Shop-Rite Supermarket, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 18, 1977

231 N.L.R.B. 500 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Shop-Rite Supermarket, Inc. and Amalgamated Meat-
cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America,
Local 117, affiliated with Amalgamated Meatcut-
ters and Butcher Workmen of North America,
AFL-CIO. Case 5-CA-8190
August 18, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
PENELLO AND MURPHY
On May 24, 1977, Administrative Law Judge Alvin
Lieberman issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief. General Counsel filed cross-
exceptions and a supporting brief and a brief in
response to Respondent's exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,' and conclusions 2 of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.3
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Shop-Rite
Supermarket, Inc., Baltimore, Maryland, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the said recommended Order.
Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to
credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Watt Products,
Inc.. 91 NLRB 544 (1950). enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
I General Counsel has excepted to the Administrative Law Judge's
failure to find that Respondent on September 18, 1976, through Supervisor
Constantine Chrysovergis, unlawfully created the impression of surveillance
of employees' union activities. We find it unnecessary to pass on this
allegation since an additional violation finding to this effect would be
cumulative
3 In accordance with Trading Porn, Inc., 219 NLRB 298 (1975), and The
Kroger Co., 228 NLRB 149 (1977), we date the bargaining order from
September 13, 1976. the date the unfair labor practice campaign com-
menced. Chairman Fanning would find that the bargaining obligation arose
on September 10, 1976, the date the Union requested Respondent to
recognize and bargain with it and was refused.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ALVIN LIEBERMAN, Administrative Law Judge: The
hearing in this proceeding, with all parties represented, was
held before me in Baltimore, Maryland, on January 19 and
20, 1977, upon the General Counsel's complaint dated
November 4, 1976,1 and Respondent's answer.2 In general,
the issues litigated were whether Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended (Act). 3 More particularly, the
questions for decision are as follows:
The complaint was issued pursuant to an amended charge filed on
lOctober 22, 1976.
: During the hearing the answer was amended to admit par. 4 of the
complaint insofar as it relates to Bernard Geher.
3 Set forth below are the relevant provisions of the sections of the Act to
which reference has been made in the text:
Sec. 8(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(I) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 7:
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment ...
to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a).
Insofar as pertinent. Secs. 7 and 9(a) are as follows:
Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of
such activities....
Sec. 9(a) Representatives designated or selected for the purposes
of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of
all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment ....
231 NLRB No. 72
500
SHOP-RITE SUPERMARKET
1. Is Constantinos Chrysovergis (Gus) 4 a supervisor
within the meaning of Section 2(1 1) of the Act? 5
2. Did Respondent violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
by, as the complaint alleges, interrogating and threatening
employees; creating the impression that their union activity
was under surveillance; and offering them wage increases
to induce them to cease supporting Amalgamated Meatcut-
ters and Butcher Workmen of North America, Local 117
(Union)? 6
3. Did Respondent violate Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by
discharging Lillian Gauger?
4. Did the Union represent a majority of Respondent's
meat department employees when it requested recognition
and bargaining on their behalf?
5. Assuming an affirmative answer to question 4, did
Respondent violate Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing
to recognize and bargain with the Union?
6. Assuming an affirmative answer to question 5,
should a bargaining order issue?
Upon the entire record,7 upon my observation of the
witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, and having
taken into account the arguments made and the briefs
submitted,R I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a Maryland corporation, is engaged at
Baltimore, Maryland, in the retail grocery business. During
the year ending on November 3, 1976, a representative
period, Respondent's gross volume of business exceeded
$500,000. During the same period, Respondent purchased,
from vendors located outside the State of Maryland,
merchandise valued in excess of $50,000. Accordingly, I
find that Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of the Act and that the assertion of jurisdiction
over this matter by the National Labor Relations Board
(Board) is warranted.
Having been repeatedly referred to at the heanng as "Gus." Constanti-
nos Chrysovergis will be similarly referred to in this Decision.
I Sec. 2(11 I) of the Act is as follows:
Sec. 2. When used in this Act-
(I11) The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority,
in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or
responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to
recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
the Act.
III. INTRODUCTION
Briefly, this case is concerned with the Union's request
for recognition as the collective-balgaining representative
of Respondent's meat department employees and for
bargaining on their behalf, to which Respondent did not
accede, and certain subsequent events. Included among the
latter, the complaint alleges, were violations of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act 9 engaged in by Bernard Geher,
Respondent's president, and Gus, its meat department
manager, who, the complaint avers, is a supervisor. Also
among the events following the Union's bargaining request
was the discharge of employee Lillian Gauger, assertedly in
violation of Section 8(aX3 ).
The General Counsel contends ' that Respondent's
refusal to recognize and bargain with the Union consti-
tuted an infraction of Section 8(aX5) of the Act. To remedy
this, as well as Respondent's claimed violation of Section
8(a)(1) and (3), set forth in the complaint as having been
undertaken "to undermine the Union's status as collective-
bargaining representative" and as having been "so exten-
sive and pervasive . . . as to render impossible . . . a free
and fair election," the General Counsel urges that, in
addition to the usual cease-and-desist order, a bargaining
order issue.
Respondent has denied the commission of the unfair
labor practices alleged in the complaint and has also
denied that Gus is a supervisor. Respecting the General
Counsel's plea that a bargaining order be entered,
Respondent's position is that, even were it to be found that
it violated the Act, the violations would not warrant the
imposition of such a remedy, nor would they, as Respon-
dent states on brief, "preclude the holding of a fair, reliable
election."
of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but
requires the use of independent judgment.
6 The Union's full designation appears in the caption.
7 Issued simultaneously is a separate order [omitted from publication]
correcting inadvertent errors in the stenographic transcript of this proceed-
ing.
I Although all the arguments of the parties and the authorities cited by
them, whether appearing in their briefs or made orally at the hearing, may
not be discussed, each has been carefully weighed and considered.
9 The nature of these claimed violations appears above in my statement
of the principal questions for decision.
i' Although represented, the Union made no opening statement at the
hearing, nor did it submit a brief. I assume, however, that its position is the
same as the General Counsel's.
501
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
IV. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS11
A. Respondent's Business
Respondent operates a retail supermarket in Baltimore,
Maryland, in which meats, groceries, and related merchan-
dise are sold. Its store is departmentalized and consists of
grocery and meat departments, each having a separate
manager. In the meat department there is a meat room in
which fresh meat is cut, wrapped, and prepared for sale; a
lunch meat case; and a delicatessen section, referred to at
hearing as the "deli."
The delicatessen section, located in the rear of the store,
is not a self-service unit. A clerk is stationed behind a
counter over which orders are given by customers for
merchandise sold in that section. When necessary in filling
orders for sliced meat, the clerk operates an electric slicing
machine.
The slicing machine poses a danger to its operator.
Unless care and attention is given to its operation, the
operator's fingers may be cut.
As Bernard Geher, Respondent's president, testified in
this regard, "You have to concentrate when you are slicing
the meat otherwise your fingers are going to go with it."
Confirming this, Debra Botler, who at all material times
was a deli clerk, related that it is "dangerous . .. to
operate the machine while . . . talking to someone"; that
in operating the machine, the operator had "to give it ...
undivided attention"; that while operating the machine she
had "cut [herself] quite a few times when [she] was talking
and not paying attention to what [she] was doing"; and
that on one such occasion, Geher "told [her] to watch it
[and] to put [her] mind on the machine."
Injuries to operators of the slicing machine have
occurred in the past. In some cases, these injuries were so
serious as to require the injured deli clerk to obtain
treatment at a hospital. As plaintively put by Geher, "the
problem of taking [the injured worker] to the hospital,
stitching the fingers" is one which he did not want to
experience again.
B. Respondent's Meat Department Employee
Classifications
Constantinos Chrysovergis (Gus) is the manager of
Respondent's meat department. The other people working
in the meat department are classified as meatcutters, meat
wrappers, and delicatessen clerks.
C. The Status of Constantinos Chrysovergis (Gus)
The General Counsel and Respondent are sharply
divided on the question of Gus' status. The former
contends that he is a supervisor and the latter that he is an
employee.
Attributing them to Gus' conduct, the complaint alleges
several violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
Respondent. If Gus is a supervisor then, on well-settled
" The purpose of these findings and conclusions is to furnish a frame of
reference within which to consider the facts relating to Respondent's alleged
unfair labor practices and to the conclusions to which they may give rise. To
the extent that the contentions of the parties relate to the findings and
conclusions made here, they will be treated here, although they, as well as
the findings and conclusions, may again be considered in other contexts.
principles, Respondent is liable for his activity in this
regard.
As already noted, Gus is the manager of Respondent's
meat department. He referred to himself as "the head man
on the place." In like vein, Bernard Geher, Respondent's
president, described Gus as being "in charge of the whole
[meat] department" and the person who "keep[s] ... the
meat department running."
Gus, alone, orders all the meat for the department.
Bernard Geher, Respondent's president, sets the prices at
which the meat ordered by Gus is to be sold. However, Gus
has the "authority," as Geher testified, to inform him when
particular cuts of meat are not selling well. Geher further
testified, upon receiving such information from Gus, he,
without more, "lower[s] the price."
Gus directs the meat department employees in their day-
to-day duties. He has told an employee which day was to
be her day off and grants employees permission to leave
work early for sickness or other reasons. Gus also selects
employees for overtime work when, in his judgment, such
work is necessary.1 2
Gus' authority to hire or discharge employees was not
shown by a preponderance of the evidence. However, the
evidence does establish that, in at least two instances when
employees were hired on a trial basis, during which they
were required to demonstrate their ability to work in the
meat department, Gus determined that they were suffi-
ciently competent to be continued in Respondent's employ.
Accordingly, Gus recommended to Geher that this be done
and Geher adopted his recommendation.
Like all people who work in the meat department, Gus
wears a white uniform, punches a timeclock, and is hourly
rated. However, his rate of pay is substantially higher than
the other people in the department. Thus, he is paid $6.90
an hour whereas the rank-and-file meatcutters receive $5
an hour and the meat wrappers $3.
Gus performs work also performed by other people who
work in the meat department. In this regard, as Geher,
Respondent's president, related, Gus spends "60 to 65
percent of [his] time" cutting meat and putting the cut
meat in trays. Gus also participates in cleaning the meat
room. In doing this, however, Gus selects other employees
to work with him.
On the basis of the foregoing, it is my opinion that Gus
possesses sufficient indicia of supervisory authority to be
classified as a supervisor. In many similar situations meat
department managers having attributes and authority
possessed by Gus have been held to be supervisors. See, for
-example, Bedford Discounters, Inc., 204 NLRB 509, 511-
512 (1973); Angeli's Super Valu, 197 NLRB 85, 86 (1972);
John H. Scheidel, Inc., 193 NLRB 489, 490-491 (1971);
Agawam Food Market, Inc., d/b/a The Food Mart, 162
NLRB 1420, 1424 (1967); and Nitro Super Market, Inc.,
161 NLRB 505, 506, 509-511 (1966).
Accordingly, I conclude that Gus is a supervisor within
the meaning of the Act.
12 Regarding overtime, Gus testified that before directing employees to
work overtime he "walkls] up ... and [tells) the boss (Geher) 'I think we
can say tonight a couple hours ... to .. catch up for tomorrow.' [Geher]
says to go ahead. [Geher does ] that all the time when I ask him."
502
SHOP-RITE SUPERMARKET
In support of its contrary position-that Gus is an
employee-Respondent places principal reliance on three
factors-the Union's inclusion of meat department manag-
ers in contracts it has with other supermarkets; 13 Gus' lack
of authority to hire or discharge employees; and his
performance of rank-and-file work, at which, I have found,
he spends about 65 percent of his time. These are not
detractive of Gus' supervisory status.
Thus, the Union's inclusion of meat department manag-
ers in contracts with supermarkets does not preclude a
finding that a meat department manager is a supervisor, if
warranted by the facts, anymore than such a finding would
be precluded by a union's consent, in a representation
proceeding, to the inclusion of a supervisor in a bargaining
unit. That there is no preclusion in such a situation is well
settled. Furr's Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 381 F.2d 562, 566 (C.A. 10,
1967), cert. denied 389 U.S. 480 (1967), N.LR.B. v. Elliot-
Williams Co., Inc., 345 F.2d 460, 463 (C.A. 7, 1965);
N. L R.B. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 242 F.2d 497,
501 (C.A. 2, 1957), cert. denied 355 U.S. 829 (1957).
The second factor on which Respondent relies to bolster
its argument that Gus is not a supervisor is his spending
more than half his time in the performance of rank-and-file
work. Concerning this, the Board has held that "the mere
fact. . . that a supervisor spends a large part of his time in
the performance of manual labor does not necessarily
affect his status as a supervisor." The Wilson Transit
Company, 80 NLRB 1476, 1478 (1948).14
The final factor relied on by Respondent, in disputing
Gus' status as a supervisor, is his lack of authority to hire
or discharge employees. However, as was stated in Maxam
Buffalo, Inc., d/b/a Maxam, 139 NLRB 1040, 1041, 1053
(1962), "authority to hire and discharge . . . is not a sine
qua non of a supervisor."
D. The Appropriate Unit and its Complement
The complaint alleges that "a unit consisting of all meat
department employees, including fish and delicatessen
clerks, cutters, weighers, and wrappers employed by
respondent . . ., but excluding all other employees,
guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, is appropri-
ate for the purpose of collective-bargaining."
At the hearing, Respondent conceded that the foregoing
unit would be appropriate if it "included [the meat
department manager] by specific references." The meat
department manager, having been found to be a supervi-
sor, cannot, as is well settled, be included in the unit.
In addition to Respondent's concession as to the
appropriateness of the unit set forth in the complaint, the
parties stipulated that at all material times there were eight
people working in Respondent's meat department.
':' In this regard. it seems to be the case that the Union represents
employees in units which include meat department managers.
" In this connection, the Board found individuals to be supervisors
notwithstanding that they spent "the major .. portion of their time [in one
case 90 percent I in manual work." Steetleld Equipment Cotnpa.v, Inc.. 76
NLRB 831. 833 (1948).
is All dates hereinafter mentioned without stating a year fall within 1976.
E. The Union's Majority and Its Bargaining
Request
At a meeting conducted by Sam Pitarra, an organizer for
the Union, on August 30, 1976,' 5 four employees who
worked in Respondent's meat department, Josephine
Shaw, Dorothy Maddox, Debra Botler, and Lillian Gau-
ger,' 6 signed cards authorizing the Union to act as their
collective-bargaining agent. A fifth employee, Robert
Hicks, did so on September 8. There being, as I have earlier
found, a total of eight employees working in Respondent's
meat department, the union at this point, and at all other
material times, represented a majority of those employees.
On September 10, Pitarra informed Bernard Geher,
Respondent's president, that a majority of Respondent's
meat department employees had signed authorization
cards and requested that Respondent bargain with the
Union. Geher refused to do so in the absence of a victory
by the Union in a Board-conducted representation elec-
tion.
Following Geher's refusal to bargain with the Union,
Pitarra sought assistance in obtaining the Union's recogni-
tion by Respondent from Gilbert Feldman, the vice
president of the Retail Store Employees Union (Retail
Union).'7 Feldman agreed to intercede with Geher on the
Union's behalf.
Accordingly, about 11 a.m. on September 13, Feldman
went to Respondent's premises to talk to Geher about
recognizing the Union. However, Geher was not in the
store, having earlier departed to appear as a witness in a
legal proceeding. Upon learning this, Feldman left his
name and telephone number with a man in Geher's office.
About an hour later, Geher returned to Respondent's
store and called Feldman. Feldman informed Geher that
he had been asked by Pitarra, an organizer for the Union,
to speak to him about recognizing the Union and, in
essence, he requested Geher to recognize the Union.
Responding to this request, Geher, in effect, reiterated
what he had earlier said to Pitarra concerning the
circumstances under which Respondent would recognize
and bargain with the Union; i.e., that Respondent would
do so upon the Union's victory in a Board-conducted
election.
V. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Facts, Contentions, and Conclusions Concerning
Respondent's Alleged Violations of Section 8(a)(3) of
the Act
i. Contentions
The complaint alleges, and the answer denies, that
Respondent's discharge of Lillian Gauger was violative of
Section 8 (aX3) of the Act. The facts concerning Gauger's
discharge are substantially undisputed. What is in dispute
16 As already noted, Gauger's later discharge is alleged in the complaint
as having been violative of Sec. 8(aX3).
7 On January 1. 1976, Respcndent and the Retail Union entered into a
collective agreement, negotiated in part by Feldman. covering the employ-
ees in Respondent's grocery department. Feldman and Geher are well
known to each other and. apparently. they enjo) a good relationship.
503
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
is Respondent's motive for the discharge. The General
Counsel contends that Gauger was discharged because of
her membership in the Union. Respondent, on the other
hand, argues that it did not know, until a few days after her
dismissal, that Gauger was an adherent of the Union and
that she was discharged because she interfered with the
work of the deli clerk.
2. Facts
Gauger was hired as a meat wrapper in 1975. She was
discharged on September 13, 1976, and rehired some 3
weeks later. At the time of the hearing in this proceeding,
which was held on January 19 and 20, 1977, Gauger was
still in Respondent's employ.
On August 30, Gauger, Debra Botler, Respondent's deli
clerk, and other employees of Respondent attended a
union meeting and there she and Botler signed union
authorization cards. Gauger and Botler also attended the
union meeting held on September 8.
As earlier found, Bernard Geher, Respondent's presi-
dent, left the store during the morning of September 13.
Upon his return about noon, he saw Gilbert Feldman's
message. 18
Before calling Feldman, however, Geher saw Dorothy
Maddox, a meat department employee, leave the lunch
meat case she was stocking, enter the deli section, and
engage Botler, the deli clerk, in conversation. While talking
to Maddox, Botler was waiting on customers and operating
the slicing machine.
After watching this for several minutes, Geher went to
the deli section and reprimanded Botler and Maddox for
talking to each other while the slicing machine was in
operation and while customers were waiting to be served.
In this connection, as Geher testified, he told them that
employees could "not hang around in the deli room while
[the slicing] machine is being operated" because the
operator "might hurt" herself, as had happened under
similar circumstances in the past. Geher also told Botler
and Maddox that their talking to each other in the deli
section while customers were waiting to be served was "not
polite" and was "obstructing the [customers'] view" of
what Botler was doing. Finally, Geher said that they would
be discharged "if [he] ever [saw] them again ... just
hanging around in [the] deli room." Gauger, who was near
the deli section at the time, heard the discharge warning
given by Geher to Botler and Maddox.
Following this, Geher returned to his office and called
Feldman, the vice president of the Retail Union. Findings
concerning their conversation have already been made. In
brief recapitulation, Feldman asked Respondent to recog-
nize the Union and Geher replied, as he had earlier
informed Sam Pitarra, an organizer for the Union, that that
would not be done in the absence of a union victory in a
Board-conducted election.
About 10 minutes later Gauger went into the deli section.
It was her intention to eat lunch there with Botler, the deli
clerk, as she had done from time to time. When Gauger
'I It will be remembered that Feldman is the vice president of the Retail
Union and had been asked by Sam Pitarra. an organizer for the Union, to
help it obtain recognition from Respondent.
9' The findings in this paragraph are based upon, and the quotations
entered the deli section, Botler was again waiting on
customers and operating the slicing machine. Notwith-
standing the discharge warning given a short time earlier
by Geher to Botler and Maddox, which, as I have found,
she overheard, Gauger asked Botler, as the former testified
"if she wanted a soda." Botler replied that she did and
asked Gauger "to wait a minute for the money."
Shortly after Gauger went into the deli, Geher walked by
that section. He saw Gauger there talking to Botler while
Botler was waiting on customers and operating the slicing
machine. About 10 minutes later, Geher again walked by
the deli section and again saw Gauger there while Botler
was waiting on a customer.
Seeing this for the second time in 10 minutes, Geher
asked Gauger what she was doing in the deli section.
Gauger said that, although she had not yet punched her
timecard, she was on her way to lunch and was waiting to
ask Botler if she wanted a soda. That being the case, Geher
told Gauger, as he related, that she had "no business being
[in the deli section]"; that he had "just told the girls . . .
that if[he saw] anyone hanging around the deli [he would]
discharge them"; and that "therefore I am discharging
you." Geher then turned to Botler and warned her, as he
further testified, that the "next time [she was] going to be
discharged too."
After discharging Gauger, Geher informed Constantinos
Chrysovergis (Gus), Respondent's meat manager, that he
had "just fired . . . Gauger." Upon being asked by Gus
why he had done so, Geher replied that Gauger had been
"in conference with [Botler ]." 19
On September 15, upon instructions from the Union,
Gauger filed an unfair labor practice charge against
Respondent, alleging that her discharge had been violative
of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. This charge was later
withdrawn. Although the date of the withdrawal does not
appear in the record, the General Counsel represents, on
brief, that Gauger withdrew her charge before, as will
appear below, she sought reemployment from Respondent.
A few days after Gauger's discharge, Botler quit her job.
On September 24, the Union filed a charge alleging that
Respondent had constructively discharged Botler in viola-
tion of Section 8(aX3) of the Act and alleging further that
Respondent had also violated Section 8(aX)(1) and (5). This
charge was amended on October 22. As amended, the
Union's charge retained the 8(a)(l) and (5) allegations of
its original charge, eliminated the first charge's reference to
the termination of Botler's employment, and alleged in its
stead that by discharging Gauger Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(3). As set forth above (fn. I) the instant
complaint was issued pursuant to this charge.
On about October 4, during the pendency of the Union's
original charge alleging that Botler's quitting constituted a
constructive discharge violative of Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act, but after Gauger had withdrawn her charge, Gauger
and Botler together asked Geher, Respondent's president,
to return them to their jobs. Notwithstanding that he knew
at this time that Gauger and Botler were members of the
appearing in the text are taken from, testimony given by Josephine Shaw, a
meat wrapper in Respondent's employ who was present during Geher's
conversation with Gus.
504
SHOP-RITE SUPERMARKET
Union and his awareness of the Union's outstanding
charge against Respondent, based in part upon Botler's
quitting some weeks earlier, Geher acceded to their
request. Like Gauger, Botler was still in Respondent's
employ at the time of the hearing.
3. Conclusions
Although guiding principles are not in doubt, "Section
8(a)(3) cases are difficult cases." N.LRB. v. Atlanta Coca-
Cola Bottling Company, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia, 293 F.2d
300, 308 (C.A. 5, 1961). Almost always present in such
cases, and the instant one is no exception, are vexatious
questions of motive.
I will assume, despite its denial, that Respondent had
knowledge, at the time of her discharge, that Lillian
Gauger was a member of the Union. If, therefore, she was
discharged because she supported the Union, obviously the
termination of her employment was violative of Section
8(aX3) of the Act. But the facts indicate that this was not
the case.
Respondent argues that Gauger's discharge was not
motivated by a purpose interdicted by the Act. Gauger was
dismissed, Respondent contends, not because of her union
membership or activity, but because she interfered with the
work of Debra Botler, its deli clerk, while Botler was
waiting on customers and operating the slicing machine, a
dangerous procedure under the best of circumstances.
Respondent's position appears to be well taken.
Unlike the explanation for a discharge offered by an
employer in another case 20 which "fail[ed] to stand under
scrutiny," the reason given by Respondent for discharging
Gauger is supported by the evidence. Thus, minutes before
Gauger's discharge, Bernard Geher, Respondent's presi-
dent, warned another employee that she would be
discharged if she again entered the deli section and
engaged in a conversation with Botler while Botler was
waiting on customers and operating the slicing machine, a
dangerous procedure when the operator's attention is
diverted. 21 Despite overhearing this warning, Gauger did
exactly what the other employee had done. She entered the
deli section and spoke to Botler while Botler was waiting
on customers and operating the slicing machine. For doing
so, Gauger was discharged.
Botler quit her job several days after Gauger's employ-
ment was terminated. Botler's quitting does not appear to
have been related to Gauger's discharge.
Even if, as Respondent argues, it did not know of
Gauger's union membership at the time of her discharge,
Respondent learned this a few days later when Gauger
filed a charge alleging that her dismissal was violative of
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. If it did not do so in any other
way, Respondent became aware of Botler's union member-
ship upon the filing of the Union's charge asserting that
Botler had been constructively discharged.
"2 N.L.R.B, v. Dant el al. d/b./a Dant & Russell, Ltd., 207 F.2d 165, 167
(C.A. 9, 1953).
Z1 In this regard. note should be taken of Botler's testimony, earlier set
forth. that the operator of the machine had "to give it . . . undivided
attention" and that while operating the machine she had "cut [herself] quite
a few times when Ishe was talking and not paying attention to what Ishe I
was doing."
2! Geher denied putting these questions to Boiler. However. Botler. as
Despite the foregoing and the pendency of the Union's
charge against Respondent dealing with Botler's alleged
constructive discharge and Respondent's claimed viola-
tions of Section 8(aX 1) and (5) of the Act, within weeks of
the termination of their employment, Botler and Gauger
were rehired upon their request and were still in Respon-
dent's employ at the time of the hearing.
Such a course of conduct does not bespeak an employer
bent on destroying its employees' interest in a union by
ridding itself of the Union's supporters. It seems to me that,
if this had been Respondent's object, it would have
discharged Botler when it discharged Gauger. And Re-
spondent certainly would not have rehired them.
"An unlawful purpose [in discharging an employee] is
not lightly to be inferred. In the choice between lawful and
unlawful motives, the record taken as a whole must present
a substantial basis of believable evidence pointing toward
the unlawful one." N.LR.B. v. T.A. McGahey et al, 233
F.2d 406, 413 (C.A. 5, 1956). Upon careful consideration of
the record, I do not find such a "substantial basis" to be
present in connection with Gauger's discharge.
Accordingly, upon consideration of the entire record, I
conclude that the General Counsel has not established by a
preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by discharging Gauger. My order
will, therefore, provide for the dismissal of paragraph 8 and
the relating portions of paragraphs II and 12 of the
complaint.
B. Facts, Contentions, and Conclusions Concerning
Respondent's Alleged Violations of Section 8(a)(l) of
the Act
The complaint alleges that Respondent engaged in
"extensive and pervasive" violations of Section 8(a)(I) of
the Act. These, the complaint asserts, consisted of interro-
gating and threatening employees, promising them benefits
to induce them to reject the Union, and creating the
impression that their union activity was under surveillance.
I. Interrogation
On September 13, 1976, Bernard Geher, Respondent's
president, interrogated Debra Botler, the deli clerk, and
Robert Hicks, then employed as a meatcutter, about the
Union. In both cases, Geher called the employees away
from the place where they normally worked and he offered
neither assurances against reprisal for answering his
questions.
Concerning Hicks, Geher asked him, as Hicks testified
and Geher admitted, "if [he] knew anything about the
Union [and] if [he] signed [a] union card." Regarding
Botler, Geher asked her, as she related, "what is going on
. . . who is trying to organize the Union." 22
has already been noted, was in Respondent's employ at the time of the
hearing. Her testimony, adverse to Respondent. was therefore given at
considerable risk of economic reprisal, including loss of employment. Thus.
having much to lose, her testimony, damaging to Respondent, was in a sense
contrary to her own interest and for this reason not likely to be false.
Georgia Rug Mill, 131 NLRB 1304. 1305 (1961), modified on other grounds
308 F.2d 89 (C.A. 5, 1962). Accordingly, I credit Botler and not Geher. For
the same reason I will make similar credibility resolutions in all other
(Continued)
505
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Constantinos Chrysovergis (Gus), the manager of Re-
spondent's meat department, who I have found to be a
supervisor, also interrogated Respondent's employees.
Thus, as Gus admitted, on about September 13, he asked
Dorothy Maddox, then employed in the meat department,
whether she had signed a union card. As Gus further
admitted, he put a similar question to Hicks on about
September 20.
On September 16, Gus questioned a third employee,
Josephine Shaw, a meat wrapper, concerning her relation-
ship to the Union. He inquired of Shaw, as she testified
without contradiction, if she "was for the Union" and
whether she knew "anything about the Union."
In none of the foregoing situations did either Geher,
Respondent's president, or Gus offer assurance against
reprisal to the employees they questioned. And, as found
regarding Geher's questioning of Hicks and Botler, he
called them away from their normal places of work. Both
circumstances imparted a coercive nature to the interroga-
tion. Blackman-Uhler Chemical Division-Synalloy Corpora-
tion, 220 NLRB 52, 57 (1975). By such interrogation
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. Threats
On September 13, in a conversation with Debra Botler,
Respondent's deli clerk, Bernard Geher, Respondent's
president, said to her, as Botler recounted and Geher
denied,2 3 "I thought you needed a job." Following this,
Geher stated "the Union [won't] get in." I construe this as
a not too thinly veiled threat that if the Union did "get in"
Botler would lose her job.
On September 18, while Constantinos Chrysovergis
(Gus), the supervisor of Respondent's meat department,
Robert Hicks, a meatcutter, and Josephine Shaw, a meat
wrapper, were talking about the Union, Gus stated, as
Shaw testified, again without contradiction, that "when the
stock clerks got their union24 . . . some of them got a drop
in pay . . . like if they were $3.50, they went back to
$2.30."
On the same day, Gus, Hicks, and Shaw discussed wage
increases for employees in the meat department. In this
connection, Gus told Hicks and Shaw, as the latter further
testified, that they "deserved a raise [but that Geher,
respondent's president,] wasn't going to give [them] a raise
because the Union was coming in." 25
It thus appears that, on September 13 and 18, Respon-
dent's employees were threatened with reprisals upon the
Union's advent, including loss of jobs, reduction in wages,
and denials of deserved wage increases. Such threats, being
situations where the testimony of an employee witness is denied by either
Geher or Constantinos Chrysovergis who, I have found, is a supervisor. In
making these credibility resolutions, I am mindful, as was the court in L S.
A ires & Co. v. N. L. R.B. 551 F.2d 586 (C.A. 4, 1977), that Sec. 8(a)(4) of the
Act proscribes "discrimination against an employee because he has . . .
given testimony under 1thel Act." This protection, however, is of small
consolation to an employee who is out of a job because he testified against
his employer in a proceeding brought under the Act. Furthermore. Sec.
8(aX
4
) is of little significance here in assisting me to determine credibility in
the situation set forth above because it was not shown that the employee
witnesses in question were aware of its provisions.
:23 For the reasons set forth in fn. 22 1 discredit Geher's denial.
24 The stock clerks in Respondent's employ are represented by the Retail
inherently coercive, are violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
3. Promises of benefit
On September 18, Gus, the meat department supervisor,
and Dorothy Maddox, then employed in the meat
department, were working together in Respondent's refrig-
erator. While they were so engaged, Gus informed
Maddox, as she related without contradiction, that he had
"told [Bernard Geher, Respondent's president,] to give
[the] people [in the meat department] a raise and . . . a
contract." Upon Maddox's inquiry as to what Gus meant
"by contract," Gus explained, "you know ... after [you]
drop the Union [Geher] couldn't back out if [there was] a
contract that all the people signed."
Gus' foregoing statement to Maddox was clearly a
promise on Respondent's part to increase the wages of the
meat department employees, provided, as Gus put it, they
"drop[ped] the Union." Promises of this nature are clearly
violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Free-Flow Packaging
Corporation, 219 NLRB 925, 928 (1975); cf. N.LR.B. v.
Exchange Parts Company, 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964).
4. Creating the impression of surveillance
On a day in September 26 while Josephine Shaw, a meat
wrapper, was at work in the meat room, Gus told her, as
Shaw testified, that Bernard Geher, Respondent's presi-
dent, "knows that there [are) four people that signed for
the Union." Gus then named the people known to Geher
as having "signed for the Union." 27
For an employer to tell an employee during a union's
campaign to obtain recognition that the identity of the
employees supporting the Union is known is to create the
impression that the employees' union activity is under
surveillance. Rafael, Igartua, Aguadilla Children's Wear
Plant, 174 NLRB 615, 618 (1969). Conduct of this type on
the part of an employer is violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act because it "tend[s] to restrain and interfere with ...
employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed under
the Act." Mitchell Plastics, Incorporated, 159 NLRB 1574,
1576 (1966).
Upon all of the foregoing, I conclude that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by coercively interrogat-
ing employees concerning the Union; threatening employ-
ees with reprisals for supporting the Union, including
discharge, reduction of wages, and the denial of benefits;
promising employees wage increases and the denial of
benefits; promising employees wage increases to dissuade
them from supporting the Union; and creating the
Union with which, it will be remembered, Respondent entered into a
contract on January 1, 1976.
25 Gus denied having said this. Shaw, however, was in Respondent's
employ at the time of the hearing. Because of this, and for reasons already
explicated, I do not credit Gus' denial.
26 The record is not very clear as to the date on which the incident here
to be recounted occurred, but it appears to have been on about September
16.
27 Gus denied telling this to Shaw but, as I have several times stated, in
cases of conflict between the testimony of a witness in the employ of
respondent at the time of the hearing, as Shaw was, and Gus, I will credit the
employee witness.
506
SHOP-RITE SUPERMARKET
impression that employees' union activity was under
surveillance.
C. Facts, Contentions, and Conclusions Concerning
Respondent's Alleged Violation of Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act
Insofar as is here pertinent, the complaint alleges that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing
to bargain with the Union. The complaint further alleges,
as an integral part of this unfair labor practice, Respon-
dent's independent violations of Section 8(a)(1).
As I have already found, on September 10 and 13, 1976,
after a majority of the employees in Respondent's meat
department2 8 had signed cards authorizing the Union to
act as their bargaining representative, the Union requested
that Respondent bargain with it. Respondent refused to do
so in the absence of a victory by the Union in a Board-
conducted election.
In determining whether an employer unlawfully refused
to bargain by an outright refusal to recognize a union
representing a majority of its employees in an appropriate
unit, as is the case here, the employer's conduct when faced
with the union's bargaining request must be assessed. If, in
such a situation, the employer engages in serious unfair
labor practices, it also violates Section 8(aX5) of the Act.
Trading Port, Inc., 219 NLRB 298, 301 (1975).
"The serious character and lasting impact on employees
of. . . unfair labor practices [including coercive interroga-
tion, threatening employees with discharge, and other
reprisals to discourage their union membership and
support, and engaging in surveillance of employees' union
activity] cannot . . . be too strongly emphasized." Olson
Bodies, Inc., 206 NLRB 779 (1973). To promise employees
benefits to induce them to reject a union has also been held
to be a serious unfair labor practice. De Luca Brothers, Inc.,
201 NLRB 327, 333 (1973).
As has been found, Respondent engaged in all of the
serious unfair labor practices just enumerated. Further-
more, Respondent did so within a period of 5 days after the
Union requested that Respondent bargain with it as the
representative of the meat department employees.
Accordingly, in consideration of the foregoing and
taking into account the fact that Respondent's serious
unfair labor practices were committed almost immediately
following the Union's request for bargaining, I conclude
that Respondent violated Section 8(aX5) of the Act by
refusing to bargain with the Union.
VI. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
Respondent's unfair labor practices occurring in connec-
tion with its operations set forth in section 1, above, have a
close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade,
traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to
lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow of commerce.
-" As has also been found. the meat department employees constitute an
appropriate collective-bargaining unit.
VII. THE REMEDY
Having found that respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(aX)(1) and (5) of
the Act, my order will require Respondent to cease and
desist therefrom and to take such affirmative action as will
effectuate the purposes of the Act. Concerning the latter,
the General Counsel urges, and Respondent resists, the
entry of a bargaining order.
In support of its position Respondent argues on brief
that, "if any violations are found ... they be remedied by
the application of traditional measures, as they could not
have been so coercive as to preclude the holding of a fair,
reliable election." I do not agree.
Although "a bargaining order ... is strong medicine,"29
it should be prescribed as the Supreme Court held in
N.LR.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 610
(1969), "as a remedy for a § 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain
where an employer has committed independent unfair
labor practices which have made the holding of a fair
election unlikely or which have in fact undermined a
union's majority .... " The Court went on to say, quoting
in part from Franks Bros. Company v. N.LR.B., 231 U.S.
702, 704 (1944), that in such cases if the Board were to
"enter only a cease-and-desist order and direct an election
. . . it would in effect be rewarding the employer and
allowing him to 'profit from [his] own wrongful refusal to
bargain.' " Finally, and by way of summarizing its lengthy
discussion on this point, the Court stated 30 that where "the
possibility of erasing the effects of past [unfair labor]
practices, and of ensuring a fair election . . . is slight and
that employee sentiment once expressed through cards
would, on balance, be better protected by a bargaining
order, then such an order should issue."
The foregoing principles indicate that a bargaining order
should issue here. Respondent's threats to discharge a
union adherent, to deprive employees of merited wage
increases "because the Union was coming in," and to
reduce the wages of meat department employees should the
Union succeed in becoming their bargaining representative
would, if carried out, result in loss of work and income. It is
well settled that such threats have an enduring quality,
cause defections from unions, and tend to destroy a union's
majority status.
In discussing the effect of threats of the nature here
under consideration the Board stated, even before Gissel,
that they are "likely to have the most substantial impact
upon employee attitudes and reactions [and] may well be
sufficiently pervasive in their impact to prevent a fair
election and to undermine a union's support". Cohen Bros.
Fruit Company, 166 NLRB 88, 90 (1967).
In Cohen the Board's conclusion was based on threats
"directed at no more than 2 employees in a unit of 15." In
the instant case the "impact" of threats in preventing a fair
election and in undermining the Union is deeper, having
been directed at three employees in a unit of eight.
In deciding that an order requiring Respondent to
bargain with the Union is warranted, I have also taken into
account the statement made by Respondent's meat
29 N.L.R. B. v. Flomatic Corporation, 347 F.2d 74. 78 (C.A. 2, 1%965).
30 395 U.S. 614-615.
507
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
department manager to a meat department employee that
he had told Respondent's president to give the employees
in the department "a raise" if they would "drop the
Union." The lingering effect of such a statement makes
slight the possibility of conducting a fair election. Cf. C. &
G. Electric, Inc., 180 NLRB 427 (1969).
Accordingly, my order will require Respondent to
bargain with the Union upon request.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and
upon the entire record in this case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of
Section 2(2) of the Act and is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Constantinos Chrysovergis, the manager of Respon-
dent's meat department, is a supervisor within the meaning
of Section 2(11) of the Act.
4. By the following conduct Respondent has engaged,
and is engaging, in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
(a) Coercively interrogating employees concerning their
attitudes toward, knowledge of, and activities on behalf of
the Union.
(b) Threatening, upon the Union's advent, to discharge
an employee and to deny wage increases to employees.
(c) Threatening to reduce the wages of meat department
employees upon the Union's becoming their bargaining
agent.
(d) Promising wage increases to meat department
employees to dissuade them from supporting the Union.
(e) Creating the impression that employees' union
activity was under surveillance.
5. Respondent did not engage in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) or (1) of the Act by
discharging Lillian Gauger.
6. All meat department employees, including fish and
delicatessen clerks, cutters, weighers, and wrappers, but
excluding all other employees, guards, and supervisors as
defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for
collective bargaining.
7. At all material times, the Union has represented a
majority of the employees in the unit set forth in
Conclusion of Law 6, above.
8. By failing and refusing since September 13, 1976, to
recognize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the
unit set forth in Conclusion of Law 6, above, Respondent
has engaged, and is engaging, in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
9. The unfair labor practices engaged in by Respon-
dent, as set forth in Conclusions of Law 4 and 8 above,
affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
:" In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER31
The Respondent, Shop-Rite Supermarket, Inc., Balti-
more, Maryland, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively interrogating employees concerning their
attitudes toward, knowledge of, activities on behalf of, or
as to any other matter relating to Amalgamated Meatcut-
ters and Butcher Workmen of North America, Local 117,
affiliated with Amalgamated Meatcutters and Butcher
Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, or any other
labor organization.
(b) Threatening employees with discharge, denial of
wage increases, or with any other form of reprisal, or
effectuating any such threats, for joining, assisting, or in
any manner supporting Amalgamated Meatcutters and
Butcher Workmen of North America, Local 117, affiliated
with Amalgamated Meatcutters and Butcher Workmen of
North America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organiza-
tion.
(c) Threatening employees with wage reductions, denial
of wage increases, or with any other form of reprisal, or
effectuating any such threats, should Amalgamated Meat-
cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, Local
117, affiliated with Amalgamated Meatcutters and Butcher
Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, or any other
labor organization, become the collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of any of its employees.
(d) Promising or granting wage increases or any other
form of benefits to dissuade employees from joining,
assisting, or in any manner supporting Amalgamated
Meatcutters and Butcher Workmen of North America,
Local 117, affiliated with Amalgamated Meatcutters and
Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, or any
other labor organization.
(e) Engaging, attempting to engage, or giving employees
the impression that it is engaging in surveillance of
employees' union activity.
(f) Failing or refusing to recognize or bargain with
Amalgamated Meatcutters and Butcher Workmen of
North America, Local 117, affiliated with Amalgamated
Meatcutters and Butcher Workmen of North America,
AFL-CIO, as the exclusive collective-bargaining represent-
ative of its employees in the following appropriate unit:
All meat department employees, including fish and
delicatessen clerks, cutters, weighers, and wrappers, but
excluding all other employees, guards and supervisors
as defined in the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended,
or failing or refusing, upon request, to bargain with
Amalgamated Meatcutters and Butcher Workmen of
North America, Local 117, affiliated with Amalgamated
and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings,
conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived
for all purposes.
508
SHOP-RITE SUPERMARKET
Meatcutters and Butcher Workmen of North America,
AFL-CIO, respecting rates of pay, wages, hours, or other
terms or conditions of employment of its employees in the
aforesaid appropriate unit.
(g) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, or to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection as guaranteed in Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, or to refrain from any or
all such activities, except to the extent that such rights may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment in
conformity with Section 8(aX3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which, it is
found, will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain with Amalgamated Meatcut-
ters and Butcher Workmen of North America, Local 117,
affiliated with Amalgamated Meatcutters and Butcher
Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the
aforesaid appropriate unit respecting rates of pay, wages,
hours, or other terms or conditions of employment, and, if
an understanding is reached, embody such understanding
in a signed agreement.
(b) Post at its premises copies of the attached notice
marked "Appendix."3 2 Copies of said notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 5, after
being duly signed by Respondent's authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof,
and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter,
in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 5, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that paragraph 8 and the relating
portions of paragraphs 11 and 12 of the complaint be, and
they hereby are, dismissed.
:1 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, at
which all parties had the opportunity to present evidence
and arguments, it has been decided that we, Shop-Rite
Supermarket, Inc., have violated the National Labor
Relations Act. We have therefore been ordered to post this
notice and carry out its terms.
WE WILL NOT question you about anything con-
nected with Amalgamated Meatcutters Union, Local
117, or any other union.
WE WILL NOT discharge you, refuse to give you pay
raises, or do anything else to your disadvantage, and
WE WILL NOT threaten to do any of these things because
you signed a card for, joined, helped, or supported
Amalgamated Meatcutters Union, Local 117, or any
other union.
WE WILL NOT reduce your wages, refuse to give you
pay raises, or do anything else to your disadvantage,
and WE WILL NOT threaten to do any of these things, if
Amalgamated Meatcutters Union, Local 117, or any
other union, becomes, or has become, your bargaining
representative.
WE WILL NOT give you, and WE WILL NOT promise to
give you, pay raises or anything else to make you want
to reject, or refuse to join, support, or help Amalga-
mated Meatcutters Union, Local 117, or any other
union.
WE WILL NOT spy on your union activity or make
you believe that we have spied, or are spying, on your
union activity.
WE WILL NOT in any other way interfere with any
right given you by the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL recognize Amalgamated Meatcutters
Union, Local 117, as the union of our meat department
employees.
WE WILL, if we are asked to do so, bargain with
Amalgamated Meatcutters Union, Local 117, about
our meat department employees' rates of pay, wages,
working hours, and other matters relating to the work
of our meat department employees. If we come to an
agreement about any of these things with Amalgamated
Meatcutters Union, Local 117, WE WILL put that
agreement in writing and sign it.
SHOP-RITE SUPERMARKET,
INC.
509