Sheet Metal Wkrs. Local 49

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 19, 1969

178 N.L.R.B. 139 (N.L.R.B. 1969)

SHEET METAL WKRS . LOCAL 49
Sheet Metal Workers' International Association,
Local Union 49 , AFL-CIO ( General Metal
Products, Inc.) and Roger Jones. Case 28-CB-479
August 19, 1969
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
BROWN AND ZAGORIA
On June 5, 1969, Trial Examiner Paul E. Weil
issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding,
finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was
engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the
meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the
Trial Examiner's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of Trial
Examiner Howard Myers made at the hearing and
finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has
considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the
Respondent's exceptions, and the entire record in
the case, and hereby adopts his findings,
conclusions,' and recommendations.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Sheet Metal
Workers' International Association, Local Union
49, AFL-CIO, Albuquerque, New Mexico, its
officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the
action set forth in the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order, as herein modified:'
1. Modify paragraph 2(b) as follows:
"(b) Repay said Roger Jones any portion of said
fines that he may have paid to Respondent with
interest at 6 percent per annum."
2. Add "with interest" at end of last indented
paragraph of notice.
'See, in further support of the findings and conclusions of the Trial
Examiner that Respondent violated Sec 8(b)(1)(B), our decision in Toledo
Locals Nos 15-P and 272 of the Lithographers and Photoengravers
International Union , AFL-CIO (The Toledo Blade Company, Inc.), 175
NLRB No. 173.
'In accordance with our established policy, we shall order the
Respondent to repay Roger Jones any portion of the fine levied against
him that he may have paid to Respondent with interest at 6 percent per
annum Isis Plumbing & Heating Co, 138 NLRB 716
TRIAL EXAMINER ' S DECISION
139
Statement of the Case
PAUL E. WEIL, Trial Examiner: Upon a charge filed
October 25, 1968, by Roger Jones, an individual, herein
sometimes called the Charging Party, against Sheet Metal
Workers' International Association, Local Union 49,
AFL-CIO, herein called the Respondent, alleging
violations of Section 8(b)(l)(A) and (B) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. 151, et
seq.) herein called the Act, the General Counsel, by the
Regional Director for Region 28 (Albuquerque, New
Mexico), issued a complaint on December 24, 1968,
alleging a violation of Section 8(b)(l)(B) of the Act. By its
duly filed answer Respondent admitted various facts
alleged in the complaint but denied jurisdiction of the
Board and denied the commission of any unfair labor
practices.
Pursuant to notice a hearing was held at Albuquerque,
New Mexico, on February 18, 1969, before Trial
Examiner Howard Myers. All parties were represented at
the hearing and had an opportunity to examine and
cross-examine witnesses and present evidence in support of
their contentions. At the close of the hearing the parties
waived oral argument but requested time in which to file
briefs with the Trial Examiner. Time was granted and
briefs were duly received from the General Counsel and
the Respondent.
Subsequent to the receipt of briefs by Trial Examiner
Myers and before he issued his decision in the proceeding
he retired. The Trial Examiner having thus become
unavailable to the agency within the meaning of Section
54(d) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (5
U.S.C. Section 54(d)), Trial Examiner Paul E.
Weil was assigned to consider the record and prepare a
decision in accordance therewith.
Upon the entire record and in consideration of the
briefs, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
General Metal Products, Inc., hereinafter called the
Employer, a New Mexico corporation, is engaged in New
Mexico in the business of contracting in the building and
construction industry. During the 12 months preceding
issuance of the complaint the Employer purchased sheet
metal, heating, cooling, and ventilating equipment and
other related products valued in excess of $50,000 from
other enterprises in New Mexico which had received such
products directly from points outside the State of New
Mexico. The Employer is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Respondent is and at all times relevant hereto has been
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Factual Background
The Employer installs heating, cooling, and ventilating
equipment in new construction using employees who are
178 NLRB No. 24
140 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
represented by the Respondent. The Employer is a
member of the New Mexico Sheet Metal Contractors
Association, Inc. (hereinafter called the Association),
through which it has in the past had a contractual
relationship with Respondent. The status of the contract
current at the time of the hearing was not litigated. It
appears however that there was some question between the
parties as to the exact terms of the most recent agreement
between the parties. Whatever the exact nature of the
contract may have been it is undisputed that it covered
not only the employees but the lower levels of supervision
including working foremen and foremen.
The Charging Party was a working foreman employed
by the Employer. In this capacity during the summer and
fall of 1968 he was in charge of a crew of some five sheet
metal workers employed on a job at the Bernalillo County
Mental Health and Retardation Center then under
construction.
On July 12, 1968, Jones' crew was scheduled to
commence work at 8 a.m. Prior to that hour he was
informed by the general contractor on the job that a crane
was immediately available for hoisting equipment to the
floor of the building then under construction. Although
Jones had seen one or more of his crew at the jobsite he
decided to do the necessary work himself. He was assisted
in this task by two other individuals, Darrell Hood, a
superintendent of the Employer who was present on the
jobsite that day, and Pablo Abeyta, the job superintendent
for the general contractor. They continued until 8 o'clock,
with Hood and Abeyta tieing the equipment on the
ground atld Jones untieing it at the top. At 8 o'clock
Hood and Abeyta left and one of Jones' crew did the
work of tieing on equipment until the job was completed.
On August 10, 1968, Respondent advised Jones that its
business manager, Rutherford, was preferring charges
against him because on July 12 Jones "did perform work
prior to the beginning of the regular work day, and used
men of other crafts to assist him perform such work,
which is within the jurisdictional claims of the sheet metal
workers." In September the charges came on for hearing
before a trial committee of Respondent. Jones admitted
that on July 12, 1968, commencing at 7:45 a.m. he tied on
sheet metal products and was assisted by Darrell Hood
and Pablo Abeyta whom he identified. He was found
guilty "as charged."'
Respondent's membership voted to concur with the
guilty verdict returned by the trial committee and Jones
informed the Respondent that he would appeal. In his
letter of October 10, 1968, objecting to the minutes of the
trial Jones concluded by stating that he had been advised
that the agreement between the Association and
Respondent provided that the regular working hours were
to be between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m. and therefore his action
of commencing work prior to 8 a.m. on July 12 was not
in violation of the contract. Because Respondent refused
dues transmitted on October 21 because he had not paid
the fine of $500, Jones sent Respondent a personal check
'The findings are memorialized in a minute of the hearing which states
inter alia , "Jones said 'he used carpenters to help load and unload the
elevator in exchange of his work '. Jones said 'he never did any of the
carpenter work back '. Jones said 'he was guilty of going to work before 8
a.m. and using carpenters and labors [sic] to load our work'."
Although it does not appear relevant to this proceeding Jones filed
objections to the minutes of the trial stating that he never said that he used
carpenters or laborers to help him in his work because that was not true
and restating the facts as set forth above.
for $50 together with another check in payment of dues.
The $50 was the amount provided by the International
Constitution under which Respondent operates as that
portion of a fine which had to be paid prior to
Respondent's acceptance of dues of a member and as a
condition "of any proper appeal from the decision under
which such fine was imposed." Respondent cashed both
checks.
Instead of filing an appeal through the Union's
procedures Jones filed his charge with the Board on
October 25.
At some time prior to the filing of Jones' charge but
after the incidents concerned therein a notice was
addressed to all contractors signatory to the agreement
with Respondent, stating in pertinent respect:
We we [sic] would direct your attention to certain
Articles and Addendum in our Agreement some of
which have been ignored in the past and which we
expect compliance with in the future. Others on which
we make our position clear to forestall future
disagreements.
ADDENDUM 2 -SECTION 2(b).•
The hours worked in any one day, regardless of the
starting time, shall be 8 consecutive hours with 1/2
hour for lunch only.
When work is begun at 7:00 A.M.-for instance, the
regular day is over at 3:30 P.M. and overtime will be
paid for work performed thereafter. Also, the Local
Union must be contacted in order to determine if
working conditions on the respective job justify any
hours other than 8:00 A.M. to 4:30 P.M.
This notice was received October 16 by the Employer
herein. It was answered by a letter signed by Edward M.
Miller, president of the Association, dated October 31,
1968, which says in pertinent part:
Pertaining to your reference regarding the starting time,
lunch time, quitting time, etc. of the work day, here
again , if we don't violate the Contract, we feel we are in
the right and none present at our meeting could recall
the Contract specifying a 1/2 hour lunch period.
Perhaps you could enlighten us on this period.
Discussion
The General Counsel contends that Respondent, by its
action in disciplining Jones, interfered with his exercise of
his supervisory functions on behalf of management and
specifically in his application of his own and presumably
management's interpretation of the collective-bargaining
agreement then in force between Respondent and the
Employer. In so doing, according to the General Counsel,
Respondent interfered with the Employer's choice of a
collective-bargaining representative by disciplining Jones
because Respondent disagreed with its interpretation of
the agreement. The General Counsel relies chiefly on the
Board's Decision in San Francisco-Oakland Mailers'
Union No. 18, International Typographical Union
(Northwest Publications, Inc.), 172 NLRB No. 252.
Respondent contends first, apparently, that Jones is not
a supervisor; second, that if he is a supervisor the actions
which brought about Respondent's disciplinary reactions
were unconnected with his supervisory function, so that he
was disciplined as a workman and union member rather
than a foreman; third, that whether or not Jones is a
supervisor the exigencies and circumstances peculiar to the
SHEET METAL WKRS. LOCAL 49
building and construction trades necessitate that the Board
as a matter of policy establish a different principle to
regulate the relationship between unions and lower echelon
supervision; and fourth, and finally, that Jones' discipline
was an internal union matter protected by the Act. In this
regard Respondent relies on Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 175. It would appear that if any of the four
contentions have merit Respondent must prevail.
1. I find Jones to be a supervisor. It is undisputed on
the record that, except for visits to the jobsite about once
a week by Darrell Hood, part owner and superintendent
of the Employer, and visits by Paul Hood, president and
part owner of the Employer, on two or three occasions
during the period from March to October, Jones was the
only management spokesman on the job. He had
authority to hire and discharge, layoff and recall, and
adjust grievances. He in fact laid off employees because
they worked slower than he thought they should. He
assigned all work in accordance with the needs of the job,
scheduled working hours, granted time off for personal
business to the employees under his supervision, kept time
and attendance records, and was responsible for
implementation of the Employer's agreements with
Respondent. He determined the number of employees
required to do the job. In short he had all of the functions
and responsibilities spelled out in the definition in Section
2(l 1) of the Act.
2. The charges of which Jones was found guilty state as
follows: "[the above-named] member, on July 12, 1968,
did perform work prior to the beginning of the regular
work day, and used men of other crafts to assist him
perform such work, which is within the jurisdictional
claims of the sheet metal workers." Respondent's
contention is that Jones' performance of the work of
tieing on supplies and equipment for hoisting by the crane
and untieing the supplies and equipment when they had
been hoisted to the first story of the building was
journeymen's work which Jones as a journeyman and a
"working" foreman performed for the Employer. The first
part of the charge, that he performed work, is pointed to
by Respondent as involving no supervisory function.
However this is not the entire story. Unquestionably the
assignment of a task is a supervisory function and the
assignment of such task to be done at a time other than
the normal working hours is even more so. The
supervisory act is the decision whether and to whom such
a task is to be assigned. It can hardly be said that Jones
was not engaging in the supervisory act when his decision
was to do the work himself without assigning it to an
employee and to do it before the employees under his
supervision commenced work. With regard to his alleged
use of men of other crafts to assist him to perform such
work, it appears that the only evidence before the trial
board was that he was assisted by Darrell Hood, his own
superintendent, who happened to be on the job and by
Pablo Abeyta, the job superintendent for the general
contractor. Obviously as a lower ranking supervisor Jones
was not in a position to assign work to Hood or Abeyta.
Nevertheless he was found guilty by the trial board of
using carpenters and laborers to load sheet metal
employees' work. Clearly in the opinion of the Union
which in Jones' absence approved and adopted the
findings of the trial board based on the minute, he was
found guilty of exercising a supervisory function, assigning
work to carpenters and laborers that should have been
assigned to sheet metal workers. It can hardly be said that
any of the charges are clearly concerned with Jones'
actions as a workman rather than his actions as a
141
supervisor. In any event I do not conceive that the
functions of a working foreman are severable in this
regard. Jones was inescapably a supervisory employee. He
worked with the tools only by reason of his
self-assignment to the work. The natural and perhaps
inevitable result of the Union's action in fining him as
they did in this case is not to interfere with his
performance of rank-and-file work but rather with his
activities as a supervisor and spokesman for the
Employer. Accordingly, I find that the second defensive
contention lacks merit.
3. In support of its contention that the Board should
establish a different rule of decision to regulate the
relationship between unions and lower echelon supervision
in the building and construction trade, Respondent in its
brief lists various factors which it contends should be
taken into consideration. They are: First, that in the
trades historically only unit employees may perform unit
work. Second, in order for "lower rung supervision" to be
permitted to perform unit work when they are not
supervising they are considered part of the unit at all
times. Referral back to the job as a journeyman is not
practical. Third, classification of working foremen may be
awarded to a journeyman one day and removed the next
and in practice they continually move up and down. This
results in (one) working foreman referred from union halls
after termination reregistering as a journeyman, (two) the
classification may be changed from foreman to
journeyman without reregistration, and (three) fringe
benefits paid to journeymen are provided by contract for
working foremen also under the trusts in which the
Department of Labor has acquiesced. Fourth, working
foremen are covered by the union-security provision of the
contract under which they work and the Board "has never
taken the position that as a consequence the Union is
management dominated or assisted." Fifth, working
foremen have not been considered ineligible to hold union
office nor vote in union meetings.' Sixth, working foremen
are considered as employees under the Act as far as the
duty of fair representation is concerned.'
Based on these considerations Respondent concludes
that "at the very least working foremen should be
considered as employees rather than supervisors when they
are not working in the capacity of a supervisor." With
regard to the elements upon which Respondent relies I do
not believe they support the distinction Respondent
contends should be made. Aside from the fact that no
evidence was adduced in the hearing that these elements
are unique to the building and construction trades, it is
quite clear that they are not. As a matter of fact in the
case on which the General Counsel relies and which
Respondent purports to distinguish each of these elements
are presented as part of the factual picture on which the
Board found a violation by a printing trades union, the
International Typographical Union. It is no secret and
there are many Board cases which illustrate that especially
in large segments of the printing trades and entertainment
industries only bargaining unit employees are allowed to
perform unit work. But without discussing each of the
alleged bases of distinction, I must consider the fact that
the Board has never made such a distinction and the Act
'Respondent does not say considered by whom. There are, of course,
cases in which the Board has found assistance to labor organizations in the
building and construction field because the union offices were held by, and
union decisions with regard to employer relationships were made by,
employer supervisors.
'Respondent cites no authority to this proposition nor do I know of any
142 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
does not do so. When the Act speaks of supervisors and
defines them it adds no exclusion of any particular type of
supervisors or supervisors in any particular industry.
Congress has had before it the peculiar problems of the
building and construction industry on many occasions.
Hearings have been conducted and considerations
advanced to remove the trades from the Act in various
respects but Congress has not seen fit to do so. I consider
that I am bound by the explicit and express provisions of
the Act in this regard. I believe that if a distinction is to
be made it must be made in the text of the law rather
than in the decisions based thereupon. Accordingly, I
reject Respondent's third contention.
4. With regard to Respondent's position that Jones'
discipline was an internal union matter again I find that
the San Francisco-Oakland Mailers' case (supra) is
dispositive. The acts with which the foremen in that case
were charged by their union related to the overtime
provisions of the contract and to the permitting of a
nonmember of the respondent union therein to perform
alleged unit work in violation of the contract. In the
instant case the same type of action by Jones gave rise to
the charges and it was clear that both allegations in the
charges related to alleged breaches of the agreements
between the parties rather than to union activities of
Jones. While Respondent may have sought, by an internal
union procedure, to enforce its viewpoint as to the
meaning of the contract through discipline imposed upon
the foremen this is not the sort of internal union
proceeding that the Supreme Court spoke of in the
Allis-Chalmers case. In addition, as the Board points out
in the Mailers' case, the proviso relied on by the Supreme
Court in Allis-Chalmers and by Respondent herein is
limited to Section 8(b)(I)(A) of the Act and is not a part
of Section 8(b)(1)(B), a violation of which in the instant
case forms the basis of the charge. Of course, the
discipline is an internal union matter, but the alleged
violation by Jones was not. I shall therefore have to reject
Respondent's fourth contention.
I find in agreement with the General Counsel that
Respondent disciplined Jones because in its opinion he
violated the established union collective-bargaining
agreement' and hence article XVII, section 1(e)
and article I, section 5(a) of the Respondent's
International Constitution and Ritual. There is no
contention that the agreement between the parties failed
to provide a grievance procedure and the evidence
preponderates to the contrary. Yet, Respondent did not
see fit to use this procedure to explicate its difference of
opinion with the Employer as to the meaning of its
agreement. Whether the contract was in fact violated by
Jones is not relevant in this proceeding,' nor is the
question of whether in fact Jones was guilty as charged as
he was found by the union trial board.` What is material
is that Respondent attempted by its internal disciplinary
procedure to circumvent the contractual procedures for
settlement between the parties of a contractual grievance.
The natural and probably inevitable consequence of
Respondent's action must be to cause the foreman faced
with such discipline to substitute the union's determination
of the meaning of the agreement for the employer's. He
therefore ceases to function as the employer's agent, and
if the employer would be represented by a foreman who
will act on its behalf, in accordance with the employer's
viewpoint, it must appoint another. Inasmuch as the
foremen are required to be union members, as Respondent
states in its brief, subject to union discipline, it is
improbable that an employer could find a representative
for itself at the foreman level. This is precisely what the
Board found to be a violation of Section 8(b)(1)(B) in the
Mailers' case and I find, as in the Mailers' case, that by
its actions Respondent restrained and coerced the
Employer in the selection of its representatives for the
purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of
grievances in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the Employer's
operations described in section 1, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
upon the entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is a labor organization within the
meaning of Sections 2(5) and 8(b) of the Act.
2. The Employer is an employer within the meaning of
Sections 2(2) and 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act.
3. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. By restraining and coercing the Employer in the
selection of its representatives for the purposes of
collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances
Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the
Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has violated Section
8(b)(l)(B) of the Act I shall recommend that it cease and
desist from restraining or coercing the Employer or any
employer with whom it has a collective-bargaining
agreement in the manner charged herein. Additionally, I
find that the coercive effect herein can be removed only if
Respondent is required to rescind the fine imposed against
Jones and to repay to him that portion of the fine which
he paid in order to remain in good standing with the
Union and any further portions he may have paid in the
interim.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law and upon the entire record in this case,
I recommend that the Respondent, its officers, agents, and
'Which was not so established that it was reduced to writing or offered
in evidence.
'As the parties stipulated.
`Respondent in its brief appears to concede that the trial board's finding
was incorrect with relation to the assignment of work to carpenters and
laborers. Respondent 's brief states "the fact that the superintendent for the
general contractor and the part owner- superintendent of the Employer were
loading the crane is immaterial for the purposes of the issue before us.
Obviously Mr. Jones was not supervising either of these men, nor did he
assign them to any task."
SHEET METAL WKRS . LOCAL 49
representatives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) In any manner restraining or coercing General
Metal Products, Inc., or any other member of the New
Mexico Sheet Metal Contractors Association, Inc., in the
selection of representatives chosen for the purposes of
collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances.
(b) Refraining or refusing to use the means provided by
its collective-bargaining agreement for the adjustment of
grievances and disputes thereunder and from substituting
representatives of its own choosing for those provided for
in the collective-bargaining agreement in order to restrain
or coerce the Employer in the selection of its
representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or
the adjustment of grievances.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Rescind the fine levied against Roger Jones and
excise all record thereof from its files.
(b) Repay said Roger Jones any portion of said fines
that he may have paid to Respondent.
(c) Post at Respondent's offices and at the offices of all
employers who are members of the New Mexico Sheet
Metal Contractors Association, Inc., the Employer
willing, as well as at Respondent's meeting place, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies of
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 28, after being duly signed by Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by Respondent for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to members are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(d) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20
days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have
'been taken to comply herewith.'
'In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the
words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice . In the further
event that the Board ' s Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of
Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a
Decision and Order."
'In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify the Regional Director for
Region 28, in writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
143
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF SHEET METAL WORKERS'
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, LOCAL UNION 49,
AFL-CIO (GENERAL METAL PRODUCTS, INC.)
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our members
and all employees employed by General Metal Products,
Inc., and New Mexico Sheet Metal Contractors
Association, Inc., that:
WEWILLNOT in any manner restrain or coerce any of
the aforesaid employers in the selection of
representatives chosen for the purposes of collective
bargaining and the adjustment of grievances or disputes
under the contract.
WE WILLNOT refuse to follow the contract provisions
provided in our collective-bargaining agreement with
New Mexico Sheet Metal Contractors Association,
Inc., for the means provided for the adjustment of
grievances or disputes thereunder.
WE WILL NOT cite foremen or working foremen before
our trial board nor require them to answer for decisions
made by them as to the meaning or application of any
collective-bargaining agreement to which we are a party
where such an agreement contains provisions for the
adjustment of grievances and disputes.
WE WILL rescind the fine assessed against Roger
Jones and excise all record thereof from our files.
WE WILL repay Roger Jones any sums of money he
paid on the fine assessed against him as a result of the
trial held at our union hall on September 7, 1968.
SHEET METAL WORKERS'
INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION,
LOCAL UNION 49,
AFL-CIO
(Labor Organization)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If members have any question concerning this notice or
compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, 7011 Federal
Building, 500 Gold Avenue, SW., Albuquerque, New
Mexico 87101, Telephone 505-843-2508.