Shelly J. Ratzlaff, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Southwest Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 25, 2004
01A33145 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 25, 2004)

01A33145

03-25-2004

Shelly J. Ratzlaff, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Southwest Area), Agency.


Shelly J. Ratzlaff v. United States Postal Service

01A33145

March 25, 2004

.

Shelly J. Ratzlaff,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(Southwest Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A33145

Agency No. 4G-730-0122-02

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation

Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons, the Commission

AFFIRMS the agency's final decision.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was employed

as a Letter Carrier at the Fairview Post Office, in Fairview, California.

Complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently filed a formal

complaint on September 19, 2002, alleging that she was discriminated

against on the basis of disability when, on July 22, 2002, complainant

submitted her resignation because she was forced to scrub the carrier

case with a bleach and water solution.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of

her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or

alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant

requested that the agency issue a final decision. In its FAD, the agency

applied a disparate treatment analysis, and concluded that complainant

failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in that she

did not identify a similarly situated individual, not in her protected

class, who was treated more favorably under similar circumstances.

The FAD concluded that complainant failed to prove that the challenged

action was discriminatory.

Complainant makes no new contentions on appeal. The agency requests

that we affirm its FAD. As an initial matter we note that, as this is

an appeal from a FAD issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �

1614.110(b), the agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the

Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a).

Because complainant contends that she requested (and was denied)

�light duty,� which we will assume for purposes of this analysis

was a request for reasonable accommodation within the meaning of the

Rehabilitation Act, we begin by analyzing this claim within a reasonable

accommodation framework. Under the Commission's regulations, an agency

is required to make reasonable accommodation to the known physical and

mental limitations of a �qualified individual with a disability� unless

the agency can show that accommodation would cause an undue hardship.

29 C.F.R. �� 1630.2(o) and (p). Here, assuming arguendo complainant

is an individual with a disability pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act,

complainant herself asserts that she �cannot perform the major function

of [her] position as a Letter Carrier.� Report of Investigation, at

Affidavit A. She contends however, that � there are certainly other

jobs within the [agency] that [she] could perform.� Id.

Here, complainant did not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that she was a qualified individual with a disability. In reaching

this conclusion, the Commission finds that complainant admitted that she

could not perform the essential functions of her Letter Carrier position

and that as a form of accommodation, she was requesting a reassignment.

However, complainant did not identify a specific vacant, funded position

to which she could have been reassigned. We note that absent evidence

of a particular vacant position, evidence that a vacant funded position

existed may be inferred based on documentary or testimonial evidence

regarding, inter alia: (1) complainant's qualifications; (2) the size of

the agency's workforce; and (3) indicia of postings and/or selections

during the pertinent time period within classes of jobs for which

complainant would have been qualified. See Barnard v. United States

Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 07A10002 (August 2, 2002). Complainant

failed to develop this evidence through requesting a hearing before an

Administrative Judge, or otherwise, and it is her burden to do so.

Considering this claim using a disparate treatment analysis, we note that

complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned

by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). She must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating

that she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be

dispensed with in this case, however, since the agency has articulated

legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See United

States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,

713-17 (1983); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request

No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, complainant must

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's explanation

is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center

v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Department of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley v. Department of

Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997); Pavelka

v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (December 14, 1995).

Again, assuming arguendo complainant is an individual with a disability

pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act, and that she otherwise established a

prima facie case of disability discrimination, we find that the agency

has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action;

namely, the Officer-in-Charge (O1) stated that on the day in question,

after all the mail had been worked and sent out on routes, there was

no other work available within complainant's medical restrictions.

O1 further stated that because of the heightened security measures

concerning anthrax at the time, she instructed complainant to clean

the carrier case in accordance with the instructions from the District.

She further testified that she also assigned other employees to similar

duties. Complainant argues that the work that she was assigned was

�demeaning� and intended as �punishment.� Complainant additionally

contends that in the past, the Postmaster had always found �productive�

work for complainant to do. Nevertheless, complainant has failed to

show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's articulated

reason was a pretext for disability-based discrimination. Therefore,

after a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration

of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the agency's final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Par 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

March 25, 2004

__________________

Date