Sikorsky Air Maintenance

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Jan 24, 2011

15-CA-019692 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 24, 2011)

JD(ATL)–01–11
Fort Rucker, AL
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
ATLANTA BRANCH OFFICE
SIKORSKY SUPPORT SERVICE, INC.
d/b/a SIKORSKY AEROSPACE
MAINTENANCE
and CASE 15–CA–19692
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE
WORKERS, AFL–CIO
Donna M. Nixon, Esq., for the General Counsel.
A. McArthur Irvin, Esq., for the Respondent.
Ramon Garcia, Grand Lodge Representative,
for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MARGARET G. BRAKEBUSCH, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried
in Fort Rucker, Alabama, on October 25, 26, 27, and 28, 2010. The charge was filed by the
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO (the Union) on
July 26, 2010. Based upon the allegations contained in the charge, the Regional Director for
Region 15 of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board), issued a complaint and notice
of hearing on October 1, 2010.
The complaint alleges that on or about April 16, 2010, Sikorsky Support Service, Inc.
d/b/a Sikorsky Aerospace Maintenance (Respondent) issued employee Jeremy Crutcher
(Crutcher) a warning and on April 26, 2010 discharged Crutcher in violation of Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act.) The complaint also alleges that
on May 3, 2010, Respondent issued a written job description and job duties for the bargaining
unit position of aircraft mechanic. The complaint alleges that Respondent did so without prior
notice to the Union and without affording the Union an opportunity to bargain with
Respondent in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Additionally, the complaint
alleges that on various dates in March and April 2010, Respondent’s named agents and
supervisors interrogated employees regarding their union activities and sentiments and
JD(ATL)–01–11
2
regarding the union activities and sentiments of other employees, solicited grievances from
the employees with the promise or with an implied promise to fix the grievances, and
promised unspecified benefits to employees if they would vote against selecting the Union as
their collective-bargaining representative. The complaint further alleges that during this same
time period, Respondent implied to employees that their activities on behalf of the Union 5
were under surveillance and impliedly threatened employees twice with discharge because of
their activities on behalf of and/or sentiments toward the Union.
On the entire record,1 including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and Respondent, I make the 10
following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION15
Respondent, with an office and place of business in Fort Rucker, Alabama, has been
engaged in the business of providing aircraft maintenance for the United States Army.
Annually, Respondent provides aircraft maintenance services to the United States valued in
excess of $50,000 and performs services valued in excess of $5000 in states other than the 20
State of Alabama. Based on its operations, Respondent has a substantial impact on the
national defense of the United States. Respondent admits and I find that it is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and the
Union is a labor organization within the meaning of 2(5) of the Act.
25
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Respondent is a subcontractor under American Eurocopter; the main contractor with
the U.S. Army to provide the LUH aircraft in support of the U.S. Army’s mission. 30
Respondent is owned by United Technologies Corporation. The LUH (light utility helicopter)
program is a medevac helicopter program that replaces the former UH-1 aircraft for medium
and light logistics flying. In June 2009, Respondent assumed a contract at Fort Rucker Army
Aviation Center (Fort Rucker) for the LUH program. In performing the contract, Respondent
provides the manpower to service and maintain the aircraft mechanically and logistically in 35
support of the Army’s Flatiron mission at Fort Rucker. The Flatiron mission at Fort Rucker
not only provides support for student training, but also supports the local community for
medical evacuation. Specifically, the mission supports the civilian hospitals in southeast
Alabama and northwest Florida with medical service support and air ambulance service to
assist in critical cases where ground transportation would not be the most efficient means of 40
transporting patients.

1 Respondent’s counsel filed a motion to correct the transcript citing seven errors involving misspellings
or typographical errors. Inasmuch as the motion is unopposed and the proposed corrections are
consistent with the testimony given and do not alter the substance of the testimony, the motion is
granted. Accordingly, the transcript is hereby corrected to incorporate the corrections included in
Respondent’s December 13, 2010 motion to correct the transcript of the hearing.
JD(ATL)–01–11
3
As the Respondent’s labor relations manager, Adrienne DeLucca (DeLucca) maintains
an office in Respondent’s corporate headquarters in Stratford, Connecticut. DeLucca
functions as both human resources representative and labor representative to Respondent’s
operation at the Fort Rucker facility.2 In addition to her responsibilities at the Fort Rucker 5
facility, DeLucca administers 12 collective-bargaining agreements and works with 9 separate
union business agents.
When Respondent began its operation at the Fort Rucker facility, Todd Schell (Schell)
was Respondent’s site manager and Justin Ott (Ott) was the lead mechanic. On 10
approximately March 1, 2010, quality control inspector Steve Kopko filed a hostile work
environment claim against Respondent, asserting that he was treated unfairly by Schell and
Ott. On March 2, 2010, DeLucca went to Fort Rucker to investigate Kopko’s claim.
DeLucca testified that in conducting her investigation of the claim, she interviewed all of
Respondent’s employees at Fort Rucker. DeLucca was assisted in her investigation by Frank 15
Eddy; manager of labor relations for United Technologies, Pratt & Whitney. DeLucca
explained that it is standard protocol for United Technologies to send someone from a “sister
unit” to assist in such an investigation and serve as an objective observer. DeLucca testified
that upon investigation, she found an egregious situation involving threats, intimidation, and
coercion. Based upon the investigation, DeLucca recommended the termination of both 20
Schell and Ott. Mechanic James Green was promoted to fill the position of lead mechanic.
While DeLucca was conducting a search for a new site manager, Respondent brought in
James Disotell (Disotell) to serve as the interim site manager. Disotell was Respondent’s site
manager for its Fort Polk, Louisiana facility. Aircraft mechanic Billy Brown (Brown) was
ultimately selected as the new site manager. Prior to his promotion Brown was an hourly 25
employee with no management responsibilities. Disotell guided Brown in learning the
operational side of his new job and DeLucca counseled him in personnel and human
resource’s (HR) issues. DeLucca recalled that she told Brown that the site was extremely
vulnerable because of the recent trauma experienced by the employees. DeLucca testified
that she also personally apologized to the Fort Rucker employees for what had happened to 30
them. DeLucca told Brown that she wanted to remain very closely tethered to the site to
“ensure smooth sailing” and to provide advice and counsel to Brown.
In early 2010, and during the relevant period for the issues involved in this
proceeding, Respondent employed approximately 11 employees, most of whom were aircraft 35
mechanics. Earle Tatum (Tatum) was the only test flight mechanic. As the test flight
mechanic, Tatum retrieved data and made adjustments to the aircraft while it was in flight.
As an aircraft mechanic, Tatum was also responsible for removing and replacing aircraft
parts, troubleshooting, and assuring that the aircraft was airworthy. Thomas Blisard (Blisard)
was the functional check pilot for the LUH aircraft program. He also served as Respondent’s 40
environmental health and safety manager. There were approximately four to five aircraft
mechanics who worked on the first shift and one to two mechanics who were assigned to the
second shift. Because the site manager and the lead mechanic worked primarily on the first
shift, the employees assigned to the second shift worked without direct supervision. For

2 DeLucca testified that she has a law degree and has completed work toward a master’s degree in labor
relations.
JD(ATL)–01–11
4
purposes of this proceeding, Brown and Blisard were admitted to be supervisors within the
meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. None of the other employees working at the Fort
Rucker facility are alleged or admitted supervisors.
Employees Tatum, James Green (Green), Blisard, Wayne Parker (Parker), and Brown 5
all began their employment with Respondent when the contract began in June 2009. Jeremy
Crutcher (Crutcher) applied to work at Respondent’s Fort Rucker facility on January 15,
2010. Crutcher, Robert Barber (Barber), Loretta Etheredge (Etheredge), and Chris Colter
(Colter) were all hired on or about January 31, 2010. Before they began working at the Fort
Rucker facility, they attended a 4-week training program in Texas. After a short period of 10
orientation on the first shift, Crutcher and Etheredge were assigned as the only two mechanics
on the evening shift.
B. Union Activity
15
In November or December 2009, the International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO (Union) began a union organizing campaign at Respondent’s
Fort Rucker facility. Tatum was the primary organizer for the campaign. An election was
held on April 8, 2010. Tatum served as the Union’s observer for the election and Etheredge
served as the Respondent’s observer for the election. The employees voted 4 to 3 in favor of 20
union representation. The Union was certified as the representative of the mechanics and
quality assurance employees on April 19, 2010.
Tatum testified that he was surprised at the election outcome. He explained that until
a few days before the election, he and other union supporters expected Green and Etheredge25
to vote for the Union. Etheredge testified that while she had initially signed a petition in
support of the Union, she withdrew her support for the Union prior to the election.
C. Alleged 8(a)(1) Violations
30
1. Alleged 8(a)(1) conduct alleged to have occurred before the election
The complaint alleges that during the course of the union campaign, certain agents,
and supervisors of Respondent engaged in conduct in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The conduct alleged during this period of time involves interrogation, the solicitation of 35
grievances, and one allegation involving a promise of benefits. In support of the complaint
allegations of preelection interrogation and solicitation of grievances, counsel for the Acting
General Counsel offered the testimony of three employees involving the conduct of three
supervisors. In support of the allegation of unlawful promise of benefits, the Acting General
Counsel submitted the testimony of one employee involving one supervisor in one alleged40
incident. The remainder of the alleged 8(a)(1) conduct is alleged to have occurred after the
April 8, 2010 election and relates to Crutcher. The allegations involving postelection conduct
are discussed below in conjunction with Crutcher’s warning and discharge.
JD(ATL)–01–11
5
a. Prevailing law
It is well established that the test of interference, restraint, and coercion under Section
8(a)(1) of the Act does not depend upon an employer’s motive or whether the coercion
succeeded or failed. The test is whether the employer engaged in conduct which, it may 5
reasonably be said, tends to interfere with the free exercise of employee rights under the Act.
American Freightways Co., 124 NLRB 146, 147 (1959).
(1) Interrogation
10
In determining whether the questioning of an employee constitutes an unlawful
interrogation, the applicable test is that found in the Board’s decision in Rossmore House, 269
NLRB 1176 (1984), affd. sub nom. Hotel Employees Union Local 11 v. NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006
(9th Cir. 1985); a test that the Board has continued to follow for the past 26 years. In its
analysis, the Board considers what has come to be known as “the Bourne factors,” as these 15
factors were first set out in Bourne v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1964). These factors
are:
(1) The background, i.e. is there a history of employer hostility and
discrimination?20
(2) The nature of the information sought, e.g., did the interrogator appear to be
seeking information upon which to base taking action against the employees?
(3) The identity of the questioner, i.e. how high was he in the company hierarchy?
(4) Place and method of interrogation, e.g., was employee called from work to the
boss’s office? Was there an atmosphere of unnatural formality?25
(5) Truthfulness of the reply.
As the Board has pointed out, interrogation of known union adherents is not per se
unlawful. The Board has found that the totality of the circumstances must be examined, and
the appropriate inquiry is whether the interrogation “reasonably tends to restrain, coerce, or 30
interfere with rights guaranteed by the Act.” Rossmore above at 1177. The Bourne criteria
are not however, prerequisites to a finding of coercive questions, but rather have proven to be
useful indicia that serve as a starting point for assessing the “totality of the circumstances.”
Perdue Farms, Inc., 144 F.3d 830, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Timsco Inc. v. NLRB, 819 F.2d
1173, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Westwood Health Care Center, 330 NLRB 935 (2000). The 35
Board has specifically noted that in the final analysis, the Board’s task is to determine
whether “under all the circumstances the questioning at issue would reasonably tend to coerce
the employee at whom it is directed so that he or she would feel restrained from exercising
rights protected by Section 7 of the Act.” Id. at 940.
40
Thus, it is apparent that there is no one-size fits all definition of unlawful
interrogation. Because Section 8(a)(1) prohibits employers only from activity which in some
manner tends to restrain, coerce, or interfere with employees, either the words themselves or
the context in which they are used must suggest an element of coercion or interference to fall
within the parameters of Section 8(a)(1). Midwest Stock Exchange, Inc. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 45
1255, 1267 (7th Cir. 1980).
JD(ATL)–01–11
6
As the Third Circuit has pointed out in its analysis of unlawful interrogation,
consideration must be given to the fact that supervisors and employees often work closely
together and consequently discuss a range of subjects of mutual interest; including
unionization. The circuit went on to note that to hold that any instance of casual questioning 5
concerning union sympathies violates the Act ignores the realities of the workplace. Graham
Architectural Products Corp. v. NLRB, 697 F.2d 534, 541 (3d Cir. 1983). Thus, wording,
circumstances, background, location, and relationship of the participants are all vital factors in
determining whether a supervisor’s questions constitute unlawful interrogation. Again, the
analysis is an objective test and looks to whether the conduct in question would reasonably 10
have a tendency to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their Section
7 rights, and not a subjective test having to do with whether the employee in question was
actually intimidated. Multi-Ad Services, Inc., 331 NLRB 1226, 1228 (2000).
(2) Solicitation and promise of benefits15
It is fundamental that absent a previous practice of doing so, the solicitation of
grievances during an organization campaign accompanied by an express or implied promise
to remedy such grievances violates the Act. Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings, 333
NLRB 284 (2001); Maple Grove Health Care Center, 330 NLRB 775 (2000); Capitol EMI 20
Music, 311 NLRB 997, 1007 (1993), enfd. 23 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 1994).
An employer who has a past policy and practice of soliciting employees’ grievances
may continue such a practice during an organizational campaign. The employer, however,
cannot justify solicitation of grievances where it significantly alters its past manner and 25
methods of solicitation. Wal-Mart, Inc., 339 NLRB 1187, 1187–1188 (2003); Carbonneau
Industries, 228 NLRB 597, 598 (1977). As the Board has long noted, there is a compelling
inference that an employer is “implicitly promising to correct those inequities that he
discovers as a result of inquiries and likewise urging on his employees that the combined
program of inquiry and correction will make union representation unnecessary.” Reliance 30
Electric Co., 191 NLRB 44, 46 (1971), enfd. 457 F.2d 503 (6th Cir. 1972).
Certainly, an employer is free to speak about a union campaign and express opinions.
Under Section 8(c), however, that freedom does not extend to statements that promise benefits
to employees in relation to the union campaign. Grouse Mountain Associates II, 333 NLRB 35
1322, 325 (2001). The Board has traditionally held that the granting or promising of benefits
during the pendency of an election is prima facie evidence of intentional interference with
employees’ Section 7 rights and is presumed to be for the illegal object of influencing
employees. Lampi, L.L.C., 322 NLRB 502, 502 (1996). An employer’s promise of benefits
need not be detailed or specific to be violative of the Act. Promises that an employer “would 40
someday better itself” and offer employees “more” have been found sufficient to constitute an
unlawful promise of benefits. JFB Mfg., Inc., 208 NLRB 2, 6 (1973). Thus, the inquiry must
be whether the express or implied promise of benefits, whether specified or not, was given for
the purpose of influencing the employees’ vote in the election and of a type reasonably
calculated to have that effect. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964).45
JD(ATL)–01–11
7
b. The 8(a)(1) allegations involving Tom Blisard
(1) Evidence presented
Complaint paragraph 7(a) alleges that on or about March 2010, Respondent, acting 5
through Thomas Blisard, interrogated employees regarding their activities on behalf of/or
sentiments toward the Union. Paragraph 7(b) alleges that on or about the same date, Blisard
solicited grievances from the employees with the promise to fix the grievances. Blisard has
worked for Respondent since Respondent began its operation at the Fort Rucker facility in
June 2009. Blisard is the functional check pilot for the LUH program. In addition to being a 10
pilot, Blisard is also a certified airframe and power plant mechanic. Respondent admits that
Blisard is a supervisor within the meaning of the Act.
Before working together at Respondent’s facility, Blisard and Crutcher worked
together for 4 years at Army Fleet Support (AFS). Blisard was the test flight operations 15
manager and Crutcher was a shop steward for the union at the facility. Blisard recalled that
Crutcher, as a union steward, represented an employee supervised by Blisard during a
grievance proceeding at AFS. Blisard testified that he had found Crutcher to be reasonably
knowledgeable of the grievance procedure. When Crutcher applied to work at Respondent’s
facility, Respondent’s former site manager Todd Schell asked Blisard if he knew Crutcher 20
and, if so, what was his opinion of Crutcher’s work. Blisard recalled that he told Schell that
he didn’t have any direct knowledge of Crutcher’s mechanical ability or qualifications. He
told Schell that his only involvement with Crutcher had been the grievance procedure when
Crutcher was a union steward. Blisard testified that he told Schell that he had nothing
positive or negative to add.25
Crutcher testified that on or about the end of February or the first of March 2010, he
had a conversation with Blisard in the hangar’s employee breakroom. Crutcher estimated that
the conversation occurred approximately 30 minutes before their shift began and no other
employees were in the area. Crutcher testified that Blisard mentioned that he knew that 30
Crutcher had been involved with the union at AFS (Army Fleet Support) and he asked
Crutcher’s “take” on the Union coming in at Respondent’s facility. Crutcher testified that he
told Blisard that he was too new to know and that he was relying on what he heard from the
more senior employees. Crutcher testified that Blisard asked him how he thought the Union
would benefit the other employees. Crutcher told Blisard that the Union would give the 35
employees affordable health insurance and would address the overtime and compensatory
time pay issues. Crutcher testified that Blisard told him that the company was going to
address those issues and if the employees gave the company a chance, the company would
address and rectify the issues. Crutcher responded that there had been 9 months for
Respondent to rectify the issues and the issues had not suddenly arisen. Crutcher testified that 40
Blisard opined that the issues had not been addressed with upper management because of the
previous site manager who was no longer at the facility.
Blisard recalled that prior to the election he had a conversation with Crutcher about
the Union. He testified that he asked Crutcher what he hoped to get out of bringing the union 45
to the company. Blisard recalled that Crutcher responded by mentioning better pay and better
JD(ATL)–01–11
8
benefits. Blisard asserted that he explained to Crutcher that Respondent had a totally different
kind of contract than AFS and comparing the pay and benefits of the two companies was like
comparing apples and oranges. Blisard recalled that he explained to Crutcher that AFS had a
direct contract with the U.S. Army while Respondent contracted with the U.S. Army through
American Eurocopter. He told Crutcher that Respondent could not provide the same kinds of 5
benefits and pay as his prior employer because of the fixed price of Respondent’s contract
with American Eurocopter.
During his testimony, Respondent’s counsel asked Blisard if he solicited any
grievances during his conversation with Crutcher. Blisard replied: “Not knowingly.” Blisard 10
recalled asking Crutcher why he would bring in an outside arbitrator and try to resolve the
issues through the Union rather than to bring the questions to the company to be resolved.
(2) Conclusions
15
Prior to the alleged interrogation and alleged solicitation of benefits, Crutcher and
Blisard worked together for 4 years prior to their employment with Respondent. There is no
dispute that Crutcher’s union activity was well known to Blisard and they had worked
together in their respective union/management roles. As a union steward, Crutcher
represented an employee who was supervised by Blisard. The conversation in issue came 20
about during the course of their daily work activities. Although Respondent stipulated that
Blisard was a supervisor within the meaning of the Act, there is no record evidence that
Blisard had any specific supervisory responsibility for Crutcher. Based upon the testimony of
both individuals, Crutcher appeared to respond to Blisard’s inquiry without hesitancy, freely
explaining the anticipated benefits that would be available with unionization. I find that 25
Blisard’s inquiry was simply casual questioning based upon his prior work relationship with
Crutcher and would not reasonably tend to coerce, restrain, or interfere with Section 7 rights.
Accordingly, I do not find that Blisard engaged in interrogation in violation of the Act as
alleged in complaint paragraph 7(a).
30
I found Blisard to be an exceptionally credible witness; appearing to be
straightforward in his description of his conversation with Crutcher. He candidly
acknowledged that he asked Crutcher how he hoped to benefit by the Union and why Crutcher
had chosen to bring in the Union to resolve issues rather than taking his concerns to
Respondent. There is no evidence that Blisard had the authority to address any of the issues 35
raised by Crutcher or even to recommend correction of any problems to upper management.
There is, in fact, no complaint allegation that he promised any benefits to Crutcher or to any
other employees. I credit Blisard’s testimony that after hearing the benefits that Crutcher
hoped to obtain with the Union, Blisard attempted to explain to Crutcher the economic
differences in their prior employer and the Respondent and why the additional pay and 40
benefits might not be attainable because of these differences. Crutcher admitted that Blisard
explained that the issues in pay had not been addressed with higher management because of
the problems with the prior site manager. It is reasonable that Blisard asked Crutcher to give
the company a chance to address these problems now that upper management had removed
the prior site manager and was in the process of putting a new manager in place.45
JD(ATL)–01–11
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On the basis of the entire record, however, Blisard’s comments may objectively be
construed as a solicitation of benefits that might reasonably tend to interfere with an
employee’s Section 7 rights. Accordingly, I find merit to complaint paragraph 7(b).
c. Allegations involving Mathew Kerzner5
(1) Evidence presented
Complaint paragraph 8(a) alleges that on or about March 2010, Respondent, acting
through Mathew Kerzner (Kerzner) interrogated employees on two separate occasions 10
regarding their activities on behalf of and/or sentiments toward the Union. Paragraph 8(b)
alleges that during the same time period, Kerzner interrogated employees regarding other
employees’ activities on behalf of and/or sentiments toward the Union. Complaint paragraph
8(c) alleges that during the same time period, Kerzner solicited grievances on two occasions
from employees with the implied promise to fix the grievances.15
Kerzner is Respondent’s labor relations project manager for corporate human
resources. He primarily deals with the unions and with labor relations enterprisewide.
Kerzner initially visited the Fort Rucker facility approximately 6 weeks prior to the April 8,
2010 election and then again closer to the election date.20
Crutcher testified that in March 2010, he had a conversation with Kerzner in the
breakroom/tool crib. Crutcher recalls that he had come into the room to check out some tools
and only Kerzner was present in the room. Crutcher testified that Kerzner commented on his
being new at the facility and asked him his opinion on the Union “coming in.” Crutcher 25
recalled telling Kerzner that he was really too new to the facility to know and he was simply
relying upon what the employees hired before him said about the issues. Crutcher testified
that Kerzner then asked if there was anything that Respondent could do to stop the Union
from coming in. Crutcher testified that he told Kerzner that he thought that “it was too far
gone.” He added that the employees had petitioned for the Union and they were afraid to 30
back out at that point. Crutcher recalled that Kerzner rubbed his forehead, sighed, and said
nothing further.
Robert Barber (Barber) worked at the Fort Rucker facility from January until June
2010, when he resigned. Barber testified that Kerzner was the first supervisor at the facility 35
who mentioned the Union to him before the election. Barber recalled that in March 2010, he
was walking through the break area when he saw Kerzner working at his computer. Barber
testified that Kerzner asked him how the employees felt about the Union and also asked if
anything could be done to change the way employees were thinking. Barber responded that
there really wasn’t anything that he could do to change what other people were thinking and 40
he personally was still looking at both sides of the issue. Barber also recalled that later in
March, he met with DeLucca and Kerzner for his 60-day evaluation. At the end of the
meeting, Kerzner asked Barber if “anything had changed with the guys.” Barber responded
that as far as he knew, everyone felt the same and they would just have to wait and see what
happened.45
JD(ATL)–01–11
10
Kerzner recalled having conversations with both Crutcher and Barber. Kerzner
described his contacts with Crutcher to center around Crutcher’s DUI situation. Kerzner
recalled that during Crutcher’s 60-day review, he asked Crutcher about a pending DUI charge
and informed Crutcher that he was aware that this was not the first offense. Kerzner told
Crutcher that his employment would be reviewed after his upcoming legal hearing. Crutcher 5
assured Kerzner that he was confident that the case would be dismissed and he would have his
license returned. Kerzner also recalled that Crutcher asked him if he were bringing up the
matter of the DUI because of the pending union election. DeLucca was also present for the
60-day review and immediately responded to Crutcher’s question. DeLucca told Crutcher
that she was offended by his comment and that his DUI was brought up because it was a 10
serious concern and had nothing to do with the union or the election. DeLucca went on to
offer Crutcher help through the employee assistance program. Kerzner testified that he
actually attended Crutcher’s court hearing along with Brown. Kerzner denied that he ever
asked Crutcher what could be done to stop the union. Kerzner denied that he ever asked any
employee how he felt about the Union. Kerzner recalled that he had several conversations 15
with Barber; but only about Barber’s operational experience as a mechanic, his qualifications
as a pilot, and about his family. Kerzner testified that while he had several conversations with
Barber, nothing was said about the Union.
(2) Conclusions20
While I do not credit all of Crutcher’s record testimony, it is also common in judicial
decisions to believe some and not all of a witness’s testimony. NLRB v. Universal Camera
Corp., 179 F.2d 749, 754 (2d Cir. 1950), vacated and remanded on other grounds 340 U.S.
474 (1951). With respect to Crutcher’s alleged conversation with Kerzner, I find the 25
testimony credible. In part, I do so because of the similarity in conversations alleged by both
Barber and Crutcher. I found Barber to be a credible witness and there is no basis to conclude
that there was any collusion in which Barber and Crutcher tailored their testimony to have
such similarity. It is reasonable that the two conversations occurred as described by Crutcher
and Barber. Kerzner’s blanket denial that he had any conversations about the Union while at 30
the facility is not reasonable. Kerzner was not prohibited from having conversations with
employees about the Union. He could have legally given them his opinion and urged them to
vote against the Union, as long as he did so without coercion, threats, or promises. As
Respondent’s labor relations project manager, it was reasonable that he would have wanted to
say something to employees to encourage their support for Respondent in the upcoming 35
election. To assert that he said nothing at all is illogical and undercuts the credibility of his
testimony.
Accordingly, the record supports a finding that on or about March 2010, Kerzner
interrogated employees about their own union activity and about the union activity of others 40
and solicited grievances with the implied promise to fix the grievances as alleged in complaint
paragraphs 8(a),(b), and (c.)
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d. Allegations involving James Disotell
(1) Evidence presented
Complaint paragraph 9 alleges that in March 2010, Respondent, acting through James 5
Disotell, promised unspecified benefits to employees if they would vote against selecting the
Union as their collective-bargaining representative. James Disotell (Disotell) is the site
manager for Respondent’s operation at Fort Polk, Louisiana. In March 2010, Respondent
temporarily assigned Disotell to the Fort Rucker facility to cover the responsibilities of site
manager while Schell’s replacement could be found. Disotell recalled that he was at the Fort 10
Rucker facility for approximately 3 weeks.
Barber testified that he had a conversation with Disotell one afternoon at the end of his
shift. He recalled that as he and Disotell were walking toward the parking lot, Disotell
commented that he really hoped that the employees would not vote in the Union. Barber also 15
recalled that Disotell stated that there were a lot of good things coming down from the
company, however, he couldn’t tell Barber what they were or promise Barber anything.
Disotell testified that while he had conversations with employees during his 3 weeks at the
facility, he didn’t remember any conversation in which he promised benefits to employees if
they would vote against the Union.20
(2) Conclusions
In very general terms, Disotell’s comment to Barber was simply a request for the
employees to give the company a chance. The Board has held that where such requests for an 25
opportunity to prove oneself are not coupled with promises of benefits, they are not conduct
that interferes with employees’ free choice in an election. Noah’s New York Bagels, Inc., 324
NLRB 266, 267 (1997), citing National Micronetics, 277 NLRB 993 (1985). Conversely,
requests by an employer for the chance to prove itself that are coupled with express or implied
promises of benefits have been found to be unlawful. Reno Hilton Resorts Corp., 319 NLRB 30
1154, 1156 (1995). Certainly, there was nothing unlawful about Disotell’s comment to
Barber that he hoped that the employees would not vote for the Union. Disotell was
apparently mindful that he could not make promises to any employees during this preelection
period and told Barber that he could not make promises. Barber recalled, however, that
Disotell went on to opine that there were good things to come from the Respondent. Disotell 35
was not a part of the Fort Rucker management staff. He was simply assigned for
approximately 3 weeks to manage the operation until Respondent could put into place a
permanent site manager. There is no dispute that there were perceived problems associated
with the prior site management; sufficient to spur a hostile work environment complaint by an
employee. Based upon the circumstances that brought Disotell to the facility, it is likely that 40
he would view the opportunity for a change in management as a good thing for employees. It
is entirely likely that it was this future new management that he was referring to in his
conversation with Barber. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that Disotell provided this kind
of detail to Barber when he talked about the “good things” that would come from Respondent.
Disotell could not recall the conversation and could not provide any further information in his 45
testimony. Accordingly, crediting Barber’s testimony, and there being no record evidence to
JD(ATL)–01–11
12
clarify the basis for Disotell’s remark, I find that Respondent promised unspecified benefits as
alleged in paragraph 9 of the complaint.
e. Allegations involving Frank Eddy
5
(1) Evidence presented
Complaint paragraph 10 alleges that at about the end of March or the beginning of
April 2010, Respondent, acting through Frank Eddy, interrogated employees regarding their
activities on behalf of and/or sentiments toward the Union. Frank Eddy (Eddy) is the 10
manager of labor relations for United Technologies, Pratt &Whitney in East Hartford,
Connecticut. Eddy testified that he was sent to the Fort Rucker facility in 2010 to provide
third-party oversight to the investigation of a hostile work environment claim involving Site
Manager Schell. Eddy interviewed most of the employees along with DeLucca and he was
present at the site for approximately 3 or 4 days. Eddy also returned to the facility again a day 15
or two before the April 8, 2010 election. Eddy conducted a meeting with all employees and
explained the collective-bargaining process to them.
Gary Wayne Parker (Parker) recalled that prior to Eddy’s meeting with the employees;
he was in the breakroom with Eddy and Blisard. He recalled that Eddy made the comment 20
“You are not for this stuff, are you? You’re a Republican, aren’t you? Mostly Democrats are
for this stuff.” Parker recalled telling Eddy “Frank, I actually used to like you because I’m
not either. I’m Independent.” Parker testified that he understood that Eddy was talking about
the Union.
25
Eddy testified that while he spoke with Parker prior to the election, he never asked
Parker if he were “for all this union stuff.” He explained that while he never asked a question
of Parker, he made a statement that might be similar to such a comment. Eddy recalls that he
made the comment “You know this union stuff, I’m not really concerned one way or the
other, because you all are pretty bright people and you’re going to figure it out one way or the 30
other, and it’s going to work itself out.” Eddy testified that while he spoke with other
employees while he was at the facility, he specifically recalled speaking with Parker because
he had a unique speech pattern3 that required Eddy to pay attention when Parker was
speaking.
35
(2) Conclusions
Although Eddy’s statement to Parker was couched more in terms of a statement than a
question, it was clearly intended to elicit a response from Parker. As the Board has noted, the
fact that a statement may not have a definable question mark at the end does not detract from 40
its coercive potential. Clinton Electronics Corp., 332 NLRB 479, 479–480 (2000). I find no
basis to discredit Parker’s testimony. As Parker describes the conversation, Eddy’s question
and Parker’s response were both made in a joking manner. As evidenced by Parker’s
response, Parker felt a need to explain his political preference and Parker testified that he
clearly understood Eddy’s remark to pertain to the Union. Parker’s testimony does not appear 45

3 Eddy did not clarify what he meant by “unique speech pattern.”
JD(ATL)–01–11
13
to be contrived or exaggerated. There is no doubt that Eddy was making an appeal to support
the Respondent by suggesting that Parker was a Republican. Eddy’s statement, however, was
also an attempt to force Parker to disclose his support for the Union. While Parker side-
stepped the question by claiming to be Independent and giving a joking response, the question
was nevertheless sufficiently coercive to be violative of the Act. Furthermore, Eddy’s 5
description of the conversation was simply too fluent and smooth to be plausible. There is no
dispute that this conversation occurred just prior to Eddy’s meeting with employees; a
meeting conducted to persuade employees to support the Respondent rather than the Union. It
is far more probable that Eddy’s statement to Parker was just as Parker recalled. The overall
record supports a finding that Respondent interrogated employees about their union activities 10
as alleged in complaint paragraph 10.
f. Preelection conduct related to Billy Brown
(1) Evidence presented15
The only conduct alleged in the complaint relating to Brown is conduct that is alleged
to have occurred on April 14, 2010, and 6 days after the election. Complaint paragraphs
11(a), (b), and (c) are the only allegations in the complaint relating to the conduct of Brown.
Complaint paragraph 11(a) alleges that on or about April 14, 2010, Respondent acting through 20
Billy Brown interrogated employees regarding their activities on behalf of and/or sentiments
toward the Union. Paragraph 11(b) alleges that Brown implied to employees that their
activities on behalf of the Union were under surveillance. During the course of the hearing,
counsel for the Acting General Counsel stated that the testimony of both Crutcher and Parker
was offered in support of paragraphs 11(a) and (b). Complaint paragraph 11(c) alleges that 25
Brown impliedly threatened employees twice with discharge because of their activities on
behalf of and/or sentiments toward the Union. Counsel for the Acting General Counsel
confirmed that only Crutcher’s testimony was offered in support of complaint paragraph
11(c). The record reflects, however, that there was some confusion and that Parker’s
testimony concerning Brown related to a conversation that is alleged to have occurred a few 30
days before the election. Parker did not testify concerning any conversations with Brown on
or about April 14, 2010, and Parker did not allege that Brown engaged in conduct similar to
that alleged in complaint paragraph 11(a) or (b). Parker’s testimony concerning his individual
conversation with Brown is described below. A discussion of the merits of complaint
paragraphs 11 (a), (b), and (c) as related to Crutcher is discussed below in relation to 35
Crutcher’s warning and discharge.
Brown was initially hired as an aircraft mechanic in June 2009. Brown remained an
hourly employee until he was promoted to site manager on March 23, 2010. Brown testified
that when the union organizing first began, he discussed with the other hourly employees the 40
pros and cons of having union representation. He specifically recalled that he discussed the
Union with Green, Parker, and Tatum. Brown testified that he made no attempt to hide his
support for the Union and that he signed a union card along with Green, Parker, and Tatum.
Brown explained that they did so in order to obtain better benefits. Brown recalled that the
employees discussed the various roles they would play if there was a union. In their 45
discussions, he and the other employees discussed the fact that both Parker and Crutcher were
JD(ATL)–01–11
14
former union stewards. Brown further testified that he and Crutcher discussed Crutcher’s
previous work as a union steward. Crutcher told him that he believed he had been terminated
from a prior job because he was “up and coming” in the union. Crutcher testified that for a
period prior to Brown’s promotion, he worked with Brown on second shift. He recalled
discussing the Union numerous times with Brown. Crutcher recalled telling Brown about his 5
serving as a union steward and his serving on the strike committee at his prior employment.
Brown recalled that when he was promoted to site manager, he asked to speak with
DeLucca and Kerzner. He recalled telling DeLucca that he did not want to be a part of any
retaliation against any of the employees who supported the Union. He told her that if she ever 10
asked him to fire someone because of their union “wants or needs,” he was not the person for
the job. Brown recalled that DeLucca told him, “Billy, that’s why the previous person in your
position was let go. I will not tolerate it. I will not let it happen, and Sikorsky will not let it
happen.”
15
Parker testified that a few days after Brown became site manager and prior to the
election, he spoke with Brown. Parker recalled that Brown made the statement: “Why don’t
we give the company a chance to correct this and do right by us?” Parker recalled that he told
Brown: “Billy, we all went and signed up for the union and we all decided to stay the
course.” Parker told Brown that he understood that Brown had changed sides, however, he 20
was still going to stay the course with what he had said that he would do. Parker denied that
he had any other conversations with Brown or any other managers or supervisors about the
union.
(2) Conclusions25
Although this particular conversation is not alleged in the complaint, I nevertheless
find no violation. The alleged statements were brief comments in casual conversation and
clearly directed to a known union supporter. They were of a general and noncoercive nature.
Dynamics Corp. of America, 286 NLRB 920 (1987).30
D. Crutcher’s Warning and Termination
The complaint alleges that Respondent unlawfully disciplined Crutcher on April 16,
2010, and unlawfully terminated Crutcher on April 26, 2010. The Acting General Counsel 35
maintains that Respondent’s asserted reasons for Crutcher’s discipline and termination were
pretextual and that Respondent took such actions because of Crutcher’s support for the Union.
Respondent asserts that Crutcher was a probationary employee and could be dismissed even
without cause at any time prior to the completion of probationary period. Respondent
contends, however, that Crutcher was discharged for creating a disruption in the work force 40
by engaging in an “unrelenting campaign against Loretta Etheredge, both within and without
the workforce.”
1. Background related to Crutcher
45
As referenced above, Crutcher was hired at the Fort Rucker facility on January 31,
JD(ATL)–01–11
15
2010. Before he began working at the facility, he attended a month’s training with newly
hired employees Etheredge and Colter. Prior to leaving for Texas to attend the training,
Crutcher was charged with DUI (driving under the influence.) His driver’s license was
suspended on March 15, 2010, and he was unable to drive any vehicles in the performance of
his job for the remainder of his employment. After returning from his training in Texas, 5
Crutcher worked for a short period of time on the day shift. Eventually however, Crutcher
and Etheredge were assigned to work the evening shift.
Crutcher testified that he was active in the union organizing campaign. He asserted
that he wore red on Thursdays to show his union support and carried a union notebook. As 10
described above, Crutcher also testified that he spoke with Blisard, Kerzner, and Brown
concerning the Union.
2. Events leading to Crutcher’s termination
15
Respondent asserts that there was escalating hostility in the workplace beginning in
late March and continuing until Crutcher’s discharge. Respondent asserts that there were
several incidents that occurred during this period of time that demonstrate Crutcher’s role in
creating the hostile work environment. The first event occurred on March 26, 2010.
20
a. March 26, 2010 incident
In order to provide maintenance for an aircraft, mechanics occasionally tow an aircraft
from one location to another at the facility and four employees are normally required to
complete the tow. On the afternoon of March 26, 2010, an aircraft was scheduled to return25
from a training flight at approximately 4:30 or 5 p.m. Upon its return, the second shift
employees were to move the aircraft to a specific area outside the hangar in order for the first
shift employees to begin maintenance on the aircraft the following morning. As lead
mechanic Green needed to leave work at 3:30 p.m. on that particular day, he told Etheredge
and Crutcher that the aircraft should be towed upon its return to the facility. At the time that 30
Green first spoke with Etheredge and Crutcher, Brown, and Blisard were away from the
facility. Green informed Etheredge that if the aircraft returned to the facility before Brown
and Blisard returned, she could contact Tatum to work overtime and to return to the facility to
assist with the towing.
35
Before leaving the facility, however, Green spoke by telephone with Brown and
learned that Brown and Blisard were returning to the facility and would be able to assist
Crutcher and Etheredge in towing the aircraft. After speaking with Brown, Green informed
Etheredge that Tatum would not be needed to assist with the tow. Etheredge in turn told
Crutcher that they would not need to call anyone in as Brown and Blisard were coming back 40
to the facility to help with towing the aircraft.
Green testified that he left the facility at approximately 3:30 p.m. By the time that he
arrived at his home, he received what he termed a “nasty” telephone message from Tatum
inquiring why Green had not called him in to work overtime. Green testified that Tatum 45
appeared to be upset and Tatum demanded to know why he had not been called to come in to
JD(ATL)–01–11
16
work overtime to tow the aircraft. In response to the message, Green telephoned Tatum and
learned that his information was based upon a telephone call from Crutcher. Based upon the
telephone call from Crutcher, Tatum understood that Green directed Etheredge not to call
Tatum in for overtime under any circumstances. Green explained to Tatum why he had not
been needed and denied that he had given any such directive to Etheredge.5
In response to Tatum’s telephone call, Green telephoned Brown and informed him of
what Tatum said. Green told Brown that Tatum was very upset about not being called in for
overtime and also upset because Etheredge had said that Green did not want Tatum to be
called in for overtime. Although Brown did not immediately understand the source of 10
Tatum’s information, Brown later confirmed that it was Crutcher who had given this
information about Etheredge to Tatum.
b. An incident occurring shortly after the election
15
The Taylor Dunn is a motorized vehicle that employees use to transport various
materials and equipment to and from the hangar to the aircraft. Crutcher did not have a valid
driver’s license after March 15, 2010, and he sometimes rode with Etheredge when she drove
the vehicle. Etheredge testified that at no time did she ever refuse to allow Crutcher to ride
with her.20
A few days after the election, Tatum received a telephone call from Crutcher during
Crutcher’s shift. Because Crutcher appeared to be out of breath, Tatum asked him why.
Crutcher told Tatum that Etheredge had not allowed him to ride with her on the cart (Taylor
Dunn) and he had been forced to carry a 7-foot ladder for a mile and a half to and from the 25
hangar to the aircraft. The following day Tatum complained to Green that Etheredge had
treated Crutcher unfairly. Green assured Tatum that he would speak with Etheredge. The
next evening Tatum spoke again with Crutcher and informed him that he (Tatum) had made a
complaint about Etheredge to Green. During the course of the conversation, Crutcher told
Tatum that Etheredge had made the statement that Tatum was a “sorry mechanic” and a 30
“waste of perfectly good oxygen.” The following day Tatum went to Brown and complained
about Etheredge’s comments. Tatum recalled telling Brown that Etheredge’s comments were
not going to do anything but hurt the morale and the work force.
Crutcher acknowledged that he had a conversation with Tatum in which he discussed 35
Etheredge. Crutcher testified that during the conversation Tatum made the statement that
Etheredge was a good mechanic. Crutcher testified that he had laughed and responded “She
doesn’t feel the same about you.” In describing the remainder of the conversation, Crutcher
testified “I think that was about it.” He did not confirm or deny the specific comments that
Tatum testified that he had heard from Crutcher.40
c. Incidents on April 13 and 14, 2010
Brown met with his employees on April 13 and discussed his concerns about
harassment. Etheredge recalled that Brown told the employees that there was a lot of 45
harassment going on. He read a section from Respondent’s policy concerning harassment and
JD(ATL)–01–11
17
reminded the employees that they were all adults. Etheredge recalled that Brown told the
employees that they needed to come to work, do their jobs, go home, and stop the harassment.
Part of the work given to the mechanics on second shift on April 13 was the
completion of an alert service bulletin (ASB) that began on first shift. The bulletin required 5
the replacement of some aircraft parts. Brown recalled that at approximately 8 p.m. on April
13, he received a telephone call from Crutcher asking for assistance. Crutcher told him that
the aircraft in question had returned to the flight line and he didn’t know what he was to do
with the aircraft. Brown directed him to contact the flight crew to determine its availability
and then to secure the aircraft.10
Etheredge recalled that when she began her shift that evening, she discovered that
some aircraft parts had been removed by the day shift mechanics. She assumed that the
mechanics had done so in order to get their arms into the narrow space in which the work had
to be performed. She recalled that she had shown the parts to Crutcher and had shared with 15
him her confusion as to why the day shift mechanics removed the parts. Etheredge also
testified that as she was later working underneath the aircraft, an aircraft part fell on her chest.
She recognized the aircraft part as a rod end and she knew that the part was important. After
attempting to find the source of the fallen part, Etheredge contacted Green to get some
guidance on what she needed to do. Green told her that it sounded as though the rod was a 20
part of the auto pilot system. He directed her to mark the part and put it on his desk for the
next morning. Etheredge recalled that Crutcher had not been in the vicinity at the time the rod
fell or when she had spoken with Green. When she saw Crutcher approximately 3 hours later,
she told him about the rod and shared her concerns about the rod. Etheredge recalled that
when she spoke with Crutcher she had not been angry and had not said anything about Barber.25
Barber testified that he had worked on the aircraft during his regular day shift on April
13. He had not been able to complete the project prior to the end of his shift. Barber recalled
that Crutcher called him during the evening and asked him about the work that he had done on
the aircraft. During the telephone call, Crutcher also told Barber that Etheredge “was yelling 30
and screaming” and had stated that Barber had “messed up” and did not know what he was
doing. Crutcher also told Barber that Etheredge stated that Barber was a “waste of oxygen”
and that it was going to take her all night to correct what he had done.
Tatum testified that at approximately 6 p.m. on that same evening, he received a 35
telephone call from Crutcher. During the telephone call, he heard Etheredge speaking in the
background. Tatum asserted that he heard Etheredge say that Barber was a “sorry fucking
mechanic” and that Barber screwed up the aircraft. He recalled that when he asked Crutcher
was what going on, Crutcher told him that Etheredge was “pissed” because a rod end had
fallen from the plane. Tatum recalled that Crutcher told him that he was calling to ask Tatum 40
what to do about the rod end. Tatum simply suggested that Crutcher position the rod end in
place and Tatum would fix it the next day.
Crutcher testified that on that particular night, he was conducting ground service
equipment inspections and Etheredge was working on the ASB assignment. Crutcher testified 45
that Etheredge was upset that Barber had taken apart some things on the aircraft that he had
JD(ATL)–01–11
18
not needed to take apart and that Etheredge stated that Barber had “fucked up” the ASB and
that it would take her all “fucking” night to finish it. Crutcher contended although he had
offered to help Etheredge with the ASB, she had cursed him, rejected his offer, and told him
to get away.
5
Despite the fact that Crutcher was not working on the ASB, he testified that he tried to
call Green to find out about the circumstances involving the ASB. He testified that when he
couldn’t reach Green, he tried to call Barber. When he didn’t initially reach Barber, he
telephoned Tatum. Crutcher testified that Tatum explained that Barber had disconnected the
part in order to get access to a part of the aircraft. Tatum told Crutcher not to worry about it 10
and he (Tatum) would take care of it in the morning. Crutcher recalled that during the
conversation, Etheredge was cursing and Tatum asked what Etheredge was saying. Crutcher
recalled that he told Tatum that Etheredge was saying that Barber had “fucked it up.”
Crutcher recalled that Tatum told him to tell Etheredge that he (Tatum) would take care of it
in the morning. Crutcher also recalled that while he had been talking with Tatum, Barber 15
returned the earlier telephone call. Crutcher admitted that during his conversation with
Barber, he told Barber what Etheredge had said about him and Barber became upset.
Before Brown arrived at work the next morning, he received a telephone call from
Blisard, informing him that Barber was visibly upset and was asking for the harassment policy 20
that Brown had read to the employees the previous day. When Brown arrived at work, Barber
was waiting outside and Brown asked to speak with him. Brown asked Barber to explain the
problem. Brown recalled that Barber replied: “Well, I don’t like employees talking about me
and telling them that I’m a waste of oxygen.” Barber went on to explain that he understood
that Etheredge had problems with the ASB the previous night and she had stated that Barber 25
“screwed up the mod”4 and that it was going to take her all night to finish that particular job.
Barber further repeated that Etheredge had stated to Crutcher that he (Barber) was a “fucking
waste of oxygen.” Barber explained that he knew this because Crutcher told him what
Etheredge had said. Brown asked Barber to write a statement confirming what Crutcher had
told him.30
Brown recalled that he checked with Green to get additional information about what
occurred on the previous shift. Green confirmed that Etheredge had texted him the previous
evening. When Green spoke with Etheredge she reported to Green that a rod had fallen on
her while she was performing the assigned task. Green confirmed to Brown that he had told 35
Etheredge to leave the completion of the project for the day shift and he would contact the
manufacturer to determine the proper repair of the aircraft part. When Brown asked Green
why was there such a commotion, Green didn’t know. He told Brown that he only knew that
Barber was upset about statements made by Etheredge and Barber knew this from Crutcher’s
telephone call. After obtaining the statement from Barber and from Blisard, Brown met 40
individually with Etheredge and Crutcher.
When Brown met with Etheredge she explained that when she was working on the
ASB, a rod fell on her chest. Brown asked if during the incident, she made any statement

4 There is no record definition for “mod.”
JD(ATL)–01–11
19
about Barber. She denied doing so. When Brown spoke with Etheredge, he recalled his
previous conversation with Tatum in which Tatum described the comments that Etheredge
had allegedly made to Crutcher about Tatum. Brown recalled Tatum’s previous comments
that he didn’t appreciate Etheredge making statements about him. In his meeting with
Etheredge, Brown also asked if she had ever made statements about Tatum. She denied doing 5
so. Brown asked Etheredge to give him a written statement concerning what happened the
previous night with the rod and also a statement about whether she had made comments about
Tatum.
In his meeting with Brown, Crutcher admitted that he telephoned both Tatum and 10
Barber during the previous night’s shift. Crutcher explained that he had telephoned Tatum
because of a maintenance question and that he had telephoned Barber because he wanted to
find out some information about the rod. Brown recalled that he told Crutcher that if he had a
question about maintenance or work, he should have called either Brown or Green. Brown
reminded Crutcher that he was to call supervision if there was a problem or question. He 15
went on to remind Crutcher that he (Crutcher) had in fact called him about the aircraft the
previous evening and Brown had told him what he needed to do. When Brown asked
Crutcher if he had told Barber that Etheredge made statements about him, Crutcher confirmed
that he had. Brown asked Crutcher why he had done so and inquired if Crutcher was trying to
“stir up stuff” between Barber and Etheredge. Brown reminded Crutcher that only the 20
previous day he had read the harassment policy to the employees. He recalled telling
Crutcher, “This has got to stop; you can’t keep causing the conflict.” During the
conversation, Crutcher did not mention that Tatum had overheard any of Etheredge’s
comments about Barber.
25
When DeLucca visited the facility earlier in the month, she happened to leave her
business card with Etheredge. She had also told Etheredge to call her if she ever had any
questions. On the evening of April 14, Etheredge sent a text message to DeLucca, asking if
she could telephone her. DeLucca returned the text immediately and Etheredge telephoned
DeLucca. DeLucca testified that when she spoke with Etheredge, Etheredge seemed to be 30
distraught and extremely upset. Etheredge told DeLucca that she felt that she was being
targeted and that the other employees were not speaking to her. DeLucca recalled that
Etheredge told her that Crutcher had falsely told employees that she was saying things about
them. Etheredge testified that she told DeLucca that she had been asked questions about
comments that she had allegedly made about Barber and Tatum. DeLucca recalled that she 35
asked Etheredge if perhaps some of her comments might have been misconstrued. Etheredge
asserted, however, that she had not said any of the remarks attributed to her. Etheredge told
DeLucca that she just couldn’t handle the stress of the job anymore. She explained that she
was tired of coming to work, pulling daggers out of her back every day. She told DeLucca
that she just wanted to come to work, do her job, and go home.40
Because of the expense involved in the initial training for the mechanics,
Respondent’s policy required employees to reimburse the company $15,000 if they resigned
during their first year of employment. During Etheredge’s telephone conversation with
DeLucca, Etheredge asked the check amount that she would need to write in order to resign. 45
Etheredge recalled telling DeLucca “Tell me who I need to write a check to, how much I need
JD(ATL)–01–11
20
to send, and where I need to send it tonight, to get out of this contract.” DeLucca told
Etheredge to give her some time and let Brown investigate the situation. Etheredge was
hospitalized 2 days later and remained in the hospital for the next 7 days. Etheredge testified
that she suffers from Crohn’s Disease, a condition that is exacerbated by stress.
5
Brown testified that he spoke with DeLucca several times and told her that he felt that
Etheredge and Green were being targeted. DeLucca testified that after the first incident
involving Etheredge’s alleged statement concerning overtime, Brown told her that he thought
that Etheredge’s sexual preference was a factor in what had happened. DeLucca confirmed
on cross-examination that she had also believed that Etheredge’s sexual preference was one of 10
the reasons for what was happening to Etheredge. DeLucca testified that based upon the
information provided by Brown, she also believed that Green and Etheredge were ostracized
by the other employees because of the election.
Brown prepared a statement for DeLucca on April 14, 2010, and included the other 15
statements that he had obtained in the course of his investigation of the harassment. Brown’s
memorandum included a brief description of the incident in which Crutcher telephoned Tatum
to report that Etheredge had kept him from getting overtime. Brown also included a
description of Crutcher’s calls to Barber and Tatum in which he reported comments that
Etheredge had allegedly made about them. Brown’s memorandum and recommendation 20
concluded with the following wording:
I see that for whatever reason that Jeremy Crutcher is causing a
disruptive work force by calling employees to inform them of what Loretta is
saying which is also causing a hostile work environment for her. I feel that if 25
some action is not taken soon that Loretta will file a formal complaint. I have
talked to the whole crew on the 13th of April 2010 about the company’s policy
on a hostile work environment and that we need to stop all of the personal
issues with one another. We need to move on and work as professionals
together. I feel that Jeremy has some personal motives for his action, what 30
they are I do not know. I recommend that Jeremy Crutcher [to] be terminated
before his 90 day probation period ends with this site.
When DeLucca spoke with Brown about his recommendation to terminate Crutcher,
DeLucca explained that there was no corroboration of either Crutcher or Etheredge’s 35
statements which resulted in a “he said/she said” situation. DeLucca told Brown that
Respondent needed to be cautious in issuing discipline and that Crutcher should receive only
a verbal warning. DeLucca recalled that she told Brown that Respondent was now
postelection and she believed that every decision she made or action that she took would be
scrutinized. She testified that because she wanted to avoid unfair labor practice hearings, she 40
was trying to take sufficient time in her decisions and she was trying to be fair and measured.
She explained that even though Crutcher was a probationary employee, she didn’t feel that
Respondent had a sufficient basis to terminate him. The decision was made to give only a
warning to Crutcher.
45
DeLucca went on to tell Brown that Respondent could not prove that Etheredge made
JD(ATL)–01–11
21
the alleged statements or didn’t make the statements. DeLucca urged however, that Brown
needed to strongly enforce to Etheredge that if she were making such statements, she must
stop as there is no place in their workplace for such comments.
On April 16, Brown met with Crutcher to give him the formal verbal warning. Green 5
was also present. The written formal verbal warning given to Crutcher included the
following:
State the Specific Violation: Violation of Harassment Free Workplace Policy.
10
State Circumstances of Violation: Unprofessional behavior for the purpose of
dividing fellow employees thereby creating a hostile work environment.
State Exact Date and Time of Violation: On or about March 26, 2010, you
contacted Earle Tatum and told him that Loretta Etheredge said that Earle was15
a sorry person” and not trustworthy.
Further on or before April 14, 2010, you contacted Randy Barber and told him
that Loretta Etheredge said, “Randy’s workmanship was not good and that he
did not know what he was doing.”20
Such behavior is unprofessional, counter-productive and divisive all of which
has created dissention amongst the crew and which has promoted a hostile
work environment.
25
3. Events occurring after Crutcher’s warning
a. Blisard’s April 22, 2010 statement
On April 22, 2010, Blisard was sitting in an aircraft performing avionics checks for 30
the radios and electronics on the aircraft while some of the crewmen were working nearby.
As he finished his paperwork, he overheard the employees’ discussing Crutcher and
Etheredge and their working relationship. After hearing the conversations, he sought out
Brown to share what he had heard. In addition to verbally informing Brown about the
comments that he overheard, he prepared a written memorandum for Brown. He testified that 35
because of the recent events involving Crutcher and Etheredge and after Brown’s admonition
to employees to get along and not conjure up animosity among the work force, he found the
conversation disturbing. In the statement, Blisard documented the conversation that he
overheard and also outlined his concerns about the working relationship between Crutcher
and Etheredge. His statement to Brown contained the following:40
During the afternoon of 21 April 2010, following the conduct of some ground
Avionics maintenance, I overheard several of the hourly employees discussing
(with some degree of disgust) the alleged mis-treatment of Jeremy Crutcher by
his 2nd shift coworker Loretta Etheredge during the previous weeks operation.45
JD(ATL)–01–11
22
Apparently, Mr. Crutcher claimed that Ms. Etheredge would not allow him to
ride on the Taylor Dunn with her. He also alleged that several times during the
work shift that he had to hand carry a ladder from the hangar back to the flight
line because she took all the equipment back to the hangar on the cart. This
information was apparently passed from Mr. Crutcher to Earle Tatum. It 5
appears that Mr. Crutcher’s insistence that Ms. Etheredge’s actions were
deliberate and spiteful has evoked the sympathy and support of at least two of
the day shift mechanics to the extent that they openly and verbally resent Ms.
Etheredge.
10
Although it is difficult to pinpoint how/when this rift began between Mr.
Crutcher and Ms. Etheredge; the fact remains that there is a severe degree of
animosity between the two; at least on the part of Mr. Crutcher (as evidenced
by his continued conversations with Mr. Tatum on the subject). It also appears
that it has become increasingly difficult to expect any appreciable productivity 15
on second shift with those two individuals on that shift.
b. Crutcher’s activities related to applicant Gibson
Daniel Gibson (Gibson) testified that when he had previously worked for Army Fleet 20
Support (AFS) at the Fort Rucker base, he was supervised by Brown and he had been a
member of the Union. In April 2010, Gibson interviewed with Brown for a position with
Respondent. Gibson testified that prior to his interview with Brown; he had given a copy of
his resume to Crutcher to give to Brown. Gibson recalled that a few weeks after his
interview, he received a telephone call from Crutcher. During the conversation, Crutcher told 25
Gibson that Respondent was not going to hire him. Crutcher explained that Etheredge had
told Brown that it wouldn’t be a good idea to hire him.
After speaking with Crutcher, Gibson contacted Ed Baldwin, who was a friend of
Gibson’s and also a mechanic who had worked with Brown at AFS. Gibson asked Baldwin to 30
help him find out what was going on with his application. Baldwin testified that in response
to Gibson’s telephone call, he contacted Brown and asked Brown if it were true that he was
not going to hire Gibson because of something a female employee had told him. Baldwin
asked Brown if there was any merit to what he had heard and whether the female employee
had made statements about Gibson being a “bad apple” or “trouble maker.”35
Brown testified that on the evening of April 21, 2010 he received the telephone call
from Baldwin. Baldwin inquired about the employment situation with Gibson. Brown
testified that Baldwin told him that he had received a telephone call from Gibson and Gibson
told Baldwin that Etheredge had allegedly badmouthed him to Brown and interfered with his 40
chance of getting a job. When Brown asked him what he was talking about, Baldwin
explained that Gibson had received this information from Crutcher. Brown told Baldwin that
nothing like that had happened. He told Baldwin that he was still interviewing applicants and
had not made a final decision on who he would hire for the job.
45
The following day Brown telephoned Gibson and asked him if he had spoken with
JD(ATL)–01–11
23
Crutcher. Gibson confirmed to Brown that he had spoken with Crutcher. Gibson told Brown
that Crutcher volunteered that Etheredge had badmouthed him to Brown and ruined his
chances for employment. Brown assured Gibson that Etheredge had never said anything
about him.
5
Crutcher admitted that he telephoned Gibson and told him that he would not be hired
because of Etheredge. Crutcher testified:
Well, you know, I called him and told him, you know that I didn’t think that he
was going to get hired, because when I handed the resume to Billy, Loretta 10
Etheredge was in there and she, you know, looked at it and said, ‘Oh, I know
him, don’t hire him; he’s a troublemaker, he’s nothing but trouble’.”
Brown recalled that after his conversation with Gibson, he was upset. He called
DeLucca and Kerzner and told them what he had learned from Baldwin and Gibson. He 15
recalled telling them “Okay, enough’s enough. He’s interfering with my hiring process now,
telling applicants that someone is badmouthing them.” Brown went on to add “I don’t need
that and don’t want that. This needs to stop, and we need to take action on this.” Brown
testified that on the afternoon of April 22, 2010 he prepared a memorandum describing how
he came to interview Gibson and describing his conversations with both Gibson and Baldwin.20
Brown additionally prepared a formal recommendation to terminate Crutcher. The
memorandum included a listing of five violations upon which Brown based the
recommendation. The first two violations were described as:
25
Discrimination or harassment against fellow employees, customer
representatives, or other contract personnel at any time in areas assigned to the
company.
Threatening, intimidating, coercing, or interfering with or making defamatory,30
vicious or malicious statements against any employee, customer, the Company
or its products or services.
The third-, fourth-, and fifth-listed violations referred to an incident in which there was
an allegation that Crutcher, Tatum, and an unknown third party entered Respondent’s 35
property, accessed the Respondent’s computer, and printed a statement prepared by Blisard
concerning Tatum. DeLucca testified that while she considered the first two violations as a
basis for terminating Crutcher, she did not rely upon the allegations concerning the other
three-listed violations. She explained that because the computer was not password protected
and was accessible to all employees, she did not believe that such an alleged violation was 40
sufficient for just cause to terminate Crutcher. She testified that such an action did not rise to
the level of a violation of company policy because of the nature of the computer accessibility.
DeLucca contacted Brown and informed him that his recommendation for Crutcher’s
termination was approved and that Crutcher would be terminated for creating a disruption in
the work force and creating a hostile work environment.45
JD(ATL)–01–11
24
DeLucca testified that she had not only been outraged about Crutcher’s comments to
Gibson, but she had also been concerned about Respondent’s exposure for liability. She
explained that if Gibson were protected under Title VII,5 Respondent might be liable for
failing to hire him. She also testified that she was concerned for Etheredge’s safety if Gibson
believed that she had prevented his being hired. DeLucca testified that she didn’t know how 5
long Gibson had been out of work or how desperate he was to get the job.
E. Conclusions Concerning Crutcher’s Warning and Termination
The complaint alleges that Respondent issued a warning to Crutcher on April 16, 2010 10
and subsequently terminated him on April 26, 2010 in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of
the Act. The Acting General Counsel asserts that Respondent disciplined and warned
Crutcher because Respondent believed that Crutcher assisted the Union and engaged in
concerted activities, and to discourage employees from engaging in these activities. The
Board’s test for determining whether an employer has engaged in such conduct in violation of 15
Section 8(a)(3) is found in its landmark decision, Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd.
662 F. 2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982). Under Wright Line, in order
to establish a prima facie violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1), the Acting General Counsel
must initially establish that the alleged discriminatee engaged in union activities and that the
employer had knowledge of such activities. In this case, there is no question that Crutcher 20
was a known union supporter who had been active in the union in his previous employment.
Blisard was aware of his prior work as a steward and Brown was aware of his union
sentiments because of their mutual organizing efforts prior to Brown’s promotion. Once an
employee’s union activity and the employer’s knowledge of that activity are established, the
Acting General Counsel must show that Respondent’s conduct was motivated by union 25
animus. Such animus is essential in establishing the nexus between the protected activity and
the motivation for the adverse action.
It is this necessary nexus that is weak in this case. Crutcher’s testimony was offered in
support of direct animus toward Crutcher. For the reasons described below, I do not find the 30
testimony sufficiently credible to support a finding of specific animus toward Crutcher.
Crutcher testified that after he first spoke with Brown on April 14, 2010 about the
situation with Etheredge, there was a second conversation with Brown later in the day.
Crutcher testified that during this second conversation in the parking lot, Brown told him that 35
he knew that Crutcher had been involved with the union at AFS and that “the company all the
way up to corporate” knew that as well. Crutcher asserts that Brown asked him if he intended
to be on the negotiating committee or simply a “lowly steward.” Crutcher testified that
Brown told him:
40
I know that you got a family to take care of, you know, I don’t want to see
anything bad happen to you, you know, but I’m afraid that since the company
all the way up to corporate knows of your past union involvement and your
obvious pro-union attitude here that higher ups are going to force me to do
something I don’t want to do.45

5 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(f), as amended 42 U.S.C. A. § 2000e.
JD(ATL)–01–11
25
Crutcher maintained that Brown began crying and told him (Crutcher) that he needed a
temporary “change in latitude to change his attitude.” Crutcher testified that Brown again
said that he didn’t want to see anything bad happen to him and Brown didn’t want to do
something that he didn’t want to do because Crutcher only had 15 days left in his 5
probationary period.
Complaint paragraph 11 is apparently based upon this testimony and alleges that on or
about April 14, 2010, Brown interrogated employees regarding their activities on behalf of
and/or sentiments toward the Union, implied to employees that their activities on behalf of the 10
Union were under surveillance, and impliedly threatened employees twice with discharge
because of their activities on behalf of the Union.
With respect to the alleged interrogation, I note that Crutcher and Brown were alone
when Brown is alleged to have asked Crutcher if he were going to be on the negotiating 15
committee or just a “lowly steward.” There were no other employees around and Crutcher
was an open and known union supporter. Based upon Brown and Crutcher’s mutual
involvement in supporting the Union prior to Brown’s promotion, I don’t find it remarkable
that Brown was curious about Crutcher’s aspirations. Crutcher had evidently served in more
than one capacity with the union in his past employment. Thus, while Brown may have made 20
an inquiry related to Crutcher’s union activities, this kind of inquiry does not fit within the
framework of unlawful interrogation as envisioned by the Rossmore decision. A supervisor’s
inquiry as to the plans or intentions of a known union supporter with no apparent coercion has
not been found to be unlawful. Tualatin Electric, Inc., 312 NLRB 129, 134 (1993).
Accordingly, I do not find that Brown unlawfully interrogated Crutcher as alleged in 25
complaint paragraph 11(a).
Additionally, I do not find that the record evidence supports the allegations contained
in complaint paragraphs 11(b) and (c). After considering the entire record testimony, I do not
find Crutcher’s account of this conversation to be credible. I make this finding based upon a 30
number of reasons. First of all, Brown is the most unlikely supervisor to engage in
interrogation and/or threats. He was active in bringing in the union and openly supported the
union prior to his promotion. The record also reflects that Tatum was viewed as the primary
employee involved in starting and sustaining the organizational activity. Tatum recalled that
after Brown’s promotion was announced to the employees, he approached Brown and told 35
Brown that his promotion would not change things at all. Tatum testified that Brown told him
that it didn’t matter to him because he could work with or without a union. Brown added that
if the employees felt that they needed to continue with the organizing effort, they should “go
right ahead.” Brown did, however, mention to Tatum later that he thought that the employees
should give the company a chance before they voted in the Union. Despite Tatum’s role in 40
the organizing activity, there is no allegation that Brown made any threats or promises to
Tatum or any other employees because of the union.
Brown denied the conduct alleged in complaint paragraph 11. He explained, however,
that he cautioned Crutcher to be careful and to stop causing controversy between other 45
employees. The record reflects that as of April 14, 2010, Crutcher had already made several
JD(ATL)–01–11
26
telephone calls to other employees; telling them negative things about Etheredge. The
comments were further inflammatory because the comments resulted in employees
concluding that Etheredge was making derogatory comments about them or had taken some
negative action toward them. Based upon Crutcher’s gratuitous telephone calls, Tatum not
only believed that Etheredge had prevented his working overtime, but also that she had made 5
derogatory comments about him and his work. Additionally, because of Crutcher’s
unsolicited telephone call to Barber, Barber believed that Etheredge had criticized his work
and made insulting remarks about him. It is totally reasonable that when Brown spoke with
Crutcher on April 14, Brown urged Crutcher to change his attitude (as Crutcher asserts) and to
watch his conduct as he still had time remaining in his probationary period.10
Thus, in weighing the record testimony and considering the undisputed facts, I find
Brown to be the more credible witness. Thus, I do not find that Respondent engaged in the
violations alleged in complaint paragraph 11(a), (b), and (c).
15
Turning back to the Wright Line analysis, I am mindful that a prima facie case may be
established by indirect evidence as well as direct evidence and that the employer’s motive
may be determined by the totality of the circumstances. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 304 NLRB 970,
970 (1991). Although, I have not found that Respondent violated the Act as alleged in
complaint paragraphs 11 and 7(a), I have found that Respondent engaged in 8(a)(1) activity as 20
alleged in paragraphs 7(b), 8(a), (b), and (c) as well as in paragraphs 9 and 10. Accordingly,
while I find this to be a very fragile nexus, the argument may be made that there was a
modicum of animus that would be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of unlawful
discrimination with respect to both Crutcher’s warning and his discharge. Starbucks Corp.,
354 NLRB No. 99, slip op. at 56 (2009).25
Once the elements of a prima facie case have been established by the Acting General
Counsel, the burden under Wright Line shifts to the Respondent to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that it took the adverse action for a legitimate nondiscriminatory business
reason. Wright Line, at 1090. I find that the Respondent has met this burden.30
As Respondent asserts in its posthearing brief, Crutcher was a probationary employee
and did not have the same job security as employees who had completed their probationary
period. Of course, it is axiomatic that Respondent is not permitted to use this probationary
period as a means of disciplining an employee because of his union activities. I find, 35
however, that the total record evidence supports a finding that Respondent would have taken
the same action with any other probationary employee who engaged in the same conduct.
Essentially, Respondent issued a warning to Crutcher and then subsequently
terminated Crutcher for his actions that caused a hostile work environment for his fellow 40
employee. There is no dispute that Crutcher told other employees that he was being
mistreated by Etheredge, with the potential of causing other employees to turn against her.
Additionally, there is no dispute that he told Barber, Tatum, and Gibson that Etheredge said
derogatory things about them. For Tatum and Gibson, Crutcher’s comments also indicated
that Etheredge had affected their livelihood ranging from a loss of overtime pay to actually 45
losing a job opportunity. Crutcher’s conduct did not occur in the context of casual
JD(ATL)–01–11
27
conversation. He specifically telephoned these individuals and sought them out to deliver the
negative comments about Etheredge.
During their discussions prior to Crutcher’s warning and termination, Brown and
DeLucca speculated as to why Crutcher had taken such actions against Etheredge. They 5
speculated that it may have been because of her personal sexual preference or it may have
been because she withdrew her support for the Union prior to the election. They were never
able to answer that question and even Etheredge testified that she didn’t know why she was
targeted.
10
The overall evidence reflects that there was no apparent reason for Crutcher to have
contacted these individuals as he did. There is no dispute that on the evening of April 13,
Crutcher was not involved in working on the ASB. Crutcher testified that he was conducting
ground service equipment inspections and Etheredge was working on the ABS. He further
testified that when he offered to help her with the ASB, she rejected his offer. Etheredge15
credibly testified that when she encountered problems with the falling rod, she contacted
Green to get direction on how to handle the situation. He told her what she needed to do.
There was no reason for Crutcher to have been involved in any respect. Earlier in the
evening, he had contacted Brown to get directions on how to handle that particular aircraft.
He had been able to reach Brown without any difficulty and he found out what he needed to 20
do. There was no reason for his having called Tatum and then Barber to talk with them about
the ASB assignment. First of all, he was not doing the work, and secondly, he could have
again contacted Brown if he really needed to know something about the ASB work. It is
likely that Etheredge was annoyed with the day-shift mechanics and in all likelihood, she
probably made disparaging comments about the state of the aircraft and the removed parts. 25
There was, however, no apparent reason for Crutcher to get involved and to disclose her
annoyance or comments to either Barber or Tatum.
Additionally, there was no reason for Crutcher to have telephoned Gibson and to tell
him that Etheredge had prevented his getting the job. It is Crutcher’s communication with 30
Gibson that suggests that Crutcher was aware that his conduct had gone beyond acceptable
bounds. As indicated above, Gibson testified at the hearing and recounted what Crutcher told
him about Etheredge’s having kept him from getting the job for which he applied.
Additionally, Gibson testified that there was an additional telephone conversation with
Crutcher after Crutcher was terminated. Gibson explained that Crutcher telephoned him and 35
told him that he would be getting a call from the “federal labor board.” Crutcher told Gibson
that he should not tell the person from the Board that he had said anything about Etheredge.
Gibson recalled that while he initially agreed to comply, he began thinking about it and
decided not to get involved. Although the Board agent tried to contact him, Gibson failed to
take the call. On cross-examination, Crutcher recalled that he may have spoken with Gibson 40
again after April 2010. Crutcher testified that he called only to ask how Gibson was doing.
Crutcher was not asked the substance of his conversation with Gibson. Counsel for the
Acting General Counsel argues that Crutcher had not seen the internal discharge
recommendation and would not have known that the call to Gibson was a basis for his
discharge. Counsel argues that it is implausible that Crutcher would have urged Gibson to lie 45
when he admitted to what he told Gibson during his testimony. I found Gibson to be a
JD(ATL)–01–11
28
credible witness. He has no apparent ties to Respondent or personal bias that would have led
him to fabricate his testimony. Although Crutcher contends that he made the follow-up call to
Gibson simply to inquire how he was doing, Crutcher did not testify as to the substance of his
full conversation with Gibson or actually deny that he had asked Gibson to lie to the Board
agent. Crediting Gibson, it is apparent that Crutcher was cognizant that his statement to 5
Gibson was a factor in his termination.
It is understandable that Crutcher’s telephone call to Gibson was the proverbial straw
as far as Brown was concerned. Brown credibly testified that when he learned of Crutcher’s
call to Gibson, he told Kerzner and DeLucca “Okay, enough’s enough. He’s interfering with 10
my hiring process now, telling applicants that someone is badmouthing them.” I find Brown
to be a credible witness and the total record evidence supports his testimony that he
recommended Crutcher’s termination. Although he had wanted to terminate Crutcher after
the first incidents involving Crutcher’s statements about Etheredge to Tatum and Barber,
DeLucca declined to do so. If Brown’s recommendation had been followed, Crutcher would 15
have been terminated 2 weeks earlier.
It was only after Crutcher interfered with a job applicant that DeLucca agreed to his
termination. It is not inconsequential that this whole issue of Crutcher’s conduct occurred
within 2 months of the hostile work environment investigation involving the prior site 20
manager and lead mechanic. For an operation that had existed only a little over 10 months,
Respondent was again facing a potential claim of a hostile work environment. When
DeLucca received information about Crutcher’s call to Gibson, she was already aware of
Etheredge’s distress. Both Etheredge and DeLucca credibly testified that when Etheredge
spoke with DeLucca on April 14, 2010, she shared her concerns that she was being targeted 25
and that Crutcher had falsely told other employees that she was saying things about them.
Etheredge told DeLucca that she could no longer handle the stress of the job. She told
DeLucca that she would write a check to the company to reimburse them for the cost of her
training just to get out of the situation. Although DeLucca had urged Etheredge to give
Brown time to investigate the matter, Etheredge entered the hospital 2 days later for a flare up 30
of her Crohn’s Disease. When DeLucca telephoned Etheredge in the hospital, Etheredge told
her that her condition had been exacerbated by her recent stress. DeLucca described
Etheredge as distraught.
Thus, at the time that Brown again recommended Crutcher’s termination, DeLucca 35
was not only aware of Etheredge’s concerns, but also aware that Etheredge believed that her
hospitalization was caused by her current stress at work. DeLucca testified that when Brown
told her about Crutcher’s telephone call to Gibson, she was not only outraged but also worried
about the potential liability that Crutcher could have brought upon the company. She
explained that because of Crutcher’s comments, Respondent might be exposed for a Title VII640

6 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination with respect to terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. It is not limited to
economic or tangible discrimination, but extends to the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men
and women in employment including a situation where individuals are required to work in a
discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701 et seq., 703 (a)(1), as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq., 2000e-2(a)(1); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
67 (1986).
JD(ATL)–01–11
29
claim, depending upon Gibson’s protected status. DeLucca testified that she also thought
about the possible risk to Etheredge’s safety. DeLucca testified that she didn’t know how
long Gibson had been out of work or how desperate he might be for employment and what
kind of risk there might be for Etheredge. I find DeLucca to be a credible witness in this
regard. Given the circumstances presented to her, and after the recent issue with the prior site 5
manager, the risks envisioned by DeLucca were realistic. As the Supreme Court has noted,
conduct need not seriously affect an employer’s psychological well-being or lead the
employee to suffer injury to be actionable under Title VII as “abusive work environment”
harassment. It is sufficient that the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is
perceived, as hostile. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). Based upon her 10
contacts with Etheredge, DeLucca had a reasonable basis to conclude that the circumstances
involving Etheredge were moving toward such a situation. As also observed by the D.C.
Circuit, a reasonably cautious employer would consider adopting measures that would
maintain a workplace free of a hostile environment and free of harassment covered by Title
VII. The court went on to opine that to severely limit an employer’s ability to insulate itself 15
from such liability is to place it in a “catch 22.” Adtranz ABB Daimler-Benz Transp., N.A.
Inc. v. NLRB, 253 F.3d 19, 27 (C.A.D.C. 2001). Respondent argues that it was facing this
kind of liability and concern when making the decision to terminate Crutcher. Although it
was totally speculative as to whether Crutcher had placed the Respondent in a risk of liability,
the concern was a reasonable one.20
One factor in my concluding that Respondent would have terminated Crutcher in the
absence of his union activity is the fact that Respondent could have terminated him earlier in
his employment. DeLucca testified that when she first visited the site, the previous site
manager recommended Crutcher’s termination. He did so because of Crutcher’s DUI. 25
DeLucca recalled that she denied the site manager’s recommendation and opted to counsel
with Crutcher. Although she offered Crutcher the benefit of the employee assistance
program, Crutcher declined and asserted that he did not need the program. Because she
understood that Crutcher had a court date in early April, she told Schell that they would allow
Crutcher to have his day in court and a decision could be made about his job after his court 30
date. DeLucca explained that she was under the impression that this was his first DUI. After
becoming site manager, Brown reviewed the employees’ personnel file to familiarize himself
with the employees. In looking through Crutcher’s file, he discovered a previous DUI
conviction. DeLucca testified that when Brown told her, she was stunned that Schell would
have hired Crutcher with that kind of background. She concluded, however, that he was 35
already hired and Respondent would just have to live with it. When she later confronted
Crutcher with the fact that this was not his first DUI offense, she told him that she was a little
upset because he had failed to tell her this when they had first spoken about the DUI. She
recalled that Crutcher told her that she was only raising this with him because of the Union.
DeLucca testified that she told Crutcher that her comments had nothing to do with the Union 40
and had to do with someone showing a pattern of behavior and also because Respondent was
in the business of dealing with flight safety. Thus, even after the onset of union organizing,
Respondent might have easily terminated Crutcher simply on the basis of his pending DUI
charge and his previous DUI history. Respondent did not do so. In fact, Respondent’s
support for Crutcher in this regard is evidenced by the fact that Brown and Kerzner attended 45
Crutcher’s court hearing. Despite the fact that Crutcher did not have a valid driver’s license
JD(ATL)–01–11
30
after March 15, 2010 and could not drive a motor vehicle at the facility, Respondent did not
seize the opportunity to terminate Crutcher.
Accordingly, based upon all of the record evidence, I find that Respondent has met its
Wright Line burden and demonstrated that it would have terminated Crutcher in the absence 5
of any union activity. Therefore, I recommend the dismissal of complaint paragraphs 12, 13,
and 14.
F. Whether Respondent Implemented a Unilateral Change on May 3, 2010
10
There is no dispute that on April 19, 2010, the Union was certified as the collective-
bargaining representative for Respondent’s aircraft mechanics and quality assurance
employees employed at the Fort Rucker facility. Respondent does not dispute that following
the April 8, 2010 election, Union Representative Jimmy Cotter sent DeLucca a request to
bargain about the terms and conditions of the unit employees. Complaint paragraph 18 15
alleges that about May 3, 2010, Respondent issued a written job description and job duties for
the bargaining unit position of aircraft mechanic. Complaint paragraph 20 alleges that
Respondent did so without prior notice to the Union and without affording the Union an
opportunity to bargain with Respondent with respect to this conduct in violation of Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. Since the Union’s initial request to bargain, the parties have met 20
and have begun bargaining.
Upon receipt of the May 3, 2010 job description, employees were required to sign the
document. Employees Parker, Tatum, and Barber testified that they did not receive a job
description when they were hired. Cotter testified that the Union was not notified prior to the 25
job description being given to the employees and he only learned that the job description had
been given to employees when Tatum brought him a copy of the job description that he had
signed. Respondent asserts that there is no unilateral change in the terms and conditions of
employment and further asserts that there is not a single task in the May 3, 2010 job
description that was not performed by mechanics prior to the issuance of the document.30
In support of its argument, Respondent points out that Tatum testified that the job
description listed a number of functions always performed by a mechanic, including fuel
check, pre and postflight inspections, tool inventory, quality assurance and various
manufacturers and technical manuals. Respondent maintains that Tatum only pointed to a 35
few items that were added to the scope of a mechanic’s job; HELOTRAC functions; ordering
repair parts; deficiency reports; and EH&S (environmental health and safety) functions.
HELOTRAC is an aircraft recordkeeping system that maintains a copy of the same
information found in the mechanics’ log book.7 Tatum testified that any information entered
into the log book should also be entered into HELOTRAC. Tatum testified that prior to the 40
issuance of the job description; HELOTRAC was primarily used by the lead mechanic. Green
further testified that while the mechanics were initially trained to use HELOTRAC, they were
not allowed to use the system before he became lead mechanic in April 2010. Disotell also
testified that when he came to the facility as acting site manager, the employees had no

7 The record does not contain a specific definition of the system, however it appears to be computer
software program related to aircraft maintenance.
JD(ATL)–01–11
31
experience with the HELOTRAC program because they had not been allowed to use it when
the former site manager and former lead mechanic were in charge of the operation. Disotell
also acknowledged that even after completing the mandatory training program in Grand
Prairie, Texas, employees are not completely skilled in using the HELOTRAC program.
Accordingly, Disotell brought in a trainer to help employees learn to use the program. 5
Disotell testified that knowing how to use the system was a perishable skill and that if not
used over time, the employees may not be familiar with how to navigate through the program,
affecting their ability to update certain inspections on the aircraft.
Respondent asserts that Tatum’s testimony concerning HELOTRAC is contradicted by 10
Crutcher and Etheredge. Crutcher confirmed that while working on the night shift, he and
Etheredge worked together to input the information into HELOTRAC. He opined that “most
days” he used the system. Etheredge testified that she uses HELOTRAC “at least once a
night, sometimes more.” Based upon their testimony, it is apparent that Etheredge uses the
system daily and that Crutcher used the HELOTRAC system more than occasionally. Their 15
testimony, however, does not establish that there was a past practice or requirement for all
mechanics to use the HELOTRAC system. It is significant that Crutcher and Etheredge were
the only employees working on the second shift. There was no lead mechanic or any other
employee available to input the information into HELOTRAC. The fact that they could
depend upon no one else to perform this task does not support a finding that there was a 20
practice of all mechanics regularly preparing and maintaining the HELOTRAC records as
mandated by the May 3, 2010 job description. It is reasonable that with Disotell’s direction
and Green’s urging, mechanics have become more proficient in the use of the system. While
it is likely that some of the mechanics have now come to use the system more regularly, the
overall evidence does not reflect that there was a past practice of all mechanics regularly 25
performing this task as mandated by the job description.
It has long been held that an employer violates its duty to bargain if, when
negotiations are sought or are in progress, it unilaterally institutes changes in existing terms
and conditions of employment. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). The Board has also held 30
that in order for a unilateral change in a term or condition of employment to constitute a
violation of Section 8(a)(5), it must be a material, substantial, and significant change. Alamo
Cement Co., 277 NLRB 1031 (1985). I am mindful that Respondent’s operation at the Fort
Rucker facility was a new one; with a significant number of its work force hired and trained
only a few months prior to the implementation of the job description. There is no dispute, 35
however, that employees were never issued a job description prior to May 3, 2010 and were
never required to sign a job description. As reflected by the testimony of Crutcher and
Etheredge, employees were at varying levels of proficiency in using the system prior to the
issuance of the May 3, 2010 job description. Both Tatum and Green confirmed that the past
practice involved only the lead mechanic using HELOTRAC. Contrary to the sporadic and 40
inconsistent requirements to use the HELOTRAC in the past, the newly issued job description
implemented a requirement that all aircraft mechanics “shall” prepare and maintain aircraft
maintenance records to include HELOTRAC and to be proficient in all aspects of the
HELOTRAC automated system. Thus, rather than the past practice of only a few employees
using the system, the job description mandated that all aircraft mechanics were required to 45
prepare and maintain records using the HELOTRAC system. I find that in issuing and
JD(ATL)–01–11
32
implementing the job description, Respondent implemented a material and significant change
in the terms and conditions of employment. Respondent’s having done so without
notification or bargaining with the Union constitutes a violation of the Act. According, I find
that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) as alleged in complaint paragraphs 18 and
20.5
III. COMPLIANCE SPECIFICATION
The underlying complaint allegations in this matter were set forth in an October 1,
2010 Order Consolidating Complaint and Compliance Specification and Notice of Hearing. 10
The incorporated compliance specification provided that the gross backpay due Crutcher is
the amount of earnings he would have received, but for the discrimination against him. The
backpay period for Crutcher is alleged to begin on April 26, 2010, and to continue until a
valid offer of reinstatement is made to him. In determining the amount of backpay that would
be due to Crutcher, the Acting General Counsel used a traditional formula; the number of 15
hours that he would have worked during the backpay period multiplied by the wage rate that
he was earning at the time of his discharge. This amount is reduced by his interim earnings
during the backpay period.
As discussed above, I have not found that Respondent discriminatorily terminated 20
Crutcher and my recommended remedy does not provide for reinstatement or backpay to
Crutcher. In the event that the Board does not adopt my recommendation, I am including my
additional recommendation with respect to the reinstatement and backpay issues related to the
compliance specification.
25
A. Backpay Amount
The Acting General Counsel has determined the amount of gross backpay by utilizing
an average of 40 hours per week at a rate of $22.65 an hour. The gross backpay also utilizes
an average of 10 hours of overtime worked per month at a pay rate of $33.97 per hour. After 30
a reduction of Crutcher’s net interim earnings, the net backpay and interest was determined to
be $20,739.87 as of September 30, 2010. The Acting General Counsel takes the position,
however, that the backpay obligation is continuing as no offer of reinstatement has been made
to Crutcher. Compliance Officer Debra Warner (Warner) testified as to how the formula was
used to determine the backpay amount included in the compliance specification. Warner 35
testified that the information that she used to determine interim earnings came from Crutcher.
She also explained that the 60 hours of overtime that was included in the backpay
specification was based upon Crutcher’s estimate of overtime hours that he worked before his
discharge. She explained that Crutcher told her that he had worked 8 to 10 hours of overtime
each month when employed by Respondent. She confirmed that this amount was an estimate 40
by Crutcher and not provided under oath.
Respondent submits that it does not possess any independent knowledge of Crutcher’s
current employment circumstances, and is therefore taking no position regarding his claim for
regular pay and benefits. Respondent asserts, however, that the evidence introduced by the 45
Acting General Counsel is wholly unreliable as it relates to the overtime hours worked by
JD(ATL)–01–11
33
Crutcher during his employment for Respondent.
Respondent submitted seven separate timesheets covering each pay period for the full
period of Crutcher’s employment. The time sheets show that Crutcher worked a total of 13.4
hours overtime during the twelve-week period. Four of the timesheets contained Crutcher’s 5
signature and three did not. Crutcher testified that each day employees document their arrival
and departure times in their own handwriting. Although Crutcher denied that he had ever
seen a typewritten copy of a document containing the total hours worked for each pay period,
he recognized his signature on three of the four sheets containing an employee signature.
Although Crutcher disputed his signature on one of the timesheets, Crutcher did not dispute 10
the information contained in any of the sheets. He also confirmed that the first two pay
periods covered the time that he was training in Texas and he would not have had overtime
during those periods.
Counsel for the Acting General Counsel asserts that Respondent did not produce 15
payroll records to support its contention that Crutcher earned less overtime than the 6 to 8
monthly hours that he estimated. Counsel cites the Board’s decision in PPG Industries, 338
NLRB 559, 561 (2002), and Filene’s Basement Store, 299 NLRB 183, 204 (1990), for the
proposition that a respondent’s failure to produce evidence that is within its control allows an
inference that such evidence, if produced, would not be favorable to it. Certainly, there were 20
other records that Respondent could have provided to show that Crutcher worked only 13.4
hours of overtime during his 12-week employment at Respondent’s facility. Respondent
could have produced the daily timesheets that were submitted by Crutcher during this period
of time or Respondent could have produced payroll records showing the actual pay to
Crutcher for each pay period during the 12-week period. While the records that Respondent 25
provided may not have been the best records to show overtime worked, they were
nevertheless the only documentary evidence produced by any party to show overtime.
Neither Crutcher nor the Acting General Counsel presented any pay stubs to dispute the
information provided in Respondent’s records. When confronted with Respondent’s records,
Crutcher acknowledged that he had no basis to dispute the information. There is no allegation 30
that Respondent failed to provide Crutcher with accurate pay stubs during his period of
employment and it is reasonable that such records were still in his possession. Accordingly,
inasmuch as Crutcher does not dispute Respondent’s records and there are no documents to
show otherwise, it is reasonable to conclude that Crutcher worked no more than the 13.4
hours of overtime as shown by Respondent’s records and the net backpay amount should be 35
modified accordingly for the total backpay period.
B. Reinstatement
Respondent argues that there are two reasons that Crutcher cannot be reinstated to his 40
former job at the Fort Rucker facility. First of all, Respondent asserts that Crutcher cannot
perform the duties of an aircraft mechanic because he cannot lawfully drive. Respondent
submits that Crutcher has not had a valid driver’s license since March 2010 and will not
regain his license until March 2011. In the posthearing brief, the Respondent maintains that
Respondent would be exposed to significant loss of productivity if Respondent is forced to 45
assign another employee to assist Crutcher in the performance of his duties and to assume the
JD(ATL)–01–11
34
driving responsibilities when a driver is needed. I don’t find Respondent’s argument to be
persuasive. The record reflects that Crutcher worked from March 15, 2010 until his discharge
on April 26, 2010 without the benefit of a driver’s license. There is nothing to indicate that
his lack of a driver’s license upon reinstatement would be any different than when he was
previously employed. Additionally, as of the date of this decision, there is relatively little 5
time remaining for Crutcher’s driving restriction. As of March 15, 2011, this issue will be
moot. Accordingly, I do not find that the absence of a valid driver’s license prior to March
15, 2011 is sufficient to preclude Crutcher’s reinstatement if ordered by the Board.
Respondent’s second basis for precluding Crutcher’s reinstatement is best described as 10
after-acquired evidence. It is this second basis which is a far more complex issue for analysis.
Respondent presented the testimony of Green concerning Crutcher’s comments about
Etheredge. Respondent does not assert that this information was known to Brown or DeLucca
at the time the decision was made to terminate Crutcher. The information only became
known to Respondent after Crutcher’s discharge. Green testified that prior to Crutcher’s 15
termination, he had occasion to walk nearby Crutcher and Tatum and to overhear a part of
their conversation. Green testified that he heard Crutcher used a derogatory term in relation
to Etheredge. Green understood the term to refer to Etheredge’s sexual preference. Green
admonished Crutcher for using the term and left the area. As indicated above, I found Green
to be a credible witness and I credit his testimony. I do not find, however, that this one 20
isolated comment is sufficient to preclude Crutcher’s reinstatement if the Board so orders. I
think that it is reflective of the animosity that Crutcher had toward Etheredge, however, this
animosity is already apparent in Crutcher’s conversation with Barber, Tatum, and Gibson.
While it might arguably be indicative of the hostile work environment; the concerns of which
triggered Crutcher’s discharge, it was not a factor relied upon by the Respondent for the 25
discharge and it is insufficient by itself to preclude Crutcher’s reinstatement.
Etheredge testified that on a number of occasions, Crutcher asked her explicit
questions about her sexual practices and preferences. She recalled that while working with
Crutcher, Crutcher gave her detailed descriptions of his sexual exploits. In her testimony, she 30
described a very explicit story that Crutcher told her about a sexual experience. She recalled
that at one point, she told him that she had enough of his stories and she told him that she did
not want to know about his sex life or what he did outside work.
Counsel for Respondent asked Etheredge how she would feel if Crutcher were 35
reinstated to work on second shift with her. Etheredge responded:
I would call Ms. DeLucca and ask her the same question: how much money do
I need to write a check for? Who do I need to mail it to to get out of this
contract, because my life is more valuable than the point that I’m at right now.40
Etheredge went on to explain how the recent stress had affected her health and her medical
condition. Etheredge’s testimony was probably the most compelling and persuasive
testimony presented during this hearing. As she testified, she became tearful and observably
distressed. With demonstrable emotion, Etheredge testified:45
JD(ATL)–01–11
35
I don’t need the stress of this job. I’m not going to let this job kill me, and I’m
not going to let Jeremy Crutcher kill me. If I need to write a check right now
for $15,000 to get out of this contract and make this crap go away, I’ll do it.
Respondent argues that now that it has knowledge of Crutcher’s misconduct, 5
permitting him to return and again engage in such offensive conduct would subject the
Respondent to massive liability in the event of repetitive conduct. Citing the eleventh circuit
decision in Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.,8 Respondent argues that “gender-
specific, derogatory comments made about women on account of their sex” constitutes sexual
harassment for which an employer may be liable.10
As I have discussed above, I find that Respondent met its burden of demonstrating that
it would have terminated Crutcher in the absence of any union activity. In large part,
Respondent met this burden by demonstrating that there were valid concerns about potential
liability and safety issues resulting from Crutcher’s conduct toward Etheredge. Essentially, 15
Respondent defended its discharge of Crutcher on the concerns relating to a hostile work
environment. I have not, however, made a finding that there was a hostile work environment
nor could I make such a finding. To sustain Respondent’s argument that Crutcher cannot be
reinstated because of after-acquired evidence of Crutcher’s misconduct would be tantamount
to my finding a Title VII violation or to my finding that there was a hostile work environment 20
because of Crutcher’s presence and conduct. Such a finding would be inappropriate for me to
make and beyond the parameters of this proceeding. Thus, I do not find a basis to preclude
Crutcher’s reinstatement should the Board fail to affirm my recommendation.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW25
1. Respondent Sikorsky Support Service, Inc. d/b/a Sikorsky Aerospace
Maintenance is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
30
2. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO is
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By soliciting grievances from its employees with the promise or implied
promise to fix the grievances, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.35
4. By interrogating its employees regarding their activities on behalf of and/or
sentiments toward the Union, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. By interrogating employees regarding other employees’ activities on behalf of 40
and/or sentiments toward the Union, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. By promising employees unspecified benefits if they would vote against
selecting the Union as their bargaining representative, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of

8 594 F.3d 798, 813 (11th Cir. 2010).
JD(ATL)–01–11
36
the Act.
7. By issuing a written job description and job duties for the bargaining unit
position of aircraft mechanic without notice to the Union and without affording the Union an
opportunity to bargain with Respondent with respect to this conduct, Respondent violated 5
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
8. Respondent has not violated the Act in any other way.9
REMEDY10
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find
that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
15
I recommend that the Respondent be ordered to rescind the job description and job
duties that were issued on May 3, 2010.
The Respondent shall post an appropriate notice, as described in the appendix,
attached. This notice shall be posted in the Respondent’s facility or wherever the notices to 20
employees are regularly posted for 60 days without anything covering it or defacing its
contents.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended1025
ORDER
The Respondent, Sikorsky Support Service, Inc. d/b/a/ Sikorsky Aerospace
Maintenance, Fort Rucker, Alabama, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall30
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Interrogating employees regarding their activities on behalf of and/or
sentiments toward the Union.35
(b) Interrogating employees regarding other employees’ activities on
behalf of and/or sentiments toward the Union.

9 During the course of the hearing, counsel for the Acting General Counsel elicited testimony from
various witnesses concerning conduct that was not alleged to be violative in the complaint. Although
counsel argues in the posthearing brief that such conduct demonstrates animus, there was no motion to
amend the complaint to include such conduct as violative and the testimony was offered for
background. Inasmuch as the conduct is not included in the complaint or alleged to be violative, I have
made no findings in this regard.
10 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
JD(ATL)–01–11
37
(c) Soliciting grievances from the employees with the promise or implied
promise to fix the grievances.
(d) Promising employees unspecified benefits if they vote against selecting 5
the Union as their collective bargaining representative.
(e) Making unilateral changes in bargaining unit employees’ terms and
conditions of employment without providing notice of the proposed changes to the Union and
giving the Union adequate opportunity to bargain about those changes.10
(f) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the 15
Act.
(a) Rescind the May 3, 2010 job description.
(b) On request, bargain collectively with International Association of 20
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO as the exclusive representative of the
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit described below:
All aircraft mechanics and quality assurance employees employed at Cairns
Army Airfield, Fort Rucker, Alabama, excluding all office clerical employees,25
professional employees, managerial employees, guards and supervisors as
defined by the Act.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Fort Rucker,
Alabama facility copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”11 Copies of the notice, on 30
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 15, after being signed by the
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon
receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other 35
material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has
gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since March 2010.
40
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional
Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region

11 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice
reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.”
JD(ATL)–01–11
38
attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C., January 24, 2011.
5
Margaret G. Brakebusch
Administrative Law Judge
10
JD(ATL)–01–11
39
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the5
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.10
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf15
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT coercively question you about your union support or activities.
20
WE WILL NOT coercively question you about the union support or activities of other
employees.
WE WILL NOT solicit grievances from you with the promise to fix the grievances in order
to interfere with, coerce, or restrain you in the exercise of your rights under the National 25
Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL NOT promise you unspecified benefits if you vote against selecting the Union as
your collective-bargaining representative.
30
WE WILL NOT unilaterally change your terms and conditions of employment without
notifying your bargaining representative and giving your representative a chance to bargain
about those changes.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the 35
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL rescind the May 3, 2010 job description.
WE WILL, on request, bargain with the Union concerning the terms and conditions of 40
employment for our employees in the bargaining unit:
All aircraft mechanics and quality assurance employees employed at Cairns
Army Airfield, Fort Rucker, Alabama, excluding all office clerical employees,
professional employees, managerial employees, guards and supervisors as45
defined by the Act.
JD(ATL)–01–11
40
SIKORSKY SUPPORT SERVICE, INC. d/b/a
SIKORSKY AEROSPACE MAINTENANCE
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to 5
enforce the National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine
whether employees want union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor
practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and
how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the
Board’s Regional office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s 10
website: www.nlrb.gov.
7th Floor, 600 South Maestri Place, New Orleans, LA 70130-3413
(504) 589-6361, Hours 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.
15
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE
DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY
ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR 20
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISION MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE
REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (504) 589-6389.