Silver Spur Casino

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 31, 1984

270 N.L.R.B. 1067 (N.L.R.B. 1984)

SILVER SPUR CASINO
221 N. Virginia St., Inc. d/b/a Silver Spur Casino
and Hotel, Motel, Restaurant Employees and
Bartenders Union Local No. 86, Hotel Employ-
ees & Restaurant Employees International
Union, AFL-CIO
Mason Corporation d/b/a Reno's Horseshoe Club
and Hotel, Motel, Restaurant Employees and
Bartenders Union Local No. 86, Hotel Employ-
ees & Restaurant Employees International
Union, AFL-CIO. Cases 32-CA-4208-2 and
32-CA-4253
31 May 1984
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS ZIMMERMAN, HUNTER, AND
DENNIS
On 13 May 1983 Administrative Law Judge
James S. Jenson issued the attached decision. The
Respondents filed exceptions and a supporting
brief, and the Charging Party filed an answering
brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,I and
conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order.
We agree with the judge that the Respondent,
Silver Spur Casino, unlawfully encouraged and as-
sisted employees in repudiating the Union. Further,
we agree that knowledge of this unlawful conduct
is attributable to Reno's Horseshoe Club, the suc-
cessor employer, and, accordingly, that the latter
did not have a reasonably based doubt concerning
the Union's representative status on 29 January
1982 when it declined to bargain with the Union,
as requested. Indeed, on that occasion, the succes-
sor's refusal was not grounded at all upon any
claim that the Union's status was in doubt, but
rather upon the contention, since abandoned, that,
upon transfer of the business, there was "no entity
for [the Union] to resume bargaining with."2
t The Respondents have excepted to some of the judge's credibility
findings. The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administra-
tive law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of
all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard
Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir.
1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for re-
versing the findings.
2 Members Hunter and Dennis would consider employee turnover a
factor in determining the existence of objective considerations sufficient
to justify withdrawal of recognition. Under all circumstances of the in-
stant case, however, they do not find the high turnover rate dispositive.
Member Zimmerman would also find that, in the circumstances of this
case, a reasonably based doubt concerning the Union's representative
status, even if entertained, would not negate the Respondents' bargaining
obligation. Almost 7 years elapsed between the time Silver Spur unlaw-
fully withdrew recognition from the Union on 20 December 1974 and the
270 NLRB No. 155
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge and orders that the Respondents, 221 N. Vir-
ginia St., Inc. d/b/a Silver Spur Casino, Reno,
Nevada, and Mason Corporation d/b/a Reno's
Horseshoe Club, Reno, Nevada, their officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the Order.
commencement of negotiations on 28 October 1981. This followed pro-
tracted litigation during which Silver Spur unsuccessfully challenged the
Board's bargaining order. A second bargaining session was held on I I
November 1981. Negotiations broke off after the third and final session
on 3 December when Silver Spur informed the Union of its impending
acquisition by Reno's Horseshoe Club.
Based on these facts, it can hardly be said that the bargaining relation-
ship, which was the subject of our Order, has been "permitted to exist
and function for a reasonable period in which it can be given a fair
chance to succeed." Franks Bros Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 705 (1944).
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAMES S. JENSON, Administrative Law Judge. This
matter was heard in Reno and Sparks, Nevada, on De-
cember 7 and 8, 1982, respectively. The consolidated
complaint issued on May 25, 1982, pursuant to a charge
and first amended charge filed on January 18 and May
24, 1982, respectively in Case 32-CA-4208-2, and a
charge filed on February 3, 1982, in Case 32-CA-4253.
The consolidated complaint alleges, in substance, that (1)
in October 1981 agents of Respondent Silver Spur par-
ticipated in the distribution and circulation of a petition
to decertify the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and
(5); and (2) that in the same month, and again in Decem-
ber, an agent of Respondent Silver Spur and Respondent
Horseshoe violated Section 8(a)(1) and/or (3) by inform-
ing an employee that she would not be hired by Re-
spondent Horseshoe because she refused to sign the de-
certification petition, and by refusing to employ her; and
(3) that since January 1982, Respondent Horseshoe has
violated Section 8(a)(5) by refusing to recognize and bar-
gain with the Union in a unit encompassing employees of
both Respondent Silver Spur and Respondent Horseshoe.
Respondents deny Respondent Silver Spur instigated or
encouraged the decertification petition; that an employee
was either threatened with, or was denied, employment
by either Respondent because of her failure to sign the
decertification petition; or that Respondent Horseshoe
unlawfully refused to bargain with the Union, on the
ground Respondent Horseshoe had a good-faith doubt of
the Union's majority status based on objective consider-
ations. All parties were afforded full opportunity to
appear, to introduce evidence, and to examine and cross-
examine witnesses. Briefs were filed by the General
Counsel, the Respondent, and the Charging Party and
have been carefully considered.
On the entire record in the case, including the demean-
or of the witnesses, and having considered the posthear-
ing briefs, I make the following
1067
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Mason Corporation d/b/a Reno's Horseshoe Club is
engaged in the operation of a restaurant, bars, and a
casino, which includes adjacent like facilities formerly
operated by 221 N. Virginia St., Inc. d/b/a Silver Spur
Casino. It is alleged, admitted, and found that, at all
times material herein, Horseshoe Club and Silver Spur
Casinos, individually, and Horseshoe Club mereged and
consolidated with Silver Spur, are employers engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act.
II1. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
It is admitted and found that Hotel, Motel, Restaurant
Employees & Bartenders Union, Local No. 86, Hotel
Employees & Restaurant Employees International Union,
AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
11. ISSUES
1. Whether Respondent Silver Spur unlawfully partici-
pated in the distribution and circulation of a decertifica-
tion petition among its employees.
2. Whether, in October and on December 31, 1981,
Evelyn Jackson, an agent of Respondent Silver Spur and
Respondent Horseshoe respectively on said dates, in-
formed Lois Webb she would not be hired by Respond-
ent Horseshoe because she refused to sign a petition to
decertify the Union.
3. Whether Respondent Horseshoe failed and refused
to employ Webb because she joined or assisted the
Union and/or she refused to sign the decertification peti-
tion.
4. Whether Respondent Horseshoe unlawfully failed
and refused to bargain with the Union.
IV. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Setting
On April 4, 1977, the Board issued a decision in Silver
Spur Casino, 228 NLRB 1147, finding that the employer,
Respondent Silver Spur herein, had violated Section
8(a)(5) of the Act by withdrawing recognition from, and
refusing to bargain with the Union, the Charging Party
herein. The Board ordered Respondent to recognize and
bargain with the Union. On May 27, 1980, the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals enforced said order.' The Su-
preme Court denied certiorari on April 20, 1981, 451
U.S. 906, and denied a petition for rehearing on June 8,
1981, 452 U.S. 931. By letter dated April 29, 1982,2 an
official of the Union requested a meeting with one of the
Silver Spur's owners to discuss a format for negotiations.
By letter of May 14, the attorney for the Silver Spur re-
sponded that the request was premature on the ground
the Company had filed a petition for rehearing with the
Supreme Court. By letter dated June 2, the Union re-
' 623 F.2d 571.
n All dates hereafter are in 1981 unless otherwise stated.
quested material in preparation for meeting to negotiate.
Sometime in June, after the Supreme Court had denied
the petition for rehearing, Dwayne Kling, the Silver
Spur's general manager, met at the offices of the Reno
Employers Council along with representatives of several
other casinos that had similarly been found by the Board
and the Court to have unlawfully refused to bargain with
the Union. Clinton Knoll of the Reno Employers Coun-
cil informed those present of the Supreme Court's ruling,
that it was "the last shot," that the clubs were supposed
to bargain, and that a decertification petition "was a pos-
sibility of a certain route that could be taken by Ca-
sionos" [sic]. On July 15, Knoll, who represented Re-
spondent Silver Spur in collective-bargaining negotia-
tions, provided the Union with part of the requested in-
formation. By letter dated July 24, the Union requested
that Knoll provide it with certain additional information.
The first of three negotiation meetings was held on Oc-
tober 28 in the Reno Employers Council offices. The
second was on November 11 and the third on December
3, both in the same location as the first. At the last meet-
ing, the Union was informed that the Silver Spur was in
the process of being sold to the Mason Corporation, and
that while bargaining would continue, any contract
reached would have to terminate January 31. In the
meantime, on December 1, Respondent Mason Corpora-
tion and Respondent Silver Spur entered into a written
agreement whereby the Mason Corporation agreed to
purchase all of the Silver Spur's stock. Its intent was to
consolidate the two operations into one. s Openings were
made in the common wall separating the two facilities,
and the Horseshoe took over the ownership and oper-
ation of the entire combined facility on January 1, 1982.
Thereafter the Mason Corporation declined to bargain
with the Union on the ground the Union, which was not
certified, did not enjoy the support of a majority of the
unit employees as evidenced by a decertification petition
filed with the Board which was signed by more than 70
percent of the employees, and a substantial turnover in
the employee complement of the Silver Spur. With few
exceptions, the Silver Spur's employees, all of whom
were terminated on December 31, were hired by the
Horseshoe as of January 1, 1982. Lois Webb, a waitress,
was one of the exceptions.
There is considerable testimonial conflict with respect
to the role supervisors or agents of the Silver Spur
played in the instigation and circulation of employee de-
certification petitions, the General Counsel contending
Respondent Silver Spur overstepped legitimate bounds
and interfered with employee rights under Section 7. Re-
spondents contend the General Counsel's case is based
on noncredible evidence, but that even if the General
Counsel's witness is credited, its involvement was not un-
lawful since it consisted merely ministerial acts.
Dwayne Kling was the general manager, a supervisor,
and an agent of the Silver Spur until it merged with the
Horseshoe on January 1, 1982, after which he was the
manager, a supervisor, and an agent of the latter. The
S The Mason Corporation owned the Horeshoe Club located adjacent
to the Silver Spur.
1068
SILVER SPUR CASINO
record also establishes that in late November he was of-
fered the general managership position with the Horse-
shoe but that he did not accept the offer until late De-
cember. The complaint was amended at the hearing to
allege Kling as an agent of the Horseshoe since on or
about an unspecified date in November. Upon the evi-
dence I find that Kling was indeed an agent of the
Horseshoe throughout the month of December although
not actually employed by that entity until the first of
January. The amended complaint alleges, and it is admit-
ted and found, that Evelyn Jackson was a supervisor and
agent of Silver Spur until December 31, and from Janu-
ary 1, 1982, until mid-February 1982, was a supervisor
and agent of the Horseshoe. It is also found, as alleged,
that she was an agent of the Horseshoe from December
15 through the end of the year. Helen Fryer was em-
ployed as a swing shift waitress by the Silver Spur
through December 31, and thereafter by the Horseshoe
until both she and her husband quit over a dispute be-
tween her husband and a supervisor. Fryer, who was
strongly opposed to the Union in 1981, 4 had threatened
to quit because of conflicts with Evelyn Jackson. Fryer
was one of two employees who circulated decertification
petitions in October. The other petition circulator was
cashier Jeannie Barber, who was also employed by the
Horeshoe when it took over the Silver Spur operations.
Barber had been a nonunion employee for over 40 years.
Clinton Knoll, as noted infra, is an official of the Reno
Employers Council which represented the Silver Spur
for collective-bargaining purposes. As such, Knoll was
an agent of Silver Spur. Lois Webb, the alleged discri-
minatee, was employed as a waitress by the Silver Spur
from 1972. She was not hired by the Horeshoe. Her testi-
mony attributes allegedly unlawful statements to Jack-
son, upon which the General Counsel relies in contend-
ing the Horseshoe unlawfully failed and refused to hire
Webb on January 1, 1982.
Respondents admit that since January 1, 1982, a single
unit comprised of Horseshoe's employees working in
both the former Silver Spur premises and its own facility
is appropriate. While in their answer to the consolidated
complaint Respondents denied the Horseshoe is the legal
successor to the Silver Spur, in their posthearing brief
the successorship is recognized, and the facts so estab-
lish. Thus, it is seen that the merged operation continued
to engage in the same business performing the same serv-
ices and serving the same customers; the Silver Spur's
employees were merged and integrated with those of the
Horseshoe's and comprised a majority of the total
number; the Silver Spur's supervisory hierarchy contin-
ued working for the Horseshoe, and after a few days in
January, were retained to the exclusion of the pre-Janu-
ary I Horseshoe supervisors; the same equipment was
utilized; and the merged operations continued in the
same locations. The foregoing establish a continuity of
the employing industry, the keystone to determining the
issue of successorship. NLRB v. Burns Security Services,
406 U.S. 272 (1972).
' She had been a union member for 30 years but withdrew in 1977 be-
cause she was not getting any benefits. In the fall of 1981, she testified,
she did not want to be represented by the Union.
B. The Decertification Petition
As noted earlier, sometime in June following the Su-
preme Court's denial of a rehearing, Knoll met with rep-
resentatives of the various casinos that were affected by
the Court's ruling, including Kling, and informed them
that the Court's ruling was "the last shot" and suggested
the possibility of decertification by the casinos. Kling ad-
mitted on cross-examination that he had asked, and been
told by Knoll, prior to employees Barber and Fryer
having circulated petitions in support of a decertification
petition, what language should be used. The role that
Kling and Jackson played in the origin of the employee
petitions is in dispute.
According to Fryer, in early October she was ap-
proached by Jackson at the cashiers cage as she was
signing in for work. Jackson brought up the fact that the
Union and Silver Spur were going to enter into negotia-
tions,5 and that "I think it should be a petition circulat-
ing," for people who did not want the Union. Fryer's re-
sponse was "Oh, the hell with it. " 6 Approximately 2
weeks later, according to Fryer, Kling approached her
while she was on her break at the employees table
having a snack. Her testimony was:
A. Mr. Kling said something about the union,
that we should have a petition, and I said, "What
are you asking me?" I said, "Are you asking me to
circulate a petition?"
He said, "No, I am not asking you." I told him I
was very aggressive and I would do it, and he said,
"But I am not asking you." I said I was doing it on
my own.
Q. How did you happen to say you were doing it
on your own?
A. I don't know.
Q. Didn't he ask you if you were doing it volun-
tarily?
A. Yes, he asked me if I was doing it voluntarily,
and I said "Yes."
She testified that later, on her day off, she received a
telephone call at home from Kling, who introduced her
to Knoll. She testified as follows:
I Fryer had read in the newspaper that negotiations were going to take
place.
e Fryer had encountered previous conflicts with Jackson, about whom
she had complained to management. She had told Kling that she was
going to quit because she could not work with Jackson. She also admit-
ted strong opposition to the Union, having taken out a withdrawal in
1977 because she was not getting any benefits after 30 years of union
membership. Jackson denied any discussion with Fryer about circulating
a petition, and Barber, who was in the cashiers cage at the time Fryer
claims Jackson made the statement, denied overhearing the conversation.
It was shown however, that Barber might have been engaged in cashier
duties and would have been distracted. I credit Fryer's testimony over
Jackson's denial Fryer was not reluctant to admit her dislike for Jackson,
and I view her response to Jackson's suggestion as consistent with her
antagonism toward Jackson. As will be seen hereafter, while I do credit
Jackson in some respects, I do not in others. To the extent I credit Jack-
son and other witnesses only in part, I do so on the evidentiary rule that
it is not uncommon "to believe some and not all of the witness's testimo-
ny." NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.2d 749, 754 (2d Cir. 1950).
1069
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
A. Mr. Kling called me at home and introduced
me to Clint Knoll from the Employer's Council,
and he said would I talk to Mr. Knoll. Mr. Knoll
told me what to write on the top of my petition,
and I took notes and wrote what he hold me to
write. And he said that when the people signed it to
also have them date it.
Q. Did Mr. Knoll give you any other instruc-
tions?
A. After it was circulated that I was to send it to
the Labor Relations Board in Oakland, California.
Q. Did Mr. Knoll tell you where to circulate the
petition?
A. Amongst the culinary, amongst the bartenders
and the waitresses.
Q. Do you recall any discussion about your cir-
culating the petition on any shift other than your
own?
A. Yes. I asked Mr. Kling if I should do it on all
shifts, and he said he had approached Jeannie
Barber and Jennie would do it on day shift, and also
on our graveyard shift.
Q. Who was Jeannie Barber?
A. The cashier at the Silver Spur in the restau-
rant.
Q. Prior to that conversation had you ever heard
of Clint Knoll?
A. Never, never.
Q. After your conversation with Mr. Kling and
Mr. Knoll that day, what, if anything, did you do
about a decertification petition?
A. I wrote it on a yellow legal pad, I was on my
day off.
Q. What did you write?
A. I wrote what Mr. Knoll told me to write for
the petition, and I took it down to the Silver Spur,
hunted up Mr. Kling in the Keno lounge, he looked
at it and said it looked O.K., so I started to circu-
late it, and it was on my day off.
Q. Did you ever have any further conversation
with Dwayne Kling regarding the decertification
petition you circulated?
A. Yes. He called me at home on a Sunday and
asked me to meet him in his office to bring the peti-
tion before I went to work. It was a working day,
so I got there about 2 or 2:15 and gave him the pe-
tition. I asked him if he wanted me to mail it, and
he said "No."
Q. What did you do with it?
A. I left it there. He said he would mail it in. He
said he would mail in Jeannie Barber's petition that
she had circulated.
Q. He said he would mail Jeannie Barber's peti-
tion in also?
A. Yes.
Kling testified that in early October, as he was passing
the cashiers cage where Barber worked, Barber brought
up the subject of the forthcoming bargaining, stating she
did not want to join the Union, and asked if there was
anything she could do about it. Kling stated, "I really
don't know that much about what you can do," and in-
vited her to discuss it further with him in his office on
her break. He testified, "So with a time span of an hour
or two, she came up to my office. That is when I told
her that we had been involved with the Reno Employers
Council for seven years, and that Clint Knoll was an
expert on such situations. And, at that time I gave her
his phone number and address." He later asked her what
Knoll had told her to do. With respect to Fryer, he testi-
fied he was in the restaurant area one day when Fryer
told him "she had heard that there was going to be a pe-
tition distributed by Jeannie Barber." Kling confirmed
that was going to happen. His testimony as to what tran-
spired thereafter is confusing and self-contradictory. He
testified, "I don't recall ever, I don't recall going to the
office with Helen [Fryer]. I know that I talked to her on
the phone from my office and introduced her to Clint
Knoll over the telephone." 7 He expressed the supposi-
tion that Barber and Fryer had already discussed the de-
certification matter. He then testified, "So that is why
Helen [Fryer] came up to the office and called, or I
called Clint Knoll, and introduced him over the phone
. . I called Clint and Helen was sitting there in my
office." He then stated that he had asked Fryer to come
to his office "the early part of October when she had
asked me about the petition. I did not ask her to do a
petition. She volunteered to do the petition" and asked
how. He then stated he did not know and that Knoll "is
the expert in that field." He then denied he had called
Fryer in Knoll's presence, thereby directly contradicting
his earlier testimony that he had talked to her on the
phone from his office and introduced her to Knoll over
the phone.8 On cross-examination he testified that, after
Fryer had talked to Knoll, she brought the petition to
him and asked if the wording was all right. He respond-
ed, "It looks all right to me. It sounds like Clint Knoll
and said what he had said to put on there." Kling admit-
ted the petitions circulated by both Fryer and Barber
were delivered to him because "I had told them that I
would mail them for them." He acknowledged examin-
ing who had signed the petitions and making copies of
both. He mailed the envelope containing the petitions to
the Board's Oakland Office.
Barber testified she had heard rumors of the Union
trying to come in, and since she had worked for 40 years
without a union, she concluded she did not need one.9
She claims she had talked to Fryer a few days before
October 20 about getting a "petition started," and that
Fryer expressed antiunion sentiment and "agreed on get-
ting a petition." She testified that a couple of days prior
to October 20 she told Kling, "I had talked it over with
some of the girls, they did not want the Union in here,
and what could we do about it, and he referred me to
Clint Knolls." The next day she went to Knoll's office.
Her account of what transpired was as follows:
I This admission corroborates Fryer's testimony that she was called at
home by Kling who introduced her to Knoll over the telephone.
Knoll was not called as a witness.
a She testified a number of other employees felt the same way.
1070
SILVER SPUR CASINO
Just like I explained to you before, we did not
want the union, and I asked him what could we do
about it, who could we write to or what could we
do. He said to get the petition up and be sure you
have each employee that signs the petition put the
date that they sign it beside their name, and he told
me who to send it to, Mr. Lawrence Hanson in
Oakland, California.
Her conversations with both Kling and Knoll indicate a
lack of any prior knowledge about a decertification peti-
tion. Moreover, if the two women had agreed to work
together in "getting a petition," there would have been
no need for Knoll to have given both of them instruc-
tions. Accordingly, I do not credit her testimony to the
effect that she and Fryer had earlier agreed on "getting a
petition."
There is no dispute over the fact that two women cir-
culated the petitions throughout the Silver Spur and that
both Kling and Jackson were aware of what they were
doing. While Jackson claimed she had never read any of
the names on the petitions, nor knew who had signed
them, Kling contradicted her by testifying that he had
discussed who had and who had not signed with both
her and Barber.
Fryer's petition contains 31 employees signatures bear-
ing dates of October 20, 21, and 22. Barber's petition,
which is addressed to a Board agent in Oakland, bears 26
signatures bearing dates of October 20, 22, 23, 24, and
25.10o
After making copies, both petitions were forwarded to
the Board's Regional Office in Oakland by Kling who
paid the postage. A Board agent completed an RD peti-
tion form and forwarded it to Barber, who signed it on
November 13. It was filed as Case 32-RD-353 on No-
vember 18. By letter dated December 8, Barber was noti-
fied by the Regional Director that he was dismissing the
petition. The letter recites a history of the refusal to bar-
gain litigation which culminated in the Supreme Court's
denial of the petition for rehearing, and outlines subse-
quent negotiations. In addition to informing Barber of
her right of Board reivew, the letter states further in per-
tinent part:
After careful consideration, I have concluded
that the petition cannot be entertained at this time.
Initially, it should be noted that six and one-half
years elapsed between the time that the Employer
withdrew recognition from Local 86 and June,
1981, when the Supreme Court denied the Employ-
er's petition for rehearing, thus finally validating the
order to bargain. Thereafter, in part because Local
86 was the recipient of several other bargaining
orders against employers in the Reno and Lake
Tahoe (Nevada) areas, and in part because of delays
in furnishing certain information relevant to the bar-
gaining process, negotiations did not commence
until four and one-half months later. Thus, it cannot
be concluded that the Union has enjoyed a "reason-
able time" under the circumstances herein, to
10 One each on the latter 3 days.
engage in collective bargaining with the Employer
towards consummation of an agreement. Accord-
ingly, the instant petition cannot now raise a ques-
tion concerning the representation of the employees
covered by the outstanding bargaining order and I
am, therefore, dismissing the petition filed herein.
Barber contacted Knoll, who prepared a timely appeal
letter. As Knoll thought it would be a good idea for
Fryer to also sign the appeal, Barber called her and she
came to Knoll's office and also signed."l The Regional
Director's dismissal of the RD petition was affirmed by
the Board on February 5, 1982.
Conclusion
Respondent argues that "The aggregate of Kling's and
Knoll's actions amount to nothing more than ministerial
acts in response to requests from Barber and Fryer. They
had no possible effect on any employee's decision to sign
or not to sign the petition. The test, as posited in Dayton
Blueprint Co., 193 NLRB 1100 (1971), is whether the pe-
tition would have been filed even without any of the em-
ployer's actions. In this case there can be no doubt that
Kling and Knoll acted only to provide acts of ministerial
assistance at the employees' request. There was no intent
to influence any employee to sign a petition." The Gen-
eral Counsel argues that the Silver Spur's assistance in
the preparation and processing of the decertification peti-
tions "went far beyond even arguably permissible con-
duct."
Under all the circumstances herein, I reject the con-
tention of Respondents concerning the minimal extent to
which agents and supervisors of the Silver Spur were in-
volved with the decertification petitions. In my view,
their involvement constitutes far more than mere ministe-
rial aid such as the Board might find not unlawful. The
evidence clearly shows that the idea of decertification
originated with Knoll at the June meeting of representa-
tives of the casinos affected by the Supreme Court's
denial of a rehearing; Kling was present and admitted
discussing with Knoll at some point in time prior to the
time Barber and Fryer circulated petitions, the wording
of such a petition. Thereafter, the credited evidence
shows the idea was implanted in the employees' minds
by Jackson and Kling. Thus, in early October, Jackson
told Fryer that she thought a petition shoud be circulat-
ed for those employees who did not want the Union;
sometime in mid-October, Kling approached Fryer and
also suggested employees should get up a petition, which
Fryer agreed to do; Kling later called Fryer at home, in-
troduced her to Knoll, who then provided the language
to be used on the petition; Knoll told her among which
classifications of employees she should circulate it, and
gave her instructions on getting it signed and dated by
the individual signers; he also told her to send it to the
Board's Oakland office; Kling approved the language on
I' A similarly worded dismissal letter from the Region involving the
Nevada Club Casino, Case 32-RD-359. was issued on January 18, 1982,
and a similarly worded appeal from the dismissal was made on January
28. 1982. It is obvious from the format of the appeal letter that it was
prepared in Knoll's office
1071
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the petition which Fryer had written out and taken to
him prior to circulating it for signatures; after she had
circulated the petition among the employees, Kling
called Fryer at home and asked that she bring it to his
office that day before going to work, which she did;
when Barber informed Kling she did not want to join
the Union,'2 Kling referred her to Knoll, who provided
the language and instructions for circulating a decertifi-
cation petition; Kling also told Barber to return the
signed petition to him, which she did; the petitions were
circulated with Kling's knowledge and approval and in
Jackson's presence; Kling discussed with both Jackson
and Barber who had and who had not signed the peti-
tions; Kling examined and made copies of both petitions,
provided the postage, and mailed them to the Board;
after the decertification petition in Case 32-RD-353 was
dismissed, Knoll prepared the appeal letter. It is clear
that the decertification petition was not only the brain-
child of the Silver Spur's agents, but that from the time
"decertification" was first implanted in their minds,
Fryer and Barber were influenced and assisted by agents
of the Silver Spur, namely, Kling, Knoll, and Jackson.
For all the above reasons, I conclude Respondent Silver
Spur's encouragement and assistance in the circulation of
petitions to decertify the Union was unlawful. Cummins
Component Plant, 259 NLRB 456 (1981); Crafttool Mfg.
Co., 229 NLRB 634 (1977); Texas Electric Coop, 197
NLRB 10 (1972).
C. Failure to Employ Lois Webb
Webb testified that early one morning in late October,
at the cashiers cage, Barber asked if she wanted to sign
the petition, which she declined to do. About 15 or 20
minutes later, while she was having coffee in the back of
the restaurant with Jackson, Barber, and Betty Lowry, a
waitress, Barber asked the latter if she wanted to sign,
and Lowry stated she did not think so.' 3 Webb testified
that the same afternoon she saw Fryer approach Jackson
at the cashiers cage and she observed Jackson take out a
piece of paper that looked to Webb like the petition she
had seen that morning. According to Webb, Fryer took
the paper over to the employees' table, where Webb
asked Fryer if she was "scabbing." Fryer, according to
Webb, answered in the affirmative.'4 Webb's purported
response was "that is why we don't have a good union
in this town, because the gals can't stick together." She
testified that about a week later she had the following
conversation with Jackson:
She asked me what I was going to do at the end
of the year or the first of the year, I guess they are
the same, what was I going to do, look for a job or
draw unemployment. I said to her, I said, "What do
12 Nevada is a right-to-work State and therefore Barber would not in
any event have had to join the Union.
sa Lowry, however, did sign the petition on October 20, as did Mary
Torrez. I conclude, therefore, that these conversations occurred on that
date.
14 Fryer did not coroborate Webb's testimony in this respect. As noted
infra, Fryer got the language for her petition from Knoll, had it ap-
proved by Kling, and circulated it herself. The evidence totally refutes
the idea that Fryer and Barber circulated the same petition or that Jack-
son had physical possession of Fryer's.
you mean?" She said, "Well, when the Horseshoe
takes over the first of the year you won't be hired
because you did not sign the petition." I said,
"Well, they can't not hire me for that reason," I
said, "I will go to the union over it," and she told
me that she would deny saying what she said to me.
I said, "Well, it is my word against yours, and
mine is just as good as yours is." She said, "Well,
we'll wait and see."
Jackson denied that she ever engaged in a discussion
with Webb concerning signing or not signing a petition.
Webb went on to testify that, on December 3, a notice
was posted by the timesheet that the Silver Spur had en-
tered into negotiations with the Horseshoe for the sale,
which would take effect at midnight December 31. On
December 23, employees were notified that, as of De-
cember 31, everyone would be terminated, and that
anyone interested in employment with the Horseshoe
should request an application from their department su-
pervisor. On December 24, Webb received an application
from Jackson, which she returned the following day.
Webb testified that as she was getting ready to leave on
December 31, "She [Jackson] called me over and said
'Lois, I have no new hire for you,' and I said 'Why?' She
said, 'Because they don't want you,' and I said, 'Who are
they?' She said, 'Dwayne, and you did not sign that peti-
tion."' She testified that a few minutes later she asked
Kling why she was not hired and that he said he did not
know and proceeded to walk away. Webb denied she
ever received any oral warnings, but admitted she re-
ceived a written employee warning form from Jackson in
August. Marked on the form as offenses were "Refusal
to obey orders" and "Leaving work without permis-
sion." The offenses are explained on the form as follows:
"Was told to wipe ash trays, only dumps them and
leaves work early. Shift change time is 2:45. Leaves
2:40." Webb admitted she was careless in not wiping out
ashtrays and contended she left early only after she was
relieved on her station. She also admitted on cross-exam-
ination that Jackson had spoken to her earlier about leav-
ing early, but that she continued to do so because she did
not consider Jackson to be her "boss."' 5 She stopped
leaving earlier after receiving the written warning. She
also admitted on cross-examination that, in the spring of
1979, she was called into the office to talk to Kling and
Restaurant Manager King because of problems she was
having with other employees.'e She admitted to having
a quick temper and a tendency to talk loudly because she
is hard of hearing. She acknowledged that other employ-
ees sometimes became angry with her for raising her
voice. She also acknowledged that after she received the
written warning, she was not friendly with Jackson and
spoke to her only when absolutely necessary.
Jackson, as noted earlier, denied she had any discus-
sions with Webb about signing or not signing a petition.
She admitted she was present at the employees' table
iL Jackson had been head hostess since 1979 and was made a supervi-
sor on July 27.
"e Fellow employee Judy Harold had made a written complaint about
her, which Webb characterized as "lies."
1072
SILVER SPUR CASINO
when Barber asked Webb if she wanted to sign, and that
Webb said she did not until she had talked to her hus-
band, and that she was going to wait and see what the
Union could do for her.17 Jackson named other employ-
ees that had complained about working with Webb, one
reason being that she wanted her orders filled first. She
testified that, even after issuing the warning regarding
failure to wipe out ashtrays, Webb still neglected to do
so. The warning with respect to Webb's leaving early
was made because Webb's relief complained that Webb
always wanted to leave early and that she was having to
go on shift early. She testified that, in mid-December,
Executive Chef Hughes stated that Webb would not be
hired by the Horseshoe, and that she said it was all right
with her.' s She later informed Kling of Hughes' deci-
sion, and Kling gave his approval.
Barber testified to Webb's inability to get along with
other employees, particularly the Mexican busboys, and
that one employee quit "because she said she could not
take Lois."
Kling testified that, in early September, the owners of
the Silver Spur decided to see if they could expand by
either purchasing or leasing the Horseshoe, which was
owned by nonresident owners. Inquiries were made, but
it was decided the Mason Corporation wanted too much
money. The Mason Corporation, however, suggested
buying out the Silver Spur. As discussions became more
serious, the Mason's asked to see the financial statements
of the Silver Spur in early October. In early November,
the Mason's concluded that the Silver Spur was produc-
ing better than the Horseshoe. In late November, the
Mason's asked Kling if he would consider working for
them as general manager. Kling responded that he would
consider it. He testified that his main concern at that
time was to sell the Silver Spur, and it was not until late
in December that he told the Mason's he would accept
the job of general manager. The agreement for the sale
was not signed until December 1, to be effective January
1, 1982. The employees were not informed of the sale
until December 3. Thus, it is seen that the agreement to
purchase the Silver Spur had not been made at the end
of October when Webb claims Jackson told her she
would not be hired by the Horseshoe because she did
not sign the decertification petition. Webb's testimony to
that effect was contrived and is not credited. Nor was
she a union adherent. The record shows a petition favor-
ing the Union was circulated among the employees. Two
employees, neither of whom was Webb, signed it. Fur-
ther, footnote 3 of the administrative law judge's deci-
sion in the earlier refusal-to-bargain case involving the
Silver Spur, which was adopted by the Board,19 recites:
"According to [Lois] Webb, a union official, Marie Tid-
well, asked her in the fall of 1974 if she would reconsider
her past refusals to join the Union. Webb replied 'The
day that you tell me that I have to join the union in
order to keep my job, that is the day I will join the
union-and not until then.' Webb recalled. Webb re-
'I Webb was corroborated by Barber.
"8 Webb was the only employee Hughes stated he did not want hired
at the Horseshoe.
'9 228 NLRB 1147 (1977).
called that Tidwell 'kind of laughed' and said 'Well, I
can tell you that."' Webb acknowledged on cross-exami-
nation that she was not a union member, had never at-
tended a union meeting, never distributed material on
behalf of the Union or contacted the Union until after
January 1, 1982. Accordingly, I do not credit Webb's
testimony where it conflicts with that of Jackson, and
specifically with respect to what she claims Jackson told
her either at the end of October or on December 31.
Further, the record also shows that 15 Silver Spur em-
ployees who did not sign a decertification petition were
hired by the Horseshoe. The evidence makes it abun-
dantly clear that Webb was not refused employment by
the Horseshoe because of her failure to sign the decertifi-
cation petition, but because of work-related deficiencies.
Accordingly, I find that the General Counsel has failed
to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the alle-
gations contained in paragraphs 7(a)(ii), 7(b), 8, and 9 of
the complaint and I recommend their dismissal.
D. Withdrawal of Recognition
As set forth infra, the order to bargain with the Union
became final on June 8, with the Supreme Court's denial
of a rehearing. After preliminary correspondence, negoti-
ating sessions were held on October 28, November 11,
and December 3. Kling testified that sometime in No-
vember, during negotiations for the sale of the Silver
Spur, representatives of the Mason Corporation were in-
formed that the Silver Spur was bargaining with the
Union, and that a couple of decertification petitions had
been circulated which a "large majority of the employ-
ees" had signed. At the last meeting between the Silver
Spur and the Union, the Union was informed that the
Silver Spur and the Union was in the process of being
sold to the Mason Corporation and that any contract
reached would have to terminate December 31. By let-
ters dated December 24 and 30, a union official wrote
letters to Stuart Mason in an effort to resume bargaining
with the Horseshoe. On January 1, 1982, the merged
businesses continued to do business under the ownership
and control of the Mason Corporation. By letter dated
January 29, 1982, the attorney for the Mason Corpora-
tion wrote the Union as follows:
Dear Mr. Sirabella:
This office represents Mason Corporation, which
owns and operates Reno's Horseshoe Club. As of
midnight, December 31, 1981, Mason Corporation
acquired all the issued and outstanding stock of 221
N. Virginia St., Inc., which corporation owned and
operated the Silver Spur Casino at 221 North Vir-
ginia Street, Reno, Nevada. The Silver Spur Casino
surrendered its gaming license to Nevada gaming
authorities as of midnight, December 31, 1981, and
the former Silver Spur Casino became a part of the
Horseshoe Club operated by Mason Corporation.
It is our understanding that the former owners of
the Silver Spur terminated all their employees prior
to the surrender of their gaming license, but that the
majority of them were hired by the Horseshoe
Club. Since the Silver Spur Casino has surrendered
1073
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
its gaming license, there is of course no entity for
you to resume collective bargaining with.
I would appreciate it if any further correspond-
ence concerning this matter would be directed to
this office.
On February 3, 1982, the instant charge was filed.
The General Counsel argues that, as a successor, the
Horseshoe had a duty to bargain with the Union since a
majority of the unit employees employed by the Horse-
shoe had been employed by the predecessor Silver Spur,
whose presumption of majority continues to apply, and
absent evidence that the Horseshoe relied on a good-
faith doubt of the Union's majority based on legitimate
objective considerations, its refusal to bargain is unlaw-
ful. In any event, in light of the predecessor's unfair
labor practices, the successor is not privileged to with-
draw recognition.
Respondent argues that "when a successor takes over
a predecessor's business, his obligation to bargain, estab-
lished in Burns, is relieved if he has a good-faith doubt
based on objective factors, of the union's majority
status." Here, the successor Horseshoe Club is excused
from bargaining by a clearly established good-faith
doubt. Respondent Horseshoe relies on five factors
which it contends rebut the presumption of majority:
(1) No grievances have been processed by the
Union or raised by employees.
(2) The Union never appointed a steward.
(3) Employee turnover has been overwhelming,
1,219 employees having occupied approximately 70
positions since 1979, a period of just over two
years.
(4) Employees informed the employer of their
disenchantment with the Union.
(5) The filing of the decertification petition, espe-
cially where the employer is aware that a majority
of employees signed the petition.
Conclusions
At the outset, it is noted that the initial refusal to bar-
gain made in the January 20, 1982 letter to the Union
gives as the reason, "Since the Silver Spur Casino has
surrendered its gaming license, there is of course no
entity for you to resume bargaining with." As the Horse-
shoe is the successor to the Silver Spur, a fact which the
Horseshoe now acknowledges, the bargaining obligation
did continue. It is also noted that Silver Spur did not
withdraw recognition even though there was a decertifi-
cation petition on file with the Board on November 18,
and Kling had examined and copied the employee peti-
tions supporting it. It is further noted that, on December
8, the Regional Director dismissed the decertification pe-
tition (R. Exh. 7) on the ground the Union had not en-
joyed a "'reasonable time' under the circumstances
herein, to engage in collective bargaining with the em-
ployer towards consumation of an agreement." 20 It is
'0 Affirmed by the Board on February 5, 1982.
also noted that the sales agreement between the Silver
Spur and Horseshoe contains, in pertinent part, the fol-
lowing:
LABOR RELATIONS
The Corporation is presently under order of the
National Labor Relations Board to begin bargaining
negotiations with the Restaurant Employees and
Bartenders Union Local 86. There is presently on
file an application for decertification. For further
particulars and information, the Buyer is directed to
Clinton Knoll of the Employers' Council of Reno,
Nevada and Robert V. Magor, Esq., 1 Embarcade-
ro Center, San Francisco, California 94111, for fur-
ther particulars regarding this matter.
The naked fact that a decertification petition has been
filed would not appear to be enough to rebut the pre-
sumption of continued majority. It must additionally be
established that the petition was "supported by a majori-
ty of the employees." Here it was not shown that the
Mason Corporation's knowledge of that fact derived
from anything more than Kling's statement during sales
negotiations in November that decertification petitions
had been circulated which had been signed by a "large
majority" of the employees. Kling, however, became the
agent of the Horseshoe in December, and remained so
thereafter, becoming its manager on January 1, 1982;
thus, his knowledge of the petitions and the circum-
stances surrounding their origin must be imputed to the
Horseshoe.
By its unlawful conduct in encouraging and assisting
in the circulation of the decertification petitions, the
Silver Spur forfeited any right it may have had to claim
good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status.2 1 Nor
does the successor whose claimed good-faith doubt is
based on its predecessor's unlawful conduct stand in any
better position, especially, as here, where its agents had
knowledge of, and had participated in, the unlawful con-
duct. An employer with knowledge of wrongdoing
which stands as the principal reason for doubting majori-
ty can scarcely claim the doubt to have arisen in good
faith. Accordingly, I find that the Horseshoe's claim of
good-faith doubt which is grounded on the decertifica-
tion petitions is without merit.
Another factor on which the Horseshoe relies in de-
ciding to withdraw recognition is that employees in-
formed the employer of their disenchantment with the
Union. It is clear from the record, however, that Barber
was the only employee with whom either of Respond-
ent's representatives spoke regarding the employee's likes
or dislikes regarding the Union. In Golden State Habilita-
tion Center, 224 NLRB 1618, 1619 (1976), at the Board
acknowleged that while employees' statements are some
indication of employee dissatisfaction, "they are entitled
to little weight to the extent they purport to convey the
sentiments of employees other than themselves. Other-
wise, a few antiunion employees could provide the basis
for a withdrawal of recognition when in fact there is ac-
21 Fremont Newspapers, 179 NLRB 390 (1969).
1074
SILVER SPUR CASINO
tually an insufficient basis for doubting the Union's con-
tinued majority."
Other factors relied on to rebut majority status are
that no grievances were processed by the Union or
raised by employees, and the Union never appointed a
steward. Similar contentions with respect to processing
grievances have been rejected by the Board where, as
here, the respondent has not demonstrated that griev-
ances existed or were unprocessed by the union, or that
the union was lax in carrying out its obligations in this
regard. Sahara-Tahoe Hotel, 241 NLRB 106 (1979); Club
Cal-Neva, 231 NLRB 22 (1977); Palace Club, 229 NLRB
1128 (1977); Nevada Lodge, 227 NLRB 368 (1976). With
respect to whether or not a steward had been appointed,
that is an internal union matter and in no way reflects a
lack of employee support for the union.
Another factor relied on to rebut majority is the
"overwhelming" turnover among the employees, there
having been 1219 employees having occupied 70 posi-
tions over the last 2-year period. The Board, with court
approval, has repeatedly held "that turnover among em-
ployees cannot, by itself, be used as a basis for belief that
a union has lost majority support since it presumed that,
absent evidence that would justify a contrary conclusion,
new employees will support the union in the same ratio
as those whom they have replaced." Golden State Habili-
tation Center, supra at 1620.
On the foregoing evidence and precedents, I conclude
that Respondent Horseshoe has failed to show that it had
a reasonably based doubt on objective considerations
that the Union did not enjoy majority status at the time
it refused to recognize and bargain with the Union, and
that by refusing to recognize and bargain with the
Union, Respondent Horseshoe violated Section 8(a)(1)
and (5) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent Silver Spur is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
2. Respondent Horseshoe is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
3. Since January 1, 1982, Respondent Horseshoe has
been the legal successor of Respondent Silver Spur in
the ownership, operation, and management of the latter's
Reno, Nevada facility.
4. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
5. The following employees constitute a unit appropri-
ate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:
All full-time and regular part-time bar and culinary
employees, including boiler cooks, fry cooks, cooks,
pantry persons, bakers, dishwashers, potwashers,
porters, captains, hostesses, food and cocktail
waiters/waitresses, busboys/busgirls, cashiers, bar-
tenders, and barboys/bargirls, employed by Re-
spondent Horseshoe at its 221 N. Virginia Street
and 229 N. Virginia Street, Reno, Nevada facilities;
excluding all other employees, guards, and supervi-
sors as defined in the Act.
6. The Union is the exclusive representative of the em-
ployees in the aforesaid unit for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment.
7. By encouraging and assisting employees to repudiate
the Union, Respondent Silver Spur has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(l) and (5) of the Act.
8. By withdrawing recognition from the Union and by
refusing to meet with the Union on and after January 29,
1982, Respondent Horseshoe Club violated Section
8(a)(5) of the Act.
9. By the foregoing conduct, Respondents have inter-
fered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the ex-
ercise of the rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of
the Act, in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.
10. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondents have engaged in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(aX1) and (5) of
the Act, I shall recommend that they be ordered to cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action
to effectuate the policies of the Act.
On foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law
and on the entire record, I issue the following recom-
mended 22
ORDER
A. Respondent 221 N. Virginia Street, Inc. d/b/a
Silver Spur Casino, Reno, Nevada, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) In any manner or by any means, including orders,
directions, instructions, requests, suggestions, or appeals
or by permitting any such to remain in existence or
effect, causing, inducing, urging, encouraging, request-
ing, or assisting employees to decertify and repudiate
Hotel, Motel, Restaurant Employee & Bartenders Union,
Local No. 86, Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees
International Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor orga-
nization, or to rescind the authority of the foregoing
named labor organization, or any other labor organiza-
tion, to represent them for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is nec-
essary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
22 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
1075
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(a) Mail one copy of the attached notice marked "Ap-
pendix A"2 3 to each employee who was employed by it
at any time during the period from October 20, 1981,
through December 31, 1981, on receipt therefrom from
the Regional Director for Region 32.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 32 in
writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what
steps have been taken to comply.
B. Respondent Mason Corporation d/b/a Reno's
Horseshoe Club, Reno, Nevada, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing or refusing to recognize and bargain with
Hotel, Motel, Restaurant Employees & Bartenders
Union, Local No. 86, Hotel Employees & Restaurant
Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative of its employees
in the following appropriate unit:
All full-time and regular part-time bar and culinary
employees, including boiler cooks, fry cooks, cooks,
pantry persons, bakers, dishwashers, potwashers,
porters, captains, hostesses, food and cocktail
waiters/waitresses, busboys/busgirls, cashiers, bar-
tenders, and barboys/bargirls, employed by Re-
spondent Horseshoe at its 221 N. Virginia Street
and 229 N. Virginia Street, Reno, Nevada facilities;
excluding all other employees, guards, and supervi-
sors as defined in the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is nec-
essary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Recognize and, on request, bargain collectively
with Hotel, Motel, Restaurant Employees & Bartenders
Union, Local No. 86, Hotel Employees & Restaurant
Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclu-
sive bargaining representative of the employees in the
appropriate unit described below, with regard to the
wages, hours, working conditions, and other terms and
conditions of employment of the unit employees and, if
an understanding is reached, embody such understanding
in a signed agreement. The unit found appropriate for
the purpose of collective bargaining is:
All full-time and regular part-time bar and culinary
employees, including boiler cooks, fry cooks, cooks,
pantry persons, bakers, dishwashers, potwashers,
porters, captains, hostesses, food and cocktail
waiters/waitresses, busboys/busgirls, cashiers, bar-
tenders, and barboys/bargirls, employed by Re-
spondent Horseshoe at its 221 N. Virginia Street
and 229 N. Virginia Street, Reno, Nevada facilities;
excluding all other employees, guards, and supervi-
sors as defined in the Act.
aS If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of
Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board."
(b) Post at its Reno, Nevada place of business copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix B."24 Copies
of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Direc-
tor for Region 32, after being signed by the Respondent's
authorized representative of the Respondent Mason Cor-
poration d/b/a Reno's Horseshoe Club, shall be posted
by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places in-
cluding all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondents to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondents have taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dis-
missed insofar as it alleges that either Respondent violat-
ed the Act otherwise than found herein.
24 See fn. 23, supra.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial at which all parties had the opportunity to
present evidence, the National Labor Relations Board
found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered us to notify you that
WE WILL NOT in any manner or by an means, includ-
ing orders, directions, instructions, requests, suggestions,
or appeals or by permitting any such to remain in exist-
ence or effect, cause, induce, urge, encourage, request, or
assist you to repudiate or decertify Hotel, Motel, Restau-
rant Employees & Bartenders Union, Local No. 86,
Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees International
Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, or
rescind the authority of the foregoing labor organization,
or any other labor organization, to represent you for the
purposes of collective bargaining.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
221 N. VIRGINIA ST., INC. D/B/A SILVER
SPUR CASINO
APPENDIX B
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial at which all parties had the opportunity to
present evidence, the National Labor Relations Board
1076
SILVER SPUR CASINO
found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered us to post this notice.
WE WILL recognize and, on request, bargain with
Hotel, Motel, Restaurant Employees & Bartenders
Union, Local No. 86, Hotel Employees & Restaurant
Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclu-
sive bargaining representative of the employees in the
appropriate unit described below, with reagrd to wages,
hours, working conditions, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment of the unit employees and, if an un-
derstanding is reached, embody such understanding in a
signed agreement. The unit found appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining is:
All full-time and regular part-time bar and culinary
employees, including boiler cooks, fry cooks, cooks,
pantry persons, bakers, dishwashers, potwashers,
porters, captains, hostesses, food and cocktail
waiters/waitresses, busboys/busgirls, cashiers, bar-
tenders, and barboys/bargirls, employed by Re-
spondent Horseshoe at its 221 N. Virginia Street
and 229 N. Virginia Street, Reno, Nevada facilities;
excluding all other employees, guards, and supervi-
sors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT refuse or fail to do the foregoing and
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
MASON CORPORATION D/B/A RENO'S
HORSESHOE CLUB
1077