EEOC Appeal No. 0120171605
10-11-2017
Sherman K. v. Dep't of Homeland Sec.
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
Sherman K.,1
Complainant,
v.
Elaine Duke,
Acting Secretary,
Department of Homeland Security
(U.S. Secret Service),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120171605
Hearing Nos. 570-2014-00361X;
570-2015-00136X
Agency Nos. HS-USSS-01216-2013;
HS-USSS-00741-2014
DECISION
On March 31, 2017, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency's final action with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission REVERSES the Agency's final action.
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Police Officer in the Agency's Uniformed Division at Headquarters in Washington, D.C. On January 17, 2013, Complainant's wife gave birth to their son. Complainant requested and was approved to take approximately two weeks of annual leave following his son's birth. On March 28, 2013, Complainant submitted a memorandum requesting approximately 456 hours of sick leave from May 13, 2013 through July 31, 2013, under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Complainant stated in the memorandum that he was requesting the leave due to being "the primary caregiver during this time" for his newborn son. Complainant included a leave slip in which he stated he was requesting leave under FMLA because "child care doesn't start until August 1, 2013." Complainant did not submit any medical documentation in support of the request.
Complainant's supervisor (S1) received and reviewed the FMLA sick leave request. Complainant informed S1 that his son was in good health and had no serious medical condition. S1 consulted with the Human Resources (HR) Specialist regarding Complainant's request. The HR Specialist informed S1 that Complainant's sick leave request for child care purposes was not consistent with the Agency's sick leave policies. Further, the HR Specialist advised S1 that an employee may request leave without pay (LWOP) or may utilize annual leave and/or compensatory time for this type of absence under FMLA. Based on this information, S1 recommended that Complainant's sick leave request be denied, and forwarded the request and his recommendation to Complainant's second-level supervisor (S2). S2 concurred with S1's recommendation because the request did not conform to the laws and policies governing the use of sick leave. Complainant's third-level supervisor (S3) concurred with the denial as well. The request was then forwarded to the Uniformed Division's Assistant Chief for a final ruling. The Assistant Chief determined that Complainant's request did not fall within the guidelines of FMLA and he concurred with the previous recommendations to deny the request.
The Foreign Missions Branch (FMB) Control Center positions are staffed by employees chosen by the Watch Commander, who fills the positions and the length of the position term is left to the discretion of the Watch Commander. Complainant was recommended for selection to the FMB Control Center by the previous Watch Commander. S1, the Watch Commander, received the applicant lists for the FMB Watch Commander Pick positions for 2013-2014 on or about May 10, 2013. Complainant was not selected for one of the Control Center positions. S1 selected two selectees for positions in the FMB Control Center. Selectee 1 had already been serving in one of the two Control Center Officer positions for approximately two months at the time and Selectee 2 was serving as an alternate.
In January 2014, the Recruiting Office had a temporary vacancy which needed to be filled quickly. Complainant was referred as a possible candidate to fill the vacancy. During a conversation about potential candidates, the Recruiting Lieutenant eliminated Complainant from further consideration based on his recollection of a conversation he had with Complainant in which Complainant told him that he did not want to work in the Recruiting Office. The Chief discussed the names provided to him for consideration. The Chief did not select a candidate from the list and, instead, chose a candidate (Selectee 3) who "popped" into his head.
On August 1, 2014, the Agency issued Vacancy Announcement No. UND-BS284-14 for two Officer-Technician positions in the Recruitment Division. Complainant and 22 other applicants applied for the position. The Chief narrowed down the pool of 23 applicants for the open positions by identifying those who had previously been certified to conduct Uniformed Division applicant interviews known as Structured Panel Interviews. Complainant and four other applicants had the requisite experience. The Chief forwarded the five candidates to the Special Agent-in-Charge (SAIC) of the Recruitment Division. SAIC and the Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge (ASAIC) interviewed the five candidates. Following the interviews, SAIC and ASAIC independently ranked the candidates and found that their rankings were identical. Both ranked Complainant fourth out of the five candidates and he was not selected. SAIC forwarded the rankings of the five candidates to the Chief. The Chief selected the top two ranked candidates (Selectee 4 and Selectee 5) based on SAIC and ASAIC's recommendations.
On May 22, 2013, Complainant filed a formal complaint (Agency No. HS-USSS-01216-2013) alleging that the Agency discriminated against him on the bases of sex (male) and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when:
1. On April 1, 2013, he was notified that the Captain denied his request to use 456 hours of sick leave under the Family Medical Leave Act to provide care and bond with his newborn son; and
2. On May 20, 2013, he was notified that the Captain did not extend his preferred assignment to work in the Control Center, Foreign Missions Branch, but instead gave the assignment to another officer with an effective date of August 1, 2013.
On April 15, 2014 (and amended on September 30, 2014), Complainant filed a second formal complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against him in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when:
3. On January 30, 2014, he was notified that he had not been selected for an unofficial temporary position in the Recruiting Office; and
4. On September 19, 2014, he was notified that he had not been selected for an Officer Technician position in the Recruiting Office.
After its investigation into the complaints, the Agency provided Complainant with copies of the reports of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. The AJ consolidated the complaints on February 4, 2015. The Agency submitted a motion for summary judgment on June 10, 2016. Complainant responded on June 27, 2016. The AJ subsequently issued a decision by summary judgment in favor of the Agency finding that Complainant had not been subjected to discrimination or reprisal.
In his decision, the AJ determined that Complainant had established a prima facie case of discrimination and reprisal as to claims (1) and (2), but not for claims (3) and (4). Regarding claim (3), Complainant alleges that the Inspector and possibly the Recruiting Lieutenant subjected him to reprisal when they failed to select him for a temporary detail position. The AJ found, however, that it was undisputed that the Inspector could not consider Complainant for the detail because the Recruiting Lieutenant removed Complainant's name from the list of candidates to be considered for the position. The Recruiting Lieutenant stated that he was unaware of Complainant's prior EEO activity and Complainant failed to present specific evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact. Therefore, the AJ found that Complainant failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of reprisal as to claim (3). Regarding claim (4), Complainant claimed that the Chief, SAIC, and ASAIC retaliated against him when they failed to select him for a permanent Officer Technician position. The AJ determined that there was no evidence that SAIC and ASAIC had any knowledge of Complainant's prior EEO activity when they recommended Selectee 4 and Selectee 5 to the Chief for selection. As a result, the AJ found that Complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of reprisal.
Next, the AJ found that the Agency had articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions in claims (1) and (2). With respect to claim (1), the Agency asserted that Complainant requested sick leave pursuant to FMLA to provide care for his son. The Agency stated that applicable rules and/or regulations governing sick leave usage taken pursuant to FMLA required that such leave be taken to address a "serious health condition" of a family member, including Complainant. The Agency contended that Complainant indicated that he requested the leave to care for his son and confirmed that his son did not have a serious health condition. As to claim (2), S1 declared that he selected Selectee 1 and Selectee 2 for the two positions in the FMB Control Center. The AJ concluded that S1 provided a detailed explanation for his decision.
The AJ then found that Complainant failed to show that the Agency's reasons for its actions were pretextual. With respect to claim (1), the AJ determined that Complainant failed to provide substantive evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact regarding the Agency's explanation for denying his FMLA sick leave request. Specifically, Complainant failed to establish that the Agency granted sick leave pursuant to FMLA where no demonstration of a "serious health condition" existed. Further, the AJ determined that Complainant failed to provide evidence that the responsible management officials exhibited discriminatory animus.
Finally, regarding claim (2), the AJ found that Complainant did not establish that there was a material fact in dispute as to S1's explanation for selecting Selectee 1 and Selectee 2. Additionally, the AJ found that Complainant failed to provide evidence to create an inference that S1 did not extend his preferred work assignment in retaliation for his protected EEO activity. Accordingly, the AJ concluded that Complainant had not been subjected to discrimination or reprisal as alleged.
As the Agency did not issue a final order within 40 days of receipt of the AJ's decision, the decision of the AJ became the final action of the Agency. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(i). The instant appeal followed.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
On appeal, Complainant contends that the AJ erred by drawing inferences in favor of the Agency and disregarded evidence contradictory to the Agency's position. Complainant argues that the AJ's decision erroneously found that the Agency was entitled to make policies and decisions regarding its application of FMLA leave, but ignored that the Agency's policies are applied in a discriminatory manner that favors women. Complainant claims that the Agency approves female officers' requests to use FMLA leave for leave related to pregnancy, child birth, and child care regardless of whether the women provide any medical documentation. He notes that he identified at least five female officers who were not required to provide medical documentation to receive approval for leave under FMLA. Complainant adds that the Agency asserted that according to its policies a female may only use sick leave under the FMLA "when incapacitated for the performance of duties by pregnancy or childbirth" in order to "recuperate from the delivery;" however, in practice, women are permitted to use leave in order to bond with and provide care for their healthy newborn. Complainant contends that he requested sick leave under the FMLA in order to provide care for his newborn child and had he been female, the Agency would have permitted him to use sick leave under the FMLA for that purpose. Complainant argues that because his request to use FMLA leave would have been denied even if he requested annual leave under the FMLA or leave without pay under the FMLA, he was treated differently than female employees who were permitted to use annual leave and/or leave without pay to care for their healthy newborn children.
In addition, Complainant argues that he established a prima facie case of reprisal as to each of the three positions and employment opportunities that he was denied. Complainant contends that each decision maker in the positions at issue was aware of his protected EEO activity. Complainant notes that S1 began treating him differently after he filed his informal EEO complaint. Further, Complainant notes that he was the only employee whose Watch Commander Pick position was not extended and that the Agency's general practice was for officers to receive the full three-year assignment unless there were performance issues or the officer did not request or bid on the position. Regarding the temporary Recruiting Office position, Complainant claims that the Chief had no explanation for why his name did not "pop into his head" as a possible candidate other than he allegedly had too much experience. Finally, with respect to the permanent Recruiting Office position, Complainant argues that the AJ erred in accepting the Agency's explanation at face value as a legitimate business decision, rather than evaluating the lack of evidence to support such a decision. Further, Complainant notes again that the ultimate selecting official, the Chief, had "unfettered" control over selecting the employee to fill the position and could have made a selection decision beyond the recommendations of SAIC and ASAIC. Accordingly, Complainant requests that the final action be vacated and remanded back to the AJ for a hearing.
The Agency submitted a brief in opposition to Complainant's appeal in which it urged the Commission to affirm the AJ's decision without a hearing, and disputed Complainant's arguments that there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ's legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency's final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a) (stating that a "decision on an appeal from an Agency's final action shall be based on a de novo review . . ."); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, � VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (providing that an administrative judge's determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de novo). This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ's, and Agency's, factual conclusions and legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9, � VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
The Commission must determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.
If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty v. Dep't of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003); Murphy v. Dep't of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 01A04099 (July 11, 2003). Finally, an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding a hearing unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling is given (1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without a hearing, (2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed material facts, (3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and (4) the chance to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary. According to the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary judgment "where the [party opposing summary judgment] has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In the hearing context, this means that the administrative judge must enable the parties to engage in the amount of discovery necessary to properly respond to any motion for a decision without a hearing. Cf. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an AJ could order discovery, if necessary, after receiving an opposition to a motion for a decision without a hearing).
The courts have been clear that summary judgment is not to be used as a "trial by affidavit." Redmand v. Warrener, 516 F.2d 766, 768 (1st Cir. 1975). The Commission has noted that when a party submits an affidavit and credibility is at issue, "there is a need for strident cross-examination and summary judgment on such evidence is improper." Pedersen v. Dep't of Justice, EEOC Request No. 05940339 (February 24, 1995).
After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the AJ erred when he concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact in this case. With respect to claim (1), the AJ relied on the Agency's explanation that it denied Complainant's FMLA sick leave request because his request was inconsistent with the Agency's polices governing sick leave. Specifically, the Agency claimed that it denied the request because Complainant was not requesting the leave to provide care for a family member with a serious health condition. The AJ found that Complainant produced no evidence that women were granted leave under FMLA where no demonstration of a serious health condition existed. The Commission finds, however, that the AJ overlooked Complainant's submitted evidence purporting to show that numerous female officers requested and were granted FMLA leave without being required to submit medical documentation in support. See, e.g., Complainant's Opposition to Agency's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exs. 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, and 22. Additionally, Complainant submitted evidence contending that the Agency permits female employees to use annual leave and/or leave without pay under FMLA while Agency officials indicated that his request for the same type of leave would have been denied. This is sufficient evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Agency applied its leave policies in a discriminatory or retaliatory manner.2
Additionally, as to the three assignments and non-selections for the positions at issue in claims (2), (3), and (4), the Commission finds that, after drawing all justifiable inferences in Complainant's favor, there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute regarding whether management's reasons for its actions were pretextual. Regarding claim (2), Complainant claimed that his preferred assignment in the Control Center was not extended despite receiving good reviews, no disciplinary action or performance counseling, and despite the Agency's general practice of extending an officer's assignment the full three years absent performance issues or the office choosing not to request the position. Further, the record established that S1 learned of Complainant's protected EEO activity approximately 14 days prior to his selection decision, and Complainant was the only employee who S1 did not extend.
With respect to the temporary position at issue in claim (3), the Commission finds that the AJ erred in finding that Complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of reprisal. Complainant alleged that the Chief, the selecting official for both positions, had knowledge of Complainant's prior protected EEO activity from 2008 and 2013, prior to his selection decisions. Furthermore, there is conflicting evidence regarding Complainant's interest in the position with Complainant directly informing the Recruiting Lieutenant via a January 28, 2014 email that he was interested in the position while the Recruiting Lieutenant recalled that Complainant told him in December 2013 that he was not interested in the position. This discrepancy creates a genuine issue of material fact as to why Complainant was not considered as a candidate for the temporary position. Notwithstanding, the Chief made a selection outside of the listed candidates of an employee that "popped into his head."
Likewise, regarding claim (4), the Commission finds that Complainant has established a genuine issue of material fact in dispute regarding whether his qualifications were "plainly superior" to Selectee 4 and Selectee 5. Complainant noted that he held the same Officer-Technician position at issue for three years and was the only one of the five candidates who previously held a permanent position in the Recruiting Office. Further, the record indicates that neither selectee had the level of recruiting experience that Complainant possessed. The AJ relied upon SAIC and ASAIC's statements that Complainant did not treat the interview with the seriousness and professionalism that they expected. For example, both SAIC and ASAIC stated that Complainant placed his wallet on top of SAIC's desk during the interview which they both viewed as unprofessional. Complainant has disputed these reasons as grounds to penalize his interview not "legitimate business expectations." Finally, Complainant raised issues with the Chief's selection decision and argued that the Chief had "unfettered" control over the selection for the permanent position just as he did with the temporary position discussed above.
The Commission notes that the hearing process is intended to be an extension of the investigative process, designed to ensure that the parties have "a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain and supplement the record and, in appropriate instances, to examine and cross-examine witnesses." See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 7-1 (Aug. 5, 2015); see also 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(e). "Truncation of this process, while material facts are still in dispute and the credibility of witnesses is still ripe for challenge, improperly deprives Complainant of a full and fair investigation of her claims." Bang v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01961575 (March 26, 1998). See also Peavley v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05950628 (October 31, 1996); Chronister v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05940578 (April 25, 1995).
Based on the above, the Commission finds that, after drawing all justifiable inferences in Complainant's favor, there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute regarding whether management's reasons for its actions were pretextual. Additionally, there are simply too many unresolved issues which require an assessment as to the credibility of the various management officials, co-workers, and Complainant, himself. Therefore, judgment as a matter of law for the Agency should not have been granted as to this complaint.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including Complainant's arguments on appeal, the Agency's response, and arguments and evidence not specifically discussed in this decision, the Commission VACATES the Agency's final action and REMANDS the matter to the Agency for further processing in accordance with this decision and the Order below.
ORDER
The Agency is directed to submit a copy of the complaint file to the EEOC Hearings Unit of the Washington Field Office within fifteen (15) calendar days of the date this decision is issued. The Agency shall provide written notification to the Compliance Officer at the address set forth below that the complaint file has been transmitted to the Hearings Unit. Thereafter, the Administrative Judge shall hold a hearing and issue a decision on the complaint in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109 and the Agency shall issue a final action in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0617)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The Agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall be in the digital format required by the Commission, and submitted via the Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.403(g). The Agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant. If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File a Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0617)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 � VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant's request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The agency's request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC's Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0610)
This is a decision requiring the Agency to continue its administrative processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or filed your appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden's signature
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
October 11, 2017
Date
1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website.
2 The Commission takes this opportunity to recognize that individuals who are also caregivers to either children or the elderly may face sex-based disparate treatment in the workplace. See Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, EEOC Notice No. 915.002, 8-12 (May 23, 2007).
---------------
------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
------------------------------------------------------------
11
0120171605