Shelby Williams of Tennessee, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 21, 1967

165 N.L.R.B. 737 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

SHELBY WILLIAMS OF TENNESSEE, INC.
Shelby Williams of Tennessee, Inc. and
Upholsterers' International Union of North
America, AFL-CIO. Case 10-CA-6476.
June 21, 1967
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS BROWN, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA
On November 3, 1966, Trial Examiner A. Bruce
Hunt issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He
also found that the Respondent had not engaged in
other unfair labor practices and recommended
dismissal of the complaint as to them. Thereafter,
the Respondent and the General Counsel filed
exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and
supporting briefs.'
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, the briefs, and
the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner's Decision as are consistent with the
following:
While we agree with the Trial Examiner's
conclusion that the Respondent did not refuse to
recognize the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we
do not fully adopt his rationale in this regard. The
Trial Examiner concluded, inter alia, that the
Respondent did not breach its bargaining obligation
on February 25, 1966, by rejecting the Union's
demand for recognition and promptly filing a petition
for an election because he found that the Union on
that date did not possess a majority of union
authorization cards. We find it unnecessary to
consider, and make no determination, whether the
Union at the time of its demand had valid
authorization cards from a majority of the employees
in an appropriate unit. Assuming, arguendo, that the
Union possessed majority status, we find no basis to
support a finding that the Respondent in bad faith
declined to recognize and to bargain with the Union.2
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the
165 NLRB No. 108
737
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Shelby Williams
of Tennessee, Inc., Morristown, Tennessee, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order.
' After filing timely exceptions , the Respondent, on
December 5, 1966, also filed cross-exceptions setting forth
additional exceptions with a supporting brief As the Board's
Rules and Regulations do not provide for the filing of cross-
exceptions by a party which has previously filed exceptions,
Respondent's cross -exceptions have not been considered by the
Board in arriving at its determination of this case See Rules and
Regulations , Series 8, as amended , revised January 1 , 1965, Sec
102 46.
2 See Hammond & Irving, Inc, 154 NLRB 1071 Cf Aaron
Brothers Company of California, 158 NLRB 1077, Mace Food
Stores Inc , 162 NLRB 1605
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. BRUCE HUNT, Trial Examiner: This proceeding, in
which the charge was filed on March 2, 1966, and the
complaint was issued on June 27, 1966, involves
allegations that the Respondent, Shelby Williams of
Tennessee, Inc., violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C., Sec.
151 et seq. On August-23 and 24, 1966, I conducted a
hearing at Morristown, Tennessee, at which all parties
were represented. Upon the entire record and my
observation of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE RESPONDENT
Shelby Williams of Tennessee, Inc., a Tennessee
corporation, is engaged in the manufacture and sale of
furniture at its office and plant in Morristown, Tennessee.
The Respondent annually ships furniture valued in excess
of $50,000 directly to points outside Tennessee. There is
no dispute. and I find, that the Respondent is engaged in
commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE UNION
Upholsterers ' International Union of North America,
AFL-CIO, I is a labor organization which admits to
membership employees of the Respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issues
The principal issue is whether the Respondent invalidly
refused to bargain with the Union during February 1966.
As will appear, the Union refused to participate in an
election, and the Respondent, asserting that it doubted
the Union's claim of majority status, refused to agree to a
card check by an impartial person. Subsidiary issues are
whether the Union possessed majority status and whether
the Respondent, by granting a wage increase to the
employees, demonstrated that it did not have a good-faith
doubt concerning such status.
738 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
B. Background
On November 12, 1964, upon a petition filed by the
Union in Case 10-RC-6025, the Board's Regional Director
for Region 10 conducted an election in which the
Respondent 's employees were afforded an opportunity to
vote for or against representation by the Union. Of
approximately 51 eligible voters, 30 voted against the
Union , 18 voted for it , and there were 1 void and 2
challenged ballots. The Union did not file objections to the
election , and, on November 20, 1964, the Regional
Director certified the result.
C. Events During 1965 and 1966
During early November 1965, the Union began another
organizational campaign among the Respondent's
employees, the number of whom had more than doubled.
Two organizers for the Union, Paul D. Vandergriff and
John E. Ray, called upon employees over a period of
approximately 4 months and solicited signatures to cards
designating the Union as the employees ' representative.
Additionally , signatures to a few cards were obtained by
employee solicitors . There were no meetings of
employees , the solicitations having been conducted on an
individual basis as the organizers learned the names and
addresses of new employees from those who had been
employed during the 1964 campaign . During November,
December, January, and February, respectively, 15, 10, 22,
and 6 employees signed cards. Two additional cards were
signed on behalf of employees by their wives at their
direction , one during November and the other during
December . One of those employees is Onnie Dyer, an
illiterate. The total number of cards which clearly bear
dates during the 4-stated months is 55. Finally, two
additional cards, bearing the purported signature of Junior
Dawson and the signature of James C . Parker, bear
erroneous or illegible dates of signing. i (The cards of
Dyer, Dawson. and Parker will be discussed hereinafter.)
The grand total of cards is 57. The number of employees in
the unit at times material was 112.
The latest legible and correct date on a card is
February 18, 1966. D.H. Woodall , a representative of the
Union , wrote to the Respondent , 2 days later , claiming that
the Union possessed majority status in a unit of production
and maintenance employees, demanding recognition, and
offering to have the claimed status established by a "cross
check" to be conducted by "an impartial person." On
February 21, prior to receipt of the Union 's letter , but after
the Respondent had learned of the solicitation of
employees to sign cards, the Respondent called a meeting
of employees and announced that a general wage increase
would be made effective on March 1 . That increase,
discussed in detail hereinafter , is alleged as a violation of
Section 8(a)(1) and as proof that the Respondent did not
have a good -faith doubt that the Union possessed majority
status. On February 23, the Respondent received the
Union 's letter. On the next day, the Respondent filed a
petition in Case 10-RM-434, seeking an election in a unit
I If I correctly decipher the signature on G C Exh 44, it is that
of an employee named Albert Rucker The date of signing is
illegible insofar as it is written in ink because the fluid in a ball
point pen did not flow freely onto the card The pressure exerted
on the pen , however , made indentations on the card which, by use
of a magnifying glass, are a distinct "1-27 66 "
2 In a few instances , signatures on cards do not coincide in
spelling with the names on a typed list of employees in the unit
of its production and maintenance employees. On
February 25, Leslie D.Guyette, the Respondent 's general
manager , replied to Woodall's letter , saying inter alta that
the Respondent "honestly" doubted that the Union
possessed majority status , the Union had made a like
claim during 1964 but had lost an election then, the
Respondent believed that the issue should be decided in
an election , and the Respondent had filed a petition. On
March 1, the wage increase became effective. On
March 2, the Union filed its charge in the instant case. On
June 27, the complaint was issued , and on July 27, the
Regional Director dismissed the Respondent 's petition for
the reason that the complaint had been issued.
D. The Refusal to Bargain Collectively
1. The appropriate unit
There is no dispute , and I find, that all full-time and
regular part -time production and maintenance employees
of the Respondent at its Morristown, Tennessee, plant,
including the truckdriver and the leadman , but excluding
office clerical employees , professional employees, guards,
and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
2. The Union' s claimed majority status
The parties are agreed, and I find , that at times material
there were 112 employees in the unit. The Union received
a total of 57 authorization cards, a bare majority.2 The
Respondent asserts that numerous cards should not be
counted . It is unnecessary to detail the Respondent's
contentions concerning various cards and to express my
disagreement with the contentions . 3 It will suffice to
discuss three cards, those of Dawson , Parker , and Dyer. If
a single one should not be counted , the Union did not have
majority status.
Prefatory to a discussion of the three cards, reference
should be made to certain data which appear on the
reverse sides of all cards. Signatures to 50 of the 57 cards
were obtained by Vandergriff and/or Ray, the two
organizers , so Vandergriff testified . According to
Vandergriff, he and Ray agreed beforehand that, as
signatures were obtained , one of the organizers would
make notations on the reverse side showing the place and
date of signing followed by the initials of the organizer or
organizers who had been present . The remaining seven
cards were not obtained by Vandergriff or Ray from the
employees whose names appear on the faces thereof. On
these cards certain notations appear on the reverse sides
which purport to identify witnesses to the signatures and,
in all instances except one (Dawson 's card), purport to fix
the dates of signing or the dates when the cards came into
the Union's possession.
Dawson's card: The date on its face appears to be
7-15-66, an inaccurate date because all of the cards came
into the possession of the Board ' s Regional Office on
No contention has been made that such variances are material
3 I should note , however , that I do not credit the contradicted
testimony of certain witnesses for the Respondent that they were
told by a union representa t ive that (1) the cards were solely for
use in obtaining an election, or (2) that loss of a job would follow a
refusal to sign a card Those witnesses for the Respondent did not
impress me favorably when giving such testimony
SHELBY WILLIAMS OF TENNESSEE, INC.
April 11, 1966 .4 There is no date on its rear . Dawson did
not testify and the record does not disclose whether he was
available to any party as a witness. Testimony concerning
the card was given by Carroll Holt, an employee. As a
witness for the General Counsel, Holt testified that
Dawson signed the card in his presence while seated in an
automobile in the Respondent 's parking lot. He testified
further:
Q. . . . As far as you know, is the date on that card
correct , to the best of your knowledge?
A. That's January 15th, 1966.
Q. That is not a seven as it appears on the upper
righthand corner?
A. Right.
MR. UEHLEIN : Note for the record that the date on
the card , the first number appears to be a seven.
Q. This was in January?
A. It was in January.
There was no further direct examination . Very quickly it
developed that Holt may have dated Dawson ' s card.
Cross-examination began:
Q. (By Mr. Pate ) Where does the date January
appear on that card?
(Witness points at card.)
Q. You mean that seven is January?
A. That's a one, sir . Why that is seven there I do
not know . Maybe the pencil , for some reason-5
Q. Who put it on there?
A. I believe I did. I don't know. The boy was asked
to sign the card, signed it, passed it to me. He said,
"Will you put the date on there for me?" Which I was,
I'm sure, I was eating lunch , and I believe I put the
date on there, to the best of my knowledge.
Holt testified that. he does not usually write the numeral
"1" so that it appears to be a "7," and the "1" in the
numeral signifying the 15th day of the month is clear. As
Holt's cross -examination continued , he did not again
express uncertainty whether he had dated Dawson 's card,
but he voiced a lack of memory in another respect. He
testified that two other men had been in the automobile
with Dawson and himself , he could not remember the
name of either of those men, one of the men had asked
Dawson to sign the card , and Holt did not know what
Dawson had done with the card after Holt dated it and
returned it to Dawson .6 In view of (1) Holt's doubt,
expressed at the beginning of his cross-examination, that
he dated the card; (2) his professed ability to recall that
there were four men in an automobile , one of whom
solicited Dawson 's signature, plus his inability to recall the
identity of the third or fourth man; and (3) the absence of
any testimony by Holt as to his ability to fix January as the
month of signing , I am not satisfied that Holt was present
when the card was signed , Dawson signed it, and the card
was signed before February 25, the date upon which the
Respondent refused to bargain.
Parker's card: Of the 50 cards obtained by the two
organizers , this card and one other are the only ones which
are not dated on the reverse side. Vandergriff , while on the
witness stand , examined a large group of cards, including
Vandergriff testified that he turned all cards over to the
Regional Office on March 2 when he filed the charge Such
testimony is not substantiated by an April 11 date , stamped on
each card to show when the Regional Office received it
739
Parker's. and testified that to the best of his knowledge all
cards in the group were correctly dated and were signed
by employees prior to the Union's demand for recognition.
Parker's card does not have a legible date on its face,
however. He used numerals to signify the date of signing.
The numeral "66" for the year is clear, but I cannot
determine the month and day. On the reverse side is a
notation bearing Vandergriff's initials that the card was
signed in Parker's home, but there is no date on the
reverse side, nor is there testimony by Vandergriff
concerning the date when Parker signed. I cannot find as a
fact that the card was signed prior to February 25.
Dyer's card: Dyer is the illiterate who directed his wife
to sign his name to a card . Vandergriff and Ray called at
Dyer's home and talked to him in the presence of his wife.
Before discussing the conversation on that occasion,
certain comments should be made about Dyer. He was
born in 1933 and is a native of Greene County, Tennessee,
which adjoins the county in which the Respondent 's plant
is located . He testified that he cannot read at all and that
he can write only his name. He testified also that he
attended public school in Greene County, dropping out
while in the fourth grade, and that he did not remember
how old he was at that time. The record does not disclose
why Dyer ceased attending school or whether , as a pupil,
he learned to read or write anything . I received the
impression that his mentality is quite limited , but he was
not on the witness stand long enough for me to obtain a
more detailed impression . Turning to Dyer's wife who
signed the card at his direction , he testified that he was
"not sure" but that he believed that "she went to about the
seventh" grade. The card reads in pertinent part:
I do hereby designate and authorize the Upholsterers'
International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, and
its representatives to act as my representative for the
purpose of collective bargaining in respect to rates of
pay, wages , hours of employment and other
conditions of employment.
The quoted words were not read to Dyer and if they had
been read it cannot be said with certainty that he would
have understood. Vandergriff testified, however, that:
[t] he card was explained to both Mr . and Mrs. Dyer,
that it-not exactly what it said-that the
Upholsterers ' Union was requesting signatures in
order to have a majority status to request recognition
from the company ; and that the card was for the
purpose of a majority to make such a request.
Before turning to Dyer ' s recollection of the
conversation , additional testimony by Vandergriff will be
recited . He testified that another employee "was told that
... our intention was going an eight -five [8(a)(5)] route,
which was something new in the law," and that "all of the
employees " were told that "we were going the eight-five
route; that we were going to request the company , once we
had a majority of signatures on cards, for recognition; and
then , if we were forced to an election , why, we had no
other alternative .... We explained as well as we could
that an eight-five was short of an election , provided we
5 A pencil was not used in filling out the card
e On the reverse side of the card the following appears "Signed
at the plant in the presence of Carroll Holt turned into
Vandergriff "
740 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
could prove that the Company had depleted their majority,
or something to that effect ...."'
Dyer testified for the Respondent. On direct
examination, he was asked what Vandergriff and Ray had
said to him about signing a card, and he answered, "Well,
I asked them if they were going to have them sign them.
They said yes, about everybody was signing them; about
as fast as they'd get to them, they were signing them."
Dyer was then asked whether he was told "what the card
was for," and he answered, "Said something about they
were going to have a voting on it, and that the card didn't
amount to anything." Dyer testified further that
Vandergriff or Ray said that the caid "would be sent to
Nashville, or somewhere, to be checked over, and that
card would be destroyed. He said that card didn't amount
to anything."" On cross-examination. Dyer gave similar
testimony and, in response to additional questions,
testified that he did not "remember what all was said," but
that Vandergriff and Ray said that "they was wanting to
get those cards signed, just about everybody was signing
them" and that "they would have an election on it." He
testified further that he could not recall having been told
(1) that if enough cards were signed the Union could talk
with the Company concerning his wages and hours, or
(2) anything about better wages, more money, better
vacations, or longer break periods, but that he was told
that the Union could do "something about better
insurance." Upon the completion of counsel's questions, I
asked Dyer if he had talked with his wife about the card.
She had listened to the remarks of the organizers and had
had an opportunity to read the card. Dyer answered: "She
told me after they [the organizers] left, said I shouldn't
have signed it; and so after a while she said she couldn't
understand it .... [W]e didn't talk any more about it. I
didn't know I couldn't read it, and I didn't know anything
about it. She said she couldn't understand what it meant."
The question is whether Dyer was aware that the card
designated the Union to represent him, Texas Electric
Cooperatives, Inc., 160 NLRB 440. Unfortunately, Dyer
was not asked to relate his "understanding of the purpose
of" the card, a question which may properly be asked of an
illiterate, Flint River Mills, Inc., 107 NLRB 472, 476. As
recited earlier, there were no union meetings, and thus
Dyer had no opportunity to meet with fellow workers
concerning the Union. He was asked if he had heard "any
talk about the union" while at work, and his
unenlightening reply was that he "didn't hear too much
about it." He did not talk with Vandergriff or Ray except
upon the occasion when they called at his home. His card
was signed on November 24 and was the 13th card to come
into the Union's possession. He testified that he had
nothing to do with the Union after that date, and there is no
evidence that he ever had any other contact with a labor
organization. He was not an employee of the Respondent
at the time of the election during 1964, having been hired
less than 4 months before his wife signed the card.
' At other points in his testimony, Vandergnff testified that he
never told anyone that the cards were "strictly confidential," but
that he told Ivan Cook that the cards were "in confidence, insofar
as we [Vandergnff and Ray] were concerned, unless the
company didn't recognize us and there would be a cross-check
" On the other hand, he testified also that he did not know
whether he told "any employee that the cards would be kept
confidential except to a person who might conduct a card check "
' Dyer's testimony that Vandergriff spoke of having the card
destroyed has the ring of truth Vandergriff testified that he told
Cook that the card "would end up at the Board, and that if he
I need not determine whether Dyer's card should be
counted. My conclusions concerning the cards of Dawson
and Parker leave the Union without majority status. There
is the possibility, however, that those conclusions will be
reversed, and for that reason I have discussed Dyer's card
at some length. I add only (1) that Vandergriff's quoted
testimony concerning the explanation of the card to Dyer
and Dyer's wife may not have been informative to a person
such as Dyer, that the same may be true of an explanation
to him of "the eight-five route," and (2) that the portions of
the organizers' remarks to Dyer which stand out in his
memory are that "about everybody was signing" cards and
that there would be an election.
In summary, I find that the Union did not possess
majority status.
3. The general wage increase and the Respondent's
refusal to bargain
As recited, on February 21, the Respondent held a
meeting of employees and announced a general wage
increase to become effective on March 1. The General
Counsel says in his brief that the announcement came at
the culmination of the Union's organizational campaign,
and this may be so because, as we have seen, the Union
obtained few authorization cards during February and the
last card with a legible and accurate date was signed on
February 18. On the other hand, the Respondent's general
manager, Guyette, testified that he did not know of the
Union's solicitation of signatures to cards until February 1
and that the decision to give the wage increase was made
prior thereto.9 According to Guyette, a tentative decision
to grant the increase was made during December in
discussions which he had with Manford Steinfeld,
president of both the Respondent and its parent
corporation, and J.W. Lawson of Southeastern Employers
Service Corporation which supplies various services to the
Respondent. Guyette testified further that additional
discussions took place during January and that it was
decided during that month to grant an increase of 7 cents
and to make the announcement during February. The
effective date of the increase, March 1, coincides with the
beginning of the fiscal years of the Respondent and its
parent corporation. Guyette's testimony concerning
conversations in which he participated with Steinfeld and
Lawson was hardly subject to contradiction by the General
Counsel, and I do not believe that Guyette was entirely
truthful. On the other hand, Guyette gave other
uncontradicted testimony in support of the Respondent's
assertion that its motive in granting the increase was
economic, and such testimony was subject to
contradiction if untrue. Thus, Guyette testified that the
Union represents employees in the Chicago plant of the
Respondent's parent corporation, the expiration date of a
contract there was March 1, and the parent's position in
negotiations there was that it could not give an increase
above 7 cents. Additionally, Guyette testified that during
[Cook] wanted it destroyed, we would either destroy it or return it
to him, if he wanted it "
" Guyette testified that on February 1 an emp'oyee told him
that the employee had been asked to sign a card It is extremely
unusual that word of organizational activity in a small town would
not reach an employer's ears for a period of 3 months, but in this
case there is no evidence that Guyette or any other supervisor
learned of the activity prior to February 1 Moreover, there were
no union meetings and there is no evidence of organizational
activity within the plant Signatures to cards were solicited on an
individual basis, principally in employees' homes.
SHELBY WILLIAMS OF TENNESSEE, INC. 741
December, January, and "the first part of 1966," labor in
Morristown was scarce; that any unemployed person there
was not "looking for a job"; that as early as December
Burkline, a competitor in Morristown, had publicized a
general increase of 5 cents; and that Forest Products,
another competitor there, had either announced a general
increase or had made known to Guyette its intention to
grant one. 10
Guyette announced the increase to assembled
employees on February 21. This was 3 weeks after the
date that Guyette fixed as the date upon which he learned
of the organizational activity, and 2 days before the
Respondent received the Union's demand for recognition.
Guyette told the employees, so he testified, that the
reason for the increase was the "fine cooperation, loyalty,
workmanship and et cetera that they had given us and
myself at our plant here in Tennessee." He also told them,
according to Lula Kate Swann, an employee, that the
Respondent "would like to keep us up with the plant in
Chicago." At one point in his remarks to the employees,
Guyette made an oblique reference to the Union. Swann
testified without contradiction that Guyette said that the
wage increase would be received "without a $5 discount."
Another employee, Olin Johnson, testified without
contradiction that Guyette said that the increase would not
cost the employees a certain amount each month. The
amount was $3 or $5, Johnson having been unable to recall
which one.
The initial question concerning the wage increase is
whether the announcement of it violated Section 8(a)(1). I
find that it did. Although there were economic motivations
for the increase , Guyette sought in his announcement to
hinder future organizational efforts of the Union. Such
purpose is shown by his reference to a discount or to the
absence of a monthly cost of $3 or $5. The next question is
whether the increase, coupled with the Respondent's
petition for an election, establishes that the Respondent
sought time for the increase to impress the employees
enough to destroy any majority status that the Union may
have obtained. This question need not be treated
thoroughly because it has been found that the Union did
not possess such status. Assuming arguendo that the
Union possessed majority status, there are definite
weaknesses in the General Counsel's contention that the
Respondent acted in bad faith in rejecting the Union's
demand for recognition. First, the Respondent possessed
sound economic motives for deciding to grant the increase.
Second, the increase was announced before the
Respondent had any reason , insofar as the record
discloses, to believe that the Union had obtained majority
status. Third, the increase was put into effect after the
Union demanded recognition, but the effectuation was no
more than compliance with the announcement. Fourth,
promptly after the Union demanded recognition, the
Respondent filed its petition. If its purpose was to gain
time in which to undermine the Union, by filing the
petition it took a step which was calculated to decrease the
length of time that otherwise would have been available to
it. Fifth, the Respondent was aware when filing the
petition that little more than 1 year before the Union had
claimed to possess majority status but had been unable to
prove its claim in an election which, insofar as the record
establishes, was not impaired by any unfair labor practice.
Sixth, the only unfair labor practice found in this case lies
in Guyette's remark about a discount or the absence of a
monthly cost of $3 or $5.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the
entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. All full-time and regular part-time production and
maintenance employees of the Respondent at its
Morristown, Tennessee, plant, including the truckdriver
and the leadman, but excluding office clerical employees,
professional employees, guards, and supervisors as
defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the Act.
3. The record does not establish that the Union has
been or is the exclusive representative of all employees in
such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining.
4. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing
employees in the exercise of their rights under the Act, the
Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. The allegations of the complaint that the Respondent
invalidly refused to bargain with the Union have not been
sustained.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case and pursuant to
Section 10(c) of the Act, and in order to effectuate the
Act's policies, I hereby recommend that Shelby Williams
of Tennessee, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Announcing wage increases to employees in a
manner calculated to hinder the efforts of any labor
organization to become the employees' representative.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post, in conspicuous places at its place of business,
including all places where notices to employees
customarily are posted, copies of the attached notice
marked "Appendix."" Copies of said notice, to be
furnished by the Regional Director for Region 10, shall,
after being signed by the Respondent's representative, be
posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and
maintained by it for at least 60 consecutive days
thereafter. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any material.
(b) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20
10 Much of Guyette's testimony concerning economic
motivation for the wage increase is substantially in accord with an
affidavit which he gave to the General Counsel on March 9, and
there was ample time before the hearing for the accuracy of
Guyette's statements to be investigated
11 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for
the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the
notice In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by
a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall
be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order."
299-352 0-70-48
742 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have
been taken to comply herewith. 12
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be
dismissed insofar as it alleges that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
11 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said
Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this
Order , what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
employees in a manner calculated to hinder the
efforts of any labor organization to become your
representative.
WE WILL NOT violate any of the rights which you
have under the National Labor Relations Act to join a
union of your own choice and to engage in union
activities , or not to join a union and not to engage in
such activities.
SHELBY WILLIAMS OF
TENNESSEE, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , we hereby notify our
employees that:
WE WILL NOT announce any wage increase to
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, 528 Peachtree-
Seventh Building , 50 Seventh Street, N.E., Atlanta,
Georgia 30323, Telephone 404-526-5760.