Shimadzu Corporation

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 30, 2020

2020003466 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 30, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/307,948 10/31/2016 Takashi SUZUKI 476574US40PCT 1139
22850 7590 12/30/2020
OBLON, MCCLELLAND, MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P.
1940 DUKE STREET
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314
EXAMINER
BERKE-SCHLESSEL, DAVID W
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1651
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/30/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
OBLONPAT@OBLON.COM
iahmadi@oblon.com
patentdocket@oblon.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte TAKASHI SUZUKI, NORIO NAKATSUJI,
HIROFUMI SUEMORI and SHINICHIRO CHUMA
____________

Appeal 2020-003466
Application 15/307,948
Technology Center 1600
____________

Before RICHARD M. LEBOVITZ, JEFFREY N. FREDMAN, and
MICHAEL A. VALEK, Administrative Patent Judges.

VALEK, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 submits appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) involving claims
to a cell differentiation state assessment method for pluripotent stem cells,
which have been rejected as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM IN PART.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies Shimadzu Corporation as the real
party in interest. Appeal Br. 1. Herein, we refer to the Final Office Action
mailed 4, 1, 2019 (“Final Act.”); Appellant’s Appeal Brief filed January 7,
2020 (“Appeal Br.”); Examiner’s Answer mailed February 5, 2020 (“Ans.”);
and Appellant’s Reply Brief filed April 6, 2020 (“Reply Br.”).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s “invention relates to a method for assessing the state of
differentiation of cells,” specifically pluripotent stem cells. Spec. ¶ 1.
According to the Specification,
in . . . conventional assessment methods, an invasive treatment
needs to be performed on the cells. Therefore, after the
assessment on the state of differentiation is completed, the cells
which have undergone the assessment process cannot be used
for other purposes; for example, they cannot be used as the cell
source for regenerative medicine. Furthermore, it is impossible
to assess a change of the same sample (i.e. cells in the same
culture dish) over time.
Id. ¶ 7.
For this reason, the Specification notes it is an “objective” of the
present inventors “to provide a method for assessing the state of
differentiation in a non-invasive manner.” Spec. ¶ 8. The Specification
explains “the present inventors have discovered that the amount of . . .
kynurenine . . . present in a culture supernatant change[s] depending on the
state of differentiation of the cells. Thus, the present invention has been
conceived.” Id. ¶ 9.
Claims 1, 3, 5, 8, 12, 16, and 21–34 are on appeal, and can be found in
the Claims Appendix of the Appeal Brief. Claim 1 is the only independent
claim and is reproduced below with numbering added to identify the claimed
steps:
1. A cell differentiation state assessment method,
comprising:
[1] collecting a culture supernatant of test cells cultured
in a culture medium;
[2] quantitatively analyzing the culture supernatant of the
test cells such that an amount of kynurenine in the culture
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supernatant of the test cells is measured;
[3] detecting a difference between the amount of
kynurenine in the culture supernatant of the test cells and an
amount of kynurenine in a culture supernatant of control cells
which are pluripotent stem cells and whose state of
differentiation is known; and
[4] detecting a state of differentiation of the test cells
based on a result of the difference between the amount of
kynurenine in the culture supernatant of the test cells and the
amount of kynurenine in a culture supernatant of control cells,
wherein the test cells are pluripotent stem cells whose
state of differentiation is unknown or cells obtained from
pluripotent stem cells which have been induced to differentiate,
and the detecting of the state of differentiation of the test cells
comprises detecting whether the test cells are in an
undifferentiated state or to detect whether the test cells include
undifferentiated cells..
Appeal. Br. 13.
Appellant seeks review of Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3, 5, 8,
12, 16, and 21–34 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent-ineligible
subject matter. Appeal Br. 2. Claims 3, 5, 8, 12, 16, and 23–34 are not
argued separately from claim 1. See generally id. at 2–11. We select claim
1 as representative for our analysis of Appellant’s arguments regarding these
claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.67(c)(vii). Appellant presents separate
arguments for claims 21 and 22, which we address below following our
analysis of the other claims. Appeal Br. 11–12; see also Reply Br. 6–8.

ANALYSIS
I. Subject Matter Eligibility
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit judicial exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank
Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In Alice step one, we ask whether the claims
are directed to an exception to patent eligibility, such as an abstract idea or
law of nature. Alice, 573 U.S. at 218. In Alice step two, we examine the
elements of the claims to determine whether they contain an inventive
concept sufficient to transform the claimed judicial exception into a patent-
eligible application. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71–72 (quoting Alice, 573 U.S. at
217–18).
The Office published revised guidance on the application of the
Supreme Court’s Alice analysis in January 2019. USPTO’s January 7, 2019
Memorandum, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. 50 (“Guidance”). According to the Guidance, we look to whether
the claim recites: (1) a judicial exception, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas such as mathematical concepts and mental processes
(Guidance Step 2A, prong 1); and (2) additional elements that integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application (Guidance Step 2A, prong 2).
Only if the claim recites a judicial exception and does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then examine whether the claim
adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-
understood, routine, conventional” in the field (Guidance Step 2B). See
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Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 54–56. An update to the Guidance further
elaborating on this analysis was published in October 2019. USPTO’s
October 17, 2019 Memorandum, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter
Eligibility, available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct _2019
_update.pdf (“Guidance Update”). Both the Guidance and Guidance Update
have since been incorporated into the MPEP.
Examiner’s Findings and Conclusions
Regarding Alice step one, Examiner finds that claim 1 is “directed to
an abstract idea: A cell differentiation method, comprising assessing a state
of differentiation of test cells.” Ans. 3. In addition, Examiner determines
Appellant’s claims recite a “natural correlation, wherein pluripotent stem
cells secrete kynurenine into the spent culture, and as these cells
differentiate, they secrete less amounts of this compound.” Ans. 8.
Examiner further determines that the judicial exception has “not been
integrated into a practical application.” Id. at 5.
For Alice step two, Examiner determines “Appellant has applied this
natural correlation to a method that utilizes well-understood, routine,
conventional activity, and as such, the claims are not eligible” under 35
U.S.C. § 101. Id. In particular, Examiner finds “[m]easuring cell
metabolites in a cell culture supernatant is a well-understood, routine, and
conventional laboratory practice to anyone of ordinary skill in the art of
(stem) cell research and experimentation” and the “use of LC-MS or GC-MS
to quantitatively analyze cells is well-understood, routine, and conventional
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in the art of cell culture and analysis.” Ans. 4 (citing Tateno2 and Cezar3).
According to Examiner, while the prior art may not “acknowledge” the
natural correlation between cell differentiation state and the amount of
kynurenine in the culture supernatant, “it does not change the fact that the
method steps of quantitively analyzing a culture supernatant for a small
molecule, including the molecule claimed, is a routine and conventional
activity.” Ans. 10.
Appellant’s Contentions
Appellant argues that claim 1 is not directed to a patent–ineligible
abstract idea. Appeal Br. 12. In addition, Appellant contends that “there is
no evidentiary support for the proposition” that steps 1-3 of claim 1 “were
ever used in a method of non-destructively assessing the differentiation state
of pluripotent stem cells” and that Examiner’s “withdrawal of the prior art
rejection is an admission that the steps are NOT conventional or routine.”4
Appeal Br. 8–11; see also Reply 2–5. For the same reason, Appellant
contends these steps “recite additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application which was previously unknown and
not obvious.” Appeal Br. 8; see also Reply Br. 5–6.

2 Tateno et al., US 9,500,650 B2; issued Nov. 22, 2016, (“Tateno”).
3 Gabriela G. Cezar et al., Identification of Small Molecules from Human
Embryonic Stem Cells Using Metabolomics, Stem Cells and Development
Vol. 16, 869–882 (2007) (“Cezar”).
4 The obviousness rejection in the Final Action was withdrawn prior to this
Appeal in an Advisory Action mailed September 30, 2019, and is not before
us now.
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Our Review
Applying the Supreme Court’s Alice framework as explained in the
Office’s Guidance, we agree with Examiner that Appellants’ claims are
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. The Guidance instructs us first
to determine whether any judicial exception to patent eligibility is recited in
the claim.5
Guidance Step 2A, Prong 1
In step 4, claim 1 recites the following limitation: “detecting a state of
differentiation of the test cells based on a result of the difference between the
amount of kynurenine in the culture supernatant of the test cells and the
amount of kynurenine in a culture supernatant of control cells, wherein the
test cells are pluripotent stem cells whose state of differentiation is unknown
or cells obtained from pluripotent stem cells which have been induced to
differentiate.” This limitation, given its broadest reasonable interpretation,
recites a law of nature, namely that the amount of kynurenine in cell culture
supernatant is correlated with the state of differentiation of pluripotent stem
cells.
Indeed, Appellant acknowledges that “[t]he claimed invention is
predicated on the recognition that pluripotent stem cells when cultured will
express different levels of kynurenine depending upon whether the cells
have differentiated or not.” Appeal Br. 7. This recognition of the naturally–
occurring correlation between kynurenine levels and cell differentiation is

5 It is undisputed that Appellants’ claims are directed to one of the statutory
classes of patentable subject matter, i.e., a method or “process,” recited in 35
U.S.C. § 101. Thus, we begin our analysis at Step 2A, prong 1 of the
Guidance.
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similar to the judicial exceptions recited in other claims held to recite a
patent ineligible law of nature by our reviewing courts. See Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 77 (2012)
(Claims reciting “laws of nature–namely, relationships between
concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a
dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause harm.”);
Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d
1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Claims reciting “multistep methods for
observing the law of nature that MPO [i.e., a particular enzyme found in
blood] correlates to cardiovascular disease.”). Thus, we agree with
Examiner that claim 1 recites a “natural correlation,” i.e., a law of nature,
which is one of the recognized judicial exceptions to patent eligible subject
matter.6 See Ans. 8–10.
Guidance Step 2A, Prong 2
Having determined that claim 1 recites a judicial exception, our
analysis now turns to determining whether there are additional elements that
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (Guidance Step
2A, prong 2). “Integration into a practical application” requires that the
claim recite an additional element or a combination of elements, that when
considered individually or in combination, “apply, rely on, or use the
judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the

6 We do not agree that Appellant’s claims recite an “abstract idea.” Ans. 3.
More accurately stated, the claims here recite a law of nature or natural
phenomena, which are likewise recognized as judicially recognized
exceptions to patent eligibility. See MPEP 2106.04(b).
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judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed
to monopolize the judicial exception.” MPEP 2106.04(d).
We begin by observing that claim 1 broadly recites the steps
necessary for observing the law of nature recited in step 4. In step 1, the test
sample of supernatant is collected. In step 2, the amount of kynuerine in that
sample is measured. In step 3, that amount is compared to the amount of
kynuerine present in the supernatant from a culture of control cells to detect
whether there is a difference between the two.
Given their broadest reasonable interpretation, none of these steps
impose any meaningful limit on how these activities are performed to
observe the recited law of nature. Rather, step 1 encompasses any way of
collecting supernatant from pluripotent stem cells cultured in any type of
culture medium. This understanding is confirmed by the Specification.
Spec. ¶ 17 (“[A]ny culture medium generally used for the culturing of stem
cells can be used.”).
Similarly, steps 2 and 3 of claim 1 do not limit how the kynuerine in
the test and control samples is measured. The Specification explains that “a
liquid chromatogram mass spectrometer (LC-MS) or gas chromatograph
mass spectrometer (GC-MS) can suitably, but not exclusively, be used” to
make these measurements. Spec. ¶ 18 (emphasis added). “As another
example,” the Specification indicates “an agent or the like which makes [the
kynuerine] develop a specific color or emit specific light may be added to
the culture supernatant” such that the amount of kynuerine “can be
determined based on the intensity of the coloring or emission of light.” Id.
Accordingly, the Specification confirms that the claim 1 is not limited to any
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particular methodology of measuring kynuerine to detect a difference
between the amount in the test sample and the control.
Step 4 of claim 1 recites the law of nature, instructing that the state of
differentiation is detected “based on a result of the difference between the
amount of kynurenine in the culture supernatant” of the test and control
samples. Like the other steps, step 4 does not specify any particular
methodology or technique for this detection. It merely instructs the user to
observe the naturally-occurring correlation between supernatant kynurenine
levels and the differentiation state of the pluripotent stem cells based on the
data gathered in the prior steps. The limitation requiring that the test cells be
“pluripotent stem cells” or “cells obtained from pluripotent stem cells” may
either be considered part of the law of nature itself, i.e., kynurenine levels
correlate to the level of pluripotent stem cell differentiation, or a “field of
use” limitation to the extent the same naturally-occurring correlation may be
observed in other types of cells. See MPEP 2106.05(h) (explaining that
“linking the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological
environment or field of use” generally does not integrate that exception into
a practical application). In either event, it does not meaningfully limit the
recited law of nature.
Petitioner argues that claim 1 integrates “the judicial exception into a
practical application” by reciting limitations that “provide for specific, non-
obvious steps which must be performed to make the assessment.” See
Appeal Br. 8–11 (distinguishing prior art). The relevant inquiry, however, is
not whether the law of nature that Appellant observed in its application was
or was not obvious. As explained above, the steps of claim 1 are the steps
necessary to observe the naturally-occurring correlation recited at a high
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level of generality that encompasses essentially any way of doing so. Such
limitations do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
Rather, when considered both individually and as ordered combination, the
steps of claim 1 are merely instructions to apply the judicial exception itself
in any way the user sees fit. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79 (determining that
steps limiting the claim to a particular field of use and telling the user to
determine metabolite levels though “whatever process the doctor or
laboratory wishes to use” amount “to nothing significantly more than an
instruction to doctors to apply the applicable law[]” of nature). For these
reasons, we conclude that the judicial exception is not integrated into a
practical application and, therefore, claim 1 is directed to the law of nature
itself.
Guidance Step 2B
Proceeding to Alice step 2 (i.e., Step 2B as provided in the Guidance),
we agree with Examiner’s findings that the elements of Appellants’ claims,
considered both individually and in combination, do not provide an
inventive concept beyond the judicial exception itself. See Ans. 4–11. We
incorporate those findings herein and additionally address Appellant’s
arguments below.
Appellant contends that steps 1-3 of claim 1 are not well-understood,
conventional, or routine. Reply Br. 2–5; see also Appeal Br. 8–11. The gist
of Appellant’s position is that Tateno and Cezar, i.e., the references
Examiner cites as evidence on this point, are different from the method in
claim 1 and do not teach assessing the cell differentiation state of pluripotent
stem cells based on the level of kynurenine in the cell culture supernatant.
Id. This may be so, but again whether or not the recited law of nature would
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have been obvious to a skilled artisan is not the relevant inquiry for section
101. See MPEP 2106.05 (Explaining that “the search for an inventive
concept should not be confused with a novelty or non-obviousness
determination.”). An inventive concept “cannot be furnished by the
unpatentable law of nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) itself.”
Genetic Techs. v. Merial LLC, 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Rather, the question for Alice step 2 is whether the claim recites additional
limitations separate and apart from the judicial exception that provide an
inventive concept. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78 (After determining that a claim
is directed to a judicial exception, asking “[w]hat else is there in the claims
before us?”).
For claim 1, the answer to this question is no. As explained above,
steps 1-3 are simply the steps necessary to the data used to apply the law of
nature in step 4. There is no limit placed by the claim on how the steps are
performed. The use of standard laboratory techniques to gather data used to
observe the law of nature or other judicial exception has consistently been
found to be well-understood, routine, and conventional activity. See, e.g.,
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79; Cleveland Clinic, 859 F.3d at 1362 (detecting and
determining biomarker levels using standard techniques); see also In re
Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 839–40 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (step requiring “performing
clinical tests on individuals to obtain data” for recited mathematical
algorithm did not transform claim into patent eligible subject matter). There
is nothing in the record before us that suggests the same is not true within
the particular context of claim 1. To the contrary, Tateno describes the
collection and measurement of stem cell culture supernatant for a biomarker
to determine the differentiation state of those cells by comparing the amount
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of the marker in a test sample to a control. See, e.g., Tateno 4:27–32, 4:65–
5:2 (describing measurement of supernatant to assess differentiation state),
9:8–16, 30:35–52 (describing comparison to a control).
The record further supports that claim 1 encompasses the use of
routine and conventional techniques to measure kynurenine in the
supernatant. As explained above, the Specification describes the use of
conventional equipment for these measurements. Spec. ¶ 18. In addition,
Cezar describes the use of the same equipment and techniques to measure
kynurenine levels in supernatant from pluripotent stem cell culture. See
Cezar 870 (Teaching that “[s]mall molecule metabolites” such as kynurenine
“can be measured by nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) or mass
spectrometry” and noting “[i]n this study, we specifically employ
electrospray ionization time of flight mass spectrometry (ESI-TOF-MS),
which provides highly accurate measurements.”) (citations omitted).
Therefore, the measurement of kynurenine was known at the time the
application was filed.
Appellant points out that “[t]he mere fact that something is disclosed
in a piece of prior art, for example, does not mean it was well-understood,
routine, and conventional.” Reply Br. 4 (quoting Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,
881 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). But Examiner’s findings are
supported by more than just a single piece of prior art. The Specification
evidences that standard analytical techniques, instrumentation and materials
are used to carry out the steps of claim 1. See Spec. ¶¶ 17–18. Examiner’s
findings are further supported by both Tateno and Cezar as well as
additional references cited therein. For example, Cezar cites a number of
references for the proposition that small molecule metabolites can be
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measured using various techniques, which further evidences that such
measurements are well-understood, routine, and conventional in the art. See
Cezar 870.
Lastly, to the extent Appellant contends that “comparing the amount
of the kynurenine in the supernatant from the test cell culture with the
amount in the culture of stem cells having a known degree of
differentiation,” i.e., comparing the test sample to a control, constitutes an
inventive concept for purposes of assessing patent eligibility, we disagree.
See Reply Br. 4–5. It is beyond dispute that the concept of comparing a test
sample to a control is a routine, conventional, and well-understood scientific
technique. Nor is there anything in claim 1 that suggests the recited control
is used in an unconventional manner. To the contrary, claim 1 states that the
“control cells” are simply “pluripotent stem cells . . . whose state of
differentiation is known,” which are compared to “test cells” that are
“pluripotent stem cells whose state of differentiation is unknown” to detect
whether there is a difference in the amount of kynurenine between the two.
This accords with the use of a control as evidenced in the prior art cited by
Examiner (see, e.g., Tateno 30:35–56) as well as scientific practice
generally.
In this regard, it is instructive to compare Appellant’s claim 1 to the
claims the Federal Circuit considered in Cleveland Clinic. There, like claim
1 here, the claims at issue recited a natural law––namely that the level of a
naturally-occuring enzyme (MPO) in a blood sample is correlated with the
subject’s risk of cardiovascular disease. Cleveland Clinic, 859 F.3d at
1360–61. Those claims further recited “a ‘determining’ step that require[d]
analyzing MPO levels” and “a ‘comparing’ step where MPO levels are
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compared to a statistically derived control or predetermined values.” Id. at
1362. Our reviewing court explained that such steps, considered both
individually and as a whole, were nothing more than “a general instruction .
. . to apply routine, conventional techniques” and, therefore, did “not
sufficiently transform the natural existence of MPO in a bodily sample and
its correlation to cardiovascular risk into a patentable invention.” Id. We
see no meaningful difference between the “determining” and “comparing”
steps in Cleveland Clinic and steps 1–3 in Appellant’s claim 1. The steps of
claim 1, like those in Cleveland Clinic, “merely tell those ‘interested in the
subject about the correlations that the researchers discovered’” through the
use of conventional detection and comparison methods. Id. (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 78).
For these reasons, we agree with Examiner that claim 1 does not recite
an inventive concept sufficient to transform the claim into patent eligible
subject matter and, therefore, affirm the rejection of that claim. We affirm
the rejection of claims 3, 5, 8, 12, 16, and 23–34, which are not argued
separately, for the same reasons we affirm the rejection of representative
claim 1.
II. Claims 21 and 22
Claims 21 and 22, depend from claim 1 and recite as additional steps:
replacing the culture medium for the test cells and a
culture medium for the control cells after the collecting of the
culture supernatant of the test cells; and
repeating the collecting and analyzing of the culture
supernatant of the test cells, the detecting of the difference, and
the detecting of the state of differentiation.
Appeal Br. 14.
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Appellant argues claims 21 and 22 separately from the other claims,
urging that “[t]here is no evidence that either of these steps were ever
performed as part of a process of determining the state of pluripotent stem
cell differentiation” and that they constitute “further meaningful limitations
which are neither routine nor obvious.” Appeal Br. 11–12.
Examiner does not respond to Appellant’s separate arguments
regarding these claims, nor has Examiner articulated specific finding
regarding the additional limitations of claims 21 and 22. See generally Ans.
6–11. For this reason, we agree with Appellant that Examiner’s burden to
present a prima facie showing for claims 21 and 22 has not been met. See
Reply Br. 7 (“The [E]xaminer bears the initial burden, on review of the prior
art or on any other ground, of presenting a prima facie case of
unpatentability.”) (citing In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir.
1992)). Accordingly, based on the record presently before us, we are
compelled to reverse Examiner’s rejection of claims 21 and 22.7
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:

7 Some of Appellant’s other dependent claims recite additional limitations
similar to those in claims 21 and 22. We do not speculate as to why
Appellant did not also present similar separate arguments for those claims,
but note that any such arguments have been waived because they were not
presented in the Appeal Brief. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.67(c)(vii).
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Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3, 5, 8,
12, 16, 21–
34
101 Eligibility 1, 3, 5, 8,
12, 16,
23–34
21, 22

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED IN PART