Serv-Air Aviation

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 18, 1955

111 N.L.R.B. 689 (N.L.R.B. 1955)

SERV-AIR AVIATION 689
Union during his own and his workmates' working hours. When Thomas learned
that Sellers still planned to arrogate to himself the power to decide whether or not
he was violating company rules in the course of indulging in union activities at the
plant and that he intended to carry on as before and continue to engage in what
were, to any reasonable man, even if not to Sellers, the breaking of regulations,
Thomas' conclusion that co-existence was intolerable is understandable and his
consequent decision against rehire has justification.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the General Counsel's con-
tention, it could be found that the allegation of discrimination has been established.
Assuming that a prima facie case was made out, it then became incumbent on
Respondent to go forward with the introduction of testimony tending to meet or
control the General Counsel's evidence. This I conclude Respondent has success-
fully done. Therefore I am unpersuaded that the weight of the evidence adduced
is sufficient to support the allegation that Sellers was either discharged or denied
reinstatement either on account of his having given testimony under the Act on
behalf of the General Counsel at a hearing of a case in which Respondent was a
party or because of his membership in, and activities on behalf of the Union. On,
the contrary I am convinced that Sellers was discharged and denied reinstatement
for cause. Accordingly, I conclude that the allegations respecting Sellers should
be dismissed.
Therefore, on the record as a whole I shall recommend dismissal of the allega-
tions of the complaint that Respondent discriminated against Burris L. Sellers in
violation of Section 8 (a) (3) and (4) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OP LAW
1. The operations of Delta Finishing Company (Division of J. P. Stevens & Co.,
Inc.-Plant No. 3) Wallace, South Carolina, constitute and affect trade, traffic,,
and commerce among the several States, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and
(7) of the Act.
2. Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8 (a) (1) (3) and (4) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
SERV-AIR AVIATION, STALLINGS AIR BASE and CLYDE H. HARTMAN
SERV-AIR AVIATION, STALLINGS AIR BASE and SAVOY NELSON
SERV-AIR AVIATION, STALLINGS AIR BASE and HARVEY L. WINSTEAD
SERV-AIR AVIATION, STALLINGS AIR BASE and MARGARET STRICKLANDD
SERV-AIR AVIATION, STALLINGS AIR BASE and ALFRED L. TucKER.
Cases Nos. 11-CA-659, 11-CA-660, 11-CA-662, 11-CA-681, and
11-CA-7f6. February 18, 1955
Decision and Order
On August 4, 1954, Trial Examiner Arthur Leff issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Re-
spondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter-
mediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed
a statement of exceptions to the Intermediate Report.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
111 NLRB No. 112.
1690 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the In-
termediate Report, the exceptions, and the entire record in the case
and hereby adopts the findings, ' conclusions , and recommendations
of the Trial Examiner.'
Order
Upon the entire record in this case and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Serv-Air Avia-
tion, Stallings Air Base, Kinston, North Carolina, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Interrogating its erployees concerning their membership in or
activities on behalf of United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners
.of America, AFL, or any other labor organization, in a manner
constituting interference, restraint, or coercion in violation of Sec-
tion S (a) (1).
(b) Threatening to discharge its employees for organizational
activities and to close the plant if an organizational attempt succeeds.
(c) Discouraging membership in United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America, AFL, or any other labor organization of
its employees, by discriminating in regard to their hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment.
(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist the aforesaid labor organization, or any other
labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to
refrain from any and all such activities, except to the extent that such
right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section
8 (a) (3) of the Act.
We note and correct the following factual inaccuracies in the Inteiniediate Report
which do not affect our concurrence with the Trial Examiner's ultimate conclusions and
recommendations in this case: (1) The Trial Examiner found that employees Winstead
and Deal made grades of 58 and 60, respectively , on the cockpit check quiz , whereas
Winstead's glade was 57 , and it was Harris, instead of Deal, who made 60 on the quiz,
as Deal slid not take the quiz at that time , (2) the Trial Examiner found at one point that
employees Tucker and Dail were discharged on March 26, 1953 , whereas they were dis-
charged on March 26, 1954; (3) the Trial Examiner found that employee Leonard was not
asked , and his testimony did not show , whether employee Tucker was among a group of
employees whom Supervisor Neal observed loafing on a certain day, whereas Leonard was
asked and testified that employee Tucker was in that group of employees ; and (4) the
Trial Examinem found that Mrs Strickland admitted crying the day her husband was dis-
charged but denied that she otherwise went through periods of crying during working
hours piioi to her discharge, whereas Mrs. Strickland was never questioned concerning
whether or not she otherwise went through periods of crying during working hours.
2 We agi ee with the Tual Examiner that the Respondent' s interrogation of employee
Leonard on November 20, 1953, and April 10, 1954, was violative of Section 8 (a) (1) of
the Act Chair man Faiinei and Member Rodgers do so, however , because it occurred in
context with other unfair labor practices and appears to be a further act implementing
the Respondent 's disciirninatory policy See Blue Flash Express, Inc, 109 NLRB 591.
SERV-AIR AVIATION 691
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Offer to Clyde H. Hartman, Harvey L. Winstead, Savoy Nel-
son, Margaret Strickland, and Alfred L. Tucker immediate and full
reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions
without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges,
and make them whole in the manner set forth in the section of the
Intermediate Report entitled "The Remedy."'
(b) Upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for
examination and copying, all payroll records, social-security payment
records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records
necessary to analyze the amount of back pay due and the right of rein-
statement under the terms of this Order.
(c) Post at its base at Stallings Air Base, Kinston, North Carolina,
copies of the notice attached hereto and marked "Appendix A." I
Copies of such notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the
Eleventh Region, shall, after being duly signed by an authorized rep-
resentative of the Respondent, be posted by the Respondent immedi-
ately upon receipt thereof in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for the Eleventh Region, in writ-
ing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
3 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals,
there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words
"Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order"
Appendix A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees concerning their mem-
bership in or activities on behalf of United Brotherhood of Car-
penters and Joiners of America, AFL, or any other labor organ-
ization , in a manner constituting interference, restraint, or coer-
cion in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with discharge or threaten
to close the plant because of their organizational activities.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in United Brotherhood
of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL, or any other labor
organization, by discriminating in regard to the hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment of any of
our employees.
344056-55-vol 111 45
692 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce
our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization,
to form labor organizations, to join the aforesaid labor organiza-
tion, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such
activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by
an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of
the Act.
WE WILL offer the following persons immediate and full rein-
statement to their former or substantially similar positions
without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privi-
leges and make them whole for any loss of pay suffered as a re-
sult of the discrimination against them :
Clyde H. Hartman Margaret Strickland
Savoy Nelson Alfred L. Tucker
Harvey L. Winstead
All our employees are free to become, remain, or refrain from be-
coming or remaining members of any labor organization, except as
that right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in
a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in
Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. We will not discriminate in regard to
the hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of em-
ployment against any employee because of membership in or activity
on behalf of any labor organization.
SERF-AIR AVIATION, STALLINGS AIR BASE,
Employer.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Intermediate Report
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charges having been filed by Clyde H. Hartman, Savoy Nelson, Harvey L. Win-
stead, Margaret Strickland, and Alfred L. Tucker against Serv-Air Aviation, Stall-
ings Air Base, herein called the Respondent, in the above-captioned duly consoli-
dated cases, the General Counsel issued complaints alleging that the Respondent
engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3)
and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136. The
Respondent filed answers to the complaints, containing general denials of the allega-
tions imputing to it the commission of unfair labor practices, and also placing in
issue the question of whether the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of the Act. Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held on May 26, 27, and 28,
1954, at Kinston, North Carolina, before Arthur Leff, the Trial Examiner duly
designated by the Chief Trial Examiner. The General Counsel and the Respondent
were represented at the hearing by counsel. Full opportunity was afforded all parties
SERV-AIR AVIATION 693
to examine and cross -examine witnesses , to present oral argument at the close of
the hearing , and thereafter to file briefs as well as proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law. At the hearing, the Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that it was not engaged in commerce within the statutory meaning.
The motion was denied.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
Jurisdiction is disputed. The Respondent, Serv-Air Aviation, a North Carolina
corporation , maintaining its principal office and place of business at Stallings Air
Base, Kinston , North Carolina , is engaged in the training of United States Air Force
pilot-trainees under a contract with the United States Air Force. At the times
material herein, the Respondent employed approximately 650 employees at the
Stallings Air Base, of whom about 200 were in its aircraft maintenance department.
The Respondent's contract with the United States Air Force is on a cost-plus-
fixed -fee basis . Its fee is computed on the basis of $1.05 per flying hour, and it
expects that in a typical 12-month period its trainees will fly approximately 100,000
hours, so that its fee would amount to approximately $105,000. All property on
the base-except the land and buildings which are leased from the city of Kinston,
county of Lenoir, for $1 per year-is owned by the United States Government.
The Respondent makes no purchases of material or equipment used on the base„
other than as agent for the United States Government. The value of the material
and equipment on the base when the Respondent first commenced operations in
1951 was approximately $375,000; but the record does not reveal its present value,
or the annual value of material consumed or new equipment used in connection
with the base's operations, such information having been withheld by the Respond-
ent assertedly for security reasons. Nor does the record disclose the geographical
point of origin of the material or equipment used, except that it does disclose that
in 1953 the Respondent in connection with its operations on the base used airplanes
manufactured in States other than the State of North Carolina, having a value in
excess of $2,500,000.
In Case No. 1 1-RC-576 , on the basis of a record containing the facts set out above,
the Board , on April 12, 1954, issued a Decision and Direction of Election finding,
inter alia, that Serv -Air Aviation Corporation was engaged in commerce within the
meaning of the Act, and asserted jurisdiction in that case over the Respondent.' I
deem the Board 's decision in Case No. 11-RC-576 a binding precedent , and on that
authority ,2 as well as the Board 's recent announcement of its new jurisdictional stand-
ards,3 I overrule the Respondent 's objection to the jurisdiction of the Board , and find
that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL, is a labor organ-
ization admitting to membership employees of the Respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction ; the issues
The Respondent began its operations at Stallings Air Base in the latter part of 1951.
There is no evidence of any organizational activity among the employees prior to the
summer of 1953. Organizational activity began about August 20, 1953, after Savoy
Nelson, one of the complainants in this case , contacted the Carpenters' Union to enlist
its aid in organizing the Respondent's aircraft maintenance department employees
then numbering some 210. On September 18, 1953, the Union filed a petition for
certification as representative for employees in that department. Following hearings
held on October 12, 1953, and February 9, 1954, the Board , on April 12, 1954, issued
' The jurisdictional facts appearing in the record in Case No 11-RC-576 , were incorpo-
rated by reference as part of the record of this proceeding, pursuant to a stipulation of
the parties
i See also Westport Moving and Storage Com pany, 91 NLRB 902 and Hawthorne School
of Aeronautics, 98 NLRB 1098, cited by the Board in support of its jurisdictional finding
in Case No 11-RC-576.
3 NLRB press release, dated July 15, 1954.
694 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
its Decision and Direction of Election in the representation proceeding. The elec-
tion was held on April 29, 1954. The Union lost by a vote of 114 to 21.
The instant proceeding is unconcerned with any question related to the Union's
representative status. It is concerned solely with certain alleged unfair labor prac-
tices claimed to have been committed by the Respondent following the commence-
ment of the Union's organizational campaign .4 More specifically, the unfair labor
practice issues to be decided are as follows:
1. On September 8, 1953, shortly after the commencement of organizational
activities, the Respondent discharged Savoy Nelson, Clyde H. Hartman, and
Harvey L. Winstead, employees in its maintenance department. The General
Counsel claims they were discharged because of their union membership and
activities. The Respondent denies this and asserts that they were terminated as
part of a reduction in force.
2. Along with Nelson, Hartman, and Winstead, the Respondent on September
8, 1953, also discharged Nade Strickland, assertedly as part of the same reduction
in force. Nade Strickland filed a charge alleging that his discharge was violative
of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3), and service of the charge was effected on the Respond-
ent on September 22. On September 30, 1953, the Respondent discharged Nade
Strickland's wife, Margaret, who was employed in another department of the plant.
At the time of his discharge, Nade Strickland was a supervisory employee in the
maintenance department. Because of his supervisory status, the charge filed by
him was subsequently administratively dismissed by the General Counsel, and the
legality of his discharge is therefore not directly involved as an issue in this case.
However, the discharge of his wife, Margaret, is alleged as a violation of Section
8 (a) (1) and (3). The Respondent denies that Margaret Strickland's discharge
was illegally motivated and asserts it was for cause.
3. On or about March 26, 1954, the Respondent discharged Alfred L. Tucker,
the vice president of the Union's organizational committee, along with Ralph Dail
who was also an officer. No charge was filed by Dail and the complaint does not
allege discrimination against him. It is alleged, however, that Tucker's discharge
was Motivated by antiunion considerations. The Respondent denies that to be
true and asserts that Tucker was discharged for cause.
4. It is alleged by the General Counsel, and denied by the Respondent, that the
Respondent through supervisory and management officials engaged in various acts
of independent interference, restraint, and coercion, including surveillance of union
meetings, interrogation of employees concerning their union membership and activi-
ties, and threats of reprisal. This aspect of the case will be considered first, before
we turn to a consideration of the alleged discriminatory discharges.
B. Interference, restraint, and coercion
1. Alleged surveillance
(a) Organizational activity began about August 20, 1953. On Thursday evening,
September 3, an organizational meeting was held at the union hall, attend by about
30 employees. The employees were asked to assemble before the meeting at the
post office, located on one of the principal streets of Kinston, so that-they might be
directed from there to the meeting place by employees Savoy Nelson and Clyde
Hartman. The General Counsel introduced evidence to show that, while the em-
ployees were assembling at the post office steps, Foreman J. P. Waldrop drove by
on two occasions, spaced at a 10-minute interval. It appears that he was proceeding
at a usual rate of speed, and there is no evidence that he engaged in any untoward
conduct. Although Waldrop's presence in the area was not explained, I am of the
opinion, and I find, that the evidence adduced does not substantially support the
General Counsel's assertion that Waldrop was engaging in surveillance of union
activities at the time.
(b) Evidence was also offered to show that Foreman William B. Johnson was
observed in the vicinity of the post office on the same evening. Johnson denied
that he was engaged in surveillance and gave a satisfactory explanation for his
presence in the area. The claim that Johnson was engaged in illegal surveillance
is found unsupported.
2. Interrogation
(a) Employee Jacks Taylor testified: On November 10 a union meeting was held
at Kinston. Taylor, who lives 23 miles from Kinston, attended it. The following
4 The consolidated complaints are based upon chaiges filed by the complainants long
before the holding of the election-by Clyde H Hartman and Savoy Nelson on September
14, 1 953 , by Harvey L Winstead on September 18, 1953; by Margaret Strickland on
November 20, 1953; and by Alfred L. Tucker on March 29, 1953.
SERV-AIR AVIATION 695
morning while at work, Foreman Waldrop asked him whether he had not seen him
in Kinston the night before. When Taylor said , "No" Waldrop observed, "You
better stay out of this mess and keep your nose clean ." About 2 or 3 weeks later,
on the morning following another union meeting , Waldrop again asked Taylor
whether he had not seen him in Kinston the night before . This time , Taylor
answered , "Yes" and Waldrop said nothing further. Those were the only occasions
Waldrop ever questioned Taylor about seeing him in Kinston. For that reason,
and because of Waldrop 's reference to "this mess ," the General Counsel would have
it concluded that Waldrop was obliquely questioning Taylor about his presence at
union meetings . Though such a construction is possible , I am not entirely satisfied
that it is the only reasonable one to be drawn from Waldrop 's at best equivocal
remarks Consequently , I make no finding of unlawful interrogation on the basis
of Taylor's testimony.
(b) As more fully appears below , Savoy Nelson , Clyde Hartman, and Harvey
Winstead-all members of the Union-were discharged on September 8, 1953.
On the following day, as they were "clearing " the base, they were interviewed by
William J. Reynolds , the Respondent 's vice president . According to them, the
interviews were requested by Reynolds ; according to Reynolds the interviews were
solicited by the employees . The basic subject of discussion was the reason for their
discharge , with Reynolds insisting that their discharge was attributable to a reduc-
tion in force , and with the employees questioning that as the real reason for their
termination All are agreed that during the meeting the Union and its activities
came up for discussion . According to the employees , the discussion along those
lines was initiated by Reynolds ' questioning . Reynolds, on the other hand, denied
that he interrogated the employees about the Union and its activities . According
to him, the discussion about the Union was provoked by the employees. On
the basis of my appraisal of all the evidence , I think it more likely that the inter-
views were solicited by the employees and the subject of the Union was raised by
them with a view toward forcing an admission from Reynolds to confirm their
belief that their discharge was traceable to their union activities . Accordingly, I
credit Reynolds on the conflicts noted , and find unsubstantiated the claim of unlaw-
ful interrogation based on that incident.
(c) E. L. Leonard , an employee hired about November 20, 1953, testified with-
out denial , and it is found , that when he applied for work at the Respondent's
personnel office, he was questioned by Personnel Director Allen Nelms as to
whether he had ever belonged to a union . After Leonard told Nelms that he had
never belonged to a union , Nelms referred him to the maintenance department
head for further interview . It is found that by such questioning , the Respondent
violated Section 8 (a) (1) and of the Act.
(d) Leonard quit his job on April 10, 1954. He testified that while clearing
the base , he was directed to see Pompey A. Combs , the chief of police of the
Respondent 's plant protection force , and that Combs questioned him concerning
his knowledge of union activities in the plant , the places where union meetings
were held, and the connection of a certain individual with the Union. Combs
admitted having a talk with Leonard on the subject of the Union on the occasion
in question , but asserted that Leonard came to him of his own accord and offered
to supply information concerning the Union . Combs' testimony in that respect
was unconvincing , and so, too , was the testimony of Foreman William B . Johnson
who testified that Leonard told him he had a statement he wished to make to the
chief of police , without, however, disclosing to him the nature of the statement.
To the extent that Leonard's testimony conflicts with that of Combs and Johnson,
I credit Leonard. I find that Combs' questioning of Leonard concerning union
activities was violative of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
3. Threats
Although the complaints allege that a number of the Respondent 's management
and supervisory employees threatened employees with economic reprisal for union
membership and activities , credible record evidence establishes such threats by only
one-Shop Foreman William B. Johnson .5 Thus, E. L. Leonard testified that
Johnson discussed the Union with him on numerous occasions , and stated on one
c Theie is undemed testimony that another supervisor , J P. Waldrop , warned an em-
ployee, J P Best, who was the Union 's president and its observer at the election , that he
and other outstandingly active union adherents were "under observation" and had better
find other jobs while the finding was good The record indicates , however, that Waldrop
may have already terminated his own employment before he made those comments. In
view of the fact that theie is doubt as to Waldrop 's agency relationship to the Respondent
at the time, I do not attribute to the Respondent responsibility for his remarks
696 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
or more occasions that if the Company could find out who its ringleader was, it
would discharge him at once. Employee Alfred L. Tucker testified that on one
occasion, when he inquired of Johnson whether the Company could fire him for
distributing union application cards during lunch hour, Johnson told him, "You
are God damn right they can." And when Tucker pointed out that he did not think
the Company could interfere with such activities during the employees' free time,
Johnson commented that "that is what they fired those other four down at the other
hangar for." 6 Johnson added in that connection that although he would not
himself fire Tucker for engaging in such activity, "if it gets to Mr. Neal [the director
of aircraft maintenance] why that will be it right then." Tucker further testified
that later that same day, Johnson approached him, and after advising him "in a
rather fatherly sort of manner" that "it was the wrong thing to do to try to fool
around with the Union," Johnson told him "that the Company could not operate
with the Union integrated into it, and said that he didn't think the Company would
stand for a union being in there and that they would close up if they came in."
Leonard and Tucker impressed me as telling the truth in the respects set out above,
and although Johnson denied making the statements they attributed to him, I do
not credit his denials. I find that the statements made by Johnson to Leonard and
Tucker as aforesaid were violative of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
C. The discriminatory discharges of Clyde Hartman, Savoy Nelson and
Harvey Winstead
1. Employment history and union activities of the complainants
Hartman, Nelson, and Winstead were mechanics in the Respondent's aircraft
maintenance department which at the time of their discharge contained a total of
about 200 employees. That department is headed by W. T. Neal, the Respondent's
director of aircraft maintenance. The particular unit of the department in which
the three employees in question worked immediately before their discharge was
the inspection hangar. That hangar had about 30 employees at the time. J. P.
Waldrop was the hangar chief and Nade Strickland, the assistant hangar chief.
At the time of their discharge, Hartman, Nelson, and Winstead were among the
oldest and most experienced mechanics in the department-Hartman having been
hired on April 3, 1952, Nelson on April 10, 1952, and Winstead on January 21,
1952. Hartman and Nelson were classified as crew chiefs, a nonsupervisory classi-
fication, the occupants of which acted as head mechanics of crews ranging in num-
ber from 3 to 5. Winstead was classified as an aircraft and engine mechanic, but
for some time prior to his discharge had been working as an acting crew chief,
though at the mechanic's rate of pay. As appears from their efficiency records which
are in evidence, Hartman, Nelson, and Winstead were rated as satisfactory em-
ployees-and the Respondent does not contend otherwise.
As has been noted above, organizational activities on behalf of the Union began
in late August 1953, and a meeting, attended by about 25 employees, was held at
the union hall on the evening of September 3, 1953, the Thursday before Labor Day.
The Respondent's management officials, including Neal, were admittedly aware-
through "rumors," according to them-of the existence of organizational activities
and of the holding of the meeting.
Hartman, Nelson, and Winstead joined the Union, or at least signed union desig-
nation cards, before their discharge. The former two appear to have been par-
ticularly active on the Union's behalf. Nelson was the employee who first con-
tacted the Union and arranged to set up the first meeting. In addition he personally
contacted before his discharge about 12 employees in an effort to get them inter-
ested in the Union. Hartman also was active before his discharge in soliciting em-
ployees to join the Union. Nelson and Hartman were among those who attended
the union meeting on the Thursday before their discharge. As for Winstead, there
is no evidence that he engaged in any organizational activity, nor does the record
show whether or not he was present at the Thursday night meeting.
U Tucker understood that Johnson's reference was to Winstead, Hartman, Nelson, and
Strickland, for, as he testified, "there had only been four [fired] that anybody knew about."
Since it does not appear that Johnson had any supervisory authority over the four
mentioned or that he had anything to do with their discharge, Johnson's statement is not
considered here as an admission against interest binding upon the Respondent on the issue
of whether the discharges of Winstead, Hartman, and Nelson were in fact motivated by
unlawful considerations That, however, does not detract from the coercive force of the
statement, since the clear implication of the statement was that the Respondent would
not hesitate to take reprisal action against employees engaging in union activity protected
by law.
SERV-AIR AVIATION 697
2. The statements by Graham to the Stricklands foreshadowing the
discharge action
James C. Graham is the Respondent's director of supply and procurement, and as
such attends weekly meetings of company department directors at which company
policy and methods of effectuating it are considered. On September 6, 1953, the
Sunday following the Thursday union meeting adverted to above, Graham and his
wife visited the home of Mr. and Mrs. Nade Strickland. Shortly after his ar-
rival, Graham turned the conversation to the subject of the Union. There is a con-
flict in the testimony as to what he said.
Nade Strickland testified that Graham questioned him at length as to what was
going on in the inspection hangar with particular reference to union activities, and
as to Strickland's connection, if any, with the Union. After Strickland disclaimed
any knowledge of the Union,7 Graham told him that on the following Tuesday
(Monday was Labor Day) Strickland and a number of other employees were to be
discharged. Graham gave as the reason, according to Strickland, "the up-stir and
the union activities and the trouble in the hangar." Graham mentioned the names
of a number of other employees who he said were to be discharged at the same
time-among them were Clyde Hartman and Savoy Nelson.
Concerning her recollection of the conversation with Graham that Sunday night,
Margaret Strickland testified as follows:
The best I remember, I forgot how this conversation came up or began, but
very shortly after Mr. and Mrs. Graham arrived at our house, Mr. Graham
asked my husband if he knew anything about a Union out on the field and
my husband told him "no," he knew that there was something brewing, but
he didn't know what it was, he could just feel the unrest of the men, and Mr.
Graham asked him if he had told Mr. Neal about it and he said "no," he didn't
know what to tell him . . . and he [Graham] said, "Well, Tom Neal came Ott
to my house this afternoon and told me he was going to fire you for being
head of the Union, organizing the Union, and that he was going to fire about
30 more," and the reason he was telling Mr. Graham was because I worked
for Mr. Graham, and, therefore, if he [Nade Strickland] was fired I would
be involved, it would affect me, and therefore, affect Mr. Graham.
According to Mrs. Strickland's further testimony, Graham referred to a number
of employees by name as included among those who were to be fired for union
activity; in her testimony she mentioned three of them, none of whom were later
discharged.
Mrs. Graham was not called as a witness. Graham admitted that on the Sunday
night in question he had discussed the Union with the Stricklands and had advised
them that a number of employees were to be released by Neal the following Tues-
day, Strickland among them. He also conceded that he might have mentioned the
names of certain employees who were to be let out with him, and he did not
specifically deny Strickland's testimony that Hartman and Nelson were among those
mentioned. Graham denied, however, that he told Strickland he was to be termi-
nated for union activity. He testified that he gave as the reason a need for a re-
duction in force in the maintenance department.
The conflict here is an important one, and I have given much consideration to
its resolution. Although I believe that Mrs. Strickland might have embellished
her account somewhat in certain respects, her husband impressed me by his overall
testimony and demeanor as a forthright witness, careful to report the facts exactly
as he recalled them. Graham, much of whose testimony was evasive, did not simi-
larly impress me. I have considered the possibility that Graham might have dis-
cussed the Union and a forthcoming reduction in force as separate subjects, and
that the Stricklands might have mistakenly blended the two together. But after
evaluating all the testimony, I have rejected that as a possibility. Certain testimony
of Graham's appears to me to refute his assertion that he assigned as a reason
for Neal's contemplated discharge action a necessary reduction in force. Thus he
did not deny, in fact he admitted, that in the course of the discussion the question
came up as to what effect Mr. Strickland's discharge would have on Mrs. Strick-
land's job status. On that point he testified:
The fact that her husband was to be reduced in force the following day, or
soon, would not have anything to do with, but depended on what developed.
As is commonly known, a man and his wife work for the same firm, a man is
4 Strickland , as appears from his testimony , never joined the Union or participated in
any of its activities.
698 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
terminated for any reason , it is logical to assume that his attitude may not be
conducive to good working conditions . Also, it is logical to assume in the
event that his attitude toward his employer was not good, that his wife would
be the same way, and for that reason, in reply to her question , she was led to
believe that it could affect her. [Emphasis supplied.]
It seems to me that if Graham's statement concerning the discharge of Strickland
and others had reference only to a necessary reduction in force, as Graham says,
then any comment concerning Strickland 's attitude toward the Company and its
effect on Mrs. Strickland 's job status would have been completely irrelevant to the
discussion . Under all the circumstances . and considering also other record facts
to be reported below, I am persuaded , and I find, in accordance with Strickland's
testimony which is credited , that Graham 's remarks relating to discharges to be
effected the following Tuesday, including his references to Hartman and Nelson,
were made in the context of a discussion concerning the Union , and were intended
by him, and understood by the Stricklands, to convey the thought that the contem-
plated discharges of which he spoke were related to union activities in the plant.
3. The discharges
On Tuesday , September 8, 1953, Hartman , Nelson , and Winstead were discharged,
and, along with them, Nade Strickland. They were told by Neal when terminated
that they were being released because it was necessary for the Respondent to reduce
its force , and that was the only reason given No other employees were terminated
at or about that time for that assigned reason. Following the discharge of the four
mentioned , a notice was posted at the guardhouse gate, stating that Hartman, Nelson,
and Winstead were to be prohibited from entering the base for any reason, and that
Strickland might be allowed to enter only for the purpose of going to the supply
department to pick up his wife and returning immediately . Witnesses for the Gen-
eral Counsel testified that they had never seen such a notice posted before. The Re-
spondent offered no evidence to explain the notice or its significance.
William J . Best , a crew chief in the inspection hangar who was then working on
the night crew, testified credibly and without contradiction that when he found out
that Strickland, Hartman, Nelson, and Winstead were laid off, he inquired of Hangar
Chief Waldrop as to "what was the deal around here on this lay-off," and was told
by Waldrop, "You just keep your nose clean and keep out of this mess and you will
be all right ." Waldrop did not specify what he meant by "mess."
Nelson testified without contradiction , and it is found , that on the day following
his discharge he called at the State employment office in Kinston to register for
work; that he was asked what work he had been doing; and that when he stated he
had been working as a mechanic on airplanes , he was told by the official at that
office that he could go to work for the Respondent as it was requesting mechanics
at the time.
According to Best, the employees who were discharged on September 8 were imme-
diately replaced in their positions as crew chiefs by other mechanics in the Respond-
ent's employ , and new mechanics were hired shortly thereafter to fill vacancies
created. Best 's testimony to that effect was disputed by Vice-President Reynolds
of the Respondent who asserted that the discharged employees were never in fact
replaced. Documentary and other reliable record evidence emanating from the
Respondent tends in the main to support Best's version.
Thus, Neal testified that in August the inspection hangar had 8 crews, totalling
31 men, with the following crew chiefs : David Ingles, Lee Cameron , Savoy Nelson,
William J. Best, Harvey L. Winstead, Lee Newton, Clyde Hartman, and W. G.
Eubanks. According to Neal , in September , following the asserted reduction in
force, the inspection hangar had only 6 crews, totalling 23 employees , with the fol-
lowing crew chiefs: Ingles, H. T. Harris, J. A. Deal, Newton, A. B. Hardy, and T. A.
Banks. Best's credited testimony that he was then working as a crew chief on the
night shift , coupled with Neal's testimony elsewhere that Best might have been put
on the night shift at about that time, reflects that there was also a seventh crew which
Neal overlooked in his testimony . In any event , it appears that immediately fol-
lowing the discharge of the complainants four new crew chiefs were added. The
vacancies filled by the 4 new crew chiefs are accounted for as follows : Of those act-
ing in that capacity prior to September 8, Cameron was moved up to replace Strick-
land, Eubanks was given another assignment , and Hartman , Nelson, and Winstead
were discharged-thus making a total of 5 vacancies, which was, however, reduced
by 1 because of the reduction in the number of crews It is obvious , of course, that
but for the discharge of Hartman , Nelson , and Winstead 3 of the 4 vacancies would
not have occurred . It follows, therefore, that 3 of the 4 new crew chiefs must be
regarded as replacements for the 3 employees mentioned and the fourth as a replace-
SERV-AIR AVIATION 699
ment for Cameron who in turn replaced Strickland Of the 4 new crew chiefs, it
appears that at least 3-Harris , Banks, and Deal-were not classified as crew chiefs
prior to the time they were promoted to fill the vacancies ; as to the fourth , Hardy, the
record is unclear as to his earlier status.
While the record shows that the total number of employees was fewer in the
aircraft maintenance department and in its inspection hangar unit in September than
in August , the record also discloses that there was an inordinate amount of voluntary
terminations in August and early September . Confirmation of Best 's testimony that
new mechanics were hired by the Respondent shortly after the discharge of the em-
ployees in question is to be found in the Respondent 's hiring records , which disclose
that during the week following that in which the discharges occurred the Respondent
put on its payroll two newly hired aircraft and engine mechanics.
As appears from the testimony of Reynolds , the Respondent normally follows a
policy of giving preference in employment to former employees who have been re-
duced in force. Admittedly , it never offered reemployment to the complainants.
Reynolds explained that the Respondent did not contact them when new jobs opened
up because it did not pursue a practice of looking up people who had been reduced
in force, but expected them to keep in touch with the personnel director. He did
not explain why, if that were so, orders had been left at the guardhouse not to admit
Hartman, Nelson , and Winstead to the field for any reason.
4. Analysis of the Respondent 's defenses ; conclusions
The Respondent 's original position at the hearing was that it released the three
complainants for no other reason than to effect a necessary reduction in force in its
aircraft maintenance department . Although the Respondent never wholly aban-
doned its original position , it shifted ground during the presentation of its case to
allege as an additional reason for the release of the complainants a desire to elimi-
nate dissatisfaction in the inspection hangar.
The Respondent offered credible evidence to show that as a result of a reduced
Air Force budget for the fiscal year beginning July 1 , 1953, and a consequent re-
duction in the number of aircraft assigned to the base, it became necessary to curtail
the complement of manpower at the base in general and in the aircraft maintenance
department in particular.
According to Vice-President Reynolds, the Respondent started to reduce its em-
ployee complement in the latter part of July or the early part of August . The Re-
spondent 's employment and termination records, which are in evidence , bear out
Reynolds ' testimony as to the decrease in personnel about the time mentioned. Thus,
it appears that during the period between July 15, 1953. and the end of August 1953,
there were 15 terminations in the department , about half of them mechanics and
crew chiefs . During the same period, there were no new hires in the department,
at least of mechanics . It is significant , however , that none of the terminations in
the period just referred to are accounted for on the Respondent 's records as reduc-
tions in force. Of the 15 terminations noted above, occurring between July 15 and
the date of the complainants ' discharge , 10 were voluntary terminations, 2 were
due to employees being drafted into the Army, and 3 are attributed to excessive
absenteeism . Thus it appears that the Respondent prior to September 8 at least,
was following a policy of allowing normal attrition to reduce its employee com-
plement to budgetary requirements . The only employees shown on the Respond-
ent's records to have been reduced in force between July 15, 1953, and the date
of the hearing were the three complainants and Nade Strickland . At about the
time such terminations were made turnover in the department was still continuing
at a relatively high rate-to such an extent as to make it necessary for the Respond-
ent to leave a request with the State employment office for mechanics , and to actu-
ally hire the week following the discharge of the complainants two mechanics to
perform work for which the complainants were qualified. In these circumstances-
and bearing particularly in mind that the Respondent had followed a policy of
attrition and had refrained from affirmative layoff action for a period of about 6
weeks after the need for reducing its complement of employees had become ap-
parent-the Respondent 's explanation , that an affirmative reduction of force was
essential to it at that particular time for economic reasons, leaves much to be
desired.
But even if the Respondent 's explanation in that regard be accepted , it still leaves
open the question of whether the Respondent was guided by nondiscriminatory
considerations in selecting the complainants rather than others for such reduction.
It has already been observed that the complainants were among the older and
more experienced employees in the department , and that their work performance
had in the past been rated as satisfactory by the Respondent . It is obvious that
700 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
they must have been regarded as among the more highly skilled mechanics in their
unit, for two of them were classified as crew chiefs, and the third, while not so
classified, had been placed in the position of an acting crew chief. At the hearing,
the Respondent did not explain why it chose to select crew chiefs rather than
less skilled employees for purposes of reduction. Certainly, it cannot be accounted
for on the theory that crew chiefs were expendable while others were not, for, as
found above, it became necessary for the Respondent to move others up by promo-
tion to replace the crew chiefs who were discharged. Nor can it be accounted for
on theory that the complainants, or at least two of them, were drawing higher
rates of pay than ordinary mechanics, a factor that might result in greater savings
by their release, for those promoted to the vacated positions presumably also ad-
vanced to their rates of pay.
Although the Respondent did attempt to explain why, as among crew chiefs in
the inspection hangar, Hartman, Nelson, and Winstead rather than others were
selected for reduction, its explanation in that regard was far from convincing.
Neal, who made the selection, testified on direct examination that the selection
was made "on the basis of going over their appearance record and also an examina-
tion we gave them." Neal did not elucidate on what he meant by "appearance
record," and the Respondent offered no evidence to show that the complainants'
attendance records-if that is what Neal meant-were deficient or compared un-
favorably with that of others. It was developed that the examination to which
Neal adverted was a "cockpit check quiz" that had been given most of the crew
chiefs in the inspection hangar and certain other aircraft maintenance personnel
some time before. On that examination, Winstead, who was not classified as a
crew chief but was acting as such, was the only one of the complainants who had
failed to meet the passing grade of 60-his grade having been 58. Despite his
failing grade Winstead had nevertheless been retained in his acting crew chief
capacity. Nelson's grade was 60 and Hartman's 65. Only one of the crew chiefs
in the inspection hangar (Newton) exceeded Hartman's grade. Of the others who
took the examination and were not affected by the discharge action, 2 received
grades of 60 and 1 a grade of 62. Of those who were advanced to the vacated
positions of crew chiefs in the hangar after the complainants' discharge, only two
(Deal and Hardy) had taken the same examination, and their grades were 60,
equal to that of Nelson, lower than that of Hartman. On cross-examination, Neal
conceded that on the basis of the grades which he had originally claimed was one
of the principal criteria for the selection, it would have been difficult to make a
choice, except for Winstead whose grade was below par, and Hartman and Newton
whose grades were clearly above par.
At that time, Neal shifted his position and conceded that the decision to discharge
Hartman, Nelson, and Winstead was influenced by additional factors to which he
had not earlier averted. He now testified that they were selected for discharge
with a view toward eliminating unrest and dissatisfaction among employees in the
inspection hangar. Neal was vague and vacillating in his testimony about what he
meant by dissatisfaction and unrest. When pressed for an explanation, Neal testi-
fied that dissatisfaction evidenced itself by "people talking instead of working,
wasting time and things like that"; he now stated that what he had in mind was
"people . . . not performing their work efficiently." He made no claim, however,
that the complainants were guilty of talking when they should have been working,
or of not performing their work efficiently, nor did he claim that they had caused
others to be derelict in that regard.
Though Neal denied that he connected the "unrest" and "dissatisfaction," which
he now assigned as a principal factor for his selection of complainants for discharge,
with the union organizational activities then going on in the plant, of which he was
then admittedly aware, I do not credit his testimony. Graham's remarks to the
Stricklands on the Sunday preceding the discharge convince me that the Respond-
ent's management officials not only viewed with alarm the union activities then
going on in the plant, but equated employee unrest and dissatisfaction with such
activities. And my conviction in that regard is reinforced by the comments of
President Miller of the Respondent in his interview with Margaret Strickland fol-
lowing the discharges-to which reference will be made below in the section of
this report treating with the issue of discrimination against Margaret Strickland.
To sum up-Graham's comments to the Stricklands not only reflect management's
concern over the organizational activities in the plant and a disposition to take
reprisal against those believed to be responsible therefor, but disclose, moreover,
that the so-called reduction in force which was planned for September 8 was directly
related to and was on account of such union activities. The Respondent's efforts
to explain the selection of the complainants for discharge on a nondiscriminatory
basis has been found unpersuasive. On the other hand, Neal's testimony that they
SERV-AIR AVIATION 701
were selected in an effort to eradicate "unrest" and "dissatisfaction," coupled with
other convincing evidence indicating that in the eyes of management employee
"unrest" and "dissatisfaction" were joined with union activities , confirm the conclu-
sion here reached that Neal, who effected the discharge of the complainants, was
in fact motivated in his decision to discharge the complainants at least in substan-
tial part by antiunion considerations, as had been indicated by Graham to the
Stricklands Upon consideration of the record as a whole, and on the basis of
what I am persuaded is a fair preponderance of the credible evidence, I reject as
implausible the nondiscriminatory reasons assigned by the respondent for the dis-
charges of Hartman, Nelson, and Winstead; conclude that the underlying motiva-
tion for their discharge was the Respondent's belief that the said complainants were
at least in part responsible for the union activities in the plant , which the Respond-
ent equated with unrest and dissatisfaction; and find that by discharging said com-
plainants , and thereafter failing to reinstate them , the Respondent discriminated
with regard to their hire and tenure of employment, thereby discouraging member-
ship in the Union , and interfering with , restraining , and coercing employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteeed in Section 7 of the Act.
D. The discharge of Margaret Strickland
Margaret Strickland was employed by the Respondent in early 1952. She worked
as a cost and inventory clerk in the supply and procurement department which is
headed by James C. Graham. Her progress reports are in evidence. They show
that her supervisors had always rated her satisfactory or above average on all items
evaluated. The last report, dated August 25, 1953, and signed by Graham, contains
this handwritten comment, "Mrs. Strickland has satisfactorily completed her assigned
tasks and has shown ability to progress."
Reference is made to the preceding section of this report , particularly to those por-
tions of it treating with Graham's comments to the Stricklands on the occasion of his
visit to their home on Sunday, September 6, 1953, and with the question then raised
as to the effect Nade Strickland's discharge would have on his wife's job status.
On the day following Nade Strickland's discharge, Mrs. Strickland had a further
conversation with Graham concerning her own status. As appears from Mrs. Strick-
land's undenied and credited testimony, Graham in the course of that conversation
remarked, "I still don't believe Nade is guilty of being involved in the Union," but
in response to her specific query stated nevertheless that she was to be reduced in force
later that day. Mrs. Strickland told Graham at that time that she preferred to re-
sign rather than to be released.
That afternoon Mrs. Strickland sought and obtained an interview with President
Miller of the Respondent. Mrs. Strickland testified without denial, and it is found,
that during the course of that interview Miller questioned her as to what, in her
opinion , "was the cause of the unrest and why the men on the base wanted a union,
and who was in it and how many, etc." Mrs. Strickland, according to her testimony,
did not know the answers to the specific questions concerning union activity , for she
herself was not identified with the Union, and all she knew of the Union and its ac-
tivities was what certain men apparently connected with it had told her at her home
the night before. She told Miller what she knew, and stated that if, as she under-
stood from the men, company officials had spied on union activities , the Respondent
should have known that her husband was not at the meeting but at home. She as-
sured Miller that neither she nor her husband was in the Union, and expressed the
thought that it was unfair for the Respondent to reduce in force her husband and her-
self while retaining less experienced and qualified people. Miller remarked that on
the basis of what she had told him it appeared to him that an injustice had been done
her husband, but stated that as long as Neal was in charge of the aircraft maintenance
department he had no choice but to back up Neal in his decision. Miller promised,
however, to investigate the matter.
Up to the time of the close of her interview with Miller, Mrs. Strickland had not
yet resigned. As she rose to leave, Miller told her, "Mrs. Strickland, if I were you
I would not make a hasty decision." Mrs. Strickland interpreted Miller's remark to
mean that he did not think it necessary for her to resign. She did not do so, and no
action was taken against her-at least not until September 30.
Later that month, Nade Strickland filed with the Board' s Regional Office a charge
against the Respondent alleging that he had been discharged because of his member-
ship and activities on behalf of the Union. The charge was served on the Respondent
on September 22, 1953.8
8 Sometime later-after the events narrated in this report-the charge was administra-
tively dismissed by the Regional Office on the ground that Nade Strickland was a super-
visor, and, as such, not an employee within the meaning of the Act.
702 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
A week later, on September 30 to be exact , the Respondent discharged Mrs. Strick-
land. The discharge was effected by Graham . As appears from Mrs. Strickland's
undenied and credited account,
[Graham] came up and said , "Margaret, I hate to say this, but you are fired,"
and I said, "Why?" and he said "disloyalty" and I said, "The only thing I am guilty
of is working hard and trying to do my job" . . . and he said, "If I came out
here and told you I was firing you because your work was not satisfactory, you
would know I was lying ," and he said , "That is just the way it has got to be,
I have my orders and I have to pass them on."
The discharge was reported in Mrs. Strickland 's personnel file as well as on the form
sent to the State unemployment office as based upon the following ground:
The attitude of the employee toward Company policy is detrimental to the De-
partment and the Corporation as a whole.
Mrs. Strickland testified credibly, and it is found, that prior to her discharge she
had never been criticized about her attitude toward the Company.
Although it was not usual for Graham to consult his superiors about the discharge
of a subordinate, he admittedly conferred with Reynolds before the decision to dis-
charge Mrs. Strickland was made. According to Reynolds, Graham indicated to
him that he was having difficulty with Mrs. Strickland because "she was keeping a
disturbance going in the office among other female employees ." But when pressed
for details, Reynolds appeared uncertain of the nature of the disturbance; he "thought"
Graham mentioned something about Mrs. Strickland going to "various other peo-
ple's desks" and talking to them and "constantly crying, and so on ," but about what
Graham, according to Reynolds , did not say .9 Reynolds made no effort to explain
why, if that were the reason for Mrs. Strickland 's discharge , no mention of it was
made to her at the time of her discharge , nor on the termination forms that were sub-
sequently filled out.
Later in the course of his examination , Reynolds shifted ground when asked to
specify the precise reasons motivating the discharge decision , and now asserted two
different reasons, seemingly inconsistent with each other and with the one he gave
before, namely , that Mrs. Strickland was discharged in order to effectuate a neces-
sary reduction in force, and that she was discharged because of "the attitude she dis-
played in the job she was in." The additional reasons assigned by Reynolds, how-
ever, were no more convincing than his earlier one. As the record reveals, no other
employees were reduced in force that day, nor, for that matter, was Mrs. Strickland's
termination noted on the Company's records as a "reduction in force." Reynolds' as-
sertion concerning Mrs. Strickland's attitude in her job was made in the form of a
conclusionary declaration , wholly unsupported by detail. As found above, Mrs.
Strickland prior to her discharge had never been criticized about her attitude in her
job. Nor was any mention of it made to Mrs. Strickland when she was discharged,
unless Graham 's vague reference to "disloyalty " he considered such . Though Mrs.
Strickland 's termination notice does refer to her attitude , the reference there is not
to her attitude in the job, but "toward Company policy." Just what that policy is was
not there set out, nor was it defined by any witness for the Respondent in this record.
Graham, who, according to Reynolds, initiated Mrs. Strickland's discharge and
who was called as the Respondent's principal witness to defend it, gave an entirely
different reason for that action-one that was at odds with any of the three reasons
asserted by Reynolds On direct examination Graham testified that he discharged
Mrs. Strickland only because her work performance was unsatisfactory. But this
added reason also fails to convince. As found above, Graham had rated Mrs.
Strickland's work performance satisfactory on her last progress report in late Au-
gust. Graham while testifying did not deny that Mrs. Strickland had been a good
worker before her husband's discharge. He claimed, however, that her efficiency
suddenly and sharply deteriorated thereafter. But when asked to specify, his testi-
mony was vague, evasive, and generally unimpressive. Significantly, he did not deny
telling Mrs. Strickland when she was discharged that he was not firing her because
her work was unsatisfactory, but because he was obliged to do so under orders he
9 The Respondent called three employee witnesses to testify that Mrs. Strickland was
nervous and cried frequently during the last 3 weeks of her employment. But when asked
for details on cross-examination, one of them could specify only two occasions when she
actually observed Mrs. Strickland crying-once when her husband was discharged and
again when she was discharged Mrs Strickland admitted that she cried the day her hus-
hand was discharged, but denied she otherwise went through periods of crying during
working hours prior to her discharge, and I credit hei testimony in that regard
SERV-AIR AVIATION 703
had received , and he made no effort to explain the obvious inconsistency between his
assertion then and his assertion at the hearing.
Though Graham in his direct examination asserted-incredibly, as has been
found-that he discharged Mrs. Strickland because of unsatisfactory work perform-
ance, he later conceded that his discharge decision was affected by another consider-
ation-the fact that Mrs. Strickland 's husband had filed an unfair labor practice
charge against the Respondent . The filing of that charge made him feel , he testi-
fied, that Mrs. Strickland was antagonistic toward the Respondent , and that factor
was taken into account in reaching the decision to discharge her.
On redirect examination , Graham testified that he also felt that Mrs. Strickland
was not loyal to the Company after her husband 's discharge . When asked, how-
ever, in what way she manifested disloyalty , his answer was confused and evasive
At one point he testified that he could point to no overt action of disloyalty on her
part , but in the next breath he spoke of Mrs. Strickland " interfering in a certain
extent with other employees of the Corporation ." His testimony was vague when
asked to describe the character of the interference he had in mind, but he indicated
along the line that hearsay information had come to him in the form of "rumors"
that Mrs. Strickland was engaging other employees in discussions and "that as
things progressed she had new information to discuss with them . Questioned as to
the type of information , Graham answered , "As I say, and I cannot give specific
statements or instances ; it was pertaining to the fact that her husband was bringing_
action against . the Corporation."
On all the evidence , and on my appraisal of the credibility of the witnesses, I do'
not believe that Mrs. Strickland was discharged for creating a disturbance among
fellow employees , or for her attitude in the performance of her job, or in order to
effect a necessary reduction in force, as variously stated by Reynolds, nor do I be-
lieve Graham 's version that he discharged Mrs. Strickland for unsatisfactory work
performance . None of the reasons so assigned are consistent with Graham's as-
sertion to Mrs. Strickland contemporaneously with her discharge that he was dis-
charging her on orders from above for "disloyalty ," or with the statements on Mrs.
Strickland 's termination forms that are practically to the same effect, that her dis-
charge was due to her opposition to company policy. The key to the Respondent's
true motivation must be sought elsewhere . It is to be found , I am convinced, in the
sequence of events leading to Mrs. Strickland 's discharge . As has been found above,
Mrs. Strickland 's husband -was in effect advised by Graham prior to his discharge
that he was believed by the Respondent to be interested in the Union and that he
was to be discharged along with others because of union activities . At that time,
too, Graham , indicated to Mrs. Strickland , as he himself admitted, that Mrs. Strick-
land's job status might also be thereby affected, on the theory that if a husband's
"attitude toward his employer was not good, that his wife would be the same way."
In the context of that conversation , Graham's reference may only be read as im-
plying that union sympathy or interest was incompatible with a proper attitude
toward the Company. Consistent with Graham's prognostication , Mrs. Strickland
was told shortly after her husband's discharge that she , too, was about to be termi-
nated. However, after she had assured the Company 's president that neither she
nor her husband were interested in the Union , and had convinced him that a mis-
take had been made in terminating her husband , she was allowed to remain on.
The situation changed when her husband filed a charge alleging that he was dis-
charged for engaging in union activities . The nature of the charge was such as to
indicate to the Respondent that there was in fact substance to its original opinion
that Strickland had been identified with the Union , and to revive its belief that if
Strickland harbored union sympathies , so, too, might his wife, thereby reflecting
upon her loyalty and attitude toward the Company in the sense noted That the
Respondent connected Strickland 's filing of a charge with its conclusion that Mrs.
Strickland 's attitude toward the Company was not a proper one need not , however,
rest on inference alone It is revealed by Graham 's admission that because of that
circumstance the Respondent felt that Mrs . Strickland was antagonistic to the Com-
pany. That the Respondent in Mrs. Strickland 's case equated "disloyalty" with
union sympathy or support is at least suggested by Graham's testimony that he felt
Mrs. Strickland to be disloyal largely as a result of the rumors reaching him that
Mrs Strickland was engaging in discussions with other employees and advising them
of the progress of the unfair labor practice proceedings pending against the Re-
spondent . In view of the Respondent 's failure otherwise credibly to explain its de-
cision to discharge Mrs. Strickland , I believe the inference inescapable from the
sequence of events and other considerations expressed above that the Respondent
drew the conclusion that Mrs. Strickland was "disloyal " because of its belief that she
shared the supposed sympathy of her husband for the Union, and , additionally, be-
704 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
cause her husband had filed an unfair labor practice charge against the Respondent,
and that it discharged Mrs. Strickland for such reasons. I so find.
Clearly, the discharge of Mrs. Strickland for the reason that she was believed
sympathetic in her attitude toward the Union was violative of Section 8 (a) (1) and
(3) of the Act. It is unimportant that in point of fact Mrs. Strickland never joined
the Union or engaged in union activities. It is enough that the Respondent believed
that to be true. The Board has "always held that when an employee is discharged
because his employer believes him to be engaged in [union] activity, the discharge
is violative of the Act, whether or not such belief is well founded." New York Tele-
phone Company, 89 NLRB 383; Griffin Manufacturing Company, 103 NLRB 732,
739.
The additional reason intertwined with the aforesaid belief, and which has been
found to have contributed to the Respondent's discharge decision-the filing of an
unfair labor practice charge by Nade Strickland-was no less an unlawful one
within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (3), and would have been so
even had it stood alone. The Board has held that participation in proceedings be-
fore the Board, such as the filing of charges and the giving of testimony, is a right
of employees embraced within the coverage of Section 7, protected against employer
coercion and restraint. Personal Products Corporation, 108 NLRB 743. It is un-
necessary in this case to decide whether Nade Strickland, who had been a supervisor
prior to his discharge but was no longer such at the time he filed his charge, was
himself exercising a statutory employee right when he filed his charge.i° What we
are concerned with here is whether the discharge of Margaret Strickland, a nonsuper-
visory employee, for the reason that a charge had been filed against the Respondent,
had the natural and forseeable consequence of restraining and coercing the Re-
spondent's ordinary employees in their future exercise of their protected right to
utilize the Board's processes as part of the employee safeguards of Section 7. If
such employee restraint and coercion was a natural and forseeable consequence of
the Respondent's action the Respondent must be presumed to have intended that
result. Radio Officers' Union of the Commercial Telegraphers Union, AFL V.
N. L. R. B., 347 U. S. 17. I think it clear that the discharge of Margaret Strick-
land because her husband filed a charge had the natural and forseeable tendency
and effect of causing the Respondent's nonsupervisory employees reasonably to fear
that they, too, might be met with reprisal action should they find it necessary in
implementation of their Section 7 rights to utilize the Board's processes, and as such
operated to restrain and coerce them in the exercise of such statutory rights in
violation of Section 8 (a) (1).1i Moreover, I am of the opinion, and I find, that
the discrimination against Mrs. Strickland, because her husband had charged the
Company with unfair labor practices related to union organization, was of such
a character as inherently to discourage union membership , and as such was also
violative of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. Radio Officers case, supra.
I conclude and find that by discharging Margaret Strickland on September 30,
1953, and thereafter refusing to reinstate her, the Respondent discriminated in
regard to her hire and tenure of employment, discouraging membership in the
Union, and also interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
E. The discriminatory discharge of Alfred L. Tucker
Alfred L. Tucker , an aircraft and engine mechanic , worked for the Respondent
from July 15, 1952, to March 26, 1954, when he was discharged, according to the
General Counsel for union activities , according to the Respondent for cause. Orig-
inally Tucker worked in the aero repair section of the aircraft maintenance depart-
ment, but in November 1953 he was transferred to the engine buildup section of
the same department, and was still in that section at the time of his discharge. In
engine buildup Tucker worked under the immediate supervision of Shop Foreman
W. B. Johnson; the supervisor above Johnson was Hangar Chief William Reynolds
(who had also been Tucker's supervisor in aero repair); and W. T. Neal was the
director of the department. Another name that figures in the account below is
Ralph Dail , an engine mechanic , who at the time of Tucker 's discharge was acting
as crew chief of the crew to which Tucker was attached. Dail was discharged
simultaneously with Tucker, and, according to Johnson, for the same reason. Dail,
however, did not file a charge alleging discrimination and is not named in the
complaint.
10 Cf Briggs Manufacturing Company, 75 NLRB 569, 572 ; John Hancock Mutual Life
Insurance Company, 92 NLRB 122, enfd . 191 F . 2d 483 (C. A., D. C.).
11Cf. Talladega Cotton Factory, Inc , 106 NLRB 295, enfd . 213 F . 2d 208 ( C. A. 5) ;
Inter- City Advertising Company, 89 NLRB 1103 , enfd . as mod. 190 F. 2d 420 ( C. A. 4).
SERV-AIR AVIATION 705
Tucker's progress and performance rating reports are in evidence. They show
he had always been rated by his immediate supervisors as satisfactory and above
average on all rated items. His last performance report prior to his discharge is dated
November 10, 1953, and is signed by Johnson and Reynolds as rating supervisors.
In light of the reasons advanced for his discharge, to be adverted to below, it is par-
ticularly to be noted that on the factor of cooperation, he is rated as one who "works
in harmony with others" and is "a very good team worker." 12 On the factor of
reliability and personal responsibility, he is noted as one who "completes all assigned
tasks promptly and in an acceptable manner." On overall evaluation he is checked
as a "dependable and typically effective employee."
Tucker joined the Union about the beginning of the organizational campaign.
He was active in employee solicitation activities on its behalf, signing up, according
to his testimony, some 15 employees. At the second union meeting held some-
time in September officers were chosen. Tucker was then elected vice president,
and Dail either secretary or treasurer. Both remained officers of the Union until
their discharge.
The Respondent's knowledge of Tucker's membership in the Union is clearly
established. Johnson admitted it while testifying. Although Neal denied such
knowledge, he conceded that he had heard "rumors" to that effect. Moreover, at
one point of his testimony Neal mentioned in passing that he could have fired Tucker
earlier, but did not, because of his "attitude," referring in that connection to an
occasion several months before Tucker's discharge when Tucker had caused "dissen-
sion of an employee" by giving him a union card.
Reference has been made earlier in this report, in the section entitled "Inter-
ference, restraint, and coercion," to Tucker's conversation with Johnson in which
Johnson told Tucker he could be fired for distributing union application cards during
lunch hour, and that although he would do nothing about it, he believed Neal would
if it got to him. Reference has also been made to Johnson's advice to Tucker later
that day not to fool around with the Union, and to his contemporaneous coercive
remarks reflecting, inter alia, upon the Respondent's opposition to union organization.
Employee E. L. Leonard, who worked under Johnson's supervision and was
friendly with him, testified that a couple of weeks before Tucker and Dail were dis-
charged, Johnson informed him that both Tucker and Dail would have to go be-
cause they were connected with union activities and were troublemakers. Leonard
further testified that following the discharge of Tucker and Dail, Johnson com-
mented with reference to them, "I told you we were going to let them go." Leonard's
testimony to that effect, although denied by Johnson, is credited.
As stated, Tucker was finally terminated, along with Dail, on March 26, 1953.
The final termination was preceded by an interview with Neal the day before.
Tucker's account of what occurred is not substantially disputed. On March 25,
Tucker and Dail were summoned to Neal's office. Neal presented them with the
choice of voluntarily quitting or being discharged. Neal gave as his reasons for
requiring their termination that they were constantly sitting down on their jobs
without working and that they were unable to get along with anyone. He also
accused them of taking the maximum amount of sick leave to which they were
entitled under the Company's regulations, whether they were sick or not. Tucker
took issue with Neal's accusations, claimed they were false or exaggerated, and
charged Neal with seeking his discharge for reasons other than those asserted.
Both he and Dail refused to quit, stating to Neal that if he desired their termina-
tion he would have to discharge them. The interview ended with Neal giving them
1 week's notice of termination, subject to the understanding that if they failed to
accomplish their work and cooperate with their supervisors in the meantime they
would be released sooner. Tucker understood-correctly I find-that he was dis-
charged as of then with only the effective date postponed. The next day both he
and Dail came to work. Dail got into a verbal altercation with Neal-the details
of which are confused on the record and are unimportant here in any event-and
Neal told Dail he was fired, effective at once. At that point, Tucker, who had
been standing by but was not himself involved in the altercation, told Neal that
he preferred to have his own termination made effective immediately rather than
to wait out the week and possibly find that he had been recorded as having quit.
Neal obliged.
Neal testified that he discharged Tucker because "there was not any place that
we could put him that he would get along with the people." According to Neal,
Tucker for a considerable period of time-dating back to August 1953-had shown
"On the form there are 5 alternative items, 1 of which must be checked, on the factor
of cooperation That noted is the second highest. The lowest alternative, left unchecked
on Tucker's report, states, "Inclined to create friction. Does not get along well."
706 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
a chronic inability to get along with those under whom and with whom he worked,
leading to friction on that account. As a result it had been necessary, testified
Neal, to transfer Tucker to various sections of the department to see if a place
could be found for him where he could work out. That was the reason, Neal
indicated, for transferring Tucker from aero repair to engine buildup in November
1953. Neal testified that Tucker was unable to get along with Foreman Johnson
in engine buildup and was later-apparently about February 1954-transferred to
another hangar to do sanding under the supervision of Jack Withers, but did not
work out there either, and so was brought back to engine buildup where his trouble
with Johnson started all over again, culminating in his discharge. According to
Neal, he did not discharge Tucker sooner for that reason only because Tucker's
family had been involved in a serious accident in 1953 and he attributed Tucker's
conduct to nervous tension.
Tucker denied that he had been transferred to various sections because of his
inability to get along with those under whom he worked, and I accept his testimony
over that of Neal. As has been found above, Tucker was highly rated by Reynolds
and Johnson on his last performance report, dated November 10, 1953, particularly
on the factors of cooperation, reliability, and dependability. At the time of that
report, Tucker was already working in engine buildup. It is difficult to believe that
if, as Neal asserted, Tucker had since August 1953 exhibited the chronic failings
ascribed to him, and had just been transferred to another section for that reason,
Reynolds would have subscribed his name to a report characterizing Tucker as one
who "works in harmony with others" and is "a very good team worker." More-
over, Neal's testimony as to the reason why Tucker was transferred from engine
buildup to work in another hangar under Withers and then back to engine buildup
is refuted by other clear record evidence, including certain other portions of Neal's
own testimony. That evidence shows conclusively that, not only Tucker, but the
entire crew of which he was part was temporarily transferred to Withers' hangar,
and that the purpose of the transfer was to perform a special job required at that
hangar.
The discharge of Tucker, although made by Neal, was effected at the recom-
mendation of Johnson, according to the Respondent. As to what led him to make
his recommendation, Johnson testified as follows: For a good while after Tucker
came under his supervision, Tucker had been a good employee. There came a
time, however, when "all the boys got slack." As a result, Johnson called a
meeting of his men sometime in February to speak to them about it, not singling
out any for criticism but addressing all in general. At that meeting Tucker ex-
pressed violent resentment. After the meeting, the men in his section continued
coming in late and taking overlong smoke breaks, with the result that Johnson
found it necessary to "get on" the men in his section again, and to threaten them
with discharge if they did not improve. Finally, Johnson recommended the dis-
missal of some eight employees in his group, making his recommendation as to
Tucker and Dail on one day, and as to the others the next morning.13 Neal
followed Johnson's recommendation with regard to Tucker and Dail. The others
whom Johnson says he recommended for discharge were not dismissed, although
according to Johnson, they were subsequently transferred to another section of
the department.
Tucker, whose testimony I credit generally, admitted that there had been some
criticism of his crew by Johnson for taking excessive breaks, but testified that the
criticism was for the most part unwarranted, and that while there had been a few
infractions on his own part, they had not exceeded a few minutes. The Respondent
adduced no testimony to show the contrary. Moreover, Tucker testified without
denial that about 2 days before his discharge he and the crew of which he was
part had been complimented by Johnson for the dispatch and efficiency with which
they had got out an emergency job.
Johnson while testifying made no claim that Tucker and Dail were more guilty
than others under his supervision of the conduct which he says led to his discharge
13 Johnson in his testimony did not claim that there was any particular occurrence in-
volving Tucker and Dail that directly precipitated the discharge decision Nor did Neal
in his testimony Tucker's personnel file contains a note, signed by Neal, prepared after
Tucker's discharge, stating that on the day before the discharge, Tucker was observed by
Neal sitting around doing nothing before it was actually time to punch out. Neal did not
testify concerning any such incident Howevei, Leonard, a witness for the General Counsel,
was questioned on cross-examination concerning such an incident. Leonard's testimony
reveals that there were about 5 or 6 employees in the section who were sitting around
unoccupied foi sonie time prior to quitting time on the day preceding the discharge He
was not asked, and his testimony does not show, whether Tucker was among them.
SERV-AIR AVIATION 707
recommendation. His basis for recommending the dismissal of the six others who
were not discharged, he testified, was exactly the same as that on which he recom-
mended the discharge of Tucker and Dail.
The record shows that long before their discharge, Tucker and Dail had been
singled out by Neal for special attention in other ways Thus Neal admitted at one
point-in contradiction to earlier testimony he had given-that Tucker and Dail
had" been under "observation" for a considerable time before their discharge. Where
an employee was under "observation," his supervisors were required to keep a
special check on him and report to Neal in writing any derelictions or infractions
in his work or conduct, major or minor That was done with respect to Tucker
and Dail, but not as to any of the other employees in the engine buildup section,
who, according to Johnson, had been similarly guilty of the conduct of which he
was critical. Neal fixed the time when Tucker and Dail were placed under observa-
tion as in August 1953. He conceded that action was taken about the same time
that he began to receive "rumors" of union organization. Neal was not questioned
as to why Dail was placed under "observation" at that time. According to Neal,
Tucker was placed under "observation" in August 1953, and thereafter retained
under "observation," because he had been advised by Supervisor Reynolds that
Tucker was "causing friction among employees and self " Neal's testimony, that
the "friction" consisted of Tucker's inability to get along with others, was not con-
vincing, particularly in the light of the ratings made on Tucker's progress and
performance reports, as set out above. Other record circumstances suggest that
the connection between Tucker's placement under "observation" and the start of
union organization in which he was active was one more of consequence than of
coincidence
I regard as highly significant Johnson's testimony that Tucker and Dail were the
only two employees whom he knew to be connected with the Union, and, more spe-
cifically, that he had no knowledge of any union identification of any of the six others,
who though they engaged in like conduct were not discharged.
In this case-to sum up-the reason given by Neal for his decision to discharge
Tucker has been found not credible. The reason given by Johnson fails adequately
to explain why Neal should have treated Tucker differently from other employees
who, according to Johnson's own account, engaged in identical conduct but were
retained. Absent such an explanation, I am convinced on all the evidence that the
true reason for the disparate treatment is to be found in the Respondent's identifica-
tion of Tucker, but not of the others, with the Union, to which, as the record as a
whole shows, it was opposed. The Respondent's predilection, and Neal's in particu-
lar, for making union membership a basis for discrimination is revealed by the other
cases discussed above. In the case of Tucker, the conclusion here reached is, more-
over, specifically supported and confirmed by Johnson's prediction to Leonard about
2 weeks before Tucker's discharge that Tucker was one of those who would have
to go because he was connected with union activities, and by his statement to Leonard
after the discharge that what he had predicted had now come to pass. Upon con-
sideration of the record as a whole, and on the basis of what I am convinced is a
fair preponderance of credible evidence, I conclude and find that the Respondent's
underlying motivation for discharging Tucker lay in Tucker's known union member-
ship and activities and the Respondent's opposition thereto. I further find that by
discharging Tucker on March 26, 1954, and thereafter refusing to reinstate him, the
Respondent discriminated in regard to his hire and tenure of employment, thereby
discouraging membership in the Union, and interfering with, restraining, and coerc-
ing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in con-
nection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have a
close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I
shall recommend that the Respondent be ordered to cease and desist therefrom, and
take certain affirmative action in order to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that the Respondent discriminated with regard to the hire and tenure
of employment of Clyde H. Hartman, Savoy Nelson, Harvey L. Winstead, Margaret
Strickland, and Alfred L. Tucker, I shall recommend that the Respondent offer them
344056-55-vol 11146
708 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and each of them immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially
equivalent positions 14 without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privi-
leges, and make them whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of the discrimina-
tion against them, by payment to each of them of a sum of money equal to the amount
he or she would have earned from the date of his or her discriminatory discharge to
the date of the offer of reinstatement less net earnings 15 to be computed on a quarterly
basis in the manner established by the Board in F. W . Woolworth Company, 90
NLRB 289, 291-294. Earnings in any one particular quarter shall have no effect
upon the back-pay liability for any other such period . It will also be recommended
that the Respondent make available to the Board, upon request , payroll and other
records to facilitate the checking of back pay due.
As the unfair labor practices committed by the Respondent were of a character
striking at the roots of employee rights safeguarded by the Act, and disclose a propen-
sity on the part of the Respondent to continue , although not necessarily by the same
means, to defeat self-organization of its employees , it will also be recommended that
the Respondent cease and desist from infringing in any manner upon the employee
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact , and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL, is a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Clyde H.
Hartman , Savoy Nelson , Harvey L. Winstead, Margaret Strickland , and Alfred L.
Tucker, thereby discouraging membership in the Union, the Respondent has engaged
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining , and coercing its employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in un-
fair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
14 The Chase National Bank of the City of New York, San Juan, Puerto Rico, Branch,
65 NLRB 827.
15 Crossett Lumber Company, 8 NLRB 440 , 447-498; Republic Steel Corporation v.
N L R B., 311 U. S. 7.
ARMSTRONG TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY, TIRE TEST FLEET BRANCH
and UNITED RUBBER, CORK, LINOLEUM AND PLASTIC WORKERS OF
AMERICA, CIO. Case No. 39-CA-359. Feb ruary 18,1955
Decision and Order
On April 8, 1954, Trial Examiner Stephen S. Bean issued his In-
termediate Report in the above-mentioned proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report
attached hereto. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent
had not engaged in certain other alleged unfair labor practices, and
recommended that the compaint be dismissed with respect to such
allegations. Thereafter, the Respondent and the General Counsel
filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and supporting briefs.
111 NLRB No. 116.