Sergey Moshonkin

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 30, 2018

No. 86943726 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 30, 2018)

Mailed: August 30, 2018
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
————
In re Sergey Moshonkin
————
Serial No. 86943726
————
Phillip Thomas Horton of Horton Law PLLC,
for Sergey Moshonkin.
Rhoda Nkojo,1 Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 117,
Travis Wheatley, Managing Attorney.
————
Before Cataldo, Taylor and Pologeorgis,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Pologeorgis, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Sergey Moshonkin (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
mark (ICE and ROCK disclaimed) for the following goods:
Cable clamps of metal; Crampons for climbing; Eye bolts; Metal
hardware for use in descending ropes, namely, belay devices; Metal
hardware for use in descending ropes, namely, descenders; Metal

1 The Office re-assigned the involved application to the Trademark Examining Attorney
identified above.
THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB
Serial No. 86943726
2
hardware, namely, pulleys; Metal screws; Pitons of metal; Metal
hardware, namely, carabiners of metal, in International Class 6;

Ice axes; Mountaineering pickels, in International Class 8;

Ascenders; Climbers’ harness; Mountaineering climbing belts;
Mountaineering equipment, namely, binding straps;
Mountaineering equipment, namely, hook and ring combinations;
Mountaineering and rock climbing equipment, namely, spring-
loaded camming devices (SLCDs); Ski bindings; Ski edges; Ski wax;
Skis; Snowshoes; Toy scooters; Mountaineering and rock climbing
equipment, namely, climbing cams and anchors made of metal, in
International Class 28.2

The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration of Applicant’s mark
under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground of
likelihood of confusion with the mark ICEROCK, in standard characters, registered
on the Principal Register for the following goods:3
Protective helmets; goggles for snow-motoring; motorcycle goggles,
in International Class 9;

tote bags; backpacks; hiking bags; luggage; pouches of leather;
pouches made of cloth, in International Class 18; and

Jackets, parkas, bomber jackets, pants, slacks, duffle coats,
leggings, leg warmers, snow suits, snow pants, bib pants, vests,
wetsuits, coats, raincoats, ponchos, shirts, blouses, turtlenecks,
tops, shorts, skirts, jumpers, capes, shawls, T-shirts, turtleneck

2 Application Serial No. 86943726, filed on March 17, 2016, based on (1) an allegation of use
in commerce under Section 1(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), for the goods
identified in International Classes 6 and 8, claiming November 2013 as the date of first use
and the date of first use in commerce as to both classes, and (2) an allegation of a bona fide
intention to use the mark in commerce under Section 1(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1051(b), for the goods identified in International Class 28. The description of the mark reads
as follows: “The mark consists of two triangles with the letters “IR” in a stylized font between
the two triangles and the wording “ICE ROCK” in an [sic] stylized font below the letters.”
Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark.
3 Registration No. 4411594, issued on October 1, 2013.
Serial No. 86943726
3
shirts and sweaters, sweatshirts, sweat pants, sweaters, cardigans,
robes, leotards, tights, body suits, culottes, gloves, mittens, hats,
caps, toques, bonnets, scarves, headbands, neck warmers, ear muffs,
boots, and socks, in International Class 25.

When the refusal was made final, Applicant appealed. We affirm the refusal to
register.4
I. Likelihood of Confusion
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all probative facts
in evidence that are relevant to the factors bearing on the issue of likelihood of
confusion. In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567
(CCPA 1973); see also In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201,
1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In any likelihood of confusion analysis, however, two key
considerations are the similarities between the marks and the similarities between
the goods. See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192
USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the
cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and
differences in the marks.”).
A. Similarities of the Marks
We initially address the first du Pont factor, “the similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression.” Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En
1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting du Pont, 177

4 The TTABVUE and Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (“TSDR”) citations
reference the docket and electronic file database for the involved application. All citations to
the TSDR database are to the downloadable .PDF version of the documents.
Serial No. 86943726
4
USPQ at 567). “The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but
instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial
impression such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a
connection between the [owners].” Coach Servs. Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 6 68
F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted).
Applicant’s mark is . The registered mark is ICEROCK in standard
characters. The dominant element of Applicant’s mark is the wording ICE ROCK.
The fact that Applicant has disclaimed the wording ICE and ROCK does not remove
these terms from the mark nor does it reduce their visual dominance of the composite
mark. See In re Shell Oil, 992 F.2d 1204, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689-90 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(“The Board correctly held that the filing of a disclaimer with the Patent and
Trademark Office does not remove the disclaimed matter from the purview of
determination of likelihood of confusion.”); see also Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s
Foodservice, Inc., 710 Fl2d 1565, 218 USPQ 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(“disclaimers are not helpful in preventing likelihood of confusion in the mind of the
consumer, because he is unaware of their existence.”). This dominant portion of
Applicant’s mark is virtually identical to the cited mark in sound, appearance,
connotation and commercial impression. The only differences are the stylization of
the wording ICE ROCK and the space between the words ICE and ROCK in
Applicant’s mark. However, the cited mark is a standard character mark, and marks
appearing in standard character form may be displayed in any stylization, font, color
and size, including the identical stylization of Applicant’s mark, because the rights
Serial No. 86943726
5
reside in the wording and not in any particular display or rendition. See Squirtco v.
Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[T]he argument
concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in
no particular display. By presenting its mark merely in a typed drawing, a difference
cannot legally be asserted by that party.”). Thus, because the cited mark may be
displayed in the identical manner as Applicant’s mark, the stylization of the term
ICE ROCK in Applicant’s mark is insufficient to distinguish the respective marks.
Furthermore, the space between the words ICE and ROCK in Applicant’s mark
does not significantly distinguish the cited ICEROCK mark from the dominant
element of Applicant’s mark. See, e.g., Mini Melts, Inc. v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC, 118
USPQ2d 1464, 1470 (TTAB 2016) (“The absence of a space in Applicant’s mark
MINIMELTS does not meaningfully distinguish it from Opposer’s mark [MINI
MELTS].”); Seaguard Corp. v. Seaward Int’l, Inc., 223 USPQ 48, 51 (1984) (“the
marks [SEA GUARD and SEAGUARD] are, in contemplation of law, identical”); In
re Best Western Family Steak House, Inc., 222 USPQ 827, 827 (TTAB 1984)
(BEEFMASTER and BEEF MASTER “are practically identical”); Stockpot, Inc. v.
Stock Pot Rest., Inc., 220 USPQ 52, 54 (TTAB 1983), aff’d, 737 F.2d 1576, 222 USPQ
665 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (the presence or absence of a space between virtually the same
words, e.g., STOCKPOT and STOCK POT, is not a significant difference).
Moreover, we find that the letters IR featured in Applicant’s mark will be
perceived as an abbreviation of the wording ICE ROCK, which only reinforces the
dominant nature of the phrase ICE ROCK in Applicant’s mark. Finally, although
Serial No. 86943726
6
Applicant’s mark includes a design element, “the verbal portion of the mark is the
one most likely to indicate the origin of the goods to which it is affixed.” Jack Wolfskin
Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. KGaA v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797
F.3d 1363, 116 USPQ2d 1129, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing CBS Inc. v. Morrow, 708
F.2d 1579, 218 USPQ 198, 200 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Greater weight is often given to the
wording because it is the wording that purchasers would use to refer to or request the
goods or services. See, e.g., In re Viterra, Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1911
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
While we have not overlooked the design element, the stylization, the abbreviation
IR, or the space between the terms ICE and ROCK in Applicant’s mark, we
nonetheless conclude that Applicant’s mark and the cited ICEROCK mark,
when considered in their entireties, are nevertheless more similar than dissimilar in
sound, appearance, meaning and commercial impression.
The first du Pont factor thus supports a finding that confusion is likely.
B. Similarity of the Goods
The next step in our analysis is a comparison of the goods identified in Applicant’s
application vis-à-vis the goods identified in the cited registration, the second du Pont
factor. See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110
USPQ2d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Hous. Comps. Servs. Inc.,
918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Hewlett-Packard Co.
v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.2d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002). It is
well-settled that it is not necessary that the goods be identical or even competitive in
Serial No. 86943726
7
nature in order to support a finding of likelihood of confusion, it being sufficient that
the goods are related in some manner and/or that the circumstances surrounding
their marketing be such that they would be likely to be encountered by the same
persons under circumstances that would give rise, because of the marks employed
thereon, to the mistaken belief that they emanate from the same source. Coach Servs.,
101 USPQ2d at 1722 (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724
(TTAB 2007)); see also In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223
USPQ 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB
1991). Evidence of relatedness may include news articles and/or evidence from
computer databases showing that the relevant goods are used together or used by the
same purchasers; advertisements showing that the relevant goods are advertised
together or offered by the same manufacturer or dealer; and/or copies of prior use-
based registrations of the same mark for both Applicant’s goods and the goods listed
in the cited registration. In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1817 (TTAB 2014) (finding
pepper sauce and agave related where evidence showed both were used for the same
purpose in the same recipes and thus consumers were likely to purchase the products
at the same time and in the same stores). The issue is not whether purchasers would
confuse the goods, but rather whether there is a likelihood of confusion as to the
source of these goods. L’Oreal S.A. v. Marcon, 102 USPQ2d 1434, 1439 (TTAB 2012);
In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830, 832 (TTAB 1984).
In support of the refusal, the Examining Attorney made of a record four third-
party, use-based registrations, each identifying, under a single mark, goods of a type
Serial No. 86943726
8
identified in Classes 8, 9, 18 and 28 of Applicant’s application and those identified in
the cited registration.5 Although such registrations are not evidence that the marks
shown therein are in use or that the public is familiar with them, they nonetheless
have probative value to the extent that they serve to suggest that the goods listed
therein are of a kind which may emanate from a single source under a single mark.
See In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re
Mucky Duck Mustard Co. Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988). They include:
• FREEDOM ACTION SPORTS (ACTION SPORTS disclaimed) (Reg.
No. 2464213) for goods including luggage, backpacks, hiking bags, in
Class 18; hats, caps, T-shirts, skirts, snow leggings, jackets, coats,
shorts, sweaters, vests, gloves, boots, scarves, in Class 25; and snow
skis, bindings for skis, ski edges, snowshoes, in Class 28;
• (Reg. No. 2365311) for goods including back-packs and
hiking bag packs, in Class 18; back-packs, hiking bag packs; snow
suits, socks, gloves, hats, caps, shirts, tee-shirts, shorts, skirts, boots,
in Class 25; and ski bindings and snow skis, in Class 28;

• CLIMBX (Reg. No. 4246342) for goods including ice axes, in Class 8;
protective helmets, in Class 9; backpacks, in Class 18; and boots, T-
shirts, sweaters, jackets, socks, gloves, skirts, shirts, vests,
sweatpants, pants, shorts, coats, leggings, sweatshirts, scarves, hats
and caps, in Class 25;

• (OUTDOOR disclaimed) (Reg. No. 3506384) for goods
including shirts, socks, sweatshirts, hats, ball caps, boots, vests,
snow pants, bicycling gloves, shorts and skirts, in Class 25 and skis
and climbing harnesses, in Class 28.

The Examining Attorney also submitted internet evidence demonstrating that

5 January 30, 2017 Office Action, TSDR pp. 24-37.
Serial No. 86943726
9
third parties offer sporting gear and associated clothing items which are identical or
similar to those offered by Applicant and Registrant under the same mark.6 The
evidence is comprised of screenshots of the commercial websites of the following
companies:
• www.blackdiamondequipment.com offering for sale goods of various
metal hardware, including, crampons, mountaineering equipment,
namely, harnesses, clothing, including snow pants, jackets, tops,
shirts, pants, shorts, t-shirts, helmets, ropes, ice axes, crampons,
harnesses;

• www.petzl.com offering for sale clothing, including, t-shirts, helmets,
goggles, various carrying bags, ice axes, various metal hardware in-
cluding crampons and pulleys, descending ropes, mountaineering
equipment, including, ascenders;

• www.moosejaw.com offering for sale backpacks, ropes, harnesses,
and various clothing items, including jackets, pants and parkas;

• www.blackcountrygear.com offering for sale ropes, helmets, bags,
harnesses, clothing, including gloves, shoes and jackets, and metal
hardware, including carabiners; and

• www.mountaingear.com offering for sale metal hardware, including
carabiners and crampons, protective wear, including helmets and
clothing, including footwear, gloves, socks and jackets.

Additionally, the Examining Attorney submitted internet articles on hiking and
climbing on ice, snow, and mountains that reveal that the relevant goods are of the
type of gear commonly used together for these activities.7 The internet articles are
reproduced below, in whole or in part:

6 Id., TSDR pp. 9-23.
7 June 30, 2016 Office Action, TSDR pp. 38-40.
Serial No. 86943726
10

Serial No. 86943726
11

Serial No. 86943726
12

The Examining Attorney argues that the foregoing evidence establishes that the
goods described in Applicant’s involved application and the cited registration are
related not only because they are complementary in nature but also that they are
often made, advertised and sold by the same company to the same consumers under
the same mark.8
In traversing the refusal, Applicant argues that the goods at issue are unrelated

8 Trademark Examining Attorney’s Appeal Brief, p. 7, 11 TTABVUE 7.
Serial No. 86943726
13
because Applicant’s goods are essential items for climbing while Registrant’s goods
are accessories for snow mobiles and motorcycles and that riding snow mobiles and
motorcycles is vastly different than climbing rocks and mountains.9
We are not persuaded by Applicant’s argument. As stated, to determine the
relationship between the goods, we are bound by the identifications in Applicant’s
involved application and the cited registration. In re Dixie Restaurants Inc., 105 F.3d
1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Likelihood of confusion must be
determined based on an analysis of the marks as applied to the … [goods] recited in
applicant’s application vis-à-vis the … [goods] recited in [a] …registration, rather
than what the evidence shows the… [goods] to be.”) (citing Canadian Imperial Bank
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 811 F.2d 1490, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1815 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
Accordingly, our determination regarding the relatedness of the goods cannot be
based on any extrinsic evidence of actual use. In re i.am.symbolic, LLC, 866 F.3d
1315, 123 USPQ2d1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Stone Lion Capital, 110 USPQ2d at
1162. In other words, an applicant may not restrict the scope of the goods covered in
its application or the cited registration by argument or extrinsic evidence. In re
Midwest Gaming & Entm’t LLC, 106 USPQ2d 1163, 1165 (TTAB 2013); see also In re
Thor Tech, 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1638 (TTAB 2009) (“We have no authority to read any
restrictions or limitations into the registrant's description of goods.”).
Here, Registrant’s “protective helmets” in Class 9 and the various clothing items
in Class 25, including jackets, parkas, gloves and scarves, are not limited to any

9 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, p. 15, 12 TTABVUE 16.
Serial No. 86943726
14
particular use so they must be presumed to be suitable for climbing, snowmobiling,
motorcycle riding or other purposes. Similarly, Registrant’s “hiking bags” and
“backpacks” in Class 18 are not limited to any sporting activity and, therefore, may
ostensibly be used in connection with rock climbing and hiking, as well as riding a
motorcycle or snow mobile.
We therefore conclude, based on the internet and third-party registration evidence
of record submitted by the Examining Attorney, that Applicant’s goods and
Registrant’s goods are related and complementary in nature, all being goods that are
used together for climbing, hiking and other outdoor activities, and are the types of
goods that have been offered under a single mark by a single entity such that, when
identified by very similar marks, as is the case here, confusion as to source is likely.
Cf. In re Shell Oil Co., 26 USPQ2d at 1689 (“…even when goods or services are not
competitive or intrinsically related, the use of identical marks can lead to the
assumption that there is a common source.”).
Thus, the second du Pont factor favors a finding of likelihood of confusion.
C. Similarities in Trade Channels and Classes of Purchasers
Next we consider established, likely-to-continue channels of trade, the third du
Pont factor. Applicant argues that goods offered and marketed under its mark reach
“the end consumer by and through consumers who are looking for the challenge of
climbing. In contrast, the registered mark appears to reach its end consumers by and
through consumers who are looking for apparel and those who want to ride snow
Serial No. 86943726
15
mobiles and motorcycles.”10 In view thereof, Applicant maintains that there is no
overlap between the respective trade channels or classes of purchasers.
We cannot look to extrinsic evidence or argument to restrict the channels of trade
or classes of purchasers. See In re Bercut Vandervoot & Co., supra. Rather, we must
deem the goods to travel in all channels of trade and offered to all classes of
purchasers appropriate for such goods. i.am.symbolic, 123 USPQ2d at 1750; Stone
Lion Capital, 110 USPQ2d at 1160-61. Applicant’s proposed distinctions between the
potential uses for the respective goods cannot overcome the actual evidence of record
which demonstrates that the relevant goods travel in the same channels of trade and
have the same general uses, namely, hiking and climbing, especially in extremely
cold conditions. The evidence of record also shows that the relevant goods are
manufactured by the same companies and commonly sold together in the same type
of marketplace, namely, online and brick and mortar stores that feature goods used
in connection with mountaineering and/or ice climbing or hiking. By featuring the
relevant goods within the same type of marketplace, providers of the goods further
promote to the consumer the complementary purpose of the goods. Thus, contrary to
Applicant’s claims regarding the distinctions between the trade channels and uses
for the goods, the trade channels of the goods and the classes of purchasers for the
goods are indeed the same or overlapping since consumers are accustomed to seeing
the goods as sharing a common purpose of use for hiking and climbing, particularly
in cold conditions.

10 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, pp. 15-16, 12 TTABVUE 16-17.
Serial No. 86943726
16
Therefore the third du Pont factor also weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of
confusion.
D. Sophistication of Consumers
We next consider Applicant’s arguments under the fourth du Pont factor: the
conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e., “impulse” vs. careful,
sophisticated purchasing. du Pont, 177 USPQ at 567. Applicant argues that
consumers of both Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods “are sophisticated insofar as
they know the differences between climbing gear and clothing and eye protection.
Consumers looking to buy fashion accessories would not confuse those goods with
mountain climbing equipment.”11
We find Applicant’s arguments unavailing. First, as discussed above, Applicant’s
arguments appear to be based in part upon distinctions between the goods that are
not reflected in their respective identifications. Moreover, our precedent requires that
we base our decision on the least sophisticated potential purchasers of the identified
goods. Primrose Ret. Cmtys., LLC v. Edward Rose Senior Living, LLC, 122 USPQ2d
1030, 1039 (TTAB 2016) (citing Stone Lion Capital, 110 USPQ2d 1157 at 1163).
Applicant provides no evidentiary support for its argument beyond merely stating
that purchasers of the relevant goods are sophisticated because they are aware of the
differences between the relevant goods and thus would not mistake Applicant’s goods
for any of Registrant’s goods. Applicant’s statement that purchasers of the relevant
goods can discern the differences between distinct items does not demonstrate that

11 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, pp. 16-17, 12 TTABVUE 17-18.
Serial No. 86943726
17
such purchasers have a heightened knowledge about the goods beyond other members
of the general public. In any event, even if the consumers of the respective goods are
sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field does not necessarily mean that
they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from
source confusion. See In re Cynosure, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1644 (TTAB 2009). With
substantially similar marks and related goods, even a careful, sophisticated
consumer of such goods is not likely to understand that the goods emanate from
different sources, particularly where, as here, there is evidence that the types of goods
offered by both Applicant and Registrant may emanate from a single source under a
single mark. Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842, 1846
(Fed. Cir. 2000).
This fourth du Pont factor is therefore neutral.
E. Nature and Extent of Any Actual Confusion
Applicant points to the absence of evidence of actual confusion, the seventh du
Pont factor, as weighing in its favor.12 A showing of actual confusion would of course
be highly probative of a likelihood of confusion. The opposite is not true, however. The
lack of evidence of actual confusion carries little weight. J.C. Hall Co. v. Hallmark
Cards, Inc., 340 F.2d 960, 144 USPQ 435, 438 (CCPA 1965). The issue before us is
the likelihood of confusion, not actual confusion. Herbko Int’l Inc. v. Kappa Books,
Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (actual confusion not
required). Further, any suggestion that there has been no actual confusion between

12 Id. at pp. 17-18, 12 TTABVUE 18-19.
Serial No. 86943726
18
the marks based on the coexistence of Applicant’s mark and the mark in the cited
registration is entitled to little probative value in the context of an ex parte appeal in
which the owner of the cited registration is not a party. In re Majestic Distilling Co.,
65 USPQ2d at 1205; see also In re Kangaroos U.S.A., 223 USPQ 1025, 1026-27 (TTAB
1984). Therefore, this du Pont factor is also neutral.
II. Conclusion
We have considered all of the arguments and evidence of record, including those
not specifically discussed herein, and all relevant du Pont factors. Because we have
found that the marks at issue are similar; that Applicant’s identified goods are related
to Registrant’s goods and move in similar or overlapping trade channels; and that
they would be offered to the same or similar classes of purchasers, we conclude that
Applicant’s mark, as used in connection with the goods identified in its
involved application, so resembles the cited mark ICEROCK as to be likely to cause
confusion or mistake, or to deceive under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
Decision: The refusal to register Applicant’s mark under Section 2(d)
of the Trademark Act is affirmed.