Silicon Laboratories Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 1, 2020

2019004223 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 1, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/555,510 11/26/2014 Mohamed M. E. Elsayed SILA359 7067
60939 7590 10/01/2020
MAXIMILLIAN R. PETERSON
PO Box 90245
Sioux Falls, SD 57109
EXAMINER
ROSARIO, NELSON M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2624
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/01/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
USPTO1@PETERSONIPLAW.COM
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte MOHAMED M. E. ELSAYED and
KENNETH W. FERNALD
____________________

Appeal 2019-004223
Application 14/555,5101
Technology Center 2600
____________________

Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, JON M. JURGOVAN, and
SCOTT RAEVSKY, Administrative Patent Judges.

JURGOVAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Non-Final
Rejection of claims 1–20, constituting all of the claims pending in the
application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.2

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Silicon
Laboratories Inc. Appeal Br. 1.
2 Our Decision refers to the Specification (“Spec.”) filed November 26,
2014 as amended on February 16, 2015; the Non-Final Office Action (“Non-
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CLAIMED INVENTION
The claims relate to a multiplexed liquid crystal display (LCD)
controller. Spec. ¶ 6, Abstr. The LCD controller drives a first set of signal
lines during a first phase of operation and a second set of signal lines during
a second phase of operation. Id. The LCD controller selectively couples
some of the signal lines to a node between the first and second phases of
operation depending on the data received by the LCD controller. Id.
The LCD controller may be used to drive multiple seven-segment
digit displays with common lines and segment lines to charge or discharge
segment capacitors. Id. ¶ 31; Figs. 2, 3. The LCD controller uses a
technique called ‘segment resetting’ during the reset period between phases
of operation. Id. ¶¶ 7, 8, 28, 92, 93. If the voltage values of a display
segment that is excited by one of the common lines are the same in the
current and following phase, then its segment line is floated during the reset
period. Id. ¶ 92. Conversely, if the voltages values differ in the current and
following phases of operation, then the segment line is reset by coupling the
segment line to a desired voltage. Id. ¶ 93. The operation of the LCD
controller is thus data-dependent.
Claims 1, 10, and 17 are independent. Claim 1 is an apparatus claim
directed to the LCD controller, claim 10 is an apparatus claim directed to the
combination of the LCD controller and LCD display, and claim 17 is a
method of operating the LCD display. Appeal Br. 31–33 (Claims
Appendix). Claims 2–9 depend from claim 1; claims 11–16 depend from

Final Act.”) mailed April 19, 2018; the Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.”) filed
November 19, 2018; the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”) mailed March 7,
2019; and the Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”) filed May 6, 2019.
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claim 10; and claims 18–20 depend from claim 17. Claim 1, shown below
with argued limitation in italics, is representative of the claimed invention.
1. An apparatus, comprising a multiplexed liquid crystal display
(LCD) controller operating in at least first and second phases
of operation, the LCD controller to drive a first plurality of
signal lines to a first set of voltages during the first phase of
operation and to a second set of voltages during the second
phase of operation, wherein the LCD controller selectively
couples to a node at least some of the first plurality of signal
lines after the first phase of operation and before the second
phase of operation depending on display data provided to the
LCD controller, the display data comprising data to be
displayed on the LCD.

Appeal Br. 31 (Claims Appendix).

REJECTIONS3
Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) for failing to
comply with the written description requirement. Non-Final Act. 10–11.
Claims 1–3, 6, 7, 9–11, and 15–17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 based on Van Ess (US 2011/0169814 A1, published July 14, 2011)
(“Ess”) and Bar (US 2010/0079439 A1, published April 1, 2010). Non-
Final Act. 12–20.

3 In the Non-Final Office Action, claims 1–38 were rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. Non-Final Act. 8–16. However, the Examiner withdrew the § 101
rejection in the Answer. Ans. 3. Accordingly, the § 101 rejection is not
before us and thus we do not address it further in this decision.
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ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
We undertake a limited de novo review of the appealed rejections for
error based upon the issues identified by Appellant, and in light of the
arguments and evidence produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, Appeal No.
2009-006013 (Feb. 26, 2010) (precedential).
Section 112(a) Rejection
Section 112(a) requires that
[t]he specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it,
in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use
the same.4
The written description must reasonably convey to those skilled in the art
that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing
date. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (en banc); D Three Enterprises, LLC v. SunModo Corp., 890 F.3d
1042, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
The Examiner finds the Specification lacks written description support
for the claim limitation shown in italics in claim 1 as reproduced above, as

4 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
(September 16, 2011) (“AIA”), included revisions to 35 U.S.C. § 112 that
became effective on September 16, 2012. Because the present patent
application is a continuation-in-part filed after this date, we assume AIA
§ 112 applies to this application. However, our analysis would not be
different if pre-AIA § 112 applied to this case.

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well as for similar limitations in claims 10 and 17.5 Non-Final Act. 10–11.
Conversely, Appellant argues that the Specification provides written
description support for the italicized claim limitation under § 112. Appeal
Br. 10–11; Reply Br. 1–4.
We agree with Appellant’s argument. The Specification states, “[t]he
LCD controller selectively couples to a node at least some of the plurality of
signal lines between the first and second phases of operation depending on
data provided to the LCD controller.” Spec. ¶ 6. Although claim 1 recites
that the selective coupling to a node occurs after the first phase of operation
and before the second phase of operation, the Examiner has not
demonstrated any difference in meaning from selective coupling that occurs
between the first and second phases of operation as described in the
Specification. See Ans. 4; Reply Br. 4; Spec. ¶ 6, Fig. 10 [trst]. To comply
with the written description requirement of § 112, the Specification is not
required to provide literal support, word for word, for the recited claim
language. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1324 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (“In order to satisfy the written description requirement, the
disclosure as originally filed does not have to provide in haec verba support
for the claimed subject matter at issue.”); MPEP § 2163.02.
Claim 10 recites “the controller is to selectively perform segment
resetting after the first phase of operation and before the second phase of

5 Although the body of the § 112(a) rejection mentions independent claims 1
and 10, it does not mention independent claim 17. The rejection heading,
however, indicates it applies to all pending claims. Non-Final Act. 10–11.
Accordingly, we assume the Examiner intended that the § 112(a) rejection
applies to claim 17 for the same reasons as stated for claims 1 and 10.
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operation of the LCD depending on display data provided to the LCD
controller.” Appeal Br. 32 (Claims Appendix). The Specification states,
According to yet another exemplary embodiment, a method of
operating an LCD includes operating the LCD in a first phase of
operation, and after operating the LCD in the first phase of
operation, selectively performing segment resetting based on
data provided to the LCD controller. The method further includes
operating the LCD in a second phase of operation after
performing selective segment resetting.
Spec. ¶ 8. In other words, the Specification describes operating the LCD in
a first phase of operation, after which segment resetting is performed, after
which the LCD is operated in a second phase of operation. The Examiner
has not shown the Specification’s description has a different meaning from
the claimed selective performance of segment resetting after the first phase
of operation and before the second phase of operation of the LCD controller.
Claim 17 recites almost verbatim the above excerpt from the
Specification. See Spec. ¶ 8; Appeal Br. 33. Thus, while written description
is not an in haec verba test, claim 17 is described word for word, or nearly
so, in the Specification.
Accordingly, the Examiner has not shown that the Specification fails
to convey to one of ordinary skill in the art that the inventors were in
possession of the claimed invention as of the filing date. We thus do not
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–20 under the written description
requirement of § 112(a).
§ 103 Rejection
Title 35, section 103, provides
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained,
notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically
disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between
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the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed
invention as a whole would have been obvious before the
effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.6
The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual
determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any
differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level
of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) where present, objective evidence of
nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
A. Independent Claims 1, 10 and 17
Appellant argues claims 1, 10, and 17 together as one group. Appeal
Br. 18–24. Accordingly, we select claim 1 as representative and unless
otherwise indicated will restrict our analysis to this claim only. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (“When multiple claims subject to the same ground of
rejection are argued as a group or subgroup by appellant, the Board may
select a single claim from the group or subgroup and may decide the appeal
as to the ground of rejection with respect to the group or subgroup on the
basis of the selected claim alone”).
The Examiner finds that the combination of Ess and Bar teaches or
suggests the limitations of claim 1. Non-Final Act. 13–16 (citing Ess ¶¶ 44,
45, Figs. 5A, 5B, 12). Appellant contends the Examiner erred and presents
several arguments for patentability. Appeal Br. 18–24; Reply Br. 4–8.

6 The AIA included revisions to 35 U.S.C. § 103 that became effective on
March 16, 2013. Because the present patent application is a continuation-in-
part filed after this date, we assume AIA § 103 applies to this application.
However, on this record, our analysis would not be different if pre-AIA
§ 103 applied to this case.
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Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us of Examiner error for the
following reasons.
(1) Node Coupling
The Examiner finds that Ess teaches or suggests the argued limitation
of claim 1 shown in emphasis above. Appellant argues “the Office
Communication fails to show that Ess couples at least some of the plurality
of signal lines to a node between two time slots or after a first timeslot and
before a second timeslot, even if one assumes, for the sake of the argument,
that the ‘off modes’ constitute ‘segment resetting.’” Appeal Br. 18; Reply
Br. 4–5.
In the rejection, the Examiner relies on Ess’s Figure 12, shown below.
Non-Final Act. 7, 16; Ans. 6, 8.

Ess’s Figure 12 shows driver signals (COM0, COM1, COM2, SEG0, SEG1)
generated by multiplexing control signals. Ess ¶¶ 107–109. The COM
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signals drive one side of the LCD and the segment signals drive the other
side. See Ess Fig. 3; Spec. Fig. 3. The Examiner considers the first halves
of the timeslots t0, t1 in Ess as the claimed “first and second phases of
operation” and the second halves of the timeslots t0, t1 as reset periods.
Non-Final Act. 7, 16; Ans. 6, 8. In Ess’s Figure 12, COM0 and SEG0 are
both low during timeslot t0’s reset period, and COM1 and SEG1 are both
high during timeslot t0’s reset period. These signals must be coupled to a
node (voltage supply or ground) for this to occur. Accordingly, Ess at least
suggests some of the signal lines are connected to a node after the first phase
and before the second phase, as claimed. We thus find Appellant’s argument
unpersuasive.
Appellant argues the “off modes” of Ess’s Figures 5A and 5B do not
constitute “segment resetting.” Appeal Br. 18–19. This argument, however,
does not negate the Examiner’s findings with respect to Ess’s Figure 12
discussed above.
(2) Choice Of
Appellant also argues the Examiner based the entire case on
interpretation of the word “between” in the claims as meaning “choice of”
first and second phases of operation. Appeal Br. 19–20; Non-Final Act. 4.
We do not agree that the Examiner’s entire case hinges on the “choice of”
interpretation. For reasons just explained, the Examiner cited Ess’s Figure
12 as showing selective coupling of signal lines to nodes between first and
second phases of operation. Thus, Appellant has not demonstrated
reversible error.
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(3) Segment Resetting
Appellant argues “Ess simply has nothing to do with segment
resetting.” Appeal Br. 20; Reply Br. 7. Claim 1, however, does not mention
“segment resetting” and terms that do not appear in the claim cannot be
relied upon for patentability. See In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA
1982).
Furthermore, as explained, Ess’s Figure 12 shows the COM0 and
SEG0 signals are both low (grounded) during the reset period. This would
have the effect of resetting the segment capacitance similarly to what is
shown below in Figure 12B of Appellant’s Specification.

Specifically, in Figure 12B, switches 39, 42 couple both terminals of
segment capacitance 30 to the ground node. Grounding the COM0 and
SEG0 signals in Ess’s Figure 12 implies the same grounding as shown in
Figure 12B of Appellant’s Specification.
(4) VSEG
Appellant argues that Ess does not disclose segment resetting because
Ess’s signal “VSEG does not represent the voltage across a single LCD
segment terminals, and does not constitute an evidence of the signal
resetting in Ess.” Appeal Br. 21. As explained, claim 1 does not recite
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segment resetting so Appellant’s argument is not supported by
corresponding language in the claim. See Self, supra.
In any case, as noted, Ess’s Figure 12 shows grounding of COM0 and
SEG0 signals across a segment capacitance during a reset period, similar to
the segment resetting shown in Appellant’s Figure 12B. Thus, we are not
persuaded by this argument.
(5) Bar’s Alleged Failure
Appellant argues “[t]he Office Communication fails to show that Bar
teaches ‘first and second phases’ of operation of the LCD, and after the first
phase and before the second phase ‘segment resetting’ is performed
‘depending on display data provided to the LCD controller.’” Appeal Br.
22–23. The Examiner relied on Ess, not Bar, for this teaching. Non-Final
Act. 13–16. Thus, Appellant’s argument attacks Bar individually, and does
not consider what the combination of Ess and Bar would have signified to a
person of ordinary skill in the art. “Non-obviousness cannot be established
by attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the
teachings of a combination of references.” In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d
1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA
1981)).
(6) Timeslots versus Phases of Operation
In the Reply Brief, for the first time, Appellant asserts that Ess’s
“timeslots” do not correspond to the claimed “phases of operation.” Reply
Br. 5. New arguments are not considered in a reply brief absent a showing
of good cause, which has not been made here. 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2)
(“Any argument raised in the reply brief which was not raised in the appeal
brief, or is not responsive to an argument raised in the examiner’s answer,
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including any designated new ground of rejection, will not be considered by
the Board for purposes of the present appeal, unless good cause is shown”).
Even if we did consider Appellant’s argument, we would find it
unpersuasive because it is a mere assertion without any explanation of why
the first halves of Ess’s timeslots do not correspond to the claimed “phases
of operation.” See Ans. 8. Attorney argument is not evidence. Icon Health
and Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc., 849 F.3d 1034, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
B. Remaining Claims
No separate arguments are presented for the remaining dependent
claims, which fall for the same reasons stated for their respective
independent claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (“the failure of
appellant to separately argue claims which appellant has grouped together
shall constitute a waiver of any argument that the Board must consider the
patentability of any grouped claim separately”).

CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–3, 6, 7, 9–11, and 15–17 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 are affirmed, but the rejections of claims 4, 5, 8, 12–14, and
18–20 are reversed.

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 112 Written description 1–20
1–3, 6, 7,
9–11, 15–
17
103 Ess, Bar 1–3, 6, 7,
9–11, 15–
17

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Overall
Outcome
1–3, 6, 7,
9–11, 15–
17
4, 5, 8, 12–
14, 18–20

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART