Sheetz of Delaware, Inc.v.Doctor's Associates Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 5, 2013

No. 91192657 (T.T.A.B. Sep. 5, 2013)

THIS OPINION IS A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB

Hearing: Mailed:
September 20, 2012 September 5, 2013

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

Sheetz of Delaware, Inc.
v.
Doctor’s Associates Inc.
_____

Opposition No. 91192657
_____

Roberta Jacobs-Meadway of Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott LLC for Sheetz of
Delaware, Inc.

Walter B. Welsh of St. Onge Steward Johnston & Reens LLC for Doctor’s Associates
Inc.
_____

Before Rogers, Mermelstein and Bergsman, Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Bergsman, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Doctor’s Associates Inc. (“applicant”) filed a use-based application to register
FOOTLONG, in standard character format, for “sandwiches,” in Class 30.1
Sheetz of Delaware, Inc. (“opposer”) opposed the registration of “Footlong” on
the ground that when used in connection with sandwiches “Footlong” is generic and,
in the alternative, that the term “Footlong” is at least merely descriptive and has

1 Serial No. 77324328, filed November 8, 2007.
Opposition No. 91192657

2

not acquired distinctiveness. Applicant, in its answer, denied the essential
allegations in the notice of opposition.
Preliminary Issues
A. Applicant’s motion to amend the description of goods.
During the proceeding, applicant filed a motion to amend the description of
goods in its application from “sandwiches” to “sandwiches, excluding hot dogs.”
Applicant argued that a hot dog is not a sandwich.2 Opposer objected to applicant’s
motion on the ground that excluding one type of sandwich (i.e., hot dog sandwiches)
from sandwiches per se in the description of goods does not make any difference “in
determining whether the term ‘footlong’ is commonly understood and commonly
used to identify sandwiches that are about a foot long irrespective of source.”3
Although we find that a hot dog is a sandwich,4 we grant applicant’s motion
to amend its description of goods. Having excluded hot dogs from the identification,

2 Applicant’s Brief, p. 19.
3 Opposer’s opposition to applicant’s motion to amend the goods.
4 A “hot dog” is defined as “a sandwich consisting of a frankfurter in a split roll, usually
eaten with mustard, sauerkraut, or relish.” THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (UNABRIDGED), p. 925 (2d ed. 1987). The Board may take judicial
notice of dictionary definitions. Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imp. Co.,
213 USPQ 594 (TTAB 1982), aff'd, 703 F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ 505 (Fed. Cir. 1983). In
addition, the record is replete with examples of hot dogs identified as sandwiches. For
example, see the following attached to the June 16, 2010 Metzger Declaration:
Exhibit B – “No Matter How You Slice It Bred In England, But Meat For
Americans,” The Roanoke Times (March 15, 2002) – “Imagine baseball without the
hot dog – which is just a sandwich with the bread on a hinge” and “But here in
America, land of plenty, the sandwich is no one-trick pony. … We have burgers, hot
dogs, submarines, clubs, po-boys, pita pockets, Reubens, BLTs.”
Exhibit G – “Everybody knows what they want at the Curly Dog,” The Indianapolis
Star August 19, 2003) – “The namesake sandwich, for the uninitiated, is a footlong
hot dog …”
Opposition No. 91192657

3

we confine our analysis to whether the term “footlong” is generic for any other types
of sandwiches.
B. Applicant’s objections to opposer’s evidence.
On July 28, 2011, the parties filed a “Substitute Stipulation to Proceed Under
ACR.” The parties agreed that (i) they could rely on the materials submitted in
support of and against opposer’s previously filed motion for summary judgment, (ii)
testimony could be submitted by declaration, (iii) the parties need not make the
pretrial disclosures otherwise required by 37 CFR § 2.121 and Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(3), and (iv) all evidence may be submitted through declarations or notices of
reliance.5
Applicant objected to the following testimony and evidence on the ground
that opposer failed to disclose the witnesses and evidence during discovery:
1. Declarations of Nelly Rodriguez, Salvatore Palilla, and Adam Mucci,
restaurant owners to whom applicant sent cease and desist letters regarding their
use of the term “footlong”;

Exhibit K – menus from inter alia Porky’s Drive In, Interstate Barbecue, Archie
Moore’s, etc.
5 While we commend the parties for agreeing to efficiencies intended to facilitate the
introduction of evidence at trial, ideally, “ACR” (i.e., Accelerated Case Resolution) cases do
not merely facilitate introduction of more evidence, but should also limit the amount of
evidence placed before the Board. When parties place before the Board, for consideration at
final hearing, the entire record developed in conjunction with a summary judgment motion
(which we said then was “extensive”) as well as significant trial evidence, the ease with
which the parties can add evidence to the record does not aid swift review of the record and
prompt decision-making. This is particularly true when the case involves numerous
objections to evidence that need to be considered and resolved to determine the precise
scope of the record on which the claims and defenses can be decided. A larger record is not
necessarily a better record.
Opposition No. 91192657

4

2. Declarations of Alexis Pontius-Jones and Timothy Johnson, restaurant
owners who use the term “footlong”;
3. October 11, 2011 Supplemental Declaration of Philip Johnson,
opposer’s expert witness, presenting a rebuttal survey;
4. Notices of reliance on printed publications and Internet postings
purportedly using the term “footlong” generically to refer to sandwiches; and
5. The second and third supplemental declarations of John Metzger, a
legal assistant employed by opposer’s counsel, introducing inter alia evidence of
third parties purportedly using the term “footlong” generically to refer to
sandwiches.
Applicant’s interrogatory Nos. 32 – 37 requested that opposer identify all
testimony and documents on which opposer may rely to establish that the term
“footlong” is used generically to identify 12-inch sandwiches. Opposer objected to
the interrogatories on the ground that it is not required to identify witnesses it
intends to call or documents it intends to disclose in advance of trial. In addition,
without waiving its objection, opposer stated that it “may rely on any documents
produced in response to earlier discovery requests and provided in support of
[opposer’s] motion for summary judgment, and documents which will be produced.”6
Initial disclosures, discovery responses and pretrial disclosures should be
viewed as a continuum of inter partes communication designed to avoid unfair
surprise and to facilitate fair adjudication of the case on the merits. Speir Wines

6 Opposer’s responses to applicant’s Interrogatory Nos. 32-37.
Opposition No. 91192657

5

(PTY) Ltd. v. Sheper, 105 USPQ2d 1239, 1246 (TTAB 2012). As indicated above,
however, the parties waived pretrial disclosures in this case.
To determine whether opposer's failure to disclose the witnesses in question
in its initial disclosures, in supplemental initial disclosures, or in a supplemental
response to applicant's interrogatories is substantially justified or harmless, the
Board is guided by the following five-factor test:
1) the surprise to the party against whom the evidence would be offered;
2) the ability of that party to cure the surprise;
3) the extent to which allowing the testimony would disrupt the trial;
4) importance of the evidence; and
5) the non-disclosing party's explanation for its failure to disclose the
evidence.
See Great Seats, Inc. v. Great Seats, Ltd., 100 USPQ2d 1323, 1327 (TTAB 2011).
The Board has also stated that, unless seasonably remedied, a party's failure to
identify a witness in its initial disclosures deprives the adverse party of the
opportunity to seek discovery of the identified witness, and this fact “must [be]
consider[ed] … as one of the relevant circumstances … in determining whether to
strike [the witness's] testimony deposition.” Jules Jurgensen/Rhapsody, Inc. v.
Baumberger, 91 USPQ2d 1443, 1444-45 (TTAB 2009).7

7 In a case where, as here, the parties stipulated to forego pretrial disclosures, the better
practice would have been for opposer to have supplemented its discovery responses to
include the identification of its third-party witnesses and other documents on which it
intended to rely prior to submitting the testimony declarations and notices of reliance,
although its failure to do so does not, as explained herein, necessarily require striking the
evidence in question. Had the parties not stipulated to forego pretrial disclosures, they
Opposition No. 91192657

6

Rodriguez, Palilla and Mucci Declarations
With respect to Nelly Rodriguez, Salvatore Palilla, and Adam Mucci,
restaurant owners to whom applicant sent protest letters regarding their use of the
term “footlong,” applicant had knowledge of the existence of these people and their
businesses, as well as the operative facts stated in their declarations because they
were people to whom applicant sent cease-and-desist letters regarding their use of
the term “Footlong.” Thus, we find that applicant had adequate and reasonable
notice about these witnesses and opposer’s failure to supplement its discovery
responses or initial disclosures does not preclude the introduction of their testimony
declarations. Applicant’s objection to the testimony declarations of Nelly Rodriguez,
Salvatore Palilla, and Adam Mucci is overruled.8

would generally have been required, in their pretrial disclosures, to name the witnesses
they expected to testify, or who could testify if needed, by oral testimony or, as provided for
in this case, by declaration, and would have been required to provide general identifying
information about the witness(es). See 37 CFR § 2.121(e). However, a party is not required
to supplement or correct its initial disclosures to provide identifying information about a
witness listed in pretrial disclosures if that information previously has been made known to
the other party in writing or during the discovery process. See Galaxy Metal Gear Inc. v.
Direct Access Technology Inc., 91 USPQ2d 1859, 1861 (TTAB 2009) (opposer’s failure to
supplement its initial disclosures to identify foreign nonparty witness as a potential witness
does not preclude introduction of witness’ discovery deposition at trial, even though opposer
should have supplemented initial disclosures, because applicant was aware of witness’s
identity and subject matter of her testimony and was able to cross-examine the witness
during the discovery phase). See TBMP § 408.03 (3d ed. rev. 2 2013).
8 Applicant also objects to the declarations of these witnesses, as well as those of Alexis
Pontius-Jones and Timothy Johnson discussed infra, on the ground that “the declarants
had a direct interest in the outcome of the Opposition because each of the declarants
purportedly uses the FOOTLONG mark in their business” and that the declarants are
biased in favor of opposer. (Applicant’s Brief, p. 38). Applicant’s objection is overruled.
These declarants are fact witnesses and fact witnesses are not expected to always be
disinterested. Applicant has offered no reason for us to believe that their testimony is not
truthful. The Board has taken the entire testimony of the witnesses into account in
assessing the probative value of their testimony.
Opposition No. 91192657

7

Pontius-Jones and Johnson Declarations
On the other hand, applicant had no knowledge about the identity and
businesses of Alexis Pontius-Jones and Timothy Johnson, two other restaurant
owners who use the term “footlong” but were not among the recipients of cease-and-
desist letters from applicant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) provides that a party that fails
to provide information or the identity of witnesses through initial disclosures or
discovery may, upon motion or objection by its adversary, be precluded from using
that information or witness at trial, “unless the failure was substantially justified or
is harmless.”
Applying the Great Seats factors to these witnesses, the record shows that
opposer filed a motion for summary judgment in which it relied on substantial
evidence of third-party use of the term “footlong” in the manner of a generic term to
refer to 12-inch sandwiches. In addition, the record shows that applicant sent
numerous letters to restaurant owners objecting to their use of the term “footlong”
to refer to their 12-inch sandwiches, thus, introducing into the record evidence of
third-party use of the term “footlong” to refer to a particular sized sandwich. Under
these circumstances, applicant is hard-pressed to argue convincingly that it was
surprised that opposer attempted to introduce the declaration of two additional
restaurateurs who identify 12-inch sandwiches using the term “footlong.” Thus,
there is no real surprise for applicant to cure. In addition, because the proffered
Opposition No. 91192657

8

testimony will not disrupt the trial and because it is cumulative, it will not unduly
prejudice applicant.
Opposer asserts that it did not supplement its initial disclosures or earlier
discovery responses because “[b]y stipulation, there was no requirement for pretrial
disclosures, and no limit on supplementation of evidence” and, therefore, it “had the
right and obligation to enter into the trial record all available evidence
demonstrating the relevant public’s perception of the term ‘footlong’ in connection
with sandwiches that are about a foot long.”9 We disagree with opposer’s
interpretation of its duty to supplement its discovery responses. Nonetheless, we
find opposer’s failure to supplement its initial disclosures or discovery responses to
identify Alexis Pontius-Jones and Timothy Johnson, restaurant owners who use the
term “footlong,” is harmless and, therefore, applicant’s objection is overruled.
Metzger Second and Third Supplemental Declarations
Although opposer identified John Metzger in its initial disclosures, applicant
objected to the second and third supplemental declarations, filed October 12, 2011
and January 31, 2012. John Metzger is a legal assistant at Eckert Seamans Cherin
& Mellott, LLC, opposer’s counsel, who authenticated third-party use on the
Internet of the term “footlong” used generically as to sandwiches of a particular size.
The initial disclosures describe John Metzger as follows:
John Metzger is a litigation paralegal at the law firm of
Eckert Seamans Cherin Mellott. He has knowledge
concerning third party use of the term footlong to describe

9 Opposer’s Reply Brief, p. 21.
Opposition No. 91192657

9

and identify sandwiches which are approximately a foot
long.
According to applicant, the Board should exclude the above-noted declarations
because they included documents that opposer did not produce in discovery.10
Once again, we apply the Great Seats test. We find that Mr. Metzger was
identified in the initial disclosures, that applicant should not have been surprised
by cumulative Internet evidence of third-party use of the term “footlong” to refer to
12-inch sandwiches and that the introduction of these declarations did not disrupt
trial. Moreover, the evidence that Mr. Metzger introduced was publicly available
and was of a type of which applicant was aware as evidenced by applicant’s
numerous letters objecting to various third-party uses of the term “footlong.” In
view of the foregoing, we find opposer’s failure to supplement its discovery
responses to specifically identify the documents attached to John Metzger’s
supplemental testimony declarations is harmless and, therefore, applicant’s
objection is overruled.
Applicant also objected to the Metzger supplemental declarations on the
ground that Mr. Metzger “made substantive decisions regarding which documents
to include.”11 This objection is overruled because witness decision-making is
inherent in deciding which third-party uses to include. In any event, the Board
reviews the evidence of third-party use for what it shows on its face, not by how it
was obtained.

10 Applicant’s Brief, p 36.
11 Applicant’s Brief, p. 36.
Opposition No. 91192657

10

Finally, applicant objects to the Metzger supplemental declarations because
Mr. Metzger is biased because he is an employee of opposer’s counsel.12 The Board
is aware that many witnesses have a particular point of view with respect to a
dispute. For example, any witness a party calls generally provides testimony
favorable for that party and prejudicial to the defending party. Applicant has
presented no evidence demonstrating that Mr. Metzger’s testimony will be
untruthful or unduly prejudicial and his declarations make his allegiances clear.
See Fed. R. Evid. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of … unfair prejudice.”).
Applicant’s objections to the second and third supplemental declarations of
Mr. Metzger are overruled.13
Philip Johnson October 11, 2011 Declaration
Applicant objected to the October 11, 2011, Supplemental Declaration of
Philip Johnson, the Chief Executive Officer of Leo J. Shapiro & Associates, L.L.C., a
market research firm that designs and conducts surveys measuring consumer
behavior and opinion.
In response to applicant’s interrogatory No. 18, opposer stated, as of June 11,
2010, “no survey or market research has been conducted by or for Opposer to date.”

12 Applicant’s Brief, p. 37.
13 With respect to the Internet evidence, since 2010, the Board has permitted Internet
evidence to be introduced through a notice of reliance so long as the printout from the
website displays the URL and the date it was printed. See Safer Inc. v. OMS Investments
Inc., 94 USPQ2d 1031, 1039 (TTAB 2010). As a result, Mr. Metzger’s declaration was
unnecessary for the admission of the attached evidence, which could have been submitted
under a notice of reliance.
Opposition No. 91192657

11

In response to applicant’s interrogatory No. 19, opposer objected to
applicant’s interrogatory requesting the identity of any experts retained by opposer
as being premature.
On September 14, 2010, opposer submitted a report entitled “An Analysis of
the [Dr. Sandra] Cogan Survey” listing Philip Johnson as the author, in support of
opposer’s motion for summary judgment. Applicant deposed Mr. Johnson on April
5, 2011. Mr. Johnson testified that opposer had not asked him “to design or
supervise a survey in this matter.” 14
During its testimony period, opposer introduced into evidence the October 11,
2011, supplemental declaration of Philip Johnson. Having been given the
underlying questionnaires and coding of applicant’s Cogan Survey after issuing his
initial evaluation, Mr. Johnson supplemented his critique based on the additional
data. In addition, the supplemental declaration of Philip Johnson includes the
results of a survey designed and conducted by Mr. Johnson to rebut applicant’s
Cogan Survey. On November 29, 2011, applicant again deposed Mr. Johnson and
specifically questioned him about the rebuttal survey. In addition, applicant
introduced the December 9, 2011 declaration of Dr. Sandra Cogan critiquing Mr.
Johnson’s rebuttal survey.

14 Johnson Dep., pp. 22-23 (April 5, 2011). See also Johnson Dep., pp. 17 and 20-21
(retained only to evaluate the design, methodology and results of the Cogan Survey). Mr.
Johnson stated in a subsequent report that in June 2011, opposer asked him to conduct a
survey to accurately measure whether the term “Footlong” is generic. A Rebuttal of the
Cogan Survey, p. 2 (Johnson Declaration (October 11, 2011), Exhibit A).
Opposition No. 91192657

12

Opposer should have supplemented its responses to applicant’s interrogatory
Nos. 18 and 19 to state that it was retaining Mr. Johnson as an expert to design and
conduct a genericness survey. However, any surprise to applicant by opposer’s
failure to give applicant technical notice of Mr. Johnson’s rebuttal survey was
ameliorated by applicant having more than one month to prepare for Mr. Johnson’s
deposition. Moreover, applicant submitted the declaration of Dr. Cogan critiquing
Mr. Johnson’s survey.
Further, Johnson’s survey is proper rebuttal to the extent that it bears on the
validity and probative value of the Cogan survey. Thus, we have considered the
Johnson rebuttal survey to that extent. We have not considered the Johnson survey
for purposes of supporting opposer’s case-in-chief on its claim that “Footlong” is
generic. See Helene Curtis Industries Inc. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 13 USPQ2d 1618,
1625 n. 33 (TTAB 1989) (“Thus, we have considered plaintiff’s rebuttal testimony
and survey to that extent. While it is a fine line to draw, we have not considered
the survey for the purpose of supporting plaintiff’s case-in-chief….”).
In view of the foregoing, we find that opposer’s failure to supplement its
discovery responses to inform applicant that Mr. Johnson was going to conduct a
genericness survey was harmless. Applicant’s objection to the October 11, 2011
Johnson declaration introducing his genericness survey is overruled. However, to
be clear, we are considering the survey and declaration, only to the extent they
constitute rebuttal; we are not considering the survey and declaration to establish
that the term “footlong” is generic.
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Opposition No. 91192657

14

Finally, applicant had thirty days between the close of opposer’s testimony period
and the opening of its testimony period to prepare any rebuttal against the evidence
of third-party use. Accordingly, applicant’s objection to the second and third
Metzger declarations on the basis that the documents were not previously produced
in response to applicant’s discovery requests is overruled.
The Record
The record includes the pleadings and, by operation of Trademark Rule
2.122(b), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b), applicant’s application file. As indicated above, the
parties stipulated that they could rely on the materials submitted in support of and
against opposer’s previously filed motion for summary judgment and that all
evidence may be submitted through declarations or notices of reliance. Accordingly,
the parties stipulated that evidence that normally is not admissible through a
notice of reliance could be introduced through a notice of reliance.
The parties submitted the evidence listed below.
A. Opposer’s testimony and evidence.
1. Declaration of Erwin D. Mulder, owner of 10 A&W Restaurants, 12
Long John Silver Restaurants, and 2 Taco Bell Restaurants, with attached exhibits;
2. Declaration of Tammy Dunkley, opposer’s Corporate Advertising
Manager, with attached exhibits;
3. Declaration of John Metzger, a legal assistant employed by opposer’s
counsel, with attached exhibits;
Opposition No. 91192657

15

4. Declaration of Sean McConnell, one of the attorneys representing
opposer, authenticating and introducing Philip Johnson’s report entitled “An
Analysis of the Cogan Survey” (September 2010);
5. Supplemental Declaration of John Metzger with attached exhibits;
6. Opposer’s notice of reliance on applicant’s responses to opposer’s
interrogatories and requests for admission;
7. Declaration of Nelly Rodriguez, owner of Spuds & Suds sandwich shop;
8. Declaration of Salvatore Palilla, owner of Santoro’s Submarine
Sandwiches sandwich shop;
9. Declaration of Timothy Johnson, owner of Eddie’s Footlong Hot Dogs;
10. Supplemental Declaration of Philip Johnson, Chief Executive Officer of
Leo J. Shapiro & Associates, L.L.C., a market research firm in the field of consumer
behavior and opinion, introducing his report entitled “A Rebuttal of the Cogan
Survey”;
11. Notices of reliance on printed publications purportedly showing the use
of the term “Footlong” in reference to sandwiches;
12. Notice of reliance on the following items:
a. Wikipedia entry for sandwiches;
b. Representative advertising by applicant;
c. A news article posted online;
d. Representative protest letters from applicant;
e. Applicant’s trademark standards program;
Opposition No. 91192657

16

f. Applicant’s franchisee brand standards guide; and
g. “Internal electronic mail correspondence”;
13. Second supplemental declaration of John Metzger with attached
exhibits;
14. Deposition of Philip Johnson (April 5, 2011) with attached exhibits;16
15. Declaration of Alexi Pontius-Jones, Vice President of Lakeshore Foods
Corporation, a company that operates supermarkets with deli counters that sell
sandwiches;
16. Notice of reliance on printed publications purportedly showing
applicant’s efforts to police the term “Footlong”;
17. Third supplemental declaration of John Metzger with attached
exhibits;
18. Deposition of Philip Johnson (November 29, 2011) with attached
exhibits;17
19. Notice of reliance on opposer’s answer in a civil action between the
parties and a copy of the Philip Johnson declaration submitted in that case; and
20 Declaration of Adam Mucci, owner of Mucci’s Italian Market, a
restaurant and sandwich shop.

16 Applicant also submitted this as its seventh notice of reliance.
17 Applicant had previously filed this deposition during its testimony period.
Opposition No. 91192657

17

B. Applicant’s testimony and evidence.18
1. Declaration of Alaine Doolan, one of the attorneys representing
applicant, introducing the following items:19
a. a survey report entitled “Genericness and Secondary Meaning
Survey Regarding the Name ‘Footlong’” by Dr. Sandra Cogan.20
b. the results of Internet searches for the term “footlong” in
connection with sandwiches and hot dogs;
c. dictionary definitions;
d. opposer’s advertising;
e. opposer’s responses to applicant’s written discovery; and
f. third-party menus;
2. Notice of reliance on the following items:
a. opposer’s initial disclosures;
b. applicant’s first set of request for admissions; and
c. opposer’s responses to applicant’s written discovery;
3. Notice of reliance on the following items:
a. applicant’s correspondence to third parties regarding the use of
the term “Footlong”; and
b. copies of oppositions and a civil action filed by third parties

18 As its thirteenth notice of reliance, applicant filed a copy of its application file which was
already of record pursuant to the rules.
19 Applicant also submitted this as its fifth notice of reliance.
20 This was also filed as applicant’s first notice of reliance.
Opposition No. 91192657

18

against applicant’s registration for FOOTLONG and dispositions
thereof;
4. Notice of reliance on opposer’s letter of protest filed in applicant’s
application;
5. Deposition of John Metzger with attached exhibits;
6. Notice of reliance on the deposition of Tammy Dunkley with attached
exhibits;
7. Deposition of Erwin D. Mulder with attached exhibits;
8. Deposition of Philip Johnson (November 29, 2011) with attached
exhibits;21
9. Notice of reliance on the following items;
a. complaint in a civil action between the parties;
b. the transcript of a preliminary injunction hearing;
c. declaration of Robert Wilker, Worldwide Profit Manager for
opposer; and
d. the previously submitted declaration by Tammy Dunkley;
10. Notice of reliance on the declaration of Valerie Pochron, corporate
attorney for Franchise World Headquarters, a company related to applicant, with
attached exhibits; and
11. Notice of reliance on representative samples of its use of the term
“Footlong.”’

21 Opposer also submitted this deposition transcript.
Opposition No. 91192657

19

Standing
“The facts regarding standing … are part of [an opposer’s] case and must be
affirmatively proved. Accordingly, [opposer] is not entitled to standing solely
because of the allegations in its petition.” Lipton Industries, Inc. v. Ralston Purina
Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 213 USPQ 185, 189 (CCPA 1982). To prove its standing to
oppose the registration of an allegedly generic term, a plaintiff need only show it is
engaged in the manufacture or sale of the same or related goods as those listed in
the applicant’s application; that is, that plaintiff has the right to use the term in a
descriptive or generic manner. Nature’s Way v. Nature’s Herbs, 9 USPQ2d 2077,
2080 (TTAB 1989); Ferro Corp. v. SCM Corp., 219 USPQ 346, 352 (TTAB 1983). See
also Binney & Smith Inc. v. Magic Marker Industries, Inc., 222 USPQ 1003, 1010
(TTAB 1984). Inasmuch as opposer sells submarine sandwiches, opposer has
established its standing.22
Genericness
There is a two-part test used to determine whether a designation is generic:
(1) what is the genus of goods at issue? and (2) does the relevant public understand
the designation primarily to refer to that genus of goods? H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v.
Int’l Assn. of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 990, 228 USPQ 528, 530 (Fed. Cir.
1986). The public’s perception is the primary consideration in determining whether
a term is generic. Loglan Inst. Inc. v. Logical Language Group Inc., 902 F.2d 1038,
22 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Evidence of the public’s understanding of a

22 Dunkley Declaration ¶6; Doolan Declaration, Exhibit M.
Opposition No. 91192657

20

term may be obtained from any competent source, including testimony, surveys,
dictionaries, trade journals, newspapers and other publications. Loglan Inst. 22
USPQ2d at 1533; Dan Robbins & Associates, Inc. v. Questor Corp., 599 F.2d 1009,
202 USPQ 100, 105 (CCPA 1979).
A. The genus of goods at issue.
The broad general category of goods involved here are sandwiches;
specifically, sandwiches excluding hot dogs. Magic Wand Inc. v. RDB Inc., 940 F.2d
638, 19 USPQ2d 1551, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[A] proper genericness inquiry
focuses on the description of [goods or] services set forth in the [application or]
certificate of registration.”).
B. The relevant public.
The second part of the genericness test is whether the relevant public
understands the designation primarily to refer to that class of goods. The relevant
public for a genericness determination is the purchasing or consuming public for the
identified goods. Magic Wand Inc. v. RDB Inc., 19 USPQ2d at 1553. Because there
are no restrictions or limitations to the channels of trade or classes of consumers for
sandwiches, the relevant consuming public comprises ordinary consumers who
purchase and eat sandwiches.
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Opposition No. 91192657

28

appears to be intended to (and none of them does) function as an indicator of the
source of the user’s goods. Extensive use of the term by restaurants offering
identical goods is strong evidence that purchasers will not be able to differentiate
between competing sources by viewing the term “Footlong.” Such use by
competitors is evidence of genericness. BellSouth Corp. v. DataNational Corp., 60
F.3d 1565, 35 USPQ2d 1554, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Remington Products, Inc. v.
North American Philips Corp., 892 F.2d 1576, 1578, 13 USPQ2d 1444, 1446 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (testimony of competitor's president of generic use by competitor).
Exhibit F to the Metzger Declaration consists of “printouts of webpages of
reviews of restaurants and eateries that use the term ‘footlong’ or ‘foot long’ with
sandwiches.” The excerpts listed below are representative.
1. The Happy Cow Compassionate Eating Guide (happycow.net)
Sheesha Café (Panama City, Florida)
Review: . . . My husband got the falafel baguette, which
turned out to be a footlong sandwich for $6.99. . . .
* * *
Basic 4 Vegetarian Snack Bar (Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania)
Review: I ordered a Vegan Philly Cheese Steak and got a
foot long sandwich with onions, “cheese”, and “steak” that
was greasy and delicious.
2. Yelp.com
El Conejo Authentic Mexican Food (Santa Ana,
California)
Great authentic Mexican food.
You really can’t beat the $5 foot long burrito.
Opposition No. 91192657

29

3. Superpages.com
Angelina’s Italian Deli (East Greenwich, Rhode Island)
Description
Italian restaurant and deli serving authentic Italian food,
foot-long subs, pasta, salads, wraps and catering.
Exhibit G to the Metzger Declaration consists of “printouts of articles located
in the U.S. News database of Lexis-Nexis referencing the term ‘footlong’ with
sandwiches including hot dogs for the years 2001 through 2010.” The articles listed
below reference sandwiches and not hot dogs and are representative.
1. The New York Times (January 23, 2010)
A Bittersweet Aftertaste for Jet Fans on Long Island
* * *
“Vinny Testaverde - - pepper turkey on whole wheat,
mustard on the side,” he said. “Chad Pennington - -
spinach omelets, four eggs. And like, oh my God, the
defensive guys – the footlong hero we make, the
Gladiator, with sausage, bacon, ham, cheese, anything
you want. These guys could eat two of them.”
2. Pittsburgh Tribune Review (November 18, 2009)
Anthony Jr.’s Restaurant & Pizzeria strives for good food,
service
* * *
Anthony Jr.’s favorites include the traditional hand-
tossed pizza, with base prices ranging from $7.99 (four-cut
junior) to $18.99 (16-cut jumbo). Hoagies – with half, 6-
inch sandwiches costing $4.95 and whole, footlongs
costing $7.95 to $8.95 – are also popular.
3. Contra Costa Times (April 30, 2009)
Giants ditch junk (mostly) for healthier buffet options
Opposition No. 91192657

30

* * *
… One former Giant, to everyone’s amazement, routinely
devoured a footlong cheese steak 10 minutes before
batting practice.
In response to opposer’s motion for summary judgment, applicant submitted
the declaration of Alaine Doolan with news articles referencing applicant’s
sandwiches.
1. Franchising.com (April 9, 2009)
$5 Footlong Subs Now At SUBWAY(R) Restaurants
Across America
All Day, Every Day – Any Regular Footlong Sub
Sandwich for Only $5.00! …
* * *
This regular footlong sub value may also be applied to
subs requested as part of a SUBWAY® combo meal …
* * *
Lower-priced SUBWAY® footlong subs will remain at
their everyday low menu price.
2. QSR Magazine (QSR.com) (March 24, 2009)
The $5 Phenomenon
… The offer follows similar efforts by other chains such as
Subway’s $5 Footlong, Quiznos' $5 Deli Favorites, and
Pizza Hut’s (NYSE: YUM!) $5 Pizza Mia.
3. Reuters (reuters.com) (March 24, 2008)
SUBWAY(R) Restaurant Chain Introduces $5 Footlongs
A “Thank-you” to Customers for Making the Subway
Footlong Famous
Opposition No. 91192657

31

… With its new $5 footlong promotion, which begins
today, SUBWAY(R) restaurants offers consumers its own
take on an enticing economic package. …
* * *
The offer gives customers up to a 25 percent discount off
the famous footlong subs. According to Moody, the special
offer is the chain’s way of thanking customers for making
SUBWAY® footlong sandwiches the number one globally.
In the past 12 months SUBWAY(R) restaurants have sold
enough footlong sandwiches to wrap around the globe
almost 6 times.
With a wide array of great-tasting fresh ingredients to
choose from and popular offerings like sweet onion
chicken teriyaki, savory turkey breast and classic roast
beef, one footlong SUBWAY(R) sandwich could be
considered dinner for a single guy, a shared lunch for a
mom and her kids, …
5. Slate (slate.com) (April 21, 2008)
AD REPORT CARD
Jingle Hell
The diabolical geniuses behind Subway’s “five-dollar foot-
long” song.
… Meanwhile, a song plays. The lyrics, repeated again
and again: Five. Five dollar. Five dollar foot-long.”
For a limited time, Subway is offering a special deal: foot-
long subs for $5. Foot-longs were once Subway’s “stock-
in-trade,” according to Chief Marketing Officer Tony Pace,
…
* * *
To ad agency MMB, the advent of a $5 foot-long seemed in
itself momentous and compelling enough that elaborate
persuasive efforts could only cloud the issue. …
6. QSR Web (qsrweb.com) (February 10, 2009)
Subway launches $5 foot long LTO
Opposition No. 91192657

32

Subway is launching a limited-time 5-foot-long sub
promotion, the company has announced. All 20 of the
chain’s sandwiches will be available under the “five-dollar
foot-long” deal.
The news articles applicant introduced do not reference “Footlong” as a
trademark. In fact, the authors of the articles in Franchising.com and Reuters
specifically identified SUBWAY as a trademark but did not identify “Footlong” as a
trademark. To the contrary, the predominant use of “footlong” in these articles is as
a term identifying a type of sandwich. As Judge Rich explained in In re Abcor
Development Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 816, 200 USPQ 215, 219 (CCPA 1978) (Rich, J.,
concurring) (emphasis in original), a term that immediately and unequivocally
describes the purpose and function of appellant's goods is a name for those goods,
for “[t]hat is what names do. They tell you what the thing is.”
5. Third-party use of Footlong in connection with hot dogs.
We disagree with applicant’s contention that with respect to the use of the
term “Footlong,” “hot dogs are distinct from sandwiches in the mind of the
consumer.”25 See supra Preliminary Issues Section A n.4. Although the description
of goods has been amended to “sandwiches, excluding hot dogs,” we are not
persuaded that hot dogs are so distinct from other sandwiches that the use of the
term “Footlong” in connection with hot dogs is irrelevant. In fact, dictionaries
reference “footlong hot dogs” to help explain the meaning of the word “footlong.” See

25 Applicant’s Brief, p. 19.
Opposition No. 91192657

33

supra Section C(1).26 The evidence in this record indeed shows that the use of
“Footlong” in connection with hot dogs is so pervasive that it affects how consumers
perceive the term “Footlong” in connection with other types of sandwiches.
6. Consumer Surveys
Each party proffered a “Teflon” survey to test how consumers perceive the
term “Footlong.”27 The surveys reach diametrically opposite results on the question
of whether the term “Footlong” is generic, and each party has criticized the survey
conducted by its opponent.28
Professor McCarthy describes a “Teflon” survey as a mini-course in the
generic versus trademark distinction, followed by a test. MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12:16 (4th ed. 2013).
In designing a TEFLON-type survey, both the initial
“mini-test” and the other marks and generic names in the
list must be carefully constructed and tailored to the facts
of a particular case.
Id. See also Jacob Zimmerman v. National Association of Realtors, 70 USPQ2d
1425, 1435-36 n.15 (TTAB 2004) (flaws in the design and administration of the
survey, including the mini-test, resulted in the survey having limited probative
value).

26 Even if we did not consider the testimony and evidence regarding the use of “footlong” to
describe or identify hot dogs, our decision would be the same.
27 A “Teflon” survey refers to the format of the survey used in E. I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co. v. Yoshida International, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 185 USPQ 597 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) to
prove that “Teflon” was not generic.
28 As mentioned earlier, we consider the Johnson survey only as evidence rebutting the
Cogan survey, not to support opposer’s case-in-chief as to genericness.
Opposition No. 91192657

34

a. Cogan survey conducted on behalf of applicant.
Dr. Sandra Cogan, the principal of Cogan Research Group, designed and
conducted a “Teflon” type survey on behalf of applicant to prove that consumers
perceive the term “Footlong” as a brand name rather than a common name. The
survey was performed between May 19 and June 23, 2010, polling 200 interviewees
in four geographic locations.
Dr. Cogan defined the universe of subjects likely to encounter the term
“Footlong” as follows:
… men and women 18 years old and older who had eaten
at or had bought food or beverages to take out at fast food
restaurants or sandwich shops in the past three months
and ate at or took out food from these restaurants at least
once a month.29
The survey was conducted in the following manner:
1. The interviewer read aloud to survey respondents definitions of
“common names” (generic names) and “brand names” and asked if respondents
understood the definition of a common name and a brand name.
2. The interviewer used the following examples to explain the difference
between a brand name and a common name (emphasis in the original):
(EXAMPLE #1) For example, the name “iced tea” is a
common name for a type of beverage that is made by
several companies. But “Snapple” is a brand name for
iced tea that is made by one company.
(Example #2) Another example is the name,
“hamburger” which is the common name for a sandwich
made with a cooked patty of ground meat placed in a bun.

29 Genericness and Secondary Meaning Survey Regarding the Name “FOOTLONG,” p. 11
(July 1, 2010) (Doolan Declaration, Exhibit A).
Opposit

3
question
4
common
individu
name w
A
as a bra
both.33

30 Id. at p
31 Id.
32 Id. at p
33 Id. at p
ion No. 91
But “
that i
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192657
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4.
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35
a brand n
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example
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54% of the
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king the r
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hamburg
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shown a
ether they
they didn
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er
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of
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nd name i
ce betwee
list of na
thought
’t know.32
fied “Footl
dentified
ing
s?31
n a
mes
each
ong”
it as
Opposit

T
respond
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F.2d 93
640 (TT
USPQ 1
the surv
S
common
significa
ion No. 91
here are s
ents is t
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7, 16 USP
AB 1981)
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ey did not
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192657
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rs who pur
nd frequen
alia patr
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Q2d 1783
(citing Ka
1958)). A
include al
examples
d a brand
By us
blems wit
. The d
ogs.” As i
chase and
t patrons
ons of eat
sandwiche
tial custo
in all norm
ctocom Sy
, 1787 (Fe
lart Co., I
ccordingly
l of the pot
Dr. Cogan
name cou
ing highl
36
h the Cog
escription
ndicated a
eat sandw
of fast foo
-in and si
s. Becaus
mers for
al chann
s. Inc. v. H
d. Cir. 199
nc. v. Cam
, the surv
entially re
used to
ld be cons
y descrip
an survey
of goods
bove, the r
iches. Rel
d restaura
t-down re
e the appli
applicant’
els of trad
ouston Co
0); In re E
era-Mart,
ey results
levant con
illustrate
idered am
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. First, t
in the
elevant pu
evant cons
nts and sa
staurants,
cation doe
s sandwic
e and to a
mputers S
lbaum, 2
Inc., 258
may be sk
sumers.
the differe
biguous, in
s that h
he univers
applicatio
blic compr
umers are
ndwich sh
delicatess
s not limit
hes, we m
ll of the u
ervs. Inc.,
11 USPQ
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ewed bec
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918
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119
ause
en a
ially
ired
Opposition No. 91192657

37

distinctiveness, Dr. Cogan’s “Quarter Pounder” and “Original Recipe” examples
might have led consumers mistakenly to think that a heavily advertised word like
“Footlong” has become the equivalent to the terms the interviewer used to explain
the meaning of a brand name, rather than ensure that the survey respondents
understood the difference between a common name and a brand name. After all,
highly descriptive terms are only a hair’s breadth away from generic terms, and the
line between them is difficult to draw even for experienced trademark attorneys, let
alone for the general sandwich-buying public. In other words, applicant’s extensive
advertising campaign may have created de facto secondary meaning (i.e., buyer
association with a generic term). See Continental Airlines Inc. v. United Air Lines
Inc., 53 USPQ2d 1385, 1395 (TTAB 2000) (“Even if one has achieved de facto
acquired distinctiveness in a generic term through promotion and advertising, the
generic term is still not entitled to protection because to allow protection would
‘deprive competing manufacturers of the product of the right to call an article by its
name.’”); see generally In re Pennington Seed, Inc., 466 F.3d 1053, 1058-59, 80
USPQ2d 1758 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Third, Dr. Cogan failed to conduct a mini-test to determine whether the
respondents understood the difference between a common name and a brand name.
Asking a respondent whether he or she understood the difference is not the same as
testing whether she or he understood the difference.
The gate-keeping questions in a genericness survey are
designed to determine whether the survey participant
understands the difference between “brand names” and
“common names.”
Opposition No. 91192657

38

In this flawed survey, rather than actually testing the
survey participant’s specific understanding of “whether
Chevrolet is a brand name or a common name?” (the
“Teflon” format), after providing some “training,” the
question was asked “Do you understand the difference
between ‘brand names’ and ‘common names?’” According
to Dr. Jacoby, this is a leading question calling for a “yea-
saying” response and is not a reliable measure of
comprehension.
See Jacob Zimmerman v. National Association of Realtors, 70 USPQ2d at 1435-36
n.5.
Fourth, Dr. Cogan should not have provided respondents with the option of
stating that the subject terms were both common names and brand names. By
definition, a generic term for a product can never function as a trademark for that
product. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 23 USPQ2d 1081,
1083 (1992) (“In contrast, generic marks [sic] – those that ‘refe[r] to the genus of
which the product is a species,’ … are not registrable as trademarks.”); BellSouth
Corp. v. DataNational Corp., 60 F.3d 1565, 35 USPQ2d 1554, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(“A generic term cannot be registered because such a term cannot function as an
indication of source.”); In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d
1567, 4 USPQ2d 1141, 1142 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“Generic terms, by definition
incapable of indicating sources, are the antithesis of trademarks, and can never
attain trademark status.”); RESTATEMENT THIRD, UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15,
cmt. a (1995) (“Generic designations are not subject to appropriation as trademarks
at common law and are ineligible for registration under state and federal trademark
statutes.”). A respondent who said that a term was both a brand name and a
common name might not have understood the difference between the two. This
Opposition No. 91192657

39

calls into question the validity of Dr. Cogan’s results because we cannot be sure how
many of the respondents actually understood the difference between a brand name
and a common name.
In her analysis of Mr. Johnson’s survey, Dr. Cogan criticized Mr. Johnson’s
failure to permit the respondents to answer “both,” citing as authority Windsurfing
International, Inc. v. Fred Ostermann GmbH, 613 F. Supp. 933, 227 USPQ 927, 946
n.168 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).34 However, Dr. Cogan’s reliance on Windsurfing is
misplaced because in that case the court noted that although respondents were free
to answer “both,” “the answers of the persons who responded in this manner were
not included in the final tabulation,” whereas Dr. Cogan included responses
identifying the names as both a brand name and a common name.
For these reasons, we give very little weight to applicant’s Cogan survey on
the question of whether prospective purchasers of sandwiches, excluding hot dogs,
view the term “Footlong” as a common name or a brand name.
b. Johnson survey conducted on behalf of opposer.
Philip Johnson, the Chief Executive Officer of Leo J. Shapiro and Associates,
Inc., a market research and consulting firm, testified that he designed and
conducted a survey “that would address the major defects in the Cogan Survey and
produce an accurate measurement of genericness.”35 The survey was performed
between July 14 and July 26, 2011, polling 408 interviewees in eight geographic

34 “Review of Philip Johnson’s Genericness Survey,” p. 17 (December 9, 2011) (Applicant’s
first notice of reliance).
35 A Rebuttal of the Cogan Survey, p. 2 (Johnson Declaration (October 11, 2011), Exhibit A).
Opposition No. 91192657

40

locations.36 As noted earlier, we have considered this survey not as evidence of
genericness supporting opposer’s case in chief, but only to the extent it stands as
evidence rebutting applicant’s case-in-chief.
Mr. Johnson interviewed adults over the age of 18 “who have purchased food
to take out, for delivery, or to eat at a cafeteria, sandwich shop, deli, coffee shop, or
restaurant in the past month.”37 Mr. Johnson has acknowledged that his survey
universe is narrow, “[b]ecause it’s a rebuttal survey.”38
Q. And why would you narrow the universe because
it’s a rebuttal survey?
A. Because if I used a broader universe I would still
have to identify the universe that’s comparable to
the universe that Cogan used, because it’s a
rebuttal survey where you can’t compare the
results directly. So I removed the bias from the
question that she used, in other words, by the focus
on fast food restaurant which was the bias, out of
the definition, it was consistent with what she did,
but it was correcting for the bias. But it is
somewhat narrower than the broadest possible
universe.39
* * *
Q. Now, you’ve also identified what you would use as
the correct universe; is that correct?
A. Well, I identified the universe of genericness if you
included people who would make it at home rather
than just those who purchase it out, yes, that is
correct.

36 Id. at p. 4.
37 Id. at p. 5
38 Johnson Dep. (November 29, 2011), p. 9.
39 Id. at 10.
Opposition No. 91192657

41

Q. … why didn’t you use that original universe you
defined in September of 2010 in your report?
Assuming that’s the correct one, and why did you
only go halfway?
* * *
A. Well, first, it isn’t halfway, as you, I think you
asked me in my deposition prior, doesn’t it include
about 90 percent of the population to have people
who eat out in the past month to which the answer
is, yes, it includes 80 to 90 percent of the
population. So leaving out the 10 percent as a
small group of people who aren’t going to be
reported on their own. But to make things
comparable, in other words, apples to apples
comparability I thought the correct thing to do was
to take out the fast food bias, in other words, the
word fast food but leave the definition that it’s
people who eat out in the past month.40
While the Johnson survey universe is narrow, it is broader than the Cogan survey
universe.41
The survey was conducted in the following manner:
Step 1. The interviewer read the following introduction to the
prospective respondents (emphasis in the original):
As you may know, most products and services have two
names. One tells us what type of product or service it is,
such as CREDIT CARD, AUTOMOBILE, or
HAMBURGER, which are names used to identify
different products or services that come from many
different sources or companies. The other is its brand
name, such as VISA, TOYOTA, or DENNY’S, which is
used to identify a particular product or service that comes
from a particular source or company. Before we go on, do
you understand what I mean when I talk about a type of

40 Id. at 11-12.
41 Based on the description of goods, the proper survey universe should include all people
who purchase and eat sandwiches (defined to exclude only hot dogs).
Opposition No. 91192657

42

product or service or a brand name, or would you like me
to read the examples again?42
Step 2. The respondent had to report that he/she understood, otherwise
the interview was terminated.43
Step 3. If the respondent said that he/she understood the difference
between and type of product and a brand name, they were asked the following mini-
test questions in rotated order (emphasis in the original):
Let’s take some example terms that are used in the food
service industry.
Question VIII:
HAND RESPONDENT “CORNDOG” CARD AND
SAY: Do you believe that the word on the card is a …
(ROTATE ORDER OF FIRST TWO ALTERNATIVES
READ)?
… TYPE?
OR
…BRAND?
OR
… DO YOU NOT KNOW?
* * *
HAND RESPONDENT “DORITOS” CARD AND SAY:
Do you believe that the word on the card is a …
(ROTATE ORDER OF FIRST TWO ALTERNATIVES
READ)?
… TYPE?
OR

42 A Rebuttal of the Cogan Survey, p. 7 (Johnson Declaration (October 11, 2011), Exhibit A).
43 Id.
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Opposition No. 91192657

45

Moreover, the use of the word restaurant in proximity to take out food, coffee shops,
sandwich shops and delis calls to mind fast food restaurants rather than excluding
them.
Second, Mr. Johnson conducted a “double-blind” survey approach “where
neither the respondents nor the interviewers conducting the study were aware of
the purpose of the research or the identity of the party who commissioned it.”51 The
“double-blind” approach minimizes bias because neither the interviewers nor the
respondents know the purpose of the survey. There is no reason for a respondent
“to take away any idea of what sort of product or eating establishment is relevant
to” the subject matter of the survey.
Third, Dr. Cogan is highly critical of Mr. Johnson’s explanation
differentiating brand names from common names.52 However, Mr. Johnson’s survey
results demonstrate that the respondents had a firm understanding regarding the
difference between a common name and a brand name (e.g., only 3% of the
respondents in the Johnson survey identified COCA-COLA as a common name
whereas 21% of the respondents in the Cogan survey identified DIET COKE as a
common name and 6% of the respondents identified it as both a common name and
a brand name).
Dr. Cogan criticizes the examples that Mr. Johnson used to explain the
difference between a common name and a brand name (i.e., credit card/VISA,
automobile/TOYOTA and hamburger/DENNY’S). According to Dr. Cogan, because

51 A Rebuttal of the Cogan Survey, p. 11.
52 Id. at pp. 9 – 15.
Opposition No. 91192657

46

the word “visa” may be a travel document, because TOYOTA manufactures many
products, and because DENNY’S is a restaurant (i.e., a service provider) and not a
product, consumers would be confused.53 We disagree. When used in the context of
the explanation in Mr. Johnson’s survey, set forth above, VISA would be understood
to mean a credit card brand and not a travel document, and TOYOTA would be
understood as a brand for automobiles. While the hamburger/DENNY’S example
was less than ideal, we think in the context of the other two examples survey
respondents would understand DENNY’S as the brand of a restaurant that serves
food referred to as hamburgers.
Fourth, Dr. Cogan criticizes Mr. Johnson’s use of the term “food service
industry” to introduce his mini-test, arguing that Mr. Johnson is “confusing to the
survey respondents” because the term misleads the respondents into thinking the
questions relate to food and beverages purchased at fast food restaurants or
sandwich shops.54 As indicated above, the results of the Johnson survey show that
the respondents understood the difference between a brand name and a common
name and, therefore, the respondents were not confused. Moreover, suggesting the
sector or industry in which the terms and marks were used is not a fatal flaw
because trademarks are understood in relation to goods and services, not in the
abstract.
Fifth, Dr. Cogan also criticizes Mr. Johnson’s use of the term “type of product
or service” to define a generic or common name because it “immediately tells survey

53 “Review of Philip Johnson’s Genericness Survey,” p. 11.
54 Id. at pp. 12-13.
Opposition No. 91192657

47

respondents that a ‘descriptive name’ can be a type of product or service.”55 Dr.
Cogan supports this argument by pointing to the survey results where 41% of the
respondents identified McMUFFIN as a type of product and 42% of the respondents
identified WHOPPER as a type of product. After carefully reviewing Mr. Johnson’s
instructions and examples, we find nothing therein would lead a respondent into
believing that a descriptive name is a type of product. In fact, Mr. Johnson’s choice
of brand names avoided descriptive terms and the majority of respondents properly
classified McMUFFIN and WHOPPER as brand names.
Sixth, Dr. Cogan criticizes Mr. Johnson’s use of CORNDOG in the mini-test
and GRILLEDCHEESE in the survey because CORNDOG and GRILLEDCHEESE
are actually two words – “Corn Dog” and “Grilled Cheese” – and by displaying them
as one word Mr. Johnson “signals survey respondents that a descriptive/suggestive
name ‘FOOTLONG’ should be classified as a ‘type of product.’ This is leading the
survey respondent to the answer preferred by the Johnson Rebuttal Survey.”56 The
display of “Corn Dog” and “Grilled Cheese” as one word instead of two words is not a
fatal error. First, it is not clear that most respondents recognized that CORNDOG
and GRILLEDCHEESE were actually two words instead of one word and, to the
extent that they did, it is doubtful that the respondents cared or that it affected
their response. Moreover, since GRILLEDCHEESE was presented as one of several
terms created by merging two words (i.e., MILKSHAKE and PANCAKE), we are not
persuaded that the respondents were led to classify FOOTLONG as type of product

55 Id. at pp. 13-15.
56 Id. at pp. 15-16.
Opposition No. 91192657

48

simply because “grilled cheese” and “corn dog” were depicted without a space.
Finally, we note that applicant, itself, uses “Foot Long” and “Footlong”
interchangeably. See supra Section C.2. “Applicant’s Use of ‘Footlong.”
Seventh and last, Dr. Cogan criticized Mr. Johnson for using COCACOLA
[sic] and GATORADE as brand names in his survey because they are well known, if
not famous, brands and they are not descriptive or suggestive.57 We see nothing
wrong with Mr. Johnson’s use of COCA-COLA and GATORADE because they act as
control terms demonstrating that the respondents understand the difference
between common names and brand names. Furthermore, as indicated above, the
results show that 59% of the survey respondents correctly identified McMUFFIN as
a brand name and that 57% of the respondents correctly identified WHOPPER as a
brand name; both terms are at least somewhat suggestive.
In summary, we find that the Johnson survey supports our finding that the
Cogan survey is entitled to little probative value. However, we do not rely on it in
determining the ultimate question of whether opposer has proved the term
“footlong” to be generic.
Discussion
Based on the record evidence properly before us, we find that “Footlong,” as
used by applicant, identifies a type or category of sandwich and that the relevant
public understands the term “Footlong” to refer to that class of products that
includes 12-inch sandwiches. The commonly understood meaning of “Footlong,”

57 Id. at pp. 16-17.
Opposition No. 91192657

49

applicant’s own use of the term, opposer’s use of the term and third-party uses
demonstrate that purchasers understand that “Footlong” identifies 12-inch
sandwiches. We accordingly find that FOOTLONG is generic for “sandwiches,
excluding hot dogs.”
In making the determination that the term “Footlong” is generic, we readily
acknowledge that “Footlong” is not the name of a food product; rather, it is an
adjective referring to the length of the sandwich. This adjectival use, however, does
not remove “Footlong” from being generic when used in connection with sandwiches.
Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 561 F.2d 75, 195 USPQ 281,
285 (7th Cir. 1977) (“The fact that ‘light’ is an adjective does not preclude it from
being a generic or common descriptive word” as applied to beer). Although it has
sometimes been said that “generic names are nouns and descriptive names are
adjectives,” such a rule is not consistent with the Board's precedent or that of many
courts; genericness cannot be determined simply by applying prescriptivist rules
based on parts of speech. MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 12:10 (4th ed. rev. March 2013).
In this case, the record makes clear that “footlong” has and continues to be
widely used in the food and restaurant industry to refer primarily to 12-inch
sandwiches. The term does not merely describe a sandwich, but in fact identifies a
category of sandwiches included within the relevant genus. And because “Footlong”
identifies a category of sandwiches 12 inches long, it should be freely available for
use by competitors. See In re Northland Aluminum Products, Inc., 777 F.2d 1556,
Opposition No. 91192657

50

227 USPQ 961 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (BUNDT for coffee cake); In re Sun Oil Co., 426 F.2d
401, 165 USPQ 718 (CCPA 1970) (CUSTOMBLENDED for gasoline held generic
because category of gasoline was blended personally for motorist); In re Helena
Rubenstein, Inc., 410 F.2d 438, 161 USPQ 606 (CCPA 1969) (PASTEURIZED for
face cream held generic); In re Preformed Line Products Co., 323 F.2d 1007, 139
USPQ 271 (CCPA 1963) (PREFORMED for preformed electrical equipment held
generic); Servo Corp. of America v. Servo-Tek Products Co., 289 F.2d 437, 126 USPQ
362 (CCPA 1960) (MATCHBOX for toy vehicles held generic because that category
of toy cars was sold in matchbox-sized boxes).
Applicant contends that “Footlong” is not generic because dictionaries do not
define “Footlong” as a sandwich.58 However, the record shows that “Footlong’ has a
well-understood and recognized meaning as a sandwich that is 12 inches long; the
fact that dictionaries do not define “Footlong” as a sandwich is not controlling on the
question of registrability. See In re Gould Paper Corp., 834 F.2d 1017, 5 USPQ2d
1110, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (SCREENWIPE held generic even though there was no
dictionary definition of the compound term); In re Dairimetics, Ltd., 169 USPQ 572,
573 (TTAB 1971) (ROSE MILK refused registration on the Supplemental Register
even though there was no dictionary definition of ROSE MILK).
Finally, applicant argues that opposer’s evidence of third-party use is not
persuasive because of “the small, local nature of operations and their geographic

58 Applicant’s Brief, p. 32.
Opposition No. 91192657

51

obscurity and disparity.”59 We disagree. The various third-party uses demonstrate
that competitors use the term “footlong” to refer to their 12-inch sandwiches and
that consumers have become conditioned to recognize that many entities refer to 12-
inch sandwiches as a “footlong.” This is a different conclusion from that reached by
the Board in Carl Karcher Enterprises Inc. v. Stars Restaurants Corp., 35 USPQ2d
1125, 1131 (TTAB 1995) relied on by applicant. However, Carl Karcher Enterprises
is a likelihood of confusion case in which the Board noted that stars were a common
shape and were laudatory when used in connection with restaurant services.
Nevertheless, the Board found that opposer’s marks were strong, even in the face of
third-party uses, because such uses were obscure. In this case, where we are
determining whether “Footlong” is generic, the evidence shows it is common to use
the term “Footlong” to refer to 12-inch sandwiches. The fact that applicant’s
business is much larger than some other establishments using “Footlong” in
connection with 12-inch sandwiches does not establish applicant’s right to exclusive
use of the term. The Trademark Act protects all competitors, big or small, against
harm resulting from registration of generic terms.
We find that “footlong” is a generic term for “sandwiches, excluding hot dogs,”
and therefore the opposition is sustained on this ground.
Acquired Distinctiveness
For purposes of completeness, we address the issue of whether the term
“Footlong” when used in connection with sandwiches, excluding hot dogs, has

59 Applicant’s Brief, p. 34.
Opposition No. 91192657

52

acquired distinctiveness. This scenario presupposes that the Board’s decision is
appealed and the reviewing court finds that the term “Footlong” used in connection
with sandwiches, excluding hot dogs, is not generic. For purposes of this discussion,
we treat applicant’s mark as highly descriptive but not generic.
During the prosecution of the application, applicant argued that “Footlong”
had acquired distinctiveness as a source indicator and amended the application to
seek registration under the provisions of Section 2(f) of the Trademark Act.
Accordingly, opposer has the initial burden of showing that applicant’s mark has
not acquired distinctiveness. Yamaha International v. Hoshino Gakki, 840 F.2d
1572, 6 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (a party challenging the sufficiency of
an applicant’s § 2(f) showing “must have at least the initial burden of challenging or
rebutting the applicant’s evidence of acquired distinctiveness made of record during
prosecution which led to publication of the proposed mark.”).
An opposer to an application submitted under Section 2(f)
sufficiently meets its initial burden if it produces
sufficient evidence or argument whereby, on the entire
record then before the board, the board could conclude
that the applicant has not met its ultimate burden of
showing acquired distinctiveness. Cf. Sanyo Watch Co. v.
Sanyo Electric Co., 691 F.2d 1019, 1022, 215 USPQ 833,
834 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (opposer's prima facie case requires
“facts from which the board might reasonably conclude”
that applicant was not entitled to the registration sought).
Thus, the board's requirement that Yamaha establish a
prima facie case of no acquired distinctiveness does not
require Yamaha to “prove” anything, but simply requires
Yamaha to present sufficient evidence or argument on
which the board could reasonably conclude that Hoshino
had not proven at least one of the elements necessary to
obtain a trademark registration.
Opposition No. 91192657

53

Yamaha International v. Hoshino Gakki, 6 USPQ2d at 1004. Opposer has met its
initial burden based on the record before us as discussed in the genericness section
of this opinion. Thus, if the term should be determined not to be generic, because
the evidence shows that the mark is, at the very least, highly descriptive, it is more
than sufficient for us to “reasonably conclude” that the term has not acquired
distinctiveness.
When, as here, the opposer has met its initial burden challenging the
sufficiency of applicant’s proof of acquired distinctiveness, applicant may then
present additional evidence and argument to rebut opposer’s showing and to
establish that its mark has acquired distinctiveness. Yamaha International v.
Hoshino Gakki, 6 USPQ2d at 1005. However, the main focus of the Board at this
point of the proceeding, where both parties have presented their evidence, filed
briefs and appeared at an oral hearing, is to determine which party should prevail
on the entire record. Yamaha International v. Hoshino Gakki, 6 USPQ2d 1006. In
this regard, the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of acquired
distinctiveness is on applicant. Yamaha International v. Hoshino Gakki, 6 USPQ2d
1006.
To prove that its mark has acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f) of the
Trademark Act, an applicant may submit any “appropriate evidence tending to
show the mark distinguishes [applicant’s] goods.” Yamaha International v. Hoshino
Gakki, 6 USPQ2d at 1010, quoting Trademark Rule 2.41(a), 37 CFR 2.41(a). Such
evidence includes the duration, extent and nature of the use of the mark in
Opposition No. 91192657

54

commerce, advertising expenditures, letters or statements from the trade or public,
and other appropriate evidence. Trademark Rule 2.41(a). See also In re
Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (acquired
distinctiveness may be shown by copying, unsolicited media coverage and consumer
surveys). “The amount and character of the evidence, if any, required to establish
that a given word or phrase … ‘has become distinctive’ of the goods necessarily
depends on the facts of each case and the nature of the alleged mark.” Roux
Laboratories, Inc. v. Clairol Inc., 427 F.2d 823, 166 USPQ 34, 39 (CCPA 1970). See
also In re Steelbuilding.com, 75 USPQ2d at 1424 (“no single factor is determinative
… the determination examines all of the circumstances involving the use of the
mark”). With respect to the nature of the alleged mark, “the applicant’s burden of
showing acquired distinctiveness increases with the level of descriptiveness; a more
descriptive term requires more evidence of secondary meaning.” In re
Steelbuilding.com, 75 USPQ2d at 1424. Because “Footlong” when used in
connection with sandwiches is highly descriptive, applicant has a heavy burden of
showing acquired distinctiveness.
Applicant argues that by its use of “Footlong” in connection with sandwiches,
the term has acquired distinctiveness through its extensive sales and advertising,
as evidenced by opposer’s copying of applicant’s mark, unsolicited media coverage,
and Dr. Cogan’s survey.60

60 Applicant’s Brief, pp. 26-30.
Opposition No. 91192657

55

A. Applicant’s sales and advertising of “Footlong.”
Applicant started using the term FOOTLONG on custom sandwiches at least
as early as 1967.61 From 2000 to 2009, applicant sold over four billion sandwiches
“under the FOOTLONG trademark.”62 In 2008, applicant launched a “$5
FOOTLONG” marketing campaign which nearly doubled applicant’s annual sales of
“Footlong” sandwiches from $541 million to $936 million per year.63 While
applicant has achieved great commercial success, sales success is not necessarily
indicative of acquired distinctiveness, but may be attributed to many other factors,
the most likely being that applicant offers a quality product at a competitive price.
See Cicena, Ltd. v. Columbia Telecommunications Group, 900 F.2d 1546, 14
USPQ2d 1401, 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1990). See also In re Boston Beer Co. L.P., 198 F.3d
1370, 53 USPQ2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (claim based on annual sales under
the mark of approximately eighty-five million dollars, and annual advertising
expenditures in excess of ten million dollars, not sufficient to establish acquired
distinctiveness in view of highly descriptive nature of mark); In re Ennco Display
Systems Inc., 56 USPQ2d 1279, 1285 (TTAB 2000) (applicant’s sales, while
impressive, may only demonstrate the growing popularity of the product, not
consumer recognition of the trademark).
Further, as noted above, applicant uses the term “Footlong” to refer to its 12-
inch sandwiches, just as it uses “6-inch” to refer to sandwiches half as long.

61 Pochron Declaration ¶ 10.
62 Pochron Declaration ¶ 11.
63 Pochron Declaration ¶¶ 11, 17; Exhibit C (the Pochron Affidavit Claiming § 2(f) in
support of the application at issue).
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Opposition No. 91192657

57

competitor’s sale of a like product “was more likely based on an effort to capitalize
on that intrinsic consumer desirability than on any alleged secondary meaning.”);
Duramax Marine, LLC v. Fernstrum & Co., 80 USPQ2d 1780, 1798 (TTAB 2006) (to
be relevant, copying needs to be for the purpose of confusing consumers as to source
or to trade on another’s goodwill).
Although opposer used the term “Footlong” long after applicant’s first use,
the rights of others to use descriptive or generic terms in competition is the purpose
of Trademark Act § 2(e)(1), at least in part. “Competitors unable to use a common
term that describes or designates their product are at a significant disadvantage
communicating to potential customers the nature and characteristics of the
product.” Boston Duck Tours LP v. Super Duck Tours LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 87 USPQ2d
1385, 1392 (1st Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Having adopted a descriptive term,
applicant should not be surprised to find that many others -- opposer, as well as a
number of third parties -- also use the term. Even if applicant was the first and/or
sole user of a generic term or phrase, as it claims, that does not entitle applicant to
register such a term or phrase as a mark. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v.
Lasting Impressions I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 122, 72 USPQ2d 1833, 1838 (2004)
(“allowing anyone to obtain a complete monopoly on use of a descriptive term simply
by grabbing it first” would “deprive commercial speakers of the ordinary utility of
descriptive words”); In re National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc., 219 USPQ
1018, 1020 (TTAB 1983). Moreover, while other terms may be used to identify
applicant's type of product, it is well settled that there can be more than one term to
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name a product. Roselux Chemical Co., Inc. v. Parsons Ammonia Co., Inc., 299 F.2d
855, 132 USPQ 627, 632 (CCPA 1962). See also: In re Sun Oil Co., 426 F.2d 401,
165 USPQ 718, 719 (CCPA 1970) (Rich, J., concurring) (“All of the generic names for
a product belong in the public domain.”) (emphasis in original). Under these
circumstances, we do not find that opposer’s use or use by others to be “copying”
sufficient to prove that “Footlong” has acquired distinctiveness.
C. Unsolicited media coverage of applicant’s use of “Footlong.”
Applicant argues that it “has received unsolicited media coverage of its
FOOTLONG brand sandwiches supporting the conclusion that the FOOTLONG
mark has acquired distinctiveness.”65 Representative examples of the unsolicited
media coverage are set forth in the analysis of whether the term is generic in
Section C(4) supra. The media coverage does not demonstrate that the term
“Footlong” has acquired distinctiveness because the news articles use the term
“Footlong” generically, not as a trademark, and they focus primarily on the $5
footlong promotion rather than the alleged FOOTLONG mark.
D. Whether applicant’s use of FOOTLONG has been substantially exclusive?
Applicant asserts that it is the only “quick service restaurant” that uses or
has used “Footlong” for sandwiches.66 This claim is simply not supported by the

65 Applicant’s Brief, pp. 28-29.
66 Applicant’s Brief, p. 29. Whether applicant is the only “quick service” restaurant to use
“Footlong” is irrelevant. As noted above, applicant’s goods are not limited to those sold in
any particular type of store or restaurant. For purposes of registration, we must consider
the descriptiveness or genericness of the term as it is used in any channel of trade that is
normal for “sandwiches, excluding hot dogs,” regardless of applicant’s actual channels of
trade. In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB 1981) (citing Kalart Co., Inc. v. Camera-
Mart, Inc., 258 F.2d 956, 119 USPQ 139 (CCPA 1958)).
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record. The third-party use of the term “Footlong” is extensive. See supra the
discussion of third-party use in the analysis of whether the term is generic in
Section C(4). In this case, the widespread use of “Footlong” demonstrated by this
record would itself be sufficient to dispose of applicant’s claim of acquired
distinctiveness:
In respect of registration, there must be a trademark, i.e.,
purchasers in the marketplace must be able to recognize
that a term or device has or has acquired such
distinctiveness that it may be relied on as indicating one
source of quality control and thus one quality standard.
When the record shows that purchasers are confronted
with more than one (let alone numerous) independent
users of a term or device, an application for registration
under Section 2(f) cannot be successful, for distinctiveness
on which purchasers may rely is lacking under such
circumstances.
Levi Strauss & Co. v. Genesco, Inc., 742 F.2d 1401, 222 USPQ 939, 941 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
Applicant further contends that it polices the use of “Footlong” and that in
the past six years it “has made at least thirty written demands to third parties to
cease and desist unauthorized use of the FOOTLONG mark for sandwiches.”67
However, acquiescence to demands of competitors to cease use of a term can be
equally viewed as simply a desire to avoid litigation. See, e.g., In re Wella Corp.,
565 F.2d 143, 144 n.2, 196 USPQ 7, 8 n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Consol. Cigar Corp.,

67 Applicant’s Brief, p. 17.
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13 USPQ2d 1481, 1483 (TTAB 1989). This is especially true in this case, where
applicant is the largest fast food restaurant chain in the country.68
E. The probative value of Dr. Cogan’s survey.
Dr. Cogan also measured “the extent to which the name FOOTLONG is
associated with a single source and if so, has attained ‘secondary meaning’ in the
marketplace.”69
The 109 respondents who thought the name FOOTLONG
was a brand name, were further asked Question 3: “What
type of product or service do you think FOOTLONG is a
brand name for?” A total of 98 respondents (49% of the
total sample of 200) mentioned “Subway” and no other
restaurant name in their answers.
The 19 respondents who thought FOOTLONG was both a
brand name and a common name were asked Question 4a:
“You thought FOOTLONG is both a common name and a
brand name. Why do you think “FOOTLONG” is both a
common name and a brand name? and Question 4b:
“What type of product or service do you think
FOOTLONG is a brand name or common name for?” A
total of 8 respondents mentioned “Subway” and no other
restaurant in their answers.70
The problems that we previously identified in Dr. Cogan’s survey affect the
probative value of the survey as applied to measuring acquired distinctiveness. For
example, Dr. Cogan’s universe is too narrow. There may be an overreliance on
patrons of “fast food” establishments that skews the results because the proper
universe is all consumers who purchase and eat sandwiches. In addition, because

68 Wilker Declaration ¶¶ 3 and 6. See also Applicant’s Brief, p. 10.
69 Genericness and Secondary Meaning Survey Regarding the Name “FOOTLONG,” p. 20
(July 1, 2010) (Doolan Declaration, Exhibit A).
70 Id. at p. 21. The Cogan report does not segregate the responses to 4(a) and 4(b).
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Dr. Cogan did not conduct a mini-test, we have little confidence that the
respondents understood the difference between a common name and brand name
and, therefore, we cannot be sure what percentage of the respondents are
associating a common name with a single source. Finally, Dr. Cogan’s question,
“What type of product or service do you think FOOTLONG is a brand name for?”, is
leading, because it asks the respondent to identify the company he/she associates
with the brand FOOTLONG. The proper question is do you associate the term
“Footlong” with one company, more than one company, or no company? An
appropriate follow-up question would be what company or companies do you
associate with “Footlong.”
Based on a consideration of all the evidence in the record, we find that
applicant has failed to establish that “Footlong” has acquired distinctiveness.
Decision: The opposition is sustained on the ground that “Footlong” used in
connection with sandwiches, excluding hot dogs, is generic. In the event that
applicant’s proposed mark should be found not to be generic in any appeal of this
decision, we further find that the mark has not acquired distinctiveness and is not
entitled to registration under Section 2(f).