01a52533
07-19-2005
Shae M. Weed, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Shae M. Weed v. United States Postal Service
01A52533
July 19, 2005
.
Shae M. Weed,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A52533
Agency No. 1J-609-0033-04
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision
(FAD) concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as
amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to
29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons, the Commission affirms
the agency's final decision.
BACKGROUND
The record reveals that during the relevant period, complainant was
employed as a Bulk Mail Dock Clerk at the agency's Chicago Bulk Mail
Center facility. Complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently filed
a formal complaint on July 9, 2004, alleging that she was discriminated
against on the basis of reprisal for prior EEO activity when on May 25,
2004, she received a 14-day suspension for failure to perform assigned
duties, and for misdirecting mail, on May 19, 2004.<1>
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of
her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or,
alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant
requested that the agency issue a final decision.
In its FAD, the agency first concluded that complainant failed to
establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment. Specifically,
the agency found that complainant had not shown that she was similarly
situated with other employees outside her protected group; the agency
also found that complainant failed to demonstrate how she was treated
differently than other co-workers in any relevant aspect. Secondly,
the agency concluded that complainant failed to substantiate a prima
facie case of retaliation-based discrimination. Particularly, the agency
determined that complainant failed to show that (1) the agency official
at issue was aware of any engagement in prior EEO activity, and (2) there
was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse actions
complained of. Finally, the agency concluded that, even if complainant
had met the burdens of a prima facie case, the agency's rationales
seeking to justify the adverse actions were not unmasked by complainant
as pretextual. In conclusion, the agency found that complainant had
failed to prove that she had been subjected to unlawful discrimination.
On appeal, complainant contends that the agency erred in finding that
there were legitimate reasons for taking adverse actions against her.
Explicitly, complainant disputes the fact that she was derelict in
fulfilling her duties, and argues that, in reality, she was not at the
specified location the agency stated, nor did she mishandle the task for
which she was eventually faulted for. Further, complainant indicates
that the pertinent official was indeed aware of her prior EEO activity.
The agency requests that we affirm its FAD.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
In the absence of direct evidence, a claim of discrimination is examined
under the three-part analysis originally enunciated in McDonnell
Douglas Corporation v. Green. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For complainant to
prevail, she must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination
by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an
inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a
factor in the adverse employment action. Id. at 802; Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the
agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
action. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, complainant bears the
ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of
the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason.
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
Complainant can establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination
by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to
an inference of discrimination. Shapiro v. Social Security Admin.,
EEOC Request No. 05960403 (Dec. 6, 1996) (citing McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). Specifically, in a reprisal
claim, and in accordance with the burdens set forth in McDonnell
Douglas, Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology,
425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976),
and Coffman v. Department of Veteran Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05960473
(November 20, 1997), a complainant may establish a prima facie case of
reprisal by showing that: (1) he or she engaged in a protected activity;
(2) the agency was aware of the protected activity; (3) subsequently,
he or she was subjected to adverse treatment by the agency; and (4) a
nexus exists between the protected activity and the adverse treatment.
Whitmire v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340
(September 25, 2000).
Although the initial inquiry in a discrimination case usually focuses
on whether the complainant has established a prima facie case, following
this order of analysis is unnecessary when the agency has articulated a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Washington
v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).
In such cases, the inquiry shifts from whether the complainant has
established a prima facie case to whether she has demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence that the agency's reasons for its actions
merely were a pretext for discrimination. Id.; see also United States
Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-717 (1983).
In this case, the Commission finds that the agency has articulated
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Specifically,
the agency stated that, at the time complainant was assigned dock-clerk
duties, she carelessly misdirected a trailer by sending it out of the
wrong dock door, which resulted in an delayed departure and misplaced
mail. Likewise, the record reveals that complainant had previously been
issued letters of warning and notices for failure to perform assigned
duties and for delaying mail delivery. Thus, the agency presented
legitimate, nondiscriminatory justifications for the 14-day suspension:
complainant had once again failed to perform her assigned duties.
The Commission further finds that complainant failed to present evidence
that, more likely than not, the agency's articulated reasons for its
actions were a pretext for discrimination. In reaching this conclusion,
we note that it is undisputed that the trailer in question was headed
towards a given location while carrying mail destined for a different
location. It is also undisputed that an employee error occurred and that
this error directly caused inefficiency and delay. Complainant claims,
however, that she was not working on the day and at the time the relevant
episode took place. To support this assertion, complainant points to
a document that ostensibly shows different login identifications and
their corresponding trailers. We find this document unreliable because
it is undated and unofficial. By contrast, complainant's supervisor
made sworn statements in which he stood by his version of events, which
is to say, that complainant worked on the day at issue and misdirected
the trailer. Official documents, such as printed computer-screens,
sustain this account. Along the same lines, during a pre-disciplinary
interview complainant did not dispute that she was working the day of
the incident; to the contrary, complainant merely sought to dispel the
notion that it was she who misdirected the trailer. In short, we do not
identify discriminatory forces animating the agency's course of action.
There is simply no supporting evidence in the record to conclude
that intentional discrimination was the motivating force behind the
14-day suspension. Therefore, after a careful review of the record,
including complainant's contentions on appeal, the agency's response,
and arguments and evidence not specifically addressed in this decision,
we AFFIRM the FAD finding no reprisal-based discrimination.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
July 19, 2005
__________________
Date
1 Complainant had filed a previous EEO complaint on February 25,
2004, which was eventually resolved on April 28, 2004; specifically,
a settlement agreement was reached. The record does not reveal the
specific statute that was initially alleged to have been violated.