Sheet Metal Workers International Association Local #18 - Wisconsin AFL-CIO (Everbrite, LLC)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 13, 2013

359 N.L.R.B. 1095 (N.L.R.B. 2013)

SHEET METAL WORKERS LOCAL 18—WISCONSIN (EVERBRITE, LLC) 1095

359 NLRB No. 121
Sheet Metal Workers International Association Local
No. 18—Wisconsin, AFL–CIO and Everbrite,
LLC. Case 30–CB–075815
May 13, 2013
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS GRIFFIN
AND BLOCK
On July 27, 2012, Administrative Law Judge Arthur J.
Amchan issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the Acting Gen-
eral Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Respond-
ent filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings and
findings only to the extent consistent with this Decision
and Order.
The judge found that the Respondent violated Section
8(b)(3) of the Act by refusing to bargain over a successor
agreement to the collective-bargaining agreement be-
tween the parties effective March 1, 2009–February 29,
2012 (the 2009 agreement). Because we find that the
judge erred in failing to defer to the parties’ contractual
grievance-arbitration procedure, we reverse.
1

For over 25 years, the Charging Party, Everbrite, LLC,
and the Respondent, Sheet Metal Workers International
Association Local #18—Wisconsin, AFL–CIO, have
been parties to a series of collective-bargaining agree-
ments, the latest of which—the 2009 agreement—
contained grievance and arbitration provisions. Specifi-
cally, article 10, section 3 of the 2009 agreement provid-
ed: “[I]n the event that any grievance or interpretation of
this Agreement arises which [affects] more than one (1)
employee in the bargaining unit, either party may request
a meeting of the ‘Joint Board’.” In article 11, section 1,
the agreement stated:
If the grievance has not been satisfactorily settled by
the Joint Board or otherwise resolved by the parties; ei-
ther party may submit the dispute to arbitration . . . .
The failure of the Joint Board to meet as scheduled

1 Accordingly, we do not pass on the merits of the complaint allega-
tions. Although we conclude that the case is appropriate for deferral,
the Charging Party is not precluded from raising the question of arbi-
trability in arbitration. See Norfolk, Portsmouth Wholesale Beer Dis-
tributors Assn., 196 NLRB 1150, 1151 (1972) (whether a dispute the
Board defers to arbitration is itself arbitrable may appropriately be
raised in arbitration).
shall not preclude either party from proceeding, at its
option, directly to arbitration.
In early January 2012, a dispute arose between the par-
ties concerning whether the 2009 agreement had, by its
terms, rolled over for an additional year. Article 32, sec-
tion 2 of the agreement provided:
This Agreement, and any amendments hereto as pro-
vided above, shall remain in full force and effect
through February 29, 2012. Thereafter, this Agree-
ment shall continue in effect on a year to year basis, un-
less either party notifies the other of its intent to modi-
fy, or terminate this Agreement, and does so in writing
at least sixty (60) days prior to the expiration date.
[bold text in original.]
On January 7, 2012, the Respondent informed the
Charging Party that the agreement had rolled over for an
additional year because neither party provided timely
written notice of an intent to modify or terminate the
agreement. In response, the Charging Party asserted that
it had in fact notified the Respondent of its intent to mod-
ify or terminate the agreement and that the parties had
already begun bargaining.
After the Respondent refused to enter into bargaining
for a successor collective-bargaining agreement, the Act-
ing General Counsel issued the instant complaint, alleg-
ing that the Respondent’s refusal to bargain violated Sec-
tion 8(b)(3) of the Act, and a hearing was scheduled.
Five days before the date of the hearing, the Respondent
amended its answer to assert as an affirmative defense
that the case should be deferred to the parties’ contractu-
al grievance-arbitration procedure.
The judge rejected the Respondent’s argument that de-
ferral was appropriate. First, the judge found that be-
cause the issue had been fully litigated at the hearing,
deferral would result in unwarranted delay. Second, the
judge relied on the Respondent’s failure to raise the de-
ferral argument at an earlier stage of this proceeding to
find that “the deferral argument is simply a means of
further delaying resolution of this matter.” Finally, the
judge found deferral inappropriate because the Respond-
ent’s conduct constituted “a rejection of collective bar-
gaining principles.”
Contrary to the judge, we find that deferral is warrant-
ed in this case. Under established precedent, which the
judge’s decision does not address, the Board finds defer-
ral appropriate when the following conditions are met:
the parties’ dispute arises within the confines of a long
and productive collective-bargaining relationship; there
1096 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

is no claim of animosity to employees’ exercise of Sec-
tion 7 rights; the parties’ agreement provides for arbitra-
tion in a broad range of disputes; the parties’ arbitration
clause clearly encompasses the dispute at issue; the party
seeking deferral has asserted its willingness to utilize
arbitration to resolve the dispute; and the dispute is well
suited to resolution by arbitration. United Technologies,
268 NLRB 557, 558 (1984); accord: Collyer Insulated
Wire, 192 NLRB 837, 842 (1971).
We find that the criteria outlined in Collyer Insulated
Wire and United Technologies are satisfied in this case.
The Respondent and the Charging Party have been par-
ties to a long and productive collective-bargaining rela-
tionship dating back to at least 1984. Neither party al-
leges that the other has exhibited animosity to employ-
ees’ exercise of Section 7 rights. The grievance-
arbitration procedure in the 2009 agreement provides for
the resolution of contract interpretation disputes, which
can be initiated by either party. The Respondent has
expressed its willingness to arbitrate the dispute. Finally,
resolution of the substantive question in this case—
whether the 2009 agreement was automatically extended
for 1 year by its terms because no party provided suffi-
cient and timely written notice of an intent to modify or
terminate the agreement—is a question of contract inter-
pretation that is well suited for resolution through arbitra-
tion. See Tri-Pak Machinery, Inc., 325 NLRB 671, 673
(1998) (disputes concerning the renewal or termination
of an agreement are appropriate for arbitration).
We find no merit in any of the judge’s reasons for de-
clining to defer. First, we disagree with the judge’s find-
ing that the Respondent’s conduct amounts to a rejection
of collective-bargaining principles. To the contrary, the
Respondent is taking the position that the parties’ collec-
tively bargained 2009 agreement remained in effect.
Second, the Respondent’s request for deferral, 5 days
before the hearing commenced, was not untimely. De-
ferral to arbitration is an affirmative defense that may be
raised in the answer or even at the hearing. See, e.g.,
Hospitality Care Center, 314 NLRB 893, 894 (1994).
Although we share the judge’s concern about potential
delay, it does not outweigh our findings that the Re-
spondent timely raised a deferral defense and the long
established criteria set forth in Collyer and its progeny
are satisfied here. Finally, the judge erred in deciding the
case on the merits before determining whether deferral
was appropriate—and, a fortiori, in basing his refusal to
defer in part on his decision on the merits. The Board
has long held that while a deferral defense and the merits
may be addressed in the same hearing and the same deci-
sion, “[w]hether deferral is appropriate is a threshold
question which must be decided in the negative before
the merits of the unfair labor practice allegations can be
considered.” L.E. Myers Co., 270 NLRB 1010, 1010 fn.
2 (1984).
Accordingly, we find that the complaint allegations in
this case should be deferred to the parties’ contractual
grievance-arbitration procedure.
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed, provided that jurisdiction
of this proceeding is retained for the limited purpose of
entertaining an appropriate and timely motion for further
consideration on a proper showing that either (a) the dis-
pute has not, with reasonable promptness after the issu-
ance of this Decision and Order, been either resolved by
amicable settlement in the grievance procedure or sub-
mitted promptly to arbitration, or (b) the grievance or
arbitration procedures have not been fair and regular or
have reached a result that is repugnant to the Act.

Andrew S. Gollin, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Matthew R. Robbins and Andrew J. Smith, Esqs. (Previant,
Goldberg, Uelmen Gratz, Miller & Brueggeman), of Mil-
waukee, Wisconsin, for the Respondent.
Robert W. Mulcahy, Esq. (Michael Best & Friedrich LLP), of
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ARTHUR J. AMCHAN, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on June 18–19, 2012.
Everbrite, LLC filed the charge initiating this matter on March
2, 2012, and the General Counsel issued the complaint on April
27, 2012. The General Counsel alleges that Respondent Sheet
Metal Workers Local 18 has been violating Section 8(b)(3) of
the Act in refusing to bargain with the Charging Party Employ-
er for a successor agreement to the parties’ March 1, 2009, to
February 29, 2012 collective-bargaining agreement. Respond-
ent contends that the Employer failed to give adequate notice
that it wished to negotiate a successor agreement. Thus, Re-
spondent argues that the prior agreement rolled over and is
effective until February 29, 2013.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel and Respondent, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Everbrite, LLC, the Charging Party, a corporation, manufac-
tures and sells lighting products at its facilities in Wisconsin,
Illinois, Kansas, and Virginia, including the facility at issue
herein in South Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Everbrite annually
sells and ships goods valued in excess of $50,000 outside of the
State of Wisconsin from the South Milwaukee plant. Everbrite
is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and the Respondent Union
SHEET METAL WORKERS LOCAL 18—WISCONSIN (EVERBRITE, LLC) 1097

is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Charging Party Employer, Everbrite, LLC, has several
manufacturing plants at which it produces signs for customers
such as McDonald’s Corporation. Some of these facilities are
organized, some are unorganized. Its unionized plants at the
present time are the one in South Milwaukee, the plant at issue
in this case, a facility in Mt. Vernon, Illinois, and one in
Pardeeville, Wisconsin. It recently closed a unionized plant in
LaCrosse, Wisconsin.
Everbrite has had a series of collective-bargaining agree-
ments with the Union, dating back to 1984 or earlier. Article
32, section 2 of the 2009–2012 agreement provides:

This Agreement, and any amendments hereto as provided
above, shall remain in full force and effect through February
29, 2012. Thereafter, this Agreement shall continue in effect
on a year to year basis, unless either party notifies the other of
its intent to modify, or terminate this Agreement, and does so
in writing at least sixty (60) days prior to the expiration date.

Should either party timely notify of its intent to modify or
terminate this Agreement, the Agreement shall remain in
force and effect subsequent to February 29, 2012 and until ei-
ther party gives a ten (10) day additional written notice of its
intent to terminate the Agreement.

Starting in 2010, Everbrite began to ask midterm concessions
from the Unions at South Milwaukee, Mt. Vernon, Pardeeville,
and LaCrosse. At the South Milwaukee plant, there are two
bargaining units. Approximately 50 employees are represented
by the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (UE) and
30 by Respondent Local 18 of the Sheet Metal Workers Inter-
national Association. Local 18 made it clear to Everbrite that
was not amenable to making mid-contract concessions.
In July 2011, Everbrite asked for a meeting with Local 18.
These parties met on August 29. Present for Everbrite were
Barbara Schaal, vice president of administration, and Neil
Fuchs, safety and environmental manager for the South Mil-
waukee plant. The Union was represented by Earl Phillips,
business representative. The first 10 minutes of this meeting
was spent discussing the grievance of employee Mark Rumpel,
a union steward, who had been laid off while on workers com-
pensation. Afterwards, Fuchs left the meeting and Schaal and
Phillips were joined by Richard Sherman, a member of Ever-
brite’s advisory board. Since December 2011, Sherman has
been Everbrite’s interim president.
Sherman told Phillips that Everbrite needed concessions
from Local 18 to stay competitive with foreign competition.
Phillips told Sherman and Schaal that he could not discuss this
without the presence of Randy Krocka, the secretary/treasurer
of Local 18.
The parties met again on October 25, 2011. Schaal and
Sherman represented Everbrite. Phillips and Randy Krocka
represented the Union. Sherman again asked the Union for
concessions, including withdrawal from the Union’s pension
fund, a change in unit members’ health insurance coverage and
the elimination of the three floating holidays set forth in the
2009–2012 collective-bargaining agreement. These were set
forth in a written proposal given to the Union. (GC Exh. 8.)
That proposal was to be effective December 1, 2011, and pro-
posed that it would last for 5 years, until February 28, 2017.
Krocka informed Everbrite that if it withdrew from the Union’s
pension fund, it would be financially responsible for its un-
funded liability.
The parties agreed to meet again on November 17, but the
Union canceled this meeting, which was postponed until De-
cember 21. However, on December 14, Everbrite electronically
filed a notice with the Federal Medication and Conciliation
Service (FMCS) on FMCS form F-7. (GC Exh. 15.) This
notice states that “You [which I take to mean the FMCS] are
hereby notified that written notice of proposed termination or
modification of the existing collective bargaining contract was
served upon the other party to this contract and that no agree-
ment has been reached.” There were several boxes on this
form: “renegotiation,” “reopener,” and “initial contract.” Ever-
brite checked the box for “renegotiation.” The Union received
a copy of this notice from the FMCS on December 27. (GC
Exh. 19.)
At the December 21 meeting, Everbrite presented the Union
with a revised written proposal which omitted its plan to with-
draw from the Union’s pension fund. (GC Exh. 16.) This pro-
posal stated that the effective date of the parties’ new agree-
ment would be December 1, 2011 (a date that had already
passed), and that the agreement would be in force until Febru-
ary 28, 2017 (5 years from the expiration of the current con-
tract). Krocka told Everbrite representatives Schaal and Sher-
man that the Union was not in the process of bargaining with it.
However, Krocka raised the possibility of grandfathering em-
ployees who were close to retirement so that they would not be
affected by any changes to the collective-bargaining agreement.
On December 21, the parties agreed to meet again on Janu-
ary 9 and 11, 2012, with the Union’s full bargaining committee
in attendance, which included Everbrite employees. Phillips
told Everbrite’s representatives, Schaal and Sherman, that the
Union would pay for the time spent at the meeting by bargain-
ing unit members. (Tr. 65.) However, on January 7, 2012,
Krocka sent Everbrite an email stating that in the Union’s opin-
ion, the March 1, 2009–February 29, 2012 collective-
bargaining agreement had “rolled over.” In a telephone conver-
sation with Schaal during the last week of January 2012,
Krocka stated that he had found a “loophole” which allowed
the Union to refuse to return to the bargaining table.1
In an exchange of letters between Everbrite and the Union,
the Union stated on June 13, 2012, that any dispute over wheth-
er Everbrite provided timely notice to the Union to negotiate a
successor agreement should be resolved under the arbitration
clause in article 11 of the 2009–2012 collective-bargaining
agreement. (GC Exh. 2, pp. 8–9.)

1 Krocka concedes that he said this, Tr. 168.
1098 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

Analysis
Section 8(b)(3) deems a union’s refusal to bargain collective-
ly to be an unfair labor practice if that union is the exclusive
bargaining representative of some of the employer’s employees
pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Act.
The Union’s defense in this matter is that Everbrite did not
file timely written notice of its intent to modify, or terminate
the 2009–2012 collective-bargaining agreement 60 days prior
to the expiration of the contract. I find that as a matter of fact
and law that Everbrite provided the requisite notice in its initial
proposals of October 25, 2011 (GC Exh. 8), and December 21
(GC Exh. 16). Both of these documents conveyed to the Union
the fact that Company was proposing significant changes from
the 2009–2012 collective-bargaining agreement. It would be
clear to any reasonable person that Everbrite was proposing that
these changes be in force until February 28, 2017. The fact that
Everbrite proposed that the changes be instituted prior to expi-
ration of the 2009–2012 contract does not detract from the fact
that the Union was on notice that Everbrite was unwilling to
extend the life of the 2009–2012 contract.
The fact that Everbrite did not dot its i’s and cross its t’s, by
failing to send the Union a letter stating its intent to modify or
terminate the 2009–2012 agreement does not mandate a differ-
ent result. I find that Everbrite’s written proposals of October
25 and December 21, 2011, sufficiently conveyed Everbrite’s
intent to prevent the 2009–2012 contract from rolling over,
Oakland Press Co., 229 NLRB 476, 479 (1977), enfd. in rele-
vant part 606 F.2d 689 (6th Cir. 1979); Chemical Workers Lo-
cal 6-0682 (Checker Motors Corp.), 339 NLRB 291, 299
(2003).
Moreover, the Union subjectively understood that Everbrite
intended to bargain for a new contract. This is reflected by the
Union agreeing to bargaining sessions in January 2012 with
unit members of its bargaining committee in attendance.
The Respondent Union’s Deferral Argument
The Union argues this matter should deferred to arbitration
pursuant to Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837 (1971). In
making this argument it relies on articles X and XI of the 2009–
2012 collective-bargaining agreement. I reject this argument
for several reasons. First, this issue has been fully litigated in
front of me and to defer this matter to arbitration now would
only delay resolution of the case. Secondly, the Union first
proposed resort to the contract’s grievance and arbitration pro-
vision on June 13, 2012, 5 days before commencement of the
hearing in this matter. Given this fact, I conclude that the de-
ferral argument is simply a means of further delaying resolution
of this matter. Further, the Board has held that where a party’s
conduct constitutes a rejection of the principles of collective
bargaining, deferral is not proper, Rappazo Electric Co., 281
NLRB 471 fn. 1 (1986). I find the Union’s conduct in the in-
stant case to be such a rejection of collective-bargaining princi-
ples.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
Respondent Sheet Metal Workers International Association,
Local 18 violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act in refusing to bar-
gain over a successor collective-bargaining agreement to its
March 1, 2009–February 29, 2012 contract with Everbrite,
LLC.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I shall order it to cease and desist therefrom
and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
[Recommended order omitted from publication.]