Shasta Fiberglass, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 12, 1973

202 N.L.R.B. 341 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

SHASTA FIBERGLASS, INC. 341
Shasta Fiberglass, Inc. and David Tuggle and General
Teamsters Local 137, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and Help-
ers of America. Cases 20-CA-7239 and
20-CA-7386
March 12, 1973
DECISION AND ORDER
By MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND
PENELLO
On November 14, 1972 , Administrative Law Judge
Maurice Alexandre issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding . Thereafter, Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief , and General Counsel
filed cross-exceptions and an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three -member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings,
findings ,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge as clarified below , and to adopt his recom-
mended Order.
We find , in agreement with the Administrative Law
Judge , that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act by discharging employee Ferguson
on December 16, 1971, and employees Tuggle, Cone,
Kell, and Hawksley on January 17, 1972. In addition
to the reasons set forth in the attached Decision, we
find other significant factors for concluding that the
motivating cause of their discharge was their union
activities and sympathies.
Respondent asserts that the precipitating reason
for Ferguson 's discharge was his involvement in a
dispute with employee Cozart on the date of his
discharge . However , it is clear from the record that
neither Supervisor Pereira nor Plant Manager Don
Baker observed what caused this dispute and neither
made any investigation of the incident before
deciding to discharge Ferguson . We are convinced
that Respondent used this incident as a pretext for
discharging, Ferguson.
It is clear that a direct consequence of Ferguson's
discharge was the suspension of organizational
activity among Respondent 's Anderson plant em-
ployees. However, this abeyance ended and there
was a resurgence of such activity among these
employees when they were informed by Respondent
on January 7, 1972, that it was terminating its
medical insurance program . Immediately following
this reactivation of protected activity and their
participation in it , Respondent discharged employees
Tuggle, Cone, Kell, and Hawksley. Respondent
contends they were discharged because of miscon-
duct which consisted of excessive talking during
worktime, loafing, horseplay, insubordination, and
careless work. Although the Administrative Law
Judge found that these employees, and Ferguson,
had engaged in misconduct and been cautioned
about it, it is clear from the record that other
employees also engaged in the same types of
misconduct and there is no evidence of their having
been similarly disciplined. In addition, the miscon-
duct of the dischargees was tolerated by Respondent
over a period of at least a couple of months prior to
their discharge, which took place on the day
following a union meeting. These factors and others
cited in the attached Decision compel us to conclude
that Respondent was motivated to discharge these
employees on January 17, 1972, because of the
resurgence of union activity and their involvement in
it.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Respondent, Shasta Fiberglass,
Inc., Anderson, California, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the said recommended Order, except that the
attached notice is substituted for the Administrative
Law Judge's notice.
1 Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to
credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions were incorrect Standard Dry Wall
Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A 3) We have carefully
examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Act gives all
employees these rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or help unions
To bargain collectively through a repre-
sentative of their own choosing
To act together for collective bargaining
or other aid or protection
To refrain from any or all of these things.
202 NLRB No. 50
342 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with
these rights.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully discharge employees
or otherwise discriminate against them because of
their union activities.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully interrogate or threat-
en our employees.
WE WILL offer to restore James Ferguson,
David Tuggle, Roy Cone, Gerald Kell, and
Donald Hawksley to their jobs and pay them for
all wages lost because of their discharges.
SHASTA FIBERGLASS, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
We will notify immediately the above-named indi-
viduals, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of
the United States, of the right to full reinstatement,
upon application after discharge from the Armed
Forces, in accordance with the Selective Service Act
and the Universal Military Training and Service Act.
This is an official notice and must not be defaced
by anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any question concerning this notice or compliance
with its provisions may be directed to the Board's
Office, 13018 Federal Building, 450 Golden Gate
Avenue, Box 36047, San Francisco, California 94102,
Telephone 415-556-3197.
DECISION
MAURICE ALEXANDRE, Administrative Law Judge: This
case was heard in Redding, California, on June 1 and 2,
and on July 18 and 19, 1972, upon a consolidated
complaint, issued on March 29, 1972,1 and amended at the
hearing, alleging that Respondent had violated Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended. Respondent has denied commission of the unfair
labor practices alleged. The issues presented are whether or
not Respondent unlawfully interrogated and threatened
employees, and whether or not it unlawfully discharged
Employees Ferguson, Tuggle, Cone, Kell, and Hawksley.
Upon the entire record,2 my observation of the witness-
es, and the briefs filed by the General Counsel and by the
Respondent, I make the following:
1 Based upon an original and amended charges filed by David Tuggle on
January 24, March 6 and 28, 1972, and upon original and amended charges
filed by General Teamsters Local 137 on March 20 and 24, 1972
2 Respondent's unopposed motion to correct the transcript is hereby
granted The General Counsel has also moved to correct the transcript, and
that motion is granted to the extent that it is unopposed by the Respondent
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent has admitted the following allegations of the
complaint:
Respondent, a California corporation with a place of
business at Anderson, California, is engaged in the
manufacture of motorboats.
During the past year, in the course and conduct of its
business operations, Respondent purchased and received
goods and supplies valued in excess of $50,000 directly
from suppliers located outside the State of California.
During the past year, in the course and conduct of its
business operations, Respondent sold goods and products
valued in excess of $50,000 directly to customers located
outside the State of California.
Respondent is, and at all times material herein has been,
an employer engaged in commerce and in operations
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
I find the facts to be as admitted, and that Respondent is
an employer engaged in commerce and in operations
affecting commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
I find that General Teamsters Local 137, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America (hereafter called the Union) is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
The General Counsel asserts that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by interrogating and making
threats to employees. Respondent takes a contrary posi-
tion. The conduct relied on by the General Counsel is as
follows:
1. Employee Ferguson testified that sometime in
September 1971, while employed at Respondent's Central
Valley plant,3 he obtained authorization cards from the
Union and so advised other employees; that later that day,
Bill Baker, Respondent's production superintendent, called
Ferguson to his office and asked "what this union business
was"; that Ferguson replied that the employees had no
choice except to consider unionization because they had no
bargaining power; and that Rickey, then a supervisor, was
present. Ferguson further testified that about a week and a
half later, while he was at the Anderson plant , Bill Baker
asked him how "the union proceeding was going" and
requested the names of those still interested in the Union.
Baker denied such interrogation. He testified that at a
meeting in September 1971 at the Central Valley plant with
With regard to the remaining proposed corrections which Respondent
opposes, the General Counsel has failed to sustain his burden of
establishing that the transcript is incorrect He merely makes an assertion
that errors were made in transcribing testimony Accordingly , the motion is
denied as to such corrections
3 Respondent also has a plant at Anderson, California
SHASTA FIBERGLASS, INC. 343
Ferguson and Rickey, they discussed Ferguson's discon-
tent about receiving a smaller pay raise than his fellow
employees. Rickey corroborated Baker's testimony regard-
ing a discussion concerning the pay raise. In view of
Baker's self-contradictions noted below, I find that he was
not a reliable witness. Rickey was no longer in Respon-
dent's employ when he testified at the hearing, and hence
can be considered a disinterested witness. For this reason, I
am inclined to accept his testimony regarding Ferguson's
first conversation with Baker. It is clear, however, that
Rickey was not present at the second conversation, and I
credit Ferguson's version.
I find that Baker asked the above questions during his
second conversation with Ferguson, and that such ques-
tions constituted unlawful interrogation violative of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. Struksnes Construction Co., Inc., 165
NLRB 1062.
2. Following his transfer from Central Valley to the
Anderson plant sometime in October 1971, Employee
Ferguson arranged for a meeting with representatives of
the Woodworkers Union, and such a meeting took place at
the Blue Ox Restaurant. The next day, Production
Superintendent Bill Baker called several employees to his
office, including Ferguson and Kell. Baker's brother, Don,
was also present during the meeting. Kell testified that Bill
Baker asked, "What did you gentlemen find out at the
meeting last night?" On direct examination, Baker denied
asking that question. In a prehearing affidavit and on
cross-examination, however, he admitted that he had
called Ferguson to his office and asked what his problems
were, that the latter had told him that he and several
employees had gone to a Woodworkers union meeting
several nights prior thereto, that Baker then called the
other employees to his office, and that he had asked what
they had learned at the union meeting.
I find that Bill Baker's admitted interrogation was
unlawful.
3. Employee Ferguson testified that about a week and a
half later, i.e., probably in early November 1971, Supervi-
sor Pereira stated, "Of course, you know that they-will
never let a union in here." When Pereira testified later the
same day, he could not recall his conversation with
Ferguson. When the hearing was resumed the following
month, Pereira testified that he recalled suggesting to
Ferguson that the employees form a group to discuss
grievances with management. When asked by counsel for
Respondent whether he said anything else about a union,
Pereira replied, "Not that I know of." However, he denied
stating that Respondent would never let a union into the
plant.
In its brief, Respondent does not deny that Pereira made
the statement, but argues that it did not constitute an
unlawful threat because it merely consisted of his personal
opinion. I find that Pereira made the statement, that it was
coercive, and that an employer is bound by coercive
statements made by a supervisor. I therefore find that
Pereira's statement violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. Pereira gave evasive testimony and then denied
asking any employees about attempts to get a union into
the plant. On further interrogation, however, he admitted
that he discussed unionization with some of his men,
including Employee Cozart and Employee Delassi ; that he
asked employees in his department about a meeting of
Respondent's "employees with union members"; and that
he asked employees in his department "about what was
going on, about getting a union in." At one point, Pereira
testified that he could not recall whether his conversation
with Cozart took place between January 10 and 17, 1972,
and stated that it could have been before or after that
period. Elsewhere, he testified that he was certain that his
conversations with Cozart and Delassi occurred after
January 17. Respondent's brief does not discuss these
conversations.
I find that Pereira engaged in unlawful interrogation of
Cozart and Delassi.
5. Employee Cleary testified that between January 10
and 17, 1972, Supervisor Hutchins asked him why the men
had consulted him regarding the formation of a union.
Cleary further testified that a few days later, Hutchins told
him that Ken Baker, Respondent's president, had stated
that, if the men continued to show interest in unionizing,
he would invite a union "from some fiberglass industry"
and this would probably result in lowering, or at least
preventing an increase in, their wage scale . Hutchins
testified that he may have asked the question attributed to
him by Cleary, and did not deny repeating to Cleary the
above statement by Ken Baker.
Respondent's sole defense is that these conversations
merely constituted interchanges of opinions between
friends. This contention is without merit. I credit Cleary
and find that Hutchins' question and statement respective-
ly constituted unlawful interrogation and an unlawful
threat.
6. Employee Cleary testified that on or about January
14, 1972, Supervisor Wick asked him who was going to
attend a forthcoming union meeting. Wick did not
contradict this testimony. I find that he asked the question
attributed to him and that the question was unlawful.
Respondent contends that Wick did not become a
supervisor until after the time in question and that it is not
responsible for his conduct. I disagree. At one point in his
testimony, Wick admitted that Plant Manager Don Baker
had told him that he had the power to hire and fire at the
time in question. Baker did not contradict this admission. I
accordingly find that Wick was a supervisor and that
Respondent was accountable for his unlawful interroga-
tion.
7. Employee Seaward testified that on January 14,
1972, Plant Manager Don Baker asked him what he knew
about an employee walkout, and stated that he intended to
get to the bottom of it. Baker testified that he had been
informed that employees had discussed a walkout and had
threatened Seaward by stating that they would turn over
the car of anyone who crossed the picket line, and that he
merely asked Seaward whether the latter had been
threatened. Respondent contends that Don Baker's version
should be credited. I disagree. In view of Don Baker's self-
contradictions noted below, I credit Seaward's testimony
and find that Baker's remarks were violative of Section
8(a)(l) of the Act.
344 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
B. Discrimination
On December 16, 1971, Respondent discharged James
Ferguson, and on January 17, 1972, it discharged David
Tuggle, Roy Cone, Gerald Kell, and Donald Hawksley.
The General Counsel asserts that they were discharged
because of their union activities. Respondent contends that
because of business losses, it engaged in an effort to reduce
its costs of operation and to eliminate problems which
hampered productivity, and that it selected the five
employees for discharge because their continued miscon-
duct4 interfered with their own productivity and that of
other employees.5 With respect to Ferguson, Respondent
also asserts that the precipitating reason for his discharge
was his participation in a fight with employee Cozart on
the date of his discharge. I find that, in selecting the five
employees for discharge, Respondent was motivated at
least in part by their union activities.
1. Ferguson
Ferguson began working for Respondent at Central
Valley on January 1, 1970, and was transferred to the
Anderson plant in October 1971. There is evidence that he
engaged in a certain amount of talking during worktime
and that he was cautioned about this conduct. But this was
also true of other employees. Moreover, it is undisputed
that he shoved and threatened to "knock the hell out of"
employee Cozart on December 16, 1971. Were there
nothing more in the record, Respondent's explanation
would be persuasive. However, the evidence shows that
Ferguson was significantly involved in promoting unioni-
zation of the employees; that he was interrogated regarding
such unionization by Production Superintendent Bill
Baker, and made clear to Baker that he favored unioniza-
tion; and that Supervisor Pereira admittedly knew of
Ferguson's union activity and told him that Respondent
would never permit a union in the plant. Ferguson also
testified without contradiction that several weeks before
his discharge, Foreman Klein told him, "You had better
watch out-the Bakers are after you."
In addition, the evidence tends to belie Pereira's
testimony that he made the decision to discharge Ferguson.
Pereira admitted that he did not know what started the
argument between Ferguson and Cozart, that he heard
yelling but not the exact words that were exchanged, that
he did not observe any physical contact between them, and
that he did not ask either of them what started the
argument. It thus appears that at the time he allegedly
4 The misconduct referred to by Respondent consisted of excessive
talking during worktime , loafing , horseplay , insubordination , and careless
work
5 In its brief , Respondent referred to certain decisions of referees of the
California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board denying unemploy-
ment benefits to Cone, Kell, and Ferguson Attached to the brief and to a
subsequent letter from Respondent dated September 18, 1972, were copies
of such referee decisions, and the affirming decisions of the California
Board with respect to Cone and Kell. The General Counsel has moved to
strike all references to the referee decisions in the appendices attached to the
brief and the letter
The decisions of a state unemployment compensation agency may be
judicially noticed Cf Sun Company of San Bernardino, 105 NLRB 515, 521;
Nashville Corp, 94 NLRB 1567, 1569 Accordingly, the motion to strike is
denied. Such decisions, however, are not controlling Supreme Dyeing &
decided to discharge Ferguson, Pereira could not have
known which of the two disputants was responsible for the
argument . In addition , Don Baker's testimony suggests
that it was he who made the decision to discharge
Ferguson.
In view of these considerations, as well as the unreliable
testimony given by Don Baker and Pereira respecting other
matters, I am inclined to credit Ferguson's testimony that
at the time he was notified of his discharge by Pereira, the
latter stated that he did not have any control over the
matter and that Don Baker was responsible. I find that
Don Baker made the decision to discharge Ferguson; and
that in making his decision , Baker was motivated at least in
part by Ferguson's union activity. I accordingly find that
the discharge of Ferguson violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
of the Act.
2. Tuggle, Cone, Kell, and Hawksley
Following the discharge of Ferguson, organizational
activity at the Anderson plant became dormant. However,
on January 7, 1972, Respondent informed its Anderson
employees that it was terminating its medical insurance
program. Organizational activities were then reactivated,
and it is undisputed that employees Tuggle, Cone, Kell,
and Hawksley engaged in such activities. These included
communication with the Union, attendance at organiza-
tional meetings , distribution and execution of authoriza-
tion cards to employees in the plant, and discussions in the
plant regarding unionization with fellow employees.
As in the case of Ferguson and other employees, the
evidence shows that the four dischargees engaged in
misconduct and were cautioned about it .6 However, I am
convinced that their union activities were responsible, in
whole or in part, for their discharges. In so concluding, I
rely on the following considerations:
(a) All four of the dischargees, who had been employed
by Respondent for periods ranging from almost 1 year to
almost 4 years, were considered competent. In December
1971, Supervisor Jenkins told Plant Manager Don Baker
that Tuggle and Cone were both capable workers. Jenkins
stated in a prehearing affidavit that the two men produced
approximately the same amount of work as the other
employees; and that he frequently asked Cone to work
overtime.? Pereira testified that the quality of Kell's work
was "great." Supervisor Hutchins obtained a raise for
Hawksley in December 1971.
(b) It is undisputed that Respondent was aware of the
union movement in the Anderson plant, and the evidence
Finishing Corp, 147 NLRB 1094, 1095, In. 1, accord , N L R B v Tennessee
Packers, Inc, 339 F 2d 203 (C.A 6), N L R B v Pacific Intermountain
Express Co, 228 F 2d 170 (C.A. 8). Indeed, in the Tennessee Packers case,
the court considered such a decision to be immaterial in that case , since it
did not know how much of the relevant evidence had been before the state
unemployment compensation agency
6 The General Counsel has moved to strike the statement on p 1, In I of
Respondent's brief on the ground that it asserts facts not in the record The
statement is that the dischargees here involved were not the only employees
whose employment was terminated for the same reason The ground
asserted by the General Counsel , even if true, is not a proper basis for
striking material from a brief The motion is denied
v Such requests to work overtime tend to refute Jenkins' testimony that
Cone produced no more work than the slowest man in his group
SHASTA FIBERGLASS, INC. 345
shows that it was determined to discourage it. Thus, as
noted above, it attempted through interrogation to ascer-
tain what organizational progress was being made;
Supervisor Pereira told Employee Ferguson that Respon-
dent will never let a union into the plant; and Respondent
attempted to discourage such progress by threats of
reprisal and by discharging Ferguson.
(c) I am persuaded that Respondent had knowledge of
the union activity of the four dischargees. Upon learning of
the termination of the employee medical benefits, employ-
ee Hawksley told Supervisor Hutchins, "Now there is
nothing left to do but to get a union in here. Once they take
this away from us, they'll start taking our wages away from
us also." On January 13, 1972, employee Freelove told
Supervisor Jenkins that the employees in the molding
room, where Hawksley worked, had signed union authori-
zation cards. In response to an inquiry by Supervisor Klein
as to what his problem was, Hawksley stated that "they
took our health and welfare plan away from us," that "they
will start taking our wage away from us," and that "there
was nothing left, but to get the union in." On January 15,
1972, Plant Manager Don Baker told employee Freelove
that two employees in the motorroom would be dis-
charged. Tuggle and Cone worked in the motorroom.
Shortly prior to the discharges on January 17, 1972, Don
Baker told Supervisor Jenkins that he believed that all the
motorroom employees, except Lloyd and Gaekler, had
signed union authorization cards. On January 15, 1972,
employee Freelove told Don Baker that he planned to
attend a union meeting scheduled for the following day,
and that he would keep Baker informed. From remarks
made to him by Cone, Tuggle, and Hawksley, Freelove
became aware that they were interested in unionizing. On
January 16, 1972, a number of employees, including
Tuggle, Cone, and Kell, met at the union hall, where the
three and several others signed authorization cards.
(d) The timing of the discharges suggests an improper
motive. On January 14 and 15, 1972, employee Freelove
told Don Baker that well over half of the employees
wanted the Union. On January 16, 1972, a number of
employees met with the Union. On the following day, the
four employees were discharged. It can hardly be a
coincidence that Supervisor Hutchins decided to discharge
Hawksley on the same day that Plant Manager Don Baker
decided to discharge Cone, Tuggle, and Kell. In addition,
the record shows that the four men, as well as other
employees, had engaged in the misconduct relied on by
Respondent for some time before January 17, 1972. Yet,
the four were not discharged until the day after the union
meeting of January 16-the meeting to which Baker was
alerted by employee Freelove, who offered to report what
occurred therein. It thus appears that, even though
Respondent in November 1971 began a campaign to
eliminate production problems, the misconduct of the four
employees did not become sufficiently intolerable to
prompt their discharge until after the January 16 meeting.
(e) Respondent's witnesses gave self-contradictory and
inconsistent testimony . Don Baker admitted that during a
state unemployment compensation proceeding, he had
testified that the decision to discharge Tuggle was made by
Supervisor Jenkins. He also admitted, however, that he
himself made the decision . Baker further testified that on
January 12 or 13, 1972, he observed Cone engage in
horseplay , and told Jenkins that he would discharge Cone
the "next" time he observed the latter engage in horseplay.
Baker then testified that he reached his decision to
discharge Cone and Tuggle 4 or 5 days before January 17,
1972, i .e., on January 12 or 13 . Supervisor Jenkins stated in
a prehearing affidavit that insofar as horseplay was
concerned , employees Cone , Gaekler , and Grieder were
the worst offenders . In his testimony , however, Jenkins
sought to give the impression that Cone was the one most
guilty of such misconduct . Don Baker testified that after
observing misconduct by Kell several weeks before
January 17, 1972, he told Supervisor Pereira that he would
discharge Kell the "next" time he caught him engaging in
misconduct . He further testified he made his decision to
discharge Kell on January 17, 1972 , after observing him
talk for 3 or 4 minutes to another employee on the
assembly line. In his prehearing affidavit , however, he
stated that he made the decision several days before
January 17, and that no particular incident prompted his
decision . Don Baker testified that , during November and
December 1971, several supervisors made complaints
about Hawksley . However , Supervisor Hutchins testified
that he obtained a wage increase for Hawksley in
December and that he had no problem with Hawksley
until January 1972.
For all of these reasons, and based on the entire record, I
find that the discharges of the four employees violated
Section 8 (a)(3) and ( 1) of the Act.
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By interfering with , restraining , and coercing em-
ployees, as found herein , Respondent engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a)(1) of the
Act.
2. By unlawfully discharging Ferguson, Cone, Tuggle,
Kell, and Hawksley , as found herein , Respondent engaged
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. Respondent did not violate the Act by any conduct
not found herein to constitute an unfair labor practice.
V. THE REMEDY
In order to effectuate the policies of the Act, I find that it
is necessary , and I recommend , that Respondent be
ordered to cease and desist from the unfair labor practices
found , and from in any other manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees.
Affirmatively, I recommend that Respondent offer to
Ferguson, Cone, Tuggle, Kell, and Hawksley immediate
and full reinstatement to the position which each held at
the time of his discharge or, if that position no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position , without
prejudice to his seniority and other rights and privileges. I
further recommend that Respondent make each whole for
any loss of earnings suffered because of his discharge, by
paying to him a sum of money equal to that which he
346 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
would have been paid by Respondent from the date of his
discharge to the date on which Respondent offers
reinstatement as aforesaid less his net earnings, if any,
during the said period. The loss of earnings under the order
recommended shall be computed in the manner set forth in
F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis
Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: 8
ORDER
Respondent, Shasta Fiberglass, Inc., its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Unlawfully interrogating and threatening its employ-
ees.
(b) Unlawfully discharging employees, or otherwise
unlawfully discriminating in regard to their hire, tenure of
employment, or any term or condition of employment.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of any right
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action:
8 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
9 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
(a) Offer to Ferguson, Cone, Tuggle, Kell, and Hawksley
immediate and full reinstatement to their former positions
or, if those positions no longer exist, to substantially
equivalent positions, and make each of them whole for any
loss of earnings he may have suffered by reason of
Respondent's discrimination against him, in the manner set
forth in the section herein entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and make available to the Board or its
agents on request, for examination and copying, all payroll
records and reports, and all other records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due and the right of
reinstatement under the terms of this recommended Order.
(c) Post at its plants in Central Valley and Anderson,
California, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix."9 Copies of said notice on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 20, after being signed by a
representative of the Respondent, shall be posted immedi-
ately in conspicuous places. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 20, in
writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision
what steps have been taken to comply herewith. 10
order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board "
iu In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board
after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read
"Notify the Regional Director for Region 20, in writing , within 20 days
from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith."