Shawn M. LeBlanc, Petitioner,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 20, 2005
03a60017 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 20, 2005)

03a60017

12-20-2005

Shawn M. LeBlanc, Petitioner, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Shawn M. LeBlanc v. United States Postal Service

03A60017

December 20, 2005

.

Shawn M. LeBlanc,

Petitioner,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Petition No. 03A60017

MSPB No. DA-0752-04-0607-I-1

DECISION

On October 19, 2005, petitioner filed a timely petition with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission asking for review of a Final Order

issued by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) concerning his claim

of discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act

of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.

BACKGROUND

The record indicates that petitioner was a City Letter Carrier at the

agency's Energy Center Station in Lafayette, Louisiana. On or about

September 7, 2003, petitioner was placed in an off-duty, non-pay status,

based on an incident which occurred on September 6, 2003. The record

indicated that petitioner had a confrontation with his Supervisor

(S1) where petitioner charged at S1. She and another supervisor (S2)

had to lock the dock doors to keep petitioner out of the facility.

Petitioner yelled at S1 using offensive language. The S1 said she

was so afraid of petitioner's behavior that she called the police.

The agency investigated the incident and determined that petitioner's

actions directly caused the confrontation. The Station Manager decided

to send petitioner for a fitness for duty examination (FFDE) based on

his conduct towards the Supervisor.

On or about September 30, 2003, the agency referred petitioner for

the FFDE to a clinical psychologist. The Psychologist examined

petitioner on October 7, 2003 and issued his report on October

29, 2003. The Psychologist diagnosed petitioner with "Delusional

Disorder, Persecutory Type" and recommended that petitioner remain on

medical leave. The Psychologist believed that petitioner's symptoms

would decrease with less stress. He also suggested that petitioner be

re-evaluated in six weeks. On December 17, 2003, petitioner was seen

at a follow-up examination with the Psychologist. The Psychologist

found that petitioner was ready to return to his job at that time.

He cautioned that attention should be given to petitioner's workload

and the amount of stress petitioner was required to tolerate.

On December 26, 2003, the agency's physician (Physician) filled out

the agency's Medical Assessment Form (MA Form) concerning petitioner.

The Physician repeated the Psychologist's concerns as to stress placed

on petitioner. On January 9, 2004, petitioner wrote to the Station

Manager providing her with copies of the MA Form. Petitioner indicated

his request to report and return to work. The Station Manager attempted

to contact petitioner in order to schedule an appointment to discuss his

return to work. Petitioner and his representative attempted to meet

with the Station Manager but she had to cancel the meeting scheduled

for January 14, 2004. On January 15, 2004, the Station Manager sent

petitioner a letter instructing him to report to work on January 17, 2004.

Petitioner reported for work but did not stay because S2 informed him

that job modifications had not been made to his route. S2 noted to

petitioner that the Psychologist did not recommend any specific physical

modifications.

On January 21, 2004, the Station Manager informed petitioner that his

absence on January 17, 2004 constituted a violation of the agency's

attendance requirements. She asked that petitioner provide satisfactory

evidence for allegedly failing to report to work. Petitioner was also

placed in Leave without Pay status (LWOP) effective January 17, 2004.

By letter dated January 22, 2004, petitioner responded. He noted that

he did report for duty, however, he was told by the supervisor that the

position had not been modified. Based on the medical documentation,

without the modifications, petitioner believed that he was not medically

qualified to perform the job. Therefore, he left work since the

modifications were not made nor attempted.

The Physician issued a memorandum dated January 26, 2004, informing

the Station Manager that if she needed a physical FFDE, that she should

contact him. The Station Manager informed petitioner that on January

28, 2004, that he should report for duty the next day after he received

the letter. On February 4, 2004, petitioner's physician sent a letter

to the agency indicating that he agreed with the assessments by the

Physician and Psychologist. He noted that petitioner could return to

his regular duties with careful attention to his stress and work hours

which were not to exceed eight hours a day.

On February 17, 2004, the Station Manager again notified petitioner that

he should report to work his next scheduled work day following receipt of

the letter. She noted that petitioner would be considered AWOL unless he

provided medical documentation that he could not perform his job duties.

Petitioner received the letter but did not contact the Station Manager.

The Station Manager then sent petitioner a letter informing him that he

must report for an investigative interview on March 24, 2004. Petitioner

contacted the agency indicating that he would not attend the interview.

On April 13, 2004, the Station Manager issued a notice of proposed removal

from employment for extended absence from duty following the release

from all the physicians. Petitioner was given ten days to respond.

On April 16, 2004, petitioner contacted the Postmaster requesting more

time to respond to the notice. On May 13, 2004, petitioner provided

the Postmaster documents which were part of his FFDE. On June 23, 2004,

the Postmaster issued his decision to remove petitioner from employment.

On July 26, 2004, petitioner filed his mixed case appeal with the MSPB.

Petitioner alleged that he was discriminated against on the bases of

disability (chronic esophagitis<1>) and reprisal (prior EEO activity)

when, effective June 25, 2004, petitioner was removed from his position.

The MSPB AJ dismissed the matter without prejudice on October 4, 2004, in

order for petitioner to file for disability retirement. Petitioner had

until thirty days after receipt of the dismissal to re-file his appeal

with MSPB. Petitioner's re-filed appeal was received by the MSPB on

November 22, 2004.

After a hearing, the MSPB Administrative Judge (AJ) found that petitioner

failed to establish his claim of discrimination. In particular, as

to petitioner's claim of disability-based discrimination, the MSPB

AJ determined that the medical reports provided by petitioner did not

require the agency make any modifications to his workload or limit his

hours of work. To the extent petitioner alleged unlawful retaliation,

the MSPB AJ found that petitioner failed to establish that the reason

for his removal was pretext. Accordingly, the MPSB AJ concluded that

petitioner did not establish his claim of discrimination. Subsequently,

petitioner filed a petition for review with the Board. The Board denied

petitioner's petition for review.

This petition to the Commission followed without comment.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

EEOC Regulations provide that the Commission has jurisdiction over

mixed case appeals on which the MSPB has issued a decision that makes

determinations on allegations of discrimination. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.303

et seq. The Commission must determine whether the decision of the

MSPB with respect to the allegation of discrimination constitutes a

correct interpretation of any applicable law, rule, regulation or policy

directive, and is supported by the evidence in the record as a whole.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.305(c).

Disability-Based Discrimination

Petitioner asserted that the agency failed to provide him with the

modifications to his position noted by the physicians' reports. In

essence, petitioner argued that he was denied a reasonable accommodation

that would have allowed him to return to duty. Under the Commission's

regulations, an agency is required to make reasonable accommodation to the

known physical and mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual

with a disability unless the agency can show that accommodation would

cause an undue hardship. 29 C.F.R. �1630.9. For purposes of analysis,

we assume petitioner is an individual with a disability. 29 C.F.R. �

1630.2(g)(1).

Upon review, we find that the only "modification" listed by the physicians

was that the agency should be aware of his levels of stress and workload

and to limit his work to eight hours a day. We note that there is

no clear indication as to how petitioner's duties should be modified

to facilitate his return. The Station Manager repeatedly tried to

get clarification from petitioner as to the modifications needed.

The review of the record showed that petitioner failed to provide

any guidance. Further, petitioner has not shown that his job duties

exceeded his limitations. Therefore, we conclude that petitioner has

not shown that the agency violated the Rehabilitation Act.

Reprisal

A claim of disparate treatment based on indirect evidence is examined

under the three-part analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas

Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For petitioner to prevail, he

must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting

facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of

discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the

adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco

Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts

to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its

actions. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,

253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the petitioner bears the

ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of

the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason.

St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the

third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of

whether petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal

Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

Upon review, the agency provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

for the removal action, namely petitioner's continued AWOL status.

The burden now shifts to petitioner to establish that the agency's reason

was pretext for unlawful retaliation. We find that petitioner has not

done so. Therefore, we conclude that petitioner has not shown that the

removal action constituted unlawful retaliation.

CONCLUSION

Based upon a thorough review of the record and for the foregoing reasons,

it is the decision of the Commission to concur with the final decision

of the MSPB finding no discrimination. The Commission finds that the

MSPB's decision constitutes a correct interpretation of the laws, rules,

regulations, and policies governing this matter and is supported by the

evidence in the record as a whole.

PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (W0900)

This decision of the Commission is final, and there is no further right of

administrative appeal from the Commission's decision. You have the right

to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court,

based on the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board, within

thirty (30) calendar days of the date that you receive this decision.

If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the

complaint the person who is the official agency head or department head,

identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

December 20, 2005

__________________

Date

1 Esophagitis is an inflammation of the lining of the esophagus, the tube

that carries food from the mouth to the stomach. If left untreated,

this condition can become very uncomfortable, causing problems with

swallowing, ulcers, and scarring of the esophagus.