SHINYDOCS CORPORATION

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 19, 2020

2019002148 (P.T.A.B. May. 19, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/458,667 08/13/2014 Jason William David CASSIDY P4639US00 3459
54640 7590 05/19/2020
PERRY + CURRIER INC.
1300 YONGE STREET
SUITE 500
TORONTO, ONTARIO M4T-1X3
CANADA
EXAMINER
AGUIAR, JOHNNY B
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2447
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/19/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@pckip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte JASON WILLIAM DAVID CASSIDY1
____________________

Appeal 2019-002148
Application 14/458,667
Technology Center 2400
____________________

Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, and
CARL L. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

NAPPI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1 through 12, and 14. Claim 13 is canceled. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). According to Appellant, SHINYDOCS CORPORATION is the
real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3.
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INVENTION
The invention relates generally to a content management system
interface at a local computer device configured to receive user file
commands from a file manager and translate the user file commands into
content management commands for sending to the remote content
management system via a network interface. Abstract. Claim 1 is
reproduced below.
1. A computer device for interfacing with a remote
content management system, the computer device comprising:
memory;
a network interface; and
a processor coupled to the memory and the network
interface, the processor configured to execute:
a file manager stored in the memory, the file
manager for receiving a plurality of user file commands
and outputting user file information;
a content management system interface stored in
the memory, the content management system interface
configured to receive the plurality of user file commands
from the file manager and translate the plurality of user
file commands into content management commands for
sending to the remote content management system via
the network interface, the content management system
interface further configured to receive remote file
information from the remote content management system
via the network interface and translate the remote file
information into the user file information for the file
manager;
wherein the content management system interface
is configured to copy a file from an existing file store to
the remote content management system upon receiving a
user file command from the plurality of user file
commands to access the file and upon determining that
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the file is not already present at the remote content
management system.
EXAMINER’S REJECTIONS2
The Examiner rejected claims 1 through 12, and 14 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 for being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Non-Final Act.
3–5.
The Examiner rejected claims 1 through 6, and 12 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over Serlet (US 2010/0191785 A1; published
July 29, 2010) and Pawar (US 2016/0019317 A1; published Jan. 21. 2016).
Non-Final Act. 5–9.
The Examiner rejected claims 7, 10, and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Serlet, Pawar, and Braginsky (US 2015/0199414
A1; published July 16, 2015). Non-Final Act. 9–11.
The Examiner rejected claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Serlet, Pawar, and Brodersen (US 2003/0191743 A1;
published Oct. 9, 2003). Non-Final Act. 11–12.
The Examiner rejected claim 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Serlet, Pawar, Brodersen and Kamath (US 2005/0060316
A1; published Mar. 17, 2005). Non-Final Act. 12–13.
The Examiner rejected claim 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Serlet, Pawar, and Yamakawa (US 2003/0097454 A1;
published May 22, 2003). Non-Final Act. 13–14.

2 Throughout this Decision we refer to the Appeal Brief filed August 10,
2018 (“Appeal Br.”); Non-Final Office Action mailed February 13, 2018
(“Non-Final Act.”); and the Examiner’s Answer mailed October 17, 2018
(“Ans.”).
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PRINCIPLES OF LAW
A. Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at
219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
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rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
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B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. See 2019 Revised
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“2019 Revised Guidance”).3 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of
internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51;
see also October 2019 Update at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).4
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.

3 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df).
4 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84
Fed. Reg. 54–55.
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 52–56.
DISCUSSION
Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101
The Examiner determines the claims are not patent eligible because
they are directed to a judicial exception without reciting significantly more.
Non-Final Act. 3–5. Specifically, the Examiner determines the claims recite
“steps describe the concept of accessing, retrieving, manipulating and
displaying file data, which corresponds to concepts identified as abstract
ideas by the courts, such as remotely accessing and retrieving user-specified
information” which is similar to ideas held abstract by the courts. Non-Final
Act. 3 (citing Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity Co. 850 F.3d
1315, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2017), Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin.
Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017), Ans. 3–4. Further, the
Examiner finds that the additional limitations are generic computer
components claimed to perform their basic functions of storing, retrieving,
analyzing, processing, removing, transmitting and displaying data, common
to electronics and computer systems and thus do not amount to significantly
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more than the abstract idea. Non-Final Act. 4–5.
Patent eligibility under § 101 is a question of law that may contain
underlying issues of fact. “We review the [Examiner’s] ultimate conclusion
on patent eligibility de novo.” Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896
F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d
1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); see also SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Whether a claim is drawn
to patent-eligible subject matter is an issue of law that we review de novo.”).
We have reviewed Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief, the
Examiner’s rejections, and the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s
arguments. Appellant’s arguments have persuaded us of error in the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 through 12, and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

Discussion
Appellant argues that independent claim 1 is not directed to an
abstract idea as in the cases cited by the Examiner, but rather directed to “a
device to interact with a remote content management system to improve the
functionality of the computer device.” Appeal Br. 9. Specifically, Appellant
argues
claim 1 is focused on and directed to improving computer
functionality itself and is not directed to an economic or other
task for which a computer is used in an ordinary capacity.
Claim 1 is directed to a specific improvement to the way a
computer system functions to communicate with a remote
system via a network more efficiently and handle information
in a way to create an improved user experience.
Appeal Br. 10 (emphasis omitted) (citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
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822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
Appellant’s arguments have persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s
rejection of independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, because the record
does not support the Examiner’s determination that the claims do not recite
an improvement in a computer related technology.
We concur with the Examiner that independent claim 1 recites a
concept similar to those found abstract by the courts. However, we concur
with Appellant that the claimed invention improves the operation of a
computer system, and that differs from the claims at issue in Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Erie, and Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One. In
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie the claims recited an abstract concept of
creating an index and using it to search and retrieve data. Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Erie at 1327. Further, the court found that the claimed use
of XML tags in the claims did not sufficiently identify how they led to an
improvement in computer technology. Id at 1329. In Intellectual Ventures I
LLC v. Capital One, the claims concerned a system and method for editing
XML documents, which the court held are directed to “abstract idea of
collecting, displaying, and manipulating data.” Intellectual Ventures I LLC
v. Capital One at 1340. The court held that although the claims applied to
XML documents such limitation “at best, this limits the invention to a
technological environment for which to apply the underlying abstract
concept.” Id.
Here, the claims recite steps of receiving commands (collecting data)
and translate the commands for sending to the remote content management
system (manipulating and transmitting data) an abstract concept. The claims
also recite steps whereby the content management interface copies a file to a
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remote location from an existing store to the remote content storage system,
when it receives a file command to access a file, if it determines if the file is
present in the remote content management. This limitation is not just
limiting the invention to a technological environment. Rather, as identified
in Appellant’s Specification, this operation is performed to improve a file
migration process, in which the files are migrated on a needed basis.
Specification ¶¶ 85, 86, 91. Thus, this feature of the claim is not directed to
implementing the abstract concept on a computer, but rather improving how
the computer operates to perform a process, similar to the claims at issue in
Enfish and DDR Holdings. In Enfish, the invention was directed to a data
structure which included a very specifically defined means for configuring a
logical data table that required a four-step algorithm to render the table self-
referential. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336. Further, the Enfish court found “the
plain focus of the claims is on an improvement to computer functionality
itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a computer is used in its
ordinary capacity.” Id. In DDR Holdings, the claimed invention created a
hybrid web page that combined advantageous elements from two web pages,
bypassing the expected manner of sending a visitor to another party’s web
page, in order to solve the internet-centric problem of retaining website
visitors. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257–59. Here, claim 1 recites a
limitation directed to content management system, copying a file from an
existing file store to a remote content management system, upon receiving a
user file command to access the file and upon determine the file is not
present in the remote content management system. We consider this to be a
computer centric solution to a computer problem, and improves the
migration of documents in a computer document management system. See
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Specification ¶¶ 85, 86, 91. Thus, we do not sustain the Examiner’s
rejection 35 U.S.C. § 101, as we consider independent claim 1 and the
claims which depend thereupon to recite an improvement to a computer
technology.

Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 based upon Serlet, Pawar
Claims 1, 5, and 6
Appellant argues the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 1 is in
error as the combination of Serlet and Pawar do not teach the content
management system interface copies a file from an existing file store to the
remote content management system upon receiving a user file command to
access the file and upon a determination that the file is not already present at
the remote content management system as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br.
16–17. Specifically, Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejection does not
rely upon Serlet to teach this limitation, and Pawar teaches creating a backup
for a virtual machine, but does not teach this feature. Appeal Br. 16.
Appellant states:
Pawar fails to teach or contemplate this feature. In particular,
Pawar states that at step 1, “the user accesses the VM file
placeholder 339 for a removed file of a virtual machine”
(paragraph 307, emphasis added). Accordingly, the file has
already been removed from the virtual machine (reference 325
in figure 3 of Pawar). Steps 2 to 3 discuss the recovery of this
removed file. This is in line with the disclosure of Pawar in that
it teaches a backup system and recover method during a failover
event. In contrast, claim 1 recites first determining if a file is
present at the remote content management system, then if the
file is not present, copying the file from the existing file store to
the remote content management system.

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Appeal Br. 16–17 (emphasis omitted).
In response, the Examiner finds that Serlet discloses a file system
interface which receives user requests which equates to the claimed plural
user file commands. Ans. 15 (citing Serlet ¶ 22). Further, the Examiner
states:
Pawar on Fig. 3, [0307]-[0310] and [0318]-[0320], discloses
that when a user requests access to a file, a storage manager 310
moves the file from a storage device 380 to information store
330, which covers the claimed limitation “wherein the content
management system interface is configured to copy (move) a
file from an existing file store (storage device 380) to the
remote content management system (information store 330)
upon receiving a user file command (user request) to access the
file (user requests to restore file) and upon determining that the
file is not already present at the remote content management
system (file was removed from information store 330).” Since
the storage manager 310 moves files that are not present at the
information store 330, a determination that a file is not already
present at the information store 330 must be made before the
storage manager 310 moves the file from the storage device 380
to the information store 330.

Ans. 15. Based upon these findings the Examiner considers the disputed
limitation to be obvious. Id.
Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us of error in the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 as they do not address the mapping of the
claim limitation to the reference as set forth by the Examiner. Appellant’s
arguments are premised on equating Pawar’s information store (item 330,
Fig. 3) with the claimed “existing file store” and Pawar’s storage device
(item 380 Fig. 3) with the claimed remote content storage system. However,
Appellant has not addressed the Examiner’s mapping of the Pawar’s
information store (item 330, Fig. 3) with the claimed “remote content
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managment system” and Pawar’s storage device (item 380 Fig. 3) with the
claimed “existing file store.” When Pawar is mapped to the claims as in the
Examiner’s response, reproduced above, the file is copied from the existing
content store, to the remote content storage unit when it is not already
present in the remote content store. Thus, we are not persuaded of error and
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1 and dependent
claims 5 and 6 grouped with claim 1.5

Dependent claim 2
Appellant additionally argues the Examiner’s rejection of dependent
claim 2 is in error as the Examiner cites to paragraphs 24, 27, and 40 of
Serlet as teaching the limitation of claim 2 but provides no reasoning as to
how they teach the claimed driver. Appeal Br. 17. Appellant argues that
paragraphs 24 and 27 discuss a method carried out by the user and that
paragraph 40 discusses use of uniform resource identifiers and that these
teachings are not related to a driver. Id.
The Examiner responds to Appellant’s arguments finding that Serlet
teaches a seamless file system which allows a remote file system to be
mounted such that it appears as if it were local drive, so that the user access
it in the same manner as the users accesses files stored locally. Ans. 16.
The Examiner states:
A driver is a program that controls a device; and every device,
whether it be a printer, disk drive, or keyboard, must have a
driver program (See

5 Appellant did not present separate arguments with respect to dependent
claims 5 and 6 which are similarly rejected as such it is grouped with claim
1.
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https://www.webopedia.com/TERM/D/driver.html>). Since the
remote file system is mounted to appear as if it were a local
disk drive, a file system driver must be present in order to allow
the user to access the remote file system as if it were another
hard disk drive stored on the user’s computer. Based on the
teachings recited above and the explanation provided, Serlet
does in fact teach the claimed subject matter recited in claim 2.

Ans. 16–17.
Appellant’s augments have not addressed these findings by the
Examiner and as such Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred in
finding the skilled artisan would consider the limitations of dependent claim
2 are obvious in light of the teachings of Serlet and Pawar.6

Dependent claim 3
Appellant’s additional arguments directed to claim 3 are similar to
those discussed above with respect to claim 2, arguing the Examiner’s
rejection of dependent claim 3 is in error as the Examiner cites to paragraphs
24, 27, and 40 of Serlet as teaching the limitation of claim 2 but provides no
reasoning as to how they teach claimed driver for mapping. Appeal Br. 18.
Appellant argues that paragraphs 24 and 27 discuss a method carried out by
the user and that paragraph 40 is directed to a discussion of file names and
that these teachings are not related to a drive. Id.
The Examiner’s response to the rejection of claim 3 is similar to the
response discussed above with respect to claim 2 in that the Examiner finds
that a driver must be present in order to map the local drivers for access in

6 We additionally note that Pawar also identifies that drivers are one of the
components that operate to provide access to storage. See ¶ 281.
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Serlet’s seamless files system. Ans. 17.
Similarly, Appellant’s augments have not addressed these findings by
the Examiner and as such Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner
erred in finding the skilled artisan would consider the limitations of
dependent claim 3 are obvious in light of the teachings of Serlet and Pawar.7

Dependent claim 4
Appellant additionally argues the Examiner’s rejection of dependent
claim 4 is in error as the Examiner cites to paragraphs 24, 27, 36, 40, and 45
of Serlet as teaching the limitation of claim 4 but provides no reasoning as to
how they teach a graphical user interface for navigating and manipulating a
hierarchy of folders and files as claimed. Appeal Br. 19. Appellant argues
that paragraph 24 mentions graphically prompting a user but does not
include a teaching that a graphical user interface is used to manipulate a
hierarchy. Id.
The Examiner responds to Appellant’s argument by finding that
“discloses that a user uses any programs on the computer to access a remote
file system as if it were another hard disk drive stored on the user's computer
and a local file hierarchy is created according to the local computer system's
directory listing style, complete with directory entries.” Ans. 18 (citing
Serlet ¶¶ 27, 36, 40, and 45).
We are not persuaded of error by Appellant’s arguments. Claim 4
recites a user interface for navigating and manipulating a hierarchy of
folders and files. As identified by Appellant, Serlet discusses, in paragraph

7 We additionally note that Pawar also identifies that drivers are one of the
components that operate to provide access to storage, see ¶ 281.
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24, graphical prompting a user to make selections. Paragraph 24 also states
that the prompts are for a “user to select a remote file system and/or
directory.” Thus, Serlet teaches a graphical interface to allow a user to
navigate files and directories (a hierarchy).8 Serlet also teaches that one of
the actions a user can perform is to “move a file between directories on the
server,” thus manipulating the hierarchy of a file. (See Serlet ¶ 28). As
such, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding that Serlet teaches
a graphical user interface recited in claim 4 and sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 4.

Dependent claim 12
Appellant additionally argues the Examiner’s rejection of dependent
claim 12 is in error as the Examiner cites to paragraphs 28, 41, and 63 of
Serlet as teaching the claim 12 limitation directed to the mapping a path on
the remote content management system to a truncated path containing a
portion of the path, but provides no reasoning as to how these paragraphs
teach the limitation. Appeal Br. 20. Appellant argues that Serlet teaches
truncating requests but does not teach truncating paths. Id. (citing Serlet ¶
63).
The Examiner responds to Appellant’s arguments and provides a
rationale as to how Serlet teaches the limitation of dependent claim 12. Ans.
18. The Examiner states:
Serlet on [0028], [0041] and [0063], discloses that a Seamless
File System (SFS) translates file names, directory names and
paths from a remote file system syntax into a local operating

8 We additionally note that Pawar teaches directory structures include files in
folders. See e.g., ¶ 69
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system syntax and a user accesses a file by making a file system
request involving a pathname and a file, which covers the
claimed limitation “wherein the content management system
interface is configured to map (translate) a path (path in remote
file system syntax) on the remote content management system
(remote file system) to a truncated path (translated path in local
operating system syntax) containing a portion of the path, and
provide the truncated path to the file manager as an alias for
addressing the path ( a user accesses files using pathnames).”

Ans. 18.
Appellant’s augments have not addressed these findings and rationale
by the Examiner and as such Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner
erred in finding the limitations of dependent claim 12 are obvious in light of
the teachings of Serlet and Pawar. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 12.

Dependent claim 7
Appellant additionally argues the Examiner’s rejection of dependent
claim 7 is in error as the Examiner has not provided sufficient reason to
combine the references. Appeal Br. 21. Appellant argues that “the
Examiner has alleged that a person of skill in the art would look to
Braginsky to improve security” but is nothing in Serlet or Pawar to suggests
that security is an issue. Id.
The Examiner responds to Appellant’s arguments stating:
Serlet on [0034], discloses storing files in a cache. Furthermore,
Braginsky on [0055] and [0058], discloses encrypting files
stored in the locally cached file system and authenticating a
user before decrypting a file. It would have been obvious to a
person with ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing
date of the claimed invention to incorporate an encrypted cache
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to Serlet because Serlet discloses storing files in a cache
([0034]) and Braginsky suggests encrypting and decrypting
files stored in a local cache ([0055] and [0058]). One of
ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to utilize the
teachings of Braginsky in the Serlet system in order to protect
locally stored documents from misuse by unauthorized users.
Therefore, since both Serlet and Braginsky disclose storing files
in a cache, the combination of Serlet and Braginsky is proper
and hindsight reconstruction has not been employed.

Ans. 19.
Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us the Examiner erred in
finding the skilled artisan would combine the teachings of Serlet, Pawar, and
Braginsky. In KSR, the Supreme Court stated that “there must be some
articulated reasoning with [a] rational underpinning to support the legal
conclusion of obviousness.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
418 (2007). Further, “[t]he combination of familiar elements according to
known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield
predictable results.” Id. at 416. Here, the Examiner has provided a reasoned
rationale based upon factual findings, which Appellant has not addressed.
Further, the Examiner has shown that using the encryption of a cache as
taught by Braginsky, to the cache of Serlet is merely the combination of
known elements to provide predictable results. Thus, Appellant has not
persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 7 and
we sustain the rejection of claim 7.

Dependent claim 10
Appellant additionally argues the Examiner’s rejection of dependent
claim 10 is in error as the Examiner has not provided sufficient reason to
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combine the references. Appeal Br. 21. Appellant argues that “Examiner
has alleged that a person of skill in the art would look to Braginsky to block
user commands based on Serlet disclosing an authentication process” and
that setting permissions is not related to an authentication process as in
Serlet. Id.
The Examiner responds to Appellant’s arguments stating:
Serlet on [0027], discloses authenticating access to remote files.
Furthermore, Braginsky on [0029], discloses determining
actions that a user is allowed to take on files in a file system. It
would have been obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the
art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to
incorporate blocking user file commands based on permissions
to Serlet because Serlet discloses authenticating access to
remote files ([0027]) and Braginsky suggests blocking user file
commands based on permissions ([0029]). One of ordinary skill
in the art would be motivated to utilize the teachings of
Braginsky in the Serlet system in order to prevent modification
of documents by unauthorized users. Therefore, since both
Serlet and Braginsky disclose determining user access
permission, the combination of Serlet and Braginsky is proper
and hindsight reconstruction has not been employed.

Appeal Br. 20.
Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us the Examiner erred in
finding the skilled artisan would combine the teachings of Serlet, Pawar, and
Braginsky. Here, the Examiner has provide a reasoned rationale based upon
factual findings, which Appellant has not addressed. Thus, Appellant has
not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim
10 and we sustain the rejection of claim 10.

Dependent claim 11
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Appellant additionally argues the Examiner’s rejection of dependent
claim 11 is in error as the Examiner has not provided sufficient reason to
combine the references. Appeal Br. 22. Appellant argues that “Examiner
has alleged that a person of skill in the art would look to Braginsky to
prevent delivery of file information based on Serlet disclosing an
authentication process,” and asserts that setting permissions is not related to
an authentication process as in Serlet. Id.
The Examiner responds to Appellant’s arguments stating:
Serlet on [0027], discloses authenticating access to remote files.
Furthermore, Braginsky on [0026] and [0059], discloses
presenting files and folders to a user for which the user has the
appropriate access rights. It would have been obvious to a
person with ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing
date of the claimed invention to incorporate blocking user file
commands based on permissions to Serlet because Serlet
discloses authenticating access to remote files ([0027]) and
Braginsky suggests blocking delivery of remote file information
based on permissions ([0026]). One of ordinary skill in the art
would be motivated to utilize the teachings of Braginsky in the
Serlet system in order to prevent access to documents by
unauthorized users. Therefore, since both Serlet and Braginsky
disclose determining user access permission, the combination
of Serlet and Braginsky is proper and hindsight reconstruction
has not been employed.

Ans. 21.
Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us the Examiner erred in
finding the skilled artisan would combine the teachings of Serlet, Pawar, and
Braginsky. The Examiner has provide a reasoned rationale based upon
factual findings, which Appellant has not addressed. Thus, Appellant has
not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim
11 and we sustain the rejection of claim 11.
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21

Dependent claim 8
Appellant additionally argues the Examiner’s rejection of dependent
claim 8 is in error as the Examiner has not provided sufficient reason to
combine the references. Appeal Br. 23. Appellant argues that “there is
nothing in Serlet or Pawar to suggest using masks and a leap from merely
using filenames to using masks to distinguish files us [sic] not small.” Id.
Further, Appellant argues that the Examiner cites to paragraph 256 of
Brodersen, but provides no reasoning as to how this paragraph teaches using
masks to differentiate files as recited in claim 8.
The Examiner responds to Appellant’s arguments stating:
Serlet on [0028], discloses using pathname and filename to
access a file. Furthermore, Brodersen on [0256], discloses
copying a file to a temporary directory with the original name
of the file to display and edit the temporary file. The
differentiation of temporary files from master files is made
when a file is copied to a temporary directory with the original
name of the file. It would have been obvious to a person with
ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the
claimed invention to incorporate filename masks to Serlet
because Serlet discloses using filenames to access files ([0028])
and Brodersen suggests copying files to a temporary directory
with the original name of the files ([0256]). One of ordinary
skill in the art would be motivated to utilize the teachings of
Brodersen in the Serlet system in order to easily differentiate
temporary and master files. Therefore, since both Serlet and
Brodersen disclose using filenames, the combination of Serlet
and Brodersen is proper and hindsight reconstruction has not
been employed.

Ans. 22.
Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us the Examiner erred in
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finding the skilled artisan would combine the teachings of Serlet, Pawar, and
Brodersen. The Examiner has provided a reasoned rationale, based upon
factual findings. In this rationale the Examiner equates the temporary
directory with the claimed mask, which Appellant’s arguments have not
addressed. Thus, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection of claim 8 and we sustain the rejection of claim 8.

Dependent claims 9 and 14
Appellant has not presented arguments directed to the Examiner’s
obviousness rejections of dependent claims 9 and 14. Accordingly, we
sustain these rejections for the same reasons as discussed with respect to the
rejection of claims 8 and 1 from which claims 9 and 14 depend.

CONCLUSION
In summary:

Claim
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–12, 14 101 Eligibility 1–12, 14
1–6, 12 103 Serlet, Pawar 1–6, 12
7, 10, 11 103 Serlet, Pawar,
Braginsky
7, 10, 11
8 103 Serlet, Pawar,
Brodersen
8
9 103 Serlet, Pawar,
Brodersen Kamath
9
14 103 Serlet, Pawar,
Yamakawa
14
Overall
Outcome
1–12, 14
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Because we have affirmed at least one ground of rejection with
respect to each claim on appeal, the Examiner’s decision is affirmed. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1).

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED