and luncheon breaks . Burgess denied that she had
done so. Burgess accused Lett of singling her out which Lett
denied. On the afternoon of March 5 Lett again called
Burgess to his office at which time he interrogated her
about the charge in this proceeding which had been filed by
Green on March 3. Lett had a copy in his hand. The charge
among other things referred to Respondent threatening and
coercing an employee on or about February 27 because she
had given testimony adverse to Respondent in the prior
proceeding. Lett asked Burgess if she had filed or signed a
complaint. Burgess replied that she had not. At Lett's
request, Burgess signed a statement , prepared by Beaver,
setting forth the interview, and an additional statement
read to Burgess by Lett before the interview advising her
that an unfair labor practice charge had been filed by
Green, that Burgess' statement was solely for the purpose of
investigating that charge, that if it accurately reflected the
conversation she should sign it, that she was free to sign or
not as she desired, and that there would be no reprisals in
either case . Burgess was not terminated and left Respon-
dent's employ voluntarily on or about March 27.
The foregoing findings with respect to the interview of
February 27 are based upon the credited testimony of
Burgess. (The two conversations on March 5 were
substantially undisputed.) Bowers testified that the conver-
sation on February 27 dealt only with whether or not
Burgess was leaving Respondent's employ to move to Los
Angeles, and denied the other comments attributed to Lett
252 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
by Burgess. However, on cross-examination Bowers'
memory was refreshed and he recalled Lett's statement to
Burgess about not buying anymore candy in the office.
Vasques, who testified after Bowers, also recalled Lett's
statement to Burgess concerning the purchase of candy in
the office. Both of them denied that Lett made any of the
other statements attributed to him by Burgess. On direct
examination as an adverse witness, Lett testified that the
interview was limited to his inquiry concerning whether and
when Burgess was planning to leave and his "facetious"
comment that she should not buy any more cookies or
candy in the office. He denied making the other statements.
However, when confronted with his signed declaration,
Lett then admitted telling Burgess that some of the other
employees were complaining that she was talking to them
too much and interfering with their work. He also admitted
telling Burgess that he had received reports that she had
been making derogatory remarks about her job and her
supervisors, and recalled that she had stated during the
interview that she was happy working there. He further
recalled telling her that he was not in any way referring to
the fact that she had been a witness at the hearing, and that
everyone was entitled to his own opinion and must testify
how he honestly felt.
C. The Discharge of Roberta Green
The complaint alleged that Respondent discharged
Green because of testimony she gave in the prior Board
hearing and/or because she "engaged in conduct sufficient-
ly related to that hearing as to possess a protected status."
As hereinabove found, the record establishes that Lett
discharged Green because she had called him a liar under
oath during a recess in the hearing the preceding day, had
reiterated her accusation four or five times the succeeding
day, and had also on that occasion called Eaton a liar, and
that her testimony at the hearing had nothing to do with
Lett's decision.
In fact, Respondent, pursuant to its counsel's advice, had
decided on February 24 not to discharge Green because she
had accused Lett of perjury during the recess, but instead
explain to her the seriousness of the accusation, that
witnesses often honestly disagreed in their recollection of
events, and seek a retraction to prevent the disciplinary and
morale problem in the department which might result from
knowledge of her making such an accusation with
impunity. Only after Green repeatedly reiterated her
accusation and also called Eaton, Lett's superior, a liar, did
Lett decide to terminate Green.
The General Counsel alternatively contends that even if
Respondent's real reason for discharging Green was
because she had accused Lett of perjury, reiterated her
accusation, and also called Eaton a liar, her discharge was
in violation of the Act because she was engaging in conduct
sufficiently related to the Board hearing to possess a
protected status. In this connection the General Counsel
contends that Green had been subpenaed to attend the
hearing, that her first accusation occurred during a recess in
that hearing, and that the hearings were still continuing the
following day when she was interviewed by Lett at work
and discharged for reiterating her accusation and also
calling Eaton a liar. Thus he contends that in doing so
Green was engaging in conduct so closely related to the
hearing as to warrant a protected status under the
provisions of Section 8(a)(4) of the Act. The Board has held
that where an employee engages in actions or conduct
"inextricably intertwined with and derived from" his
original charges and the giving of testimony in support
thereof, a discharge or other discrimination therefor
violates both Sections 8(a)(4) and (1) of the Act
independently.2
The record establishes that Green testified on February
17 and was not thereafter called to the witness stand. While
she may have been in attendance at the hearing on
February 24 pursuant to a subpena when she made her
accusation in the hallway during the recess, there can be no
question but that she was excused from further attendance
that afternoon by the General Counsel and accordingly
returned to work on February 25, the last day of the
hearing, at which time she was no longer under subpena as
a witness. Even if Green was in attendance at the hearing
pursuant to the General Counsel's subpena 1 week after she
had testified, her accusation of perjury in the hall during a
recess would not appear to be so inextricably intertwined
with and derived from her contentions and her giving of
testimony as to warrant a protected status for such an
unprovoked accusation. In any event, her connection with
the hearing as a witness had terminated the following day
when she repeatedly reiterated her accusation and embel-
lished it by also calling Eaton a liar. Clearly that conduct
was not so "inextricably intertwined" with the hearing or
the fact that she had been a witness as to deserve a
protected status. Upon a consideration of the entire record,
I am convinced and find that the General Counsel has
failed to sustain his burden of proving that Green was
discharged for testifying under the Act, or for any other
reason proscribed by Section 8(a)(4) or (1) of the Act.
D. Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
The complaint alleged that on or about February 27
Respondent interfered with, restrained, or coerced its
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7
of the Act by attempting to constructively discharge an
employee (Burgess) because of her testimony at a prior
Board hearing. As hereinabove found, on February 27 Lett,
after ascertaining from Burgess that she planned to leave
Respondent's employ in mid-April because of her hus-
band's transfer to Los Angeles, told her that he was not
going to fire her, but that he wished she would leave
voluntarily because her presence was bothering the other
employees and was annoying to management . He also
stated that she could not be happy working there because it
seemed that every time something came up she was always
on the opposite side of management, an obvious reference
to her prior testimony. After Burgess replied that she was
happy working for Respondent and that she had to testify
as she had both because she was testifying under oath and
2 Lakeland Bus Lines, Inc, 124 NLRB 123 (1959), and Brake Parts
Company, 178 NLRB No 43 (1969)
SKAGGS PAY LESS DRUG STORES 253
because of her own conscience, with which Lett agreed, Lett
then cautioned her not to buy candy from children
soliciting in the office, another obvious reference to her
prior testimony adverse to Respondent.
On March 5 Lett again called Burgess to his office and
criticized her for taking too much time on her coffee and
luncheon breaks. Burgess' testimony that she had not done
so was not rebutted by Respondent. On the afternoon of
the same day, Lett again summoned Burgess and interro-
gated her about the charge filed by Green in this
proceeding on March 3, which charge included an
allegation that Respondent had threatened and coerced an
employee on February 27 because she gave testimony
adverse to Respondent in the prior proceeding. Lett asked
Burgess if she had filed or signed a complaint and Burgess
replied that she had not. A preponderance of the reliable,
probative and substantial evidence in the entire record
convinces me, and I find, that Respondent, by interrogation
and harassment, including specific references to her prior
testimony, tried to induce Burgess to quit, thereby
attempting to constructively discharge her, because of her
testimony at the prior Board hearing, thus interfering with,
restraining, and coercing an employee in the exercise of
rights guaranteed by the Act, in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the
entire record in the case, I make the following.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce,
and the Union is a labor organization, within the meaning
of the Act.
2. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act, Respondent has engaged in an unfair labor
practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practice affects commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. Respondent has not, as alleged in the complaint,
discharged an employee in violation of Section 8(a)(4) or (1)
of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in an unfair
labor practice, I shall recommend that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action of the type
which is conventionally ordered in such cases as provided
in the recommended Order below, which I find necessary to
remedy and to remove the effects of the unfair labor
practices and to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER
Skaggs Pay Less Drug Stores, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Attempting to cause its employees to quit, or
attempting to constructively discharge them, because of
their giving testimony under the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its office and place of business in Oakland,
California, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix." 3 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 20, after being duly
signed by Respondent's representative shall be posted by
Respondent immediately upon reciept thereof, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 20, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this
Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.4
3 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, recommendations and recommended Order herein
shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be
adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions , and order, and
all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes In the event
that the Board's Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court
of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted
pursuant to a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board "
4 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for
Region 20, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT attempt to cause our employees to quit,
or attempt to constructively discharge them, because of
their giving testimony under the National Labor
Relations Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
any of the rights guaranteed them by the National
Labor Relations Act.
All of our employees are free to become or remain, or
refrain from becoming or remaining, members of Profes-
sional & Clerical Employees Division of Freight Checkers,
Clerical Employees & Helpers, Local 856, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America, or any other labor organization,
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement conforming to the provisions of Section 8(a)(3)
of the National Labor Relations Act.
254 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
SKAGGS PAY LESS DRUG This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
STORES from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
(Employer) or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
Dated By its provisions, may be directed to the Board's Office, 450
(Representative) (Title) Golden Gate Avenue, Box 36047, San Francisco, California
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
94102, Telephone 556-0335.
anyone.