Shinya Yudate et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 17, 2019

13579403 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 17, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/579,403 08/16/2012 Shinya Yudate P23161US00 3292
38834 7590 09/17/2019
WESTERMAN, HATTORI, DANIELS & ADRIAN, LLP
8500 Leesburg Pike
SUITE 7500
Tysons, VA 22182
EXAMINER
FIGUEROA, FELIX O
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2833
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/17/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patentmail@whda.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte SHINYA YUDATE and MASANOBU OZAKI
____________

Appeal 2019-000423
Application 13/579,403
Technology Center 2800
____________

Before ROMULO H. DELMENDO, KAREN M. HASTINGS, and
RAE LYNN P. GUEST, Administrative Patent Judges.

HASTINGS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of claims 8, 12, 13, and 14 as
unpatentable over at least the combined prior art of Chan (US 2002/0119697
A1; published Aug. 29, 2002), Matkovich (US 2005/0054238 A1; published
March 10, 2005), and Angele (US 3,670,290, issued June 13, 1972).2

1 The real party in interest is stated to be “EX COMPANY LIMITED”
(Appeal Br. 2).
2 The Examiner additionally applies Peng (US 8,092,252 B2, issued Jan. 10,
2012) to the rejection of claims 13 and 14 (Final Action 4; Ans. 5), but a
discussion of Peng is not needed for disposition of this Appeal.
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We have jurisdiction over the Appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claim 8 is representative:
8. A mobile terminal connector comprising:
an approximately cylindrical housing having an upper
wall, a lower wall and two side walls perpendicular thereto,
wherein the upper wall and the lower wall each extend from
one end of a connection terminal inserting side of the mobile
terminal connector to an opposite end of a contact terminal side
of the mobile terminal connector;
a support provided in a form of a wall in a rear section of
the housing;
a contact terminal and a power terminal supported by the
support;
a shell mounted inside the housing; and
a seal provided along an outer circumference adjacent to
an end on a connection terminal inserting side of the housing,
wherein the seal is welded to the housing and made of a
resin softer than a resin of the housing,
wherein an adhesive is provided in an innermost recess
surrounded by an inside of an innermost peripheral wall of the
housing and an innermost surface of the support.

Appeal Br. 21 (Claims Appendix).

OPINION
Upon consideration of the evidence in this appeal and each of
Appellant’s contentions as set forth in the Appeal Brief filed June 4, 2018, as
well as the Reply Brief filed October 24, 2018, we determine that Appellant
has not demonstrated reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection (e.g., Ans.
2–8 (mailed August 30, 2018)). In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365–66 (Fed.
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Cir. 2011) (explaining the Board’s long-held practice of requiring Appellant
to identify the alleged error in the Examiner’s rejection). We sustain the
rejections for the reasons expressed by the Examiner in the Final Office
Action and the Answer. We add the following for emphasis.
It has been established that “the [obviousness] analysis need not seek
out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged
claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007); see also In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1264–
65 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (A reference stands for all of the specific teachings
thereof as well as the inferences one of ordinary skill in the art would have
reasonably been expected to draw therefrom).
Appellant first disputes the Examiner’s findings with respect to the
housing of Chan as required in claim 8 (e.g., Appeal Br. 10–12; Reply Br. 2–
5). Appellant also contends that the Examiner failed to provide proper
reasoning to modify Chan with teachings from Matkovich and Angele (e.g.,
Appeal Br. 13–17; Reply Br. 5, 6). These arguments are not persuasive.
First, Appellant has not shown error in the Examiner’s position that
the housing as recited in claim 8 encompasses the housing of Chan in
accordance with the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim terms
(e.g., Final Action 3, 4; Ans. 2–4 (de facto explaining that Chan’s housing
Fig. 1 has four walls as recited and likewise extends as recited; see
Examiner’s annotated Fig. 5 of Chan)). In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,
496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (it is well established that “the PTO
must give claims their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the
specification” and if the Specification does not provide a definition for claim
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terms, the PTO applies a broad interpretation). Appellant concedes that the
Examiner’s interpretation is “possible,” but merely concludes that the
broadest possible interpretation is not the broadest reasonable interpretation
(Reply Br. 2) (emphasis omitted). This is not persuasive of error, as
Appellant directs us to no limiting definition in the Specification or other
evidence to contravene the Examiner’s interpretation nor any rationale as to
why the Examiner’s interpretation is unreasonable.3
Second, Appellant’s arguments regarding how Chan’s washer 40 and
cover 30 work such that it would not have been reasonable to weld seal 40 to
the housing (e.g., Appeal Br. 13, 14) are not persuasive of error, since one of
ordinary skill would have expected, from the teachings of Matkovich, that
the seal 40 could indeed be welded to securely fasten the seal to the housing
20 (e.g., in groove 23) and the device cover would still function as intended
to seal as discussed by the Examiner (e.g., Ans. 5).
Contrary to Appellant’s position, one of ordinary skill would have
readily appreciated that the electrical connector of Angele is indeed
analogous art to the claimed mobile terminal electrical connector4 and also

3 We further note that since there are no size or directional limitations on the
sides of the housing in the claim, one could also view the smaller side walls
of Chan’s housing 20 as being encompassed by claim 8’s language that
“each extend[s] from one end . . . to an opposite end . . . .” (that is, when the
connector is placed in a position where the shorter sides are respectively in
an upper and lower position).

4 Cf. In re ICON, 496 F.3d at 1379–80 (holding that analogous art with
regard to a folding mechanism of a treadmill, may come from any area
describing hinges, springs, latches, counterweights, or other similar
mechanisms); see also Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1238 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in KSR International Co. v.
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would have readily inferred that Angele’s adhesive/potting compound 72
would indeed have been useful to seal the other end of Chan’s electrical
connector, and would have required no more than ordinary creativity (Ans.
6; Appeal Br. 15, 16). KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 (“A person of ordinary skill is
also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”); Ball Aerosol &
Specialty Container, Inc. v. Limited Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 993 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (Under the flexible inquiry set forth by the Supreme Court, the
PTO must take account of the “inferences and creative steps,” as well as
routine steps, that an ordinary artisan would employ).
Finally, Appellant has not shown error in the Examiner’s
determination that the language of separately argued dependent claim 12
encompasses Chan’s seal configuration (Ans. 7, 8; Appeal Br. 18). While
Appellant asserts that the cover 30 of Chan would be unnecessary with the
structure of claim 12 (Appeal Br. 19), the claim does not preclude the use of
such a cover.
Accordingly, we affirm all of the Examiner’s rejections on appeal.

Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 . . . (2007), directs us to construe the scope of
analogous art broadly, stating that ‘familiar items may have obvious uses
beyond their primary purposes . . .’”).
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DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
Basis Affirmed Reversed
8 and 12 § 103 Chan,
Matkovich, and
Angele
8 and 12
13 and 14 § 103 Chan,
Matkovich, Angele,
and Peng
13 and 14
Outcome 8 and 12–14

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this Appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED