Shell Oil Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 13, 1972

194 N.L.R.B. 988 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

988 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Shell Oil Company and its divisions Shell Chemical
Company and Shell Development Company and
OR, Chemical & Atomic Workers International
Union, AFL-CIO, and its Locals Nos. 1-2, 1-5,
1-19, 1-120, 1-128, 1-210, 1-547, 1-589, 2-477,
4-367, 4-750, 7 389, 7-390, 8-800. Case
2-CA-11628
January 13, 1972
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND KENNEDY
On August 6, 1971, Trial Examiner Arthur Leff
issued the attached Decision in this proceeding.
Thereafter, the General Counsel and the Charging
Party filed exceptions and supporting briefs, and
Respondent filed cross-exceptions and a supporting
brief.'
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the Trial
Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions, cross-
exceptions, and briefs and has decided to affirm the
Trial Examiner's rulings, findings, and conclusions
and to adopt his recommended Order.2
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that
the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in
its entirety.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ARTHUR LEFF, Tnal Examiner : This case is based on a
charge filed on August 22, 1968, by the Unions above
named (herein collectively called either the Union or
OCAW) against the Companies above named (herein
collectively called either the Respondent or Shell) and a
complaint issued on September 23, 1970 , alleging that the
Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor
Relations Act in respects to be stated below. The
Respondent in its ' answer denied the commission of the
alleged unfair labor practices . A hearing on the issues of
this case was held at New York City on March 15-17, 1971.
Briefs were filed by all parties on May 21, 1971, and a reply
brief was filed by the Respondent on June 15, 1971.
Upon the entire record , including my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses , and after due consideration of
the briefs filed by the parties, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Shell Oil Company, a Delaware corporation , which has
its principal office and place of business in New York City
and operates plants and other places of business in the
States of California, Louisiana, Indiana, Michigan, New
Jersey, Colorado, Texas, and Washington, is engaged in
purchasing, producing, refining, distributing, and market-
ing petroleum, chemical, and related products. The
Respondent annually ships products valued in excess of
$50,000 in interstate commerce from its various places of
business where they are produced to States in the United
States other than their source of origin, as well as in foreign
commerce to foreign countries . The Respondent, as it
admits, is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2),(6), and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The International Union and its various locals named in
the caption of the complaint are labor organizations within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
' The Charging Party's request for oral argument is hereby denied, as
the record, the, exceptions, the cross -exceptions and briefs adequately
present the issues and the positions of the parties.
2 We hereby correct the following inadvertent errors in the Trial
Examiner's Decision which in no way affected his decision nor our
adoption thereof The last sentence of the 15th paragraph of sec. III, B
should read , "in every instance the basic modification as proposed by Shell
has either been accepted by the Union or implemented by Shell after
impasse " In the first sentence of the ninth paragraph of sec. III, C, the
dates should be changed to January 15, 1970, and November 26, 1969,
respectively . In fn . 15, "Respondent" should read "Charging Party and
General Counsel ." Finally, in Appendix A the table should be changed to
reflect that the OCAW International was certified as the representative of
the specified unit at the Shell Oil Refinery in Anacortes , Washington, on
12-23-55 and that the unit contains 214 employees ; that the OCAW
International and Local 7-389 were certified as the representative of the
specific unit at the Shell Oil Marketing Plant in Detroit , Michigan, on
3-10-39, and that the Shell Development Co. is located at Emeryville,
California
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Central Issue
Broadly stated, the issue presented for determination is
this: In light of the limited subject matter involved and the
character of the parties past dealings with regard to that
subject matter, did the Respondent unlawfully refuse to
bargain in good faith with the Union in July 1968, and
thereafter, by rejecting the Union's request that it meet and
bargain at a single time and place with the OCAW
representatives of some 19 separate bargaining units of its
employees concerning revisions in certain company-wide
fringe benefit plans, although the plans themselves , as well
as the changes therein which Shell had proposed , and which
the Union on behalf of all OCAW-represented bargaining
194 NLRB No. 166
SHELL OIL COMPANY 989
units had counterproposed, were uniform for all such
bargaining units?
B. Background
Shell employs at its numerous locations in the United
States a total of about 36,000 employees. About 10,000 of
them are represented by various unions in about 80
separate bargaining units. OCAW is by far the largest single
bargaining representative. Its International and/or various
affiliated locals are the certified representatives of nearly
6,000 Shell employees who, at the time of the events in
issue, were grouped in 19 separate bargaining units. The
units vary in size from less than 100 employees (eight units)
to morethan 1,000 employees (two units) and are located in
various States, including, California, Colorado, Indiana,
Louisiana, Michigan, New Jersey, and Washington.'
Attached hereto as Appendix A is a table, drawn from a
stipulated exhibit in the record, showing with respect to
each of the 19 OCAW- represented bargaining units of
Shell employees, as of about the time of the alleged refusal
to bargain, the location of the unit, the date of certification,
the identification (International, Local, or both) of the
certified representative, a general description of the unit
composition, and the number of employees in the unit.2,
Historically, all collective-bargaining agreements to
which Shell has been a party, including those covering the
bargaining units here involved, have been negotiated
between local management and local bargaining unit
representatives, and separate contracts have been executed
covering the employees in each unit separately. No
negotiations have ever been conducted on a multiunit or
companywide basis.
The employees in each of the OCAW- represented units
are covered by a number of uniform companywide fringe
benefit plans or programs which are applicable as well to all
other Shell personnel, including nonunion employees,
employees represented by other unions, and supervisory
and management personnel. Specifically involved in this
proceeding are the following:
(1) The Shell Pension Plan, which provides a retirement
income for Shell employees computed in accordance with
the formula set out in the plan. The plan is funded by Shell
without employee contributions and is administered by
Shell-appointed trustees. Pension benefits for Shell employ-
ees have existed in some form since 1938.
(2) The Shell Provident Fund, which has existed in one
form or another since 1939. This is a savings program,
which is administered by Shell-appointed trustees, to which
employees may contribute up to a stipulated maximum
percentage of their earnings, with their contributions
matched by Shell, for investment at their option either in a
thrift fund (bonds, debentures, and the like), an equity fund
1 Of the more than 60 bargaining units represented by unions other than
OCAW, only 6 contain more than 100 employees , the largest has 690
employees.
2 Two of the 19 listed units , the production and maintenance unit at
Torrence , California , and the unit of testers and gaugers in the State of
California , are no longer represented by OCAW.
3 Not directly involved in this proceeding is another company benefit
plan, the Health , Surgical and Medical Plan (HSM ), which covers some
OCAW-represented employees and some employees in units represented by
other unions , as well as all nonrepresented Shell employees . It appears that
(similar to a stock mutual fund), or in Shell stock. The
Provident Fund is designed primarily to provide savings for
employees' use after their termination or retirement, but
employees also have limited withdrawal rights during their
employment.
(3) The Shell Survivor Benefit Plan , first established in
1952, which provides life insurance under a group policy for
employees up to a specified proportion of their annual
earnings, with premiums paid by Shell.
(4) A Group Life Insurance Program, dating from 1944,
which permits employees to purchase additional life
insurance coverage at group rates, but at their own expense.
(5) A Disability Plan in existence since 1938, which
provides income in stipulated amounts and for stipulated'
periods to employees unable to work because of accident or
illness.3
The provisions of the companywide fringe benefit plans
are not written into the negotiated collective-bargaining
agreements which cover terms and conditions of employ-
ment generally, and, unlike such agreements, which are for
fixed terms, allow for modification at any time. Particularly
with respect to the Pension Plan and the Provident Fund,
Shell' has always resisted union efforts to have their benefit
provisions guaranteed for fixed periods. The Pension Plan
and Provident Fund, as written, reserve to the Shell-
appointed trustees the right to amend, modify, or terminate
Shell's participation in them at any time. When, as has
occurred in a few instances, collective-bargaining contracts
have made reference to benefits provided by the company-
wide plans, the contracts have always included a caveat
that "these plans will be subject to any change, revision, or
revocation which is made generally effective throughout the
Company," or language of similar import.
Shell has never disputed that changes in the benefit plans
at issue are subject to the Act's bargaining requirements,
even where, as in the case of the Pension Plan and the
Provident Fund, the underlying trust agreements, reserve to
the trustees broad authority to add to, modify, or even
revoke employee benefits that have been announced to
employees. At various times during the many years the
plans have been in existence Shell has effected changes in
the plans. As will more fully appear below, whenever such
changes were made, Shell has always abided by the
formalities of bargaining before making such changes
operative for represented employees, by first proposing the
change to the representative of each bargaining unit, and by
according that representative an opportunity both to voice
its objections, if any, and to meet with local management to
discuss the changes. Similarly, whenever OCAW unit
representatives have made proposals of their own for
benefit plan changes, Shell has agreed to discuss such
proposals on the individual unit level.
It is the contention of the General Counsel and the
most OCAW-represented units, as well as some units represented by other
unions, refused to join in the HSM plan when it was first proposed in 1953,
preferring to remain under the Blue Cross or other plans by which they
were already covered. In those instances Shell agreed to supplementary or
substitute plans Shell subsidizes the substitute plans to the same extent
that it does its own HSM plan . There have been times when Shell in
negotiations with a union for a particular unit has conceded an increase in
the amount of its subsidy. It then similarly increased the amount of its
subsidy under its own HSM plan, and also extended the same increase to
all other units covered by substitute plans
990 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Charging party, however, a contention disputed by the
Respondent, that the "bargaining" which has occurred at
the individual unit level has amounted to no more than
sterile discussions; that any meaningful bargaining at the
local level has realistically been precluded by the central-
ized and uniform manner in which Shell has historically
administered and effected changes in its benefit plan. That
contention provides one of the pillars on which the General
Counsel rests his argument that it was unlawful for Shell in
1968 to reject the OCAW demand for simultaneous
bargaining on behalf of all OCAW units concerning benefit
plan changes. It is important, therefore, before turning to
the events which immediately gave rise to this proceeding,
to examine the manner in which Shell has decided upon
and implemented changes in the benefit plans at issue, the
extent to which Shell has followed a policy of uniformity
with respect thereto, and the nature of the bargaining that
has taken place at the local level with respect to changes in
the fringe benefit plans that have been proposed by the
Company or counterproposed by the Union.
The facts relating to the manner in which Shell has
historically decided upon changes to be made in the benefit
plans at issue and has proceeded to implement its decisions
are not essentially in dispute. Shell maintains at its
corporate headquarters (located at the time this case arose
in New York City) a policy and benefits division. That
division conducts a continuous review and analysis of
Shell's fringe benefit plans, taking into account the fringe
benefit programs of other companies, changes in relevant
legislation such as in the Social Security Act, reports and
recommendations from plant and field employee relations
managers, feedbacks from the field concerning proposals
and requests made by the unions with which Shell bargains,
and all other information which the division deems
pertinent. Based on the studies it makes, the information it
receives, and its own evaluation of what is appropriate, the
policy and benefits division from time to time recommends
changes in the benefit plans. These recommendations are
then considered, along with the cost factors involved, by the
appropriate corporate officers who make the final decision.
The timing of the decision and its announcement are not
geared to coincide with the expiration date of any OCAW
unit contract. This was true, not only when the OCAW
contracts had different expiration dates, but also during
recent-,pears when most of the OCAW units' contracts have
had common expiration dates. For example, when the
changes which are specifically involved in this case were
announced by Shell in May 1968, the OCAW units had
contracts expiring December 31, 1968, or shortly thereafter.
Once a decision has been made at Shell's corporate
headquarters to revise a fringe benefit plan, a letter is
drafted addressed to "all employees" announcing and
describing the change. Shortly before this letter is scheduled
to be mailed to employees generally (10 days in the case of
the May 1968 changes), it is sent to each of the unit
bargaining representatives with which Shell deals, along
with a standard covering letter drafted at Shell's headquar-
ters, but signed by local management. The covering letter
states the effective date of the revisions that have been
decided upon, the date on which the announcement of the
change will be released to Shell's employees generally, and
Shell's intention to make the announced revisions applica-
ble to the unit's employees unless their union objects by a
stated date. The letter concludes with an expression of local
management's willingness to meet with the union to discuss
the matter, if so requested.
On frequent occasions, one or more unions , following
receipt of Shell's proposal, have requested meetings, raised
objections, or presented counterproposals. On such occa-
sions, Shell has proceeded to make the changes effective as
of the originally announced date for all unrepresented
employees, as well as for employees represented by unions
which have not objected, but has deferred doing so for
employees represented by an objecting union pending that
union's agreement to the changes.4 Whenever objections or
counterproposals have been presented by a unit representa-
tive, local Shell management has always met and discussed
them with the objecting unit representative. However,
except for one instance involving a relatively insignificant
concession which affected the benefits of only one
employee,5 Shell in the end has invariably refused to
modify either the formulation or substance of its own
proposal in any respect. As was stipulated by all parties at
the hearing, "in every instance the basic modification as
proposed by Shell has either been accepted by Shell or
implemented by Shell after impasse.""
More often than not, the benefit revisions fashioned by
Shell have been announced at times when OCAW
collective-bargaining contracts were not open for negotia-
tions, and the OCAW unions were contractually precluded
from striking.6 OCAW unit representatives, however, have
frequently presented proposals of their own while contracts
were open for negotiations, and also on occasions have
deferred until that time the consideration of their
objections or counterproposals to changes which Shell had
earlier initiated or proposed. The union proposals made at
the individual unit level always contemplated changes
within the framework of the existing companywide benefit
plans, and never sought a completely separate or substitute
plan applicable only to the unit involved in the negotia-
tions. Local management at the individual unit level has at
no time refused to discuss with the unit representatives the
union proposals that were submitted. However, aside from
the instance mentioned above when Shell predated for the
Houston unit the effective date of a survivor benefit change
to take care of the widow of one deceased employee, the
record discloses only a single respect in which Shell has ever
yielded a concession in local negotiations in response to a
union proposal or counterproposal. That concession
involved a provision in the Shell disability plan which, as
last revised, requires a 1-day waiting period for nonoccupa-
tional disability before an employee is entitled to benefits.
During the 1954 negotiations in the Sewaren unit, which
was then represented by a predecessor union of the OCAW,
4 In most but not all situations, however, when the objecting union did September 25 rather than on October 1, as originally proposed, in order to
finally agree to the proposed changes, Shell would agree to apply them benefit the widow of an employee who had died in the interim. The
retroactively to the originally announced effective date. deceased employee had been a mayor in the community.
5 At the Houston refinery in 1957, Shell agreed to make an 6 The no-strike articles in the contracts made no exception for midterm
improvement in its survivor benefit plan effective for that unit on • disputes relating to the benefit plans.
SHELL OIL COMPANY
local Shell management agreed by letter to "consider
waiving on an individual case basis the waiting period .. .
subject to such administrative safeguards as may be
determined necessary by the Company." The record
discloses that somewhat similar waivers with respect to the
1-day waiting requirement now also exist at two other of the
smaller OCAW units where that requirement would
otherwise have been applicable. Although there is no direct
evidence showing how these waivers came about, it is
reasonable to infer that they also were the product of local
negotiations.
With the two relatively minor exceptions just noted, Shell
has never responded in contract negotiations to union
proposals for benefit changes by agreeing to accept any
union proposal, in whole or in part. Nor, has Shell during
contract negotiations ever made any specific counterpropo-
sal to union requests for changes in an effort to meet or
compromise proposals made by OCAW unit
representatives.7
In discussing union proposals for change, the Company's
local negotiators at times would indicate in'a general way
that their headquarters office had under consideration
benefit improvements of the kind in which the Union was
then interested, but, when they did so, they always carefully
refrained from any specific commitment that such changes
would actually be forthcoming. At other times, the
company negotiators rejected such union proposals without
giving any indication of what might be in prospect, even
where a change of similar kind was almost ready for
announcement on a companywide basis. The last is vividly
illustrated by the following: In the 1954 contract negotia-
tions in the California "statewide" unit which were
conducted in January and February of that year, the Union
proposed the elimination or reduction of the waiting penod
in the disability plan, which was then 3 days. During
discussions of the Union's proposal, the Company made no
counterproposal and indicated no willingness to modify the
waiting period in any respect. The Union ultimately
dropped its demand in the final contract wrap-up in order
to achieve a contract. Two days later, Shell advised the
Union at all locations that it was revising its disability
benefits plan to reduce the waiting penod from three days
to one day. The Union in its brief points to the foregoing
incident as providing "the best single illustration of the
futility of local bargaining with respect to these fringe
benefit plans."
In the end, the Union always had to withdraw its
7 The Respondent in its brief refers to the 1971 negotiations in the
Norco unit when, it says, the Company "offered a substitute plan in
response to union demands for increased pensions, by saying they were
willing to consider a, trade for a reduced provident fund contribution." A
careful reading of the underlying evidence makes reasonably clear,
however, that the statement alluded to was neither intended by the
company negotiators, nor considered by the union negotiators, as the
proffer of a specific counterproposal aimed at bringing the parties closer to
agreement The Union had asked for an increase in the pension multiplier
to raise it to a level equal to that provided for in pension plans of certain
other employers. The Company's position was that its pension plan should
not be considered in isolation but in tandem with its Provident Fund which
served to implement employee retirement benefits The expressed
willingness to "consider" a trade for a reduced provident fund contribution
appears to have been mentioned in passing simply to point up Shell's
argument that, with the Provident Fund taken into account, its total
benefit package was clearly superior to those of the other companies to
991
proposals for benefit plan changes made during contract
negotiations in order to close out a contract. This was
normally done at the final wrap-up stage of the negotia-
tions, after negotiations had reached the point where each
side felt it had extracted from the other all concessions it
was likely to get on its affirmative demands. It was the
usual practice of the negotiating parties at that time
mutually to agree to drop all other items remaining in issue
so as to clear the way for the final consummation of a
contract. The Union's benefit demands would be with-
drawn as part of that "package" arrangement. Under this
wrap-up arrangement the Union actually gained nothing of
economic value in specific exchange for the withdrawal of
its proposals for benefit changes.
According to the General Counsel' s witnesses , the give
and take of bargaining that existed with respect to other
matters has been wholly lacking when it came to the benefit
plans. This is disputed by the Respondent. The Respondent
however was able to show but one, and at most two,
instances in more than 20 years of bargaining in some 19
separate units where a specific trade involving a benefit
plan matter was effected. During the 1958 negotiations in
the California "statewide" unit, the Union objected to
proposals Shell had submitted for revisions in its Pension
Plan and Provident Fund programs, and presented certain
counterproposals of its own. A deal was finally concluded
under which the Union consented to having the Company's
benefit plan changes made applicable to the "statewide"
unit and the Company agreed in exchange to pay a subsidy
toward HSM coverage for present and future retirees .8 The
second and more questionable instance occurred in the
1971 Houston unit negotiations, which were held after the
complaint in this proceeding had issued. Near the end of
the negotiations, the Company presented the Union a
package settlement proposal which turned out to be its last
proposal short of settlement. It then proposed a contract
wrap-up under which each side would drop all of its
remaining outstanding items not already satisfied by the
package proposal. The Union then had four such remaining
items, including one for benefit improvement and one for
the liberalization of vacation computation. In making its
wrap-up proposal the Company specifically mentioned the
Union's benefits improvement proposal as one of the items
to be dropped. The Union rejected the wrap-up proposal,
saying something had to be added in exchange for the items
it was being asked to drop. Subsequently, the Company, as
an addition to its earlier package proposal, offered to
which the Union had made reference. Had the company negotiators
seriously intended to make a specific proposal of the sort claimed, they
would have been required under company policy to obtain the prior
clearance of company headquarters. It was admitted that the Norco
negotiators had not checked with company headquarters for that purpose.
8 This finding is based on the testimony , credited in this respect, of
Verle G Whittington, Shell's manager of industrial relations. Whittington's
testimony was partially disputed by Virgil Coragliotta, an OCAW
International representative. On the point of their disagreement, the
minutes of the negotiating meeting involved appear more consistent with
Whittington's testimony than with Corgliotta's.
The record does not specifically show whether the HSM subsidy for
retirees which was agreed to in these negotiations was subsequently
extended to retirees on a companywide basis, but , from other evidence in
the record relating to Shell's policy in matters of this kind , it is reasonable
to infer that it was.
992 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
concede substantially on the Union's request for liberaliza-
tion of the vacation computation if the Union would agree
to give the Company more flexibility in the use of a job
classification, called permanent vacation breaker. The
Union accepted that proposal and simultaneously agreed to
a wrap-up arrangement as to all remaining outstanding
items.
So far as appears, OCAW has never made its failure to
achieve results in local bargaining on benefits issues a
subject for strike action. Verle Whittington, Shell's manager
of industrial relations, testified that the Company never
appraised OCAW proposals in this area as potential
"stumbling blocks" to the settlement of contracts until
perhaps the most recent negotiations in late 1970 and early
1971. Whittington attributed this "lack of pressure" from
OCAW to the fact that Shell's benefits programs, on
balance taken as a package, were among the best offered by
the major companies in the oil industry, an industry which
itself was in the top bracket of all American industry with
respect to such programs.
The Respondent denied in its answer the complaint's
allegations that it centrally determines all revisions,
modifications, and changes in the benefit plans at issue and
that it follows a policy of uniformity in their implementa-
tion. The facts set out above concerning the mechanics
involved in making and announcing changes in the benefit
plans can leave no doubt, however, that such changes are
centrally determined. The allegation that Shell follows a
policy of uniformity in the implementation of such changes,
even where it goes through the formalities of separate unit
bargaining at local levels, appears to be equally supported
by the evidence as a whole.
Except for the variations specifically mentioned
above-the predating in the Houston unit of the survivor
benefit change, the effect of which was to benefit the widow
of one employee, and the modification of the 1-day
disability benefit waiting period in three of the smaller
-units-the only local deviation from uniformity to which
Shell has been able to point relates to a special bonus
package described in the marginal note and known as the
"golden handshake," which Shell itself conceived, and
which, with union acquiescence, it has offered at various
times to employees at facilities faced with a large reduction
of force .9 However, considering its nature and purpose, as
well as the manner in which it has been applied, the "golden
handshake" cannot, analytically, be classified as a local
variation from uniformity, and certainly not one negotiated
at the behest of the Union. The General Counsel in his brief
characterizes it as in effect "a separate supplement to [the
pension] plan uniformly made available at Shell's discre-
tion to meet a layoff situation at any of its locations." This
appears to be a fair characterization.
9 The "golden handshake" was designed to encourage in large layoff
situations the early voluntary retirement of older employees (over 50 years
of age with at least 20 years of service) and thereby allow for the retention
of younger employees with less seniority who otherwise would be forced to
go It offers such older employees, if they elect early retirement within a
limited period of time, a waiver of the Pension Plan's retirement eligibility
requirements and an upward revision of pension credits, as well as a
substantial cash bonus in the form of extra severance pay The "golden
handshake" has never been incorporated in the pension plan itself or made
part of any collective-bargaining agreement It was first offered by Shell in
1961 at one of its facilities in the California "statewide unit" at the time of
Considering the breadth of the benefit plans at issue and
the multitude of terms, rules , and regulatory provisions
contained in them, the fact that no more variations from
complete uniformity have occurred than those shown
above, in over 20 years of local bargaining covering some
19 separate units, strongly suggests that Shell 's local
managers are expected as a,matter of company policy to
conform in local bargaining to decisions centrally arrived
with respect to Shell 's companywide fringe benefit plans.
Other and more specific evidence serves to confirm a
finding to that effect . Thus, it was stipulated at the hearing
that Shell requires its local managers to obtain head office
approval for any change in its benefit plans. Extracts of
minutes of local bargaining sessions that are in evidence
reveal a number of instances where local negotiators for
Shell attributed to Shell's policy to maintain uniformity in
its Pension Plan and the Provident - Fund, their own
inability to agree to local deviations . On one occasion,
when union negotiators accused local management of
inability to bargain about changes in the benefit plans, the
company negotiator , denying the charge, asserted that local
management was fulfilling its bargaining obligation by
obtaining the Union 's recommendations . He -then went on
to explain that the local union could not expect local
management to bargain otherwise on a companywide plan.
Shell 's centralized control of local bargaining on benefit
plans is perhaps best reflected by what occurred in the 1970
negotiations when the OCAW bargaining representatives
made separate but identical pension proposals to Shell at
each of the bargaining units.10 The OCAW proposals were
submitted by Shell's local managers to Shell's policy and
benefits division , and, after study and analysis by that
division , were discussed at a meeting of local management
officials held at central headquarters . There a collective
judgment was arrived at to reject OCAW's demands, as was
subsequently uniformly done in all units . The only matter
that was left to the discretion of the local managers was the
form of the presentation and choice of arguments to be
used at the local level to support the collective judgment
-that had been reached.
C. The Specific Events Giving Rise to the
Complaint
On May 10, 1968, Shell sent a written notice to the
certified representatives of each of the OCAW-represented
units, advising that "revisions will be made in the Shell
Pension Plan, Shell Provident Fund, Survivor Benefit, and
Group Life Insurance Programs for Shell employees
generally." The notice in each instance was signed by local
Shell management in the unit to which the notice was
directed. Attached to each notice was a separate letter
a large layoff, and subsequently on the occasions of two further layoffs at
plants in that unit in about 1965 and in 1969, it was also utilized at the
Houston unit in 1962 and 1964, once in the Denver unit, and in the Norco
unit in 1963. On each occasion it was proposed by Shell and in each
instance was identical in its terms , except that when it was last applied, at
California in 1969, it was modified at the Union 's request to extend the
privilege of early retirement to employees who had 20 years of service but
were not yet 50 years of age.
is This was after Shell had rejected the OCAW request for bargaining at
a single time and place, to be discussed infra
SHELL OIL COMPANY
addressed to all employees, summarizing in detail the
proposed benefit plan changes. In all but five of the units,
the notice to the union representatives stated that the
revisions would be made applicable "to the employees
whom you represent unless you object, in which event we
should appreciate hearing from you by June 10, 1968." At
the remaining five units the current collective-bargaining
contracts contained provisions which Shell construed as
permitting it to effect the proposed revisions unilaterally.
The notices involving these units differed from the others in
that they stated that the changes would become effective on
the dates specified in the attached employee announcement
letter." At the time the foregoing notices were sent, none of
the collective-bargaining contracts in the OCAW-repre-
sented units was open for negotiation; 15 of the contracts
were due to expire on December 31, 1968, 2 on January 31,
1969, 1 on March 31, 1969, and 1 on May 1, 1969.
Following the receipt of the May 10, 1968, notice of
benefit changes, the OCAW held a special meeting of its
Shell Council, which is composed of local union representa-
tives from all Shell units, to discuss Shell's proposed benefit
plan revisions. It was decided at that meeting to present
Shell with a uniform set of counterproposals on behalf of all
OCAW locals. The Council adopted a resolution, subse-
quently ratified by all Shell locals, recommending that these
counterproposals be presented to the Company with anoint
letter on behalf of all OCAW-represented units requesting
"common bargaining on these subject matters."
On July 17, 1968, A. F. Grospiron, OCAW's Internation-
al president, wrote a letter to John C. Quilty, Shell's vice
president in charge of personnel and industrial relations, in
which he submitted the Union's uniform counterproposals
to Shell's proposals of May 10, 1968, and proposed that
representatives of Shell meet with representatives of
OCAW and its locals "at some reasonable time and single
location for the purpose of collective bargaining in regard
to the . . . plans." In his letter, Grospiron explained that
"since the Company's proposed revisions are identical
regardless of location, and the Union's counterproposals
are identical, regardless of location, it seems unreasonable
to the Union for the parties to have to bargain at various
different times and locations for revisions in these Plans."
On July 26, 1968, Shell, through Quilty, responded to
Grospiron's letter. In its letter, Shell pointed out that
OCAW and certain of its locals were the certified
collective-bargaining representatives for Shell employees in
19 separate bargaining units which historically had
negotiated separate bargaining contracts for each unit, and
then added:
We are convinced that all collective bargaining matters
should be handled on a bargaining unit basis rather
than through any type of multiple-unit arrangement.
Accordingly, we are not prepared to accept your
proposal that meetings be held on a multiple-unit
arrangement.
As in prior years, Shell's management at each
bargaining unit location will be quite prepared to meet
with the collective bargaining representative of their
employees at an appropriate time to negotiate with
11 The five units referred to were located at Detroit and Grand Haven,
Michigan, Sewaren, New Jersey, Denver, Colorado, and East Chicago,
993
respect to these plans or any other proper subject
matter.
On August 16, 1968, the Union filed its unfair labor
practice charge giving rise to this case . The charge alleged
that Shell had violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) by "failing
and refusing to meet and confer in good faith at a
reasonable time and place with respect to pension plans,
provident fund and death benefit plan... .11
The exchange of letters which preceded the filing of the
charge had dealt only with the Shell Pension Plan,
Provident Fund, and Survivor Benefit Plan . However, on
October 17, 1968, Grospiron wrote Shell a further letter, in
which, after adverting to the unfair labor practice charge
filed by the Union, he proposed that Shell and OCAW
"meet on the same basis as requested in my letter of July 17,
1968, and bargain collectively in good faith regarding the
Shell group life insurance plan and the Shell disability
plan." Shell in its reply, dated October 21, 1968, reiterated
that it was "convinced that all collective bargaining matters
should be handled on a bargaining unit basis rather than
through any type of multiple unit arrangement" and that,
accordingly, it was "not prepared to accept [the Union's]
proposal that meetings be held on a multiple-unit
arrangement."
Under date of November 26, 1969, Shell wrote a further
letter to the Union in which it repeated its earlier objection
to bargaining about the benefit plans on a multiple-unit
basis, but stated that it recognized "an obligation to meet
with the bargaining representative of our employees and
discuss the time and place of any bargaining session." The
letter went on to state that, while it was Shell's "initial
position" that the convenience of all parties was best served
by continuing the past practice of meeting "with the
bargaining representative of a particular unit at the physical
location reasonably located in the vicinity of the installa-
tion covered by the bargaining unit," it would be "willing to
meet with the representative[s] of any of the bargaining
units to consider any proposal by such bargaining unit to
meet at a different physical location than in the past." The
Union did not immediately reply to this letter.
Most of the collective-bargaining contracts between Shell
and the OCAW expired on December 31, 1968. Prior to the
expiration dates of such contracts, the parties began local
bargaining for new contracts. There was, however, no
bargaining in any of the OCAW units on the five benefit
plans at issue, since the Union adhered to its position that
these matters should be handled separately and centrally
while the Company continued to maintain its stand that
multiple-unit bargaining concerning the benefit plans was
not appropriate and could not be required. For a
considerable time , because of the resultant impasse, the
Company's May 10 proposals were not placed into effect
for any of the OCAW units, except for the five, referred to
above, as to which the Company had construed the
applicable contracts as allowing it to act unilaterally. On
January 2, 1969, however, the Company separately advised
the appropriate union representatives of each of the
remaining 14 units that it was making its proposed May 10,
1968, revisions effective for the employees in those units
Indiana
994 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
notwithstanding the Union's views with respect thereto. In
the same letter the Company advised each of the unit
representatives of its willingness to bargain on a separate
unit basis with respect to the revisions that had been made
or any counterproposal the unit representative might wish
to submit.
On January 15, 1971, OCAW President Grospiron
responded to the Company's letter of 'November 26, 1970.
Taking issue with the Company's interpretation of the
Union's position "as a demand for the merger of individual
and separately certified units into one companywide unit,"
Grospiron stated:
If there is anything in my prior letters which in any way
implied a desire on our part to alter or combine existing
bargaining units, I want to assure you that this is not
our intention at all . Indeed, if the Company were to
agree to the form of bargaining which we have
requested, we would be perfectly willing to agree in
writing that we will not at any time use the new method
of bargaining to support any claim or contention that
there has been a change in the nature , scope, or status of
the existing separately certified bargaining units.
Grospiron in his letter went on to "make very clear what we
are trying to accomplish ," stating in pertinent part:
We realize that such uniformity [in the Company's
benefit plans ] is no accident, but is the result of
conscious Company policy. We also realize that, as a
practical matter, no individual bargaining committee,
representing the employees of dust one bargaining unit,
can ever hope to have an effective voice in determining
the terms and conditions of those benefit programs,
since the Company cannot accept any proposal at any
individual unit without departing from the principle of
uniformity . On the other hand , if all the bargaining
units involved make the same demands, we would hope
that the Company might accept at least some of them.
Accordingly, our International Union and the Local
Unions involved have decided to make identical
proposals . . . and to designate a single committee to
bargain on behalf of all of the units with respect to such
proposals.
we have asked you . . . to appoint a similar committee
... to bargain both about our proposals and about any
proposals you might wish to present. Any agreement
reached in such negotiations would be applicable to and
binding upon each of the separate bargaining units
represented. If you should so desire, we could
incorporate the terms of any such agreement into
separate contracts for each of the separate units
involved, so that there could be no question that the
separate status of those units has been preserved.
* * * * *
Inherent in our proposal . . . is the concept of
simultaneous bargaining for all of the affected bargain-
ing units, with representatives of both sides of the
bargaining table, who have authority to speak for all of
them. We see no purpose in meeting on a plant-by-
plant, unit-by-unit basis, when we are dealing with
uniform proposals concerning uniform, company-wide
benefit plans. No progress could ever be made if we had
to re-hash the same issues and the same arguments
separately for each separate unit.
On March 16,1970, Shell responded to Grospiron' s letter
last referred to. It again rejected the OCAW proposal for
simultaneous bargaining on the benefits plan. It construed
the OCAW proposal, elaborated upon in Grospiron's last
letter, as one which "demanded bargaining with all units as
one, or with none" and which called for agreement "with all
or none," and this, it declared, "would result, in form and
effect, [in] a merger of all separately certified units into one
company-wide unit, at least for the purpose of bargaining
and reaching an agreement on the benefit programs." Shell
adhered to its earlier expressed position that:
bargaining, on an individual unit basis with the
representatives of separately certified units is the only
form of bargaining compelled under the law, that it is
the form of bargaining historically followed the the
past, and that this form of bargaining on an individual
unit basis best serves the purposes of the National
Labor Relations Act and the interest of both parties.
At the request of the Union, a meeting of Shell and
OCAW representatives was held on May 21, 1970, in an
effort to resolve the controversy. At that meeting, Shell
indicated a willingness to meet for purposes of bargaining
about the benefit plans and programs at central locations in
geographical areas where several bargaining units are
located, but insisted that such bargaining must be
conducted on a unit-by-unit basis. The Union repeated its
willingness to give Shell written assurances that it would not
rely on the form of bargaining it was requesting as a basis
for merging or consolidating the established units. There
was, however, no change in the basic position of either of
the parties , and the meeting came to nought.
D. Analysis and Conclusions
The gravamen of the complaint is that Shell violated
Section 8(a)(5) of the "Act by rejecting the requests of
OCAW, made on July 17 and October 17, 1968, to meet at a
single time and place with the designated representatives of
all 19 OCAW units for the purpose of common bargaining
with respect to Shell's uniform benefit plans, and by
insisting, instead, that it would only bargain individually
with the representatives of each separate bargaining unit.
Broadly stated, it is the position of the General Counsel and
the Union that, in the circumstances of this case, Shell's
rejection of the OCAW request for simultaneous bargaining
was unreasonable, and served only to frustrate meaningful
bargaining, since the employees in all 19 units were covered
by precisely the same benefit plans; Shell had historically
followed a policy of centralized determination and uniform
implementation with respect to benefit plan revisions;
Shell's proposals and the OCAW counterproposals pending
at the time of the refusals were identical for all OCAW
units; and-so the proponents of the complaint
assert Shell had no good reason for refusing to engage in
simultaneous bargaining other than a desire to perpetuate
the "ineffective bargaining" that had occurred in the past
when conducted on a unit-by-unit basis. The General
Counsel and the Union urge the Board to apply to this case
SHELL OIL COMPANY
the principle which the Board has declared and applied in
other cases, although admittedly in different contexts and
heretofore only in single unit situations, that an employer
violates Section 8(a)(5) by insisting that negotiations occur
at a time and place which the Board finds under all the
circumstances to be unreasonable and inhibitive of
meaningful bargaining.12
Shell disputes that the reasonableness of its refusal to
engage in simultaneous bargaining is a relevant criterion in
determining its obligation' to bargain in the manner
requested by the Union. it also contests some of the
subsidiary contentions urged by the General Counsel,
among them, that meaningful and effective bargaining
cannot be conducted with regard to the benefit plans on an
individual unit basis, and that it had no good reason for
refusing to engage in simultaneous bargaining. Basically,
however, Shell defends its refusal on the ground that under
the Act it was not obligated to bargain on a basis broader
than the established individual units that had separately
been found by-the Board to be appropriate for the purposes
of collective bargaining. More specifically, it contends that
the OCAW requests for simultaneous bargaining contained
in its letters of July 17 and October 17, 1968, would, if
acceded to, have resulted in a merger of the separately
established units into a single companywide bargaining
unit, at least for the purpose of bargaining on the benefit
plans, and that it was, therefore, lawfully justified in
viewing and rejecting the requests as an attempt by the
OCAW to breach the integrity of the certified separate
bargaining units.
On equitable considerations, and without regard to
existing law, the Union's position is not without consider-
able appeal. It does seem sensible, reasonable, and just that
Shell, which formulates its pension plan revisions on the
basis of a collective judgment, centrally arrived at, and
presents them to all OCAW units on a common basis,
should be required to meet and bargain with all OCAW
units on the same basis. Such a centralized form of dealing
would not only avoid the rehashing of issues and arguments
19 different times; it would be more apt to provide the
conditions for, though it would not necessarily assure, more
meaningful bargaining than can take place at the individual
unit level. This is so both because the bargaining would be
more broadly based in terms of the number of affected
employees whose interests are represented, and because
those selected by the Company for bargaining at the
corporate level are likely to be persons closer to the
decision-making process than those who now represent it at
the local management level. In a situation where the
employees in all 19 units are covered by precisely the same
fringe benefit plans, where both parties intend to keep them
uniform, and where to that end the Company and the
Union have each submitted identical proposals for all units,
12 See, e.g, Westinghouse Pacific Coast Brake Co., 89 NLRB 145,
168-175, MidAmenca Transportation Co., 141 NLRB 326, enfd. 225 F.2d
87 (C.A. 7), Wavetromcs Industries, Inc., 147 NLRB 238 The Union also
contends that an express statutory affirmation of that principle is to be
read in the language in Sec. 8(d) of the Act, which imposes a duty on
negotiating parties "to meet at reasonable times " There is nothing, however,
in the legislative history to indicate that the quoted language was directed
to more than delaying tactics in collective bargaining
13 See AFL-CIO Joint Negotiating Committee (Phelps Dodge Corp.), 184
NLRB, No 106, and cases cited in fn 6 thereof.
995
it appears, at least on the surface, to make little practical
sense for Shell to insist on unit-by-unit negotiations.
Equitable considerations aside, however, the applicable
principles of law, as they have heretofore been declared by
the Board with court approval, appear to support Shell's
position in this case. It is well settled that the parties to a
collective-bargaining relationship may voluntarily
agree-subject to any later determination of appropriate-
ness under Section 9(b) of the Act-to the enlargement or
alteration of an existing unit, or to the merger of separate
units, theretofore recognized by the parties or found by the
Board to be appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining. But, in the absence of an agreement, neither
party may attempt to force upon the other an enlargement,
alteration or merger of an established unit or units. -Stated
differently, an employer (or a union) may lawfully insist on
confining bargaining within established unit borders,
and-what is but the opposite side of the same coin-a
union's (or employer's) attempt by coercive means, or by
insistence in bargaining to the point of impasse, to require
the crossing of such borders will be regarded as a unilateral
attack on the integrity of the established bargaining unit,
violative of the Act.13 The stated principle rests on the
rationale that, once an appropriate unit has been estab-
lished, and particularly where this has been done by a
finding of the Board, the statutory interest in maintaining
stability and certainty in bargaining obligations requires
adherence to that unit in bargaining.14 For reasons to be
explicated below, I hold that this principle controls
determination of this case.15
It is reasonably clear from the facts of this case that the
Union's requests for common bargaining on the benefit
plan were neither meant by it, nor understood by Shell, as
simply calling for concurrent discussions at which, though
an agreement common to all units might be sought, the
separate unit identity of each unit was to be retained, and
both sides were to be left free to negotiate, to trade if need
be, and to conclude divergent settlements on an individual
unit basis.16 The Union's requests appear, rather, to have
contemplated that for purposes of such common benefit
plan bargaining, and any settlement that might be reached;
all units were to be treated as a single combined group.
Whatever ambiguity there might have been about this in
the requests themselves was clarified by the Union in its
letter of January 5, 1970, wherein it stated:
Inherent in our proposal, ' of course, is the concept of
simultaneous bargaining for all of the affected bargain-
ing units, with representatives of both sides of the
bargaining table who have authority to speak for all of
them.
Any agreement reached in such negotiations would be
applicable to 'and binding upon each of the separate
bargaining units represented.
14 See Douds v, ILA, 241 F 2d 278 (C.,a 2).
15 It is true, as the Respondent stresses in its brief, that the cases in
which that principle has heretofore been declared and applied have
involved factual situations that are distinguishable for a variety of reasons
from the situation in` the case at hand Rut, considering the underlying
reasoning for the principle, I am unable to agree that it has no place in the
consideration of this case.
16 My overall view of this case might have been different if that were so,
though this is a matter on which I need not, and do not, now pass.
996 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Shell, in its letter in reply, interpreted the OCAW requests
for simultaneous bargaining as being a demand for
"bargaining with all units as one, or with none, and that
agreement must be with all or none." The Union never
denied to Shell that its intent was as Shell interpreted it.
And the Union's brief to me appears implicitly to confirm
through some of the arguments it makes that this form of
joint bargaining was indeed what the Union was demand-
ing.
In these circumstances, I think that Shell was correct in
characterizing the Union's proposed method of bargaining
as requiring "in form and effect a merger of the separately
certified units-at least for the purpose of reaching an
agreement on the benefit plans." Although the Union
disclaimed a merger purpose, the fact is that the Union was
requesting a method of bargaining, the actual effect of
which would have been to remove benefit plan bargaining
from the separate individual units, to have such bargaining
conducted on a pooled basis for all units, and to condition
agreement on a joint settlement made with all units as a
group rather than with each unit individually. To that
extent, the Union's proposed method of bargaining, if
acceded to by Shell, would, I find, have represented a
departure both from the previously recognized form of
bargaining and from the appropriate unit lines as they had
been drawn by the Board.17 Under the principle adverted
to above, Shell was thus at liberty to refuse to agree to that
method of bargaining.
The General Counsel and the Union in effect urge,
however, that the particular circumstances of this case
warrant an exception from the normal rule permitting an
employer to limit bargaining strictly to the unit the Board
has found appropriate. They argue that it is unreasonable
to require unit-by-unit bargaining in this case because (1)
Shell's decision with respect to the benefit plans are not
made separately for each unit, but are centrally formulated
and applied; therefore in this area separate unit distinctions
are meaningless ; (2) the employees in all the OCAW units
have a special community of interest justifying common
lrgaining because of the identity of the plans, the
proposals, and the counterproposals relating to all of them;
and (3) separate unit bargaining has been demonstrated (so
they assert) to be "sterile" and "ineffective." I am not
persuaded, however, that these considerations are suffi-
cient, in the light of other related Board policies, to support
an exception from the normal rule-and this for the reasons
to be indicated below.
Though uniform for all units, the terms and conditions of
employment covered by the benefit plans do not stand in
isolation , but are interrelated with all other terms and
conditions of employment which, it is not disputed, vary
significantly from unit to unit. And, as cost items, their
consideration -at the bargaining table inevitably would
bring into play the consideration of cost items in other
areas , wages and other fringe benefits for example. Shell
argues that, under the Union's proposal for multiunit
bargaining on benefit plan subjects and individual unit
17 It is of no consequence to the issue in this case that the Board in a
representation proceeding would not regard the limited multiple-unit
bargaining proposed by the Umon as evidencing, without more, a merger
of a kind sufficient to obliterate the separate unit fines, as they had
bargaining in all other subjects, it would be prevented in the
benefit plan negotiations from trading off, on, a- selective
individual unit basis, concessions in other areas that it
might be willing to yield to one or more, but not all, the
separate units in exchange for acceptance of its benefit plan
proposals. Shell's objection in that regard cannot be
rejected as wholly unreasonable. Though it might still be
possible to arrange for such trading, difficulties would be
encountered in joint bargaining that are not now present.
Nor may Shell's stated objection lightly be brushed aside as
"spurious" (the Union's word) because the record shows
that such trading has hardly ever occurred in the past. It is
not conclusively to be presumed that because such trading
has been de minimis in the past, no occasion for it will arise
in the future. Shell's interest in retaining its present
bargaining advantages, is no less legitimate than the
Union's desire to strengthen its own bargaining position.
And is not for the Board to "act at large in equalizing
disparities in bargaining power." N.L.R.B. v. Insurance
Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 490.
There is no doubt that the Shell employees in all 19
OCAW units have a community of interest in the sense that
they are all covered by the same benefit plans. But in that
sense they are distinguishable from all other Shell
employees only in that they happen to be represented by
the same labor organization. The Union in its brief
substantially concedes that the 19 OCAW units could not
be combined into a single unit that would be generally
appropriate for the purposes of bargaining, because, as it
states, they "are widely separated from each other
geographically; they vary greatly in the type of product
they produce or service they perform; there are significant
differences between them with respect to wages, hours, and
working conditions; and to a large degree their labor
relations are handled on a local basis." Recent decisions
reflect no present disposition on the part of the Board, even
where such differences do not exist, to look with favor on a
union's request, opposed by an employer, to merge into one
combined unit several units that theretofore have been
bargained for separately. 18 Since , under existing Board
policy, Shell could not be required,to bargain with the
Union on a merged unit basis with respect to all
bargainable subjects, it would seem to follow that, under
that same policy, it should not be required to do so with
respect to only one bargainable subject-the benefit plans.
There can be little doubt that this record does show that,
from the Union's point of view, individual unit bargaining
on the benefit plans has been ineffective. This would seem
to be attributable to a combination of reasons, among them
the following: (1) OCAW's preference to participate in the
companywide plans, rather than to negotiate for separate
plans of its own-probably because the broadly based
Company plans offer greater economic advantages than it
could realistically expect to attain otherwise; (2) Shell's
understandable, and not in itself impermissable, policy to
seek uniformity in plans that are companywide in their
scope; (3) the inherent practical difficulties in bargaining
previously been defined
18 PPG Industries, Inc, 180 NLRB No. 58; Libbey Owens Ford Co, 189
NLRB No 138 and No. 139.
SHELL OIL COMPANY
on the normal give-and-take basis with respect to uniform
plans, where there are numerous bargaining units, different
contract expiration dates, and no one unit contains more
than a very small percentage of the total number of covered
employees; and (4) OCAW's failure to generate any
pressure in support of its bargaining demands, possibly
because, .as Shell asserts, the benefits offered ranked in the,
top bracket of American industry and never gave rise to
employee discontent.19 It is noted that OCAW never filed
an unfair labor practice charge claiming that the
"ineffective" bargaining was attributable to Shell's failure
to bargain in good faith. If the Union believes, as some of
the arguments made on its behalf suggest, that Shell's local
managers do not have adequate authority to bargain about
the benefit plans, or that Shell's bargaining with respect to
that subject on the individual unit level does not measure
up to its statutory obligations, it has an available remedy
for this. There is no need in this proceeding to impose an
obligation on Shell that the Act, as it has been interpreted,
does not require.
For the reasons stated above, I conclude and find that the
unfair labor practice allegations of the complaint have not
been sustained, and, accordingly, shall recommend dismiss-
al of the complaint.
APPENDIX A
OCAW Bargaining Units
997
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Charging Parties are labor organizations within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Respondent has not, as alleged in the complaint,
engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
It is recommended that the complaint herein be
dismissed in its entirety.
19 Bargaining by OCAW for all its units on a combined basis might, for
reasons earlier stated, improve the conditions for more meaningful
bargaining , but it would not eradicate the impediments to "effective"
bargaining outlined above, for the OCAW would still be dealing with Shell
as a representative of only 14 percent of the employees covered by the
benefit plans To a substantial degree, the advantages of a united front
offered by centralized bargaining can now be achieved by coordination
through the OCAW Shell Council of similar bargaining demands for all
OCAW units-and this without deviating from the Board's applicable rules
relating to separate unit bargaining . Cf. N. L. KB. v. Standard Oil Co., 322
F.2d 40 (C.A. 6). And see also General Electric Co. v. N.LR B, 412 F.2d
512 (C.A 2).
A B C
REPRESENTATIVE UNIT
LOCATION CERTIFIED & DATE REPRESENTED (1)
Shell Chemical
Plant, Wilmington,
California
OCAW Int. Union;
12-31-37
All production and
maintenance employees
Shell Chemical Plant,
Ventura , California
Shell Chemical Plant,
Torrance , California
Shell Development Co.
Emerysville , California
Shell Development Co.
Emerysville , California
Shell Oil Pipe Line
Gaugers, State of
California
Shell Chemical Plant,
Denver , Colorado
OCAW Int. Union;
1-22-54
OCAW Int . Union;
1-31-68
OCAW Int. Union;
7-9-48
OCAW Int. Union,
Local 589;
12-22-50
OCAW Int. Union
10-20-42
OCAW Int . Union;
11-20-52
All production and
maintenance employees
All production and
maintenance employees
Certain specified
nonprofessional
classifications
All Cafeteria employees
All gaugers and oil
testers
Certain production and
maintenance employees
Shell Oil Co. , OCAW Int. Union All operating and
East Chicago Plant, Local 7-210; maintenance employees in
Hammond , Indiana 4-21-49; Original specified classifications
recognition Circa
1939
D
NO. UNION
REPRESENTED (2)
OCAW 104
OCAW 105
OCAW 496
OCAW 510
OCAW 10
OCAW 23
OCAW 206
OCAW 32
998
A
LOCATION
Shell Oil Refinery,
Norco , Louisiana
Shell Oil
Refinery and Shell
Chemical Plant,
Houston, Texas
Shell Oil
Houston Central Plant,
Sheridan, Texas
Shell Oil Refinery,
Anacortes , Washington
Shell Chemical Plant,
Martinez, California
Shell Chemical Plant,
Pittsburg, California
Shell Oil Co., State of
Calif. Exploration and
Production and Pipe Line
facilities, and Martinez
and Wilmington, California,
Refineries
Shell Oil Refinery,
Martinez, California
Shell Oil Marketing Plant
Detroit, Michigan
Shell Oil Marketing
Plant Grand Haven , Michigan
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
fl
REPRESENTATIVE'
CERTIFIED & DATE
C
UNIT
REPRESENTED 1
OCAW Int. Union and its
Local 4-750; 10-13-64 (4)
OCAW Int. Union,
Local 4-367;
2-21-39
OCAW Int. Union,
Local 4-367;
5-2-66
OCAW Int. Union;
12-31-55 ,
OCAW Int. Union;
12-31-37
OCAW Int. Union
and its Local 1-
5; 12-31-:37
OCAW Int. Union;
11-16-38
OCAW Int. Union;
7-2-48
OCAW Int. Union,
Local 7-389;
3-10-69
OCAW Int. Union,
3-10-51
All hourly paid operating,
maintenance , warehouse,
and laboratory employees
All hourly paid employees,
excluding btickmasons.
Cargo Inspectors (monthly
paid) also represented.
All operating and
maintenance employees in
specified classifications
All operating and
maintenance employees
Certain operating and
maintenance employees
Certain operating and
maintenance employees
Certain production and gas,
operating and maintenance
and Pipe Line Employees
Laboratory Inspectors
All employees except
professional employees,
watchmen, guards, and
supervisors
All yardmen and driver
salesmen
0
NO. UNION
REPRESENTED (2)
OCAW 449
OCAW 1,655
OCAW 13
OCAW 24
OCAW 89
OCAW 57
OCAW 1,471
OCAW 67
OCAW 86
OCAW 306'Shell Oil Plant OCAW Int. Union ; All production, mainte-
Sewaren , N. J. 4-7-67 nance, clerical and
laboratory employees