Serra Sampsell, Complainant,v.Bruce Babbitt, Secretary, Department of the Interior, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionApr 25, 2000
01a00409 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 25, 2000)

01a00409

04-25-2000

Serra Sampsell, Complainant, v. Bruce Babbitt, Secretary, Department of the Interior, Agency.


Serra Sampsell, )

Complainant, )

) Appeal No. 01A00409

v. ) Agency No. FNP-98-079

)

Bruce Babbitt, )

Secretary, )

Department of the Interior, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final decision

concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination on the basis of sex (female), in violation

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq.<1> The appeal is accepted pursuant to 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644,

37,659 (1999)(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405).

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented is whether the agency properly determined that

complainant failed to establish by preponderant evidence that the agency

discriminated against her.

BACKGROUND

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was employed

as a Custodian at the agency's Harpers Ferry National Historical Park.

On February 6, 1998, complainant received a letter informing her that

she was not selected for the position of Painting Worker for which

she applied. Further, she was informed of the name of the individual

selected for the position (the Selectee). She had seen the Selectee

being aided by her supervisor in completing his application for the

position on the last day of the application deadline. Believing she

was a victim of discrimination, complainant sought EEO counseling and,

subsequently, filed a formal complaint on April 8, 1998.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy

of the investigative report and requested that the agency issue her a

final agency decision (FAD). On September 9, 1999, the agency issued

its FAD finding no discrimination. In particular, the agency found that

complainant stated a prima facie case of sex discrimination. Further,

the FAD held that the agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for its decision not to select complainant. Finally, the FAD

found that complainant failed to show that the agency's reasoning was

pretext for discrimination.

On appeal, complainant argues that the investigation failed to include a

witness who saw the Selectee receive assistance on his application from

her supervisor. Complainant alleges that the supervisor's assistance

gave the Selectee an unfair advantage over her application and that the

assistance was evidence that the Selectee was preselected for the vacancy.

Further, complainant argues that the investigation was inadequate and

contained several errors. The agency requests that we affirm its FAD.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Complainant alleges disparate treatment on the basis of sex. A claim

of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis first

enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

For complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima facie

case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a

prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438

U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep't of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency

has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility

to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor

Cen. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the personnel

actions at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the

third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of

whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. United States

Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transp., EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28,

1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Serv., EEOC Request

No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of the Navy,

EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

Assuming, arguendo, that complainant has established a prima facie case

of sex discrimination, the burden shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. The agency

argues that the Selecting Official (SO) reviewed all the applications

for the position and selected the individual with the highest score, the

Selectee. Further, the SO averred that the Selectee had more experience

painting historical buildings and knowledge of paints and tools used

on historical buildings than complainant. In particular, the SO noted

that the Selectee had been a Painter Helper from 1988 to the date of his

selection while complainant only had worked for short periods of time

as a painter. The agency also argues that it wanted someone who could

assume the position in question without being provided any additional

training and that individual was the Selectee. Finally, when asked to

respond to complainant's arguments, the SO averred that he was not aware

of any assistance given to the Selectee on his application nor of any

preselection and that he does not have any problems working with females.

Upon review of the record, the Commission finds that the agency has

articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action.

The burden now shifts to complainant to show that the agency's reasons

were pretext for discrimination. Complainant argues that the agency

preselected the Selectee and that the SO is uncomfortable working

around females. Upon review of the record, we find that complainant

fails to provide any evidence that the agency preselected the selectee

in a discriminatory manner. Further, complainant failed to demonstrate

that the SO made his selection based on sex. Accordingly, the Commission

finds that complainant has failed to show that the agency's action was

motivated by a discriminatory animus.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

contentions on appeal, we AFFIRM the agency's final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0400)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

April 25, 2000

Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify

that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

Date 1On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the

EEOC's federal sector complaint process went into effect. These

regulations apply to all federal sector EEO complaints pending at any

stage in the administrative process. Consequently, the Commission will

apply the revised regulations found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999),

where applicable, in deciding the present appeal. The regulations,

as amended, may also be found at the Commission's website at

www.eeoc.gov.