Sequoyah Mills, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 1, 1967

168 N.L.R.B. 32 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

32 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Sequoyah Mills, Inc. and Carl H . Pyle. Case
16-CA-2865
November 1, 1967
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
BROWN AND JENKINS
On August 28, 1967, Trial Examiner Morton D.
Friedman issued his Decision n the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged
in certain unfair labor practices and recommending
that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial
Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, Respondent filed
exceptions to the Decision and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, the
brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby
adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
complaint on February 27, 1967, on behalf of the
General Counsel of the Board, against Sequoyah Mills,
Inc., herein called the Respondent, alleging violations of
Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended (29 U.S.C. Sec. 151, et seq. ), herein called the
Act. In its duly filed answer to the aforesaid complaint,
the Respondent, while admitting certain allegations
thereof, denied the commission of any unfair labor prac-
tices.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before me in
Chickasha, Oklahoma, on April 26, 1967. All parties
were represented and afforded full opportunity to be
heard, to introduce relevant evidence, to present oral ar-
gument, and to file briefs. Briefs were filed by counsel for
the General Counsel and the Respondent.
Upon consideration of the entire record in this case, in-
cluding the briefs of the parties, and upon my observation
of the demeanor of each of the witnesses testifying before
me, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent, an Oklahoma corporation, has its
principal office and plant at Anadarko, Oklahoma, where
it is engaged in the manufacture and sale of carpets and
related products. During the year immediately preceding
the issuance of the complaint in this proceeding, a
representative period, the Respondent, in the course and
conduct of its business operations, purchased goods and
materials of a value in excess of $100,000, of which more
than $50,000 was shipped directly to Respondent's
warehouse from points outside the State of Oklahoma.
It is conceded, and I find, that the Respondent is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby
orders that Respondent, Sequoyah Mills, Inc., An-
darko, Oklahoma, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.
The Trial Examiner found that even if Respondent had no direct
knowledge of Walter Taylor's participation in the concerted activity, it,
nontheless, discharged Taylor because he was one of the senior drivers
and, thus, a possible leader of the dissident employees Since we find that
knowledge of Taylor's participation can be inferred under all the circum-
stances, we find it unnecessary to consider, and do not adopt, the Trial
Examiner's alternative finding that Taylor was discharged because he was
one of the senior drivers
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MORTON D. FRIEDMAN, Trial Examiner: Upon a
charge filed on December 15, 1966, and an amended
charge filed on February 17, 1967. by Carl H. Pyle, an in-
dividual, the Regional Director for Region 16 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, herein the Board, issued a
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background and Issues
As set forth above, the Respondent is engaged in the
manufacture, sale, and distribution of carpet and related
material. Approximately 65 to 70 percent of its products
are shipped to its distributors by trucks driven by driver
employees of the Respondent. These employees are un-
represented and, so far as the record shows, no attempt
has been made to organize them.
The events with which this proceeding is concerned
began when approximately 12 out of the Respondent's 19
truckdrivers met to discuss grievances. As a result of this
meeting, four of the most senior drivers were appointed
as a committee to approach the Respondent's officials
with regard to these matters. The following day, three out
of the four men so appointed met with Respondent's
director of personnel and traffic and discussed the mat-
ters previously reviewed by the drivers. Within a day or
so thereafter, all of the drivers who talked with the
Respondent's official and the fourth member who did not
go to the office of the Respondent's official were on over-
the-road trips. As each of these drivers returned he was
discharged. In addition to these four individuals, a fifth
driver was discharged who was not in any way connected
with the presentation of the drivers' grievances to the
Respondent.
The complaint alleges, in substance, that the four in-
168 NLRB No. 12
SEQUOYAH MILLS 33
dividuals who were appointed to discuss the grievances
with the Respondent were thereafter discharged for hav-
ing done so and , accordingly , were discharged for engag-
ing in protected concerted activity in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. The Respondent 's answer substantially
denies all of the material allegations of the complaint. At
the hearing the Respondent sought to establish through
its officials that the discharges were for cause and unre-
lated to the presentation of grievances.
Thus, the issues are:
1. Whether the dischargees were engaged in protected
concerted activity.
2. If so , whether they were discharged for engaging in
such activity.
B. The Facts
1. The events preceding the discharges
The Respondent's drivers do not drive the Respond-
ent's own trucks in making deliveries for the Respond-
ent but drive trucks leased to the Respondent by Public
Leasing Company which has a truck lot immediately ad-
jacent to the Respondent's property. The Respondent
pays a rental rate for the trucks which includes all ser-
vices and gasoline. The only contribution of the Respond-
ent to the trucking operation is the furnishing of the
drivers, all of whom are employed and paid by the
Respondent.
On Sunday, December 4, 1966,' approximately a
dozen of the Respondent's truckdrivers assembled at the
Public Leasing lot, above mentioned. The meeting was
held for the purpose of discussing matters which con-
cerned their employment and relationship with the
Respondent. Among the items discussed was the alleged
cutting of running time, that is, the hours allowed the
drivers on their trips. At the end of the meeting the four
oldest employees in point of service with the Respondent
were appointed as a committee to discuss the matters
with management. These employees are Carl H. Pyle, the
Charging Party herein, Raymond Steen, Hosey Kane,
and Walter Taylor.2
The following day, Monday, December 5, Pyle, Steen,
and Kane spoke to Respondent's assistant director of per-
sonnel, Tom Montgomery in the latter's office in Respond-
ent's plant. Taylor, who had also been selected as one of
the committee to speak to management, had left on the
previous evening on an over-the-road driving assignment
for the Respondent. The three drivers told Montgomery
that there had been a meeting of the drivers and that a
number of complaints had been aired. They asked for a
meeting with Montgomery, Louis Lemmons, traffic
manager, Leon Carver, Respondent's vice president in
charge of industrial relations, and Sanford D. Lee,
Respondent's executive vice president. Montgomery told
the employees that he was certain Lee would not meet
with them at that time. Nevertheless, the employees
discussed with Montgomery the situation which had
brought them to his office. With regard to the reduction in
time allowed for the drivers to reach their destination,
Montgomery displayed a schedule which he had used
when he was dispatcher. The men agreed that the driving
time permitted in that schedule was the time they desired
and not the time that had been put into effect by Mont-
gomery's successor. Montgomery promised them that the
time allowed would be restored to its original length and,
furthermore, that the shorter period of time which the
men found to be hazardous had only been in effect for a
few weeks.
The men also complained that they often had to report
to Respondent's plant to pick up a truck at a certain time
and when they arrived the truck was not loaded. This
meant that the men had to wait at the Respondent's plant
for the truck to be loaded without being paid for such
waiting time. Montgomery promised the men that he
would see to it that the shipping department did not keep
the men waiting in the future. Whether the men appeared
satisfied as testified by Montgomery or whether they
were still unhappy about developments when the meeting
broke up, nevertheless, all parties agree, including Mont-
gomery, that at the end of the meeting Montgomery
promised the men that he would see what he could do
about a meeting with Executive Vice President Lee.3
As related above, Taylor did not attend the meeting
because he left on a trip for the Respondent on the night
before. The three employees who met with Montgomery
within a day or so after the interview also left on trips for
the Respondent. As each returned to the Respondent's
plant he was discharged: Steen on December 9, Pyle on
December 12, Kane on December 16, and Taylor on
December 9. Also discharged during that period was
another driver, Charles Harrington, who had attended
neither the Sunday meeting of the drivers nor the Monday
meeting with Montgomery.
2. The discharges
On the afternoon of Tuesday, December 6, the day
after the meeting, Pyle, who had worked for the Respond-
ent for about 2 years, left on an over-the-road run for the
Respondent. He returned at II p.m. the following Sun-
day, December 11. At approximately 10 a.m. on Mon-
day, December 12, Pyle went to the Respondent's office
to turn in his trip papers. While there Montgomery called
him into his office and told Pyle that he, Montgomery,
hated to do it but he had been told to tell Pyle that the
latter either quit or resign or Respondent would lay him
off. When Pyle asked the reason, Montgomery. stated that
there had been a meeting at which it was decided that
Pyle was unhappy with his job and that they were going
to let him go. This was the only explanation which Pyle
received.4
According to both Montgomery and Sanford D. Lee,
executive vice president of Respondent who is responsi-
ble for all plant operations, Lee made the decision to fire
all of the dischargees including Pyle. Lee stated, on the
witness stand, that the reason he decided to discharge
Pyle was- because the latter was a chronic complainer
about his truck being loaded incorrectly; about getting out
late, that is leaving the Respondent's plant late after hav-
ing reported earlier to take out a truck; about men on runs
other than his own having a better deal than Pyle. Lee
testified that he said to himself that if this is the type of
employee Pyle is, the best thing to do would be to get rid
All dates, unless otherwise specified , are in 1966.
z All of the foregoing from the uncontroverted testimony of Carl Pyle.
J From credited portions of the testimony of Carl Pyle and Tom Mont-
gomery
a From the credited testimony of Pyle Montgomery, who also testified
as to this exit meeting, did not seriously controvert any of Pyle's
testimony.
34 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of him. Lee further testified that at the time he made this
decision he had no knowledge whatsoever of the con-
certed complaint to Montgomery by Pyle and the other
two drivers. Lee further stated that Pyle's discharge and
the discharge of the other employees came about after
Lee had reviewed the files of all of the Respondent's
over-the-road truckdrivers. The reasons Lee claimed the
review was made at this time are set forth later herein.
a. Hosey Kane
Within a day or so after the meeting between Mont-
gomery and the three drivers, Kane left on an over-the-
road trip for the Respondent. During this trip he called his
wife on the telephone from Indianapolis. His wife told
him at that time that he was going to be discharged. Then,
when he arrived home, Kane was told by Taylor that he
would probably be discharged. On Monday night,
December 12, Pyle called Mr. Leon Carver, Respond-
ent's vice president of industrial relations, on the
telephone at Carver's home. Kane listened in on the con-
versation and at one time during that conversation Carver
actually stated that Kane , among others , was going to be
discharged. The next day, December 13, Kane visited the
office of the Respondent and spoke to Montgomery who
confirmed that Kane was discharged.5
Montgomery, who discharged Kane, testified that he
could not give Kane a reason for his discharge inasmuch
as Kane told him that he did not want a story that if Kane
was going to be discharged just to discharge him. This
Montgomery did and there was no exit interview in a for-
mal sense.
Lee, in testifying, sought to explain why Kane was
discharged. According to Lee, when he was reviewing the
files of the truckdrivers, Lee found a note in Kane's file
from the chairman of the board, Don Greve, about some
talking that Kane had done in Chicago. Also, a Mr. Race,
of Malcolm Spinning Mills, a supplier of wool to the
Respondent, had been a guest at Lee's home on Wed-
nesday evening before the discharges. Race told Lee,
when the latter said that they were having trouble with
some of their truckmen, that a couple of the drivers had
made a secret agreement with Race 's shipping foreman at
the latter's plant in Pennsylvania, that if they arrived in
the afternoon to pick up material, they would leave their
trailers at the Spinning Mill plant and then go down to
spend some time in Baltimore . The only name which
Race could remember was Hosey Kane's. Leaving the
trailer behind was a violation of company rules, according
to Lee.
According to Kane, the only time he had left the trailer
behind and had taken the truck from the Spinning Mill
dock was when he had to stay overnight and had to use
the truck to drive to a motel. The motel did not have ac-
comodations for both the truck and the trailer. Kane de-
nied he ever went to Baltimore on such an occasion.
b. Raymond Steen
On Wednesday, December 7, Steen an employee for
over 2 years, made his last run for the Respondent. On his
return on December 9, Steen was discharged by Mont-
gomery and Carver.
Either Carver or Montgomery told Steen that the latter
was dissatisfied on the job and had expressed this to peo-
ple outside the Respondent's mill and also, in doing so,
had been running down the Respondent's name. Neither
Montgomery nor Carver showed Steen any of the alleged
reports that had been received from outsiders to this ef-
fect. Steen, on the other hand, denied that he had ever
talked to any customers about the Respondent or had run
down the Respondent's name. Nor was he dissatisfied
with his job.6
In testifying as to the reasons he ordered Steen's
discharge, Lee testified that he decided to discharge
Steen because Lee had heard that Steen had made
derogatory statements about the Respondent. Also,
athough admittedly uncommunicated to Steen at his final
interview, Lee had found a letter in Steen's file from
Public Leasing Corporation, the owners of the trucks
which Respondent's drivers used, to the effect that Steen
had demanded cash refunds on his credit cards. Lee ad-
mitted, on cross-examination, that the letter from Public
Leasing had been in the file for about 3 months but that
Lee did not know of its existence.7 Lee admitted that no
instruction had ever been given to any employee about
not taking a cash discount.
According to Steen, however, when he had first started
to drive Public Leasing's trucks, he was given a Texaco
gasoline credit card by Public Leasing. During that time
he received but did not ask for cash discounts. Then,
Public Leasing collected the Texaco credit card and is-
sued instead, a National Trucking Association charge
card on which it was specifically forbidden to accept cash
discounts or for the oil companies to give such discounts.
Thereafter, on one occasion, according to Steen, about
a year before the discharges, Steen used the Trucking As-
sociation credit card at a gasoline station and was handed
a cash refund by the man who attended the pump How-
ever, the manager of the station saw this, and realizing
that Steen was using an Association credit card, asked for
the return of the money, which Steen immediately
returned. Steen did not ask for the discount. It was given
voluntarily by the pumpman. Steen stated, without hesita-
tion, that this was the only time that he had ever been in-
volved in a cash discount incident after the Association
credit cards were issued.
c. Walter Taylor
Taylor had been employed by the Respondent for 2
years at the time of his discharge. As noted above, Taylor
was one of the four men selected by the drivers to
represent them in their grievances with management.
However, Taylor did not attend the Monday, December
5, meeting with Montgomery because on the evening be-
fore that, Sunday, December 4, about 6 p.m., Taylor left
on an over-the-road trip to various points in Texas and
Louisiana. According to Taylor, he was given, at the time
of his departure, oral instructions by Carrol DeLong, the
dispatcher, which provided that Taylor had to be in Fort
Worth, Texas, on Monday morning, in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, on Tuesday morning, and in Houston, Texas,
on Wednesday morning. Taylor reached these destina-
tions within the times given to him by DeLong.
When Taylor returned to Anadarko on Thursday,
December 8, Montgomery asked him why he had not
been at Ross Carpets, a Houston distributor, on Tuesday
5 From the credited testimony of Kane which was not controverted by
Montgomery
s From the credited , uncontroverted testimony of Raymond Steen.
The letter was not produced at the hearing
SEQUOYAH MILLS
evening. Taylor explained that DeLong had instructed
him to be there on Wednesday morning. Montgomery
took Taylor's logbook from him. Montgomery told
Taylor that he would have to decide what should be done
with Taylor. On Friday, the following day, when Taylor
went to the Respondent's plant to pick up his check,
Montgomery discharged him, telling Taylor that the latter
had not delivered his merchandise to Ross Carpets on
schedule and also that Taylor had been talking about the
Respondent at various customers and stops over the
country. Montgomery said that he had written proof but
did not offer to show such proof to Taylor. Nor did Mont-
gomery mention any specific names of individuals who
had related these alleged complaints concerning Taylor
to the Respondent. Taylor denied that he had ever done
any talking Taylor admitted however that under normal
driving time the distance between Baton Rouge, Loui-
siana, which he left on Tuesday afternoon, and Houston
was about 300 miles and could be driven in about 6 hours
He further admitted that he had falsified his log relative
to his arrival time in Houston. The falsification added two
extra hours to the trip from Baton Rouge to Houston.
Montgomery explained, in testifying, that he
discharged Taylor because the latter was late at the dis-
tributor, Ross Carpets in Houston. He claimed that
Taylor did not make his schedule and it took him approxi-
mately 24 hours to make a 6- or 7-hour run. He insisted
that Taylor was discharged for being late to Ross Car-
pets.
According to Lee, on Tuesday, December 6, about
10:30 or 11 p.m., he received a call from Ross Carpets in
Houston at his home. Ross informed Lee that he had men
waiting from 3 p.m. of that day to unload the truck which
had not arrived. The next morning, Lee spoke to Mont-
gomery and asked the latter what had happened with re-
gard to Taylor and the delivery in Houston. Montgomery
told Lee that Taylor's truck was due in Houston at 4 p.m.
on Tuesday. Montgomery came to Lee on Wednesday af-
ternoon and told Lee that Taylor had not called in, as
required, when he had finished at Baton Rouge. Lee then
told Montgomery that unless Taylor had a good excuse,
Lee wanted him discharged.
In connection with these discharges, it should be noted
that on November 1, 1966, the local newspaper carried
a story and a picture of six drivers, including Taylor and
Pyle, who received watches from the Respondent for
having driven over 100,000 safe miles without a traffic
accident. Also honored, was Charlie Harrington, one of
the drivers who was discharged at the same time as the
four alleged discriminatees herein, but whose discharge
is not a subject of this proceeding.
3. The Respondent's explanation of the timing of the
discharges
According to the Respondent, the timing of the
discharges was coincidental and the discharges them-
selves were brought about by a review made by Lee of
the files of the Respondent's over-the-road truckdrivers
brought on, in turn, by a series of events which began ap-
proximately a month or so before the discharges.
According to Don Greve, the chairman of the board of
the Respondent, one of his duties is to call on customers
or to call on the telephone to customers every 60 days to
ask, primarily, whether the customer is being treated
properly by the Respondent. During his last round of
35
telephone calls prior to the events herein, Greve received
a complaint from his Los Angeles distributor that some of
the drivers had a bad attitude and were not cooperating.
He also received complaints to the same effect from the
San Francisco and New York distributors of the Respond-
ent's products. Greve also received complaints from
others that deliveries were being made late. The Los An-
geles complaint was made on November 14 and 15. He
received complaints from Phoenix on November 15 and
New York and San Francisco on the 18th and 22d.
Greve further testified that a result of these complaints,
at a corporation executive committee meeting held on
November 28, Greve told the staff of these problems.
Vice President Lee was instructed to look into the
problem, to ferret out information and obtain a true pic-
ture of each driver. The reason that the driver is so impor-
tant, according to Greve, is that often times he is the good
will ambassador of the Respondent inasmuch as 65 to 70
percent of the Respondent's product is delivered by truck
and often the driver is the main contact between the
Respondent and the customer. In his testimony, Greve
admitted that although he made general complaints to Lee
at the executive committee meeting on November 28, he
did not mention to Lee any specific driver or any specific
customer who had complained.
According to Lee, following by but a short time the in-
struction from Greve at the executive committee meet-
ing, the incident occurred involving the complaint from
the Houston distributor regarding Taylor's alleged late ar-
rival. Also, according to Lee, although he had made stu-
dies of all of the hourly employees frequently from time
to time, he had neglected to do so with regard to
truckdrivers who are salaried. Therefore, the occurrence
of Greve's instructions and the matter of Taylor's alleged
late delivery brought the entire matter to a head and Lee
decided at that time to make a thorough study of the files
of all the drivers. He therefore went over the files with
Montgomery and with Carver, the vice president in
charge of industrial relations. It was only after a thorough
review of these files that the employees were discharged
as noted above.
The foregoing, according to the Respondent, explains
the coincidence of the timing of the discharges with re-
gard to the date of the grievance meeting between the
drivers and Montgomery on December 5. It should be
noted in connection therewith that all of the Respondent's
officials who testified including Greve and Lee specifi-
cally stated that they were unaware of the grievance
meeting between Montgomery and the three employees
until after the discharges had been completed. Mont-
gomery, in turn, testified that he had thought that he had
satisfied the employees at that grievance meeting and had
therefore not passed the matter on to Vice President Lee.
Contrasting sharply with the Respondent's explana-
tion, is testimony of Pyle and Kane who stated on the wit-
ness stand that on Monday evening, December 12, after
the discharges of all but Kane, Pyle called Vice President
Carver at the latter's home. The call was made about mid-
night according to both Pyle and Kane. Pyle held the
earphone in such a way that both Kane and Pyle could
hear Carver's end of the conversation. Pyle asked Carver
if there was any truth to the rumor that if the drivers
would not "group up" anymore the Respondent would
rescind the layoffs. Carver answered in the negative and
said that the decision was final. Carver admitted that
Kane and the others were also getting fired and then
336-845 0 - 70 - 4
36 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Carver said, "there is a company policy that there will be
no grouping of the employees."8
C. Analysis and Concluding Findings
The basic contentions of the General Counsel are that
the four dischargees engaged in protected concerted ac-
tivities and that the Respondent discharged them for en-
gaging in these activities as evidenced by (1) the timing of
the discharges within a week after the four engaged in
these activities, (2) company knowledge of the activities
by reason of the grievance meeting with Personnel
Director Montgomery, and (3) the fact that no prior
warnings were given to any of the dischargees of any
behavior which the Respondent might have concluded
was inimical to the Respondent's interest.
The Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the
concerted activity was unknown to Vice President Lee
and Board Chairman Greve, who were responsible for
the discharges, and that the discharges were for cause.
With regard to the question of whether the dischargees
had engaged in protected concerted activity, the Respond-
ent makes no serious contention. It is well settled that
where, as here, employees get together to mutually
protest working conditions and speak for themselves,
they engage in protected concerted activity. When the
drivers held a meeting to protest the driving time allowed
between stops and chose Pyle, Steen, Kane, and Taylor
as spokesmen, and when Pyle, Steen, and Kane, acting in
that capacity, spoke to Montgomery regarding the
grievances, they clearly engaged in protected concerted
activity. They had a protected right to speak for them-
selves as best they could.9
Even accepting Montgomery's explanation that he felt
that the employees were satisifed with his handling of the
grievance and that the matter was settled, nevertheless,
this did not change the nature of the activity engaged in
by the employees. Moreover, Montgomery did tell the
employees at the conclusion of the meeting that he would
see what he could do about arranging a meeting with Vice
President Lee, which was the original purpose of their
meeting with Montgomery. This would indicate that in
Montgomery's mind the activity was still going on.
Insofar as company knowledge is concerned, it cannot
be controverted that Montgomery, an official of the
Respondent, knew of the concerted activity inasmuch as
he was interviewed by Pyle, Steen, and Kane. Moreover,
although Lee denied knowledge of this activity he did tes-
tify that he reviewed the files of these employees with
Montgomery within 3 days of the date of the employee
meeting. 1, therefore, cannot accept Lee's testimony to
the effect that he did not have knowledge of this activity
especially in view of the fact that not only did he review
the files with Montgomery but Montgomery himself
testified that he had promised the employees to inform
Lee of their request. 1, therefore, reject Lee's testimony
that he did not have knowledge of the concerted activity
of the employees and find that as of the date he made his
decision to discharge them he, as well as Montgomery,
was aware of what had taken place in the preceding days.
As noted above, the timing of the discharges is the main
element of the General Counsel's case. As heretofore
discussed, the three employees presented their group
grievances on December 5 and each of the dischargees
went upon an over-the-road trip for the Respondent that
same week and were each discharged as each returned.
Except for this last trip, the employees never worked
again after concertedly presenting their grievances to
management.
The Board has often and consistently held that
discharges, which occur soon after the discovery by an
employer of his employees, union or concerted protected
activity, constitute very strong evidence of discrimina-
tion.10
I do not find merit in the Respondent's contention that
the timing of the discharges is unimportant because it was
only coincidental with the Respondent's determination to
survey its employees and ferret out those who were un-
satisfactory. Indeed, there is too much coicidence in-
volved. Thus, it might well be asked if it was mere for-
tuitous circumstance that the discharges followed the air-
ing of the grievances within a few days and that the per-
sons who were discharged, with but one exception, were
the individuals who were in some way involved in the air-
ing of the grievances. Moreover, as the General Counsel
points out, if Board Chairman Greve speaks to customers
every 60 days, is it not rather strange that he never
received serious complaints about the drivers from
widespread sources except during the crucial period
herein. It seems most peculiar to me that suddenly so
many of the drivers should have become unsatisfactory
to so many widespread customers in so short a period of
time whereas for several years prior to that time no com-
plaints were registered.
As noted above, in addition to all of the foregoing, none
of Respondent's officials or supervisors ever spoke to any
of the four dischargees regarding their alleged faults. No
prior warnings whatsoever were given to any of them.
Perhaps this would not seem strange if only one employee
had been involved. However, two of the employees in-
volved, Pyle and Steen, within a month before their
discharges were given gold watches for their unusual
safety records as drivers. These two individuals must, in-
deed, have been most satisfactory employees with regard
to the purpose for which they were hired Moreover, the
four employees discharged were the most senior of all the
employees in the driver complement. Certainly, under
these circumstances, it would seem that some warning
would have been given by a reasonable employer. Indeed,
it is reasonable to consider that the failure to give warning
under such circumstances is most suspicious in view of
the timing and the lodging of the grievances.
I come now to the Respondent's claim with regard to
the individual drivers. Thus, Respondent claims that Pyle
was discharged because he was a "chronic complainer."
Respondent, neither at the hearing, nor at any other time
offered proof that Pyle had run the Company down other
than the Respondent's officials' testimony. I was much
impressed, on the other hand, with Pyle's denial that he
had talked adversely about the Company to any customer
8 From the credited testimony of Pyle and Kane I do not credit
Carver's denial of this testimony. Nor do I credit Carver's testimony to
the effect that all he told the employees on the telephone was that they
should speak to Montgomery His denial that he had no conversation with
regard to the discharges and the reasons therefor , together with his
demeanor on the witness stand, convince me that Kane and Pyle were the
more reliable witnesses
0 Washington Aluminum Company, 370 U S 9, Morrison-Knudsen
Company v N L R B, 358 F 2d 411 (C A 9), enfg 149 NLRB 1577,
Salt River Valley Water Users' Association, 206 F 2d 325 (C A 9), enfg
as modified 99 N LRB 849
10 The Borden Company, 161 NLRB 1271, Pottsville Community
Hotel Co., Inc, 140 NLRB 556, 558, Byrds Manufacturing Corp, 140
NLRB 147, 161, Camco, Incorporated, 140 N LR B 361,365-366
SEQUOYAH MILLS 37
or anyone else. The same can be said in the case of Hosey
Kane. Moreover, with regard to Steen's discharge, the
note in the file with regard to his taking a cash discount
was included in the said file for at least 3 months before
the discharge. It would seem that if Lee had not seen it
someone else, especially the personnel director, would
have seen this note. Additionally, I was impressed with
Steen's denial. Further, Steen was not given this alleged
acceptance of a cash discount as a reason for his
discharge. Thus I find in the case of Steen that the
Respondent's alleged reasons were afterthoughts used to
bolster the explanation for his discharge. Thus with re-
gard to Pyle, Kane, and Steen, I find that the reasons
given for the discharges were mere pretext. The timing of
the discharges, the company knowledge, and the failure
to give prior warnings to otherwise satisfactory em-
ployees lead me to conclude and find that these em-
ployees were discharged in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act for engaging in concerted activity for their mutual
aid and protection.
The case of Walter Taylor presents a more difficult
problem. In the first place, Taylor, although chosen by his
fellow employees as one of the four individuals to
represent them in presenting grievances to the Respond-
ent, did not attend the grievance meeting which I have
found led to the discharges of the other three drivers.
There is nothing in the record from which it can be
directly determined that any supervisor or official of the
Respondent knew of Taylor's participation. There is no
testimony by which it is demonstrated that the committee
informed Montgomery that Taylor was to have been one
of the spokesmen. Nor is there any other testimony that
any one else imparted this knowledge to any of the other
Respondent officials. Therefore, if knowledge of Taylor's
participation is to be imputed to the Respondent, such
knowledge must be implied from all of the circumstances.
In addition to the question of knowledge is the admitted
fact, by Taylor himself, that he falsified his log to his
benefit on the morning on which he made his delivery to
Houston. This would give credence to the Respondent's
claim that it discharged Taylor because of his failure to
make timely delivery to Ross Carpets, the Houston dis-
tributor.
However, Taylor testified, without contradiction, that
he had falsified his log any number of times prior to the in-
cident in question for the benefit of the Company because
of Interstate Commerce Commission rules that a driver
could not drive more than a certain number of hours in
any 24-hour period. In his uncontroverted testimony,
Taylor explained that Vice President Carver was well
aware of this practice and had never expressed his disap-
proval.
Additionally, Taylor maintained throughout the hear-
ing, in all of his testimony, that he arrived at the facility of
the Houston distributor at the time assigned to him by
DeLong, Respondent's dispatcher. Although the Re-
spondent maintained, through Montgomery and Lee, that
Taylor had not made timely delivery and had not main-
tained his required schedule, Respondent failed to
produce, as a witness, dispatcher DeLong, who, as far as
the record shows, was still employed by the Respondent
and under its control at the time of the hearing. I can only
infer from this that had DeLong testified his testimony
would have supported Taylor's version of the incident
and not the Respondent's.
I therefore conclude that under all of the circumstances
the Respondent's alleged reasons for discharging Taylor
were mere pretext. This conclusion is supported by the
fact that the falsifying of the log was not given as a reason
to Taylor at the time of his discharge. Moreover, I find
that under these circumstances the Respondent included
Taylor in the discharge, even if it had no direct knowledge
of his participation in the concerted activity, by reason of
the fact that Taylor was one of the senior drivers, and
thus, a possible leader of the dissident employees. Ac-
cordingly, I find and conclude that Taylor was
discharged, as were the other employees here, in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
III. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section II,
above, occurring in connection with the operations.
described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States and tend to lead to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the
free flow of commerce.
IV. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that the
Respondent be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and
to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act.
Having found that the Respondent discharged
Raymond Steen, Carl Pyle, Hosey Kane, and Walter
Taylor because they engaged in concerted activity for the
employees' mutual aid and protection I shall recommend
that the usual remedy of reinstatement and backpay be
imposed upon Respondent in the same manner as if their
discharges constituted unlawful discrimination in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(3).11 Backpay shall be computed in
accordance with Board policy as set forth in F.W. Wool-
worth Co., 90 NLRB 289, with interest computed in the
manner set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138
NLRB 716.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of
Section 2(2) of the Act and is engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. By discharging Raymond Steen, Carl Pyle, Hosey
Kane, and Walter Taylor because they engaged in con-
certed protected activity for the mutual aid and protection
of Respondent 's employees , Respondent interfered with,
restrained , and coerced its employees in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the
Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law and the entire record in the case it is
recommended that the Respondent, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall:
11 Salt River Valley Water Users' Association , 99 NLRB 849, 853,
857, enfd . 206 F 2d 325 (C.A. 9)
38 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging its employees for engaging in con-
certed activities for the purpose of their mutual aid or pro-
tection.
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to
self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or
assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to en-
gage in other concerted activities for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection and
refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of em-
ployment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as
modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959.
2. Take the following affirmative action:
(a) Offer to Raymond Steen, Carl Pyle, Hosey Kane,
and Walter Taylor immediate and full reinstatement to
their former positions, or to substantially equivalent posi-
tions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights
and privileges, and make each whole for any loss of pay
he may have suffered as a result of his discharge, in the
manner set forth above in the section entitled "The
Remedy."
[Notify the above-named employees if presently serv-
ing in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right
to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with
the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge
from the Armed Forces.]
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.
(c) Post at its plant in Anadarko, Oklahoma, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix." 12 Copies of said
notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 16, after being duly signed by Respondent's
representative, shall be posted by Respondent im-
mediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it
for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 16, in
writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision,
what steps have been taken to comply herewith.13
this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify the Regional Director for
Region 16, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Ex-
aminer of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our em-
ployees that:
After a trial in which both sides had the opportunity to
present their evidence, the National Labor Relations
Board has found that we violated the law and has ordered
us to post this notice and to keep our word about what we
say in this notice.
WE WILL NOT discourage concerted activity for
the mutual aid and the protection of our employees
by discharging any of them for engaging in such ac-
tivity.
Since the Board found that we did so when we fired
Raymond Steen, Carl Pyle, Hosey Kane, and Walter
Taylor we will offer to them full reinstatement to their old
jobs and we will pay each of them for any loss he may
have suffered because we fired him.
WE WILL respect the rights of our employees to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor or-
ganization, or to bargain collectively in respect to
terms or conditions of employment through said
labor organization, or any representative of their own
choosing, and we will not interfere with, restrain, or
coerce our employees in the exercise of these rights.
WE WILL notify the employees to be reinstated, if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United
States of their right to full reinstatement upon appli-
cation in accordance with the Selective Service Act
and the Universal Military Training and Service Act,
as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces.
You and all our employees are free to become mem-
bers, or to refrain from becoming members; of any labor
organization and are free to engage in any concerted ac-
tivity for our employees' mutual aid and protection.
SEQUOYAH MILLS, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
12 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further
event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap-
peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order."
11 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, 8A24 Federal
Office Building, 819 Taylor Street, Fort Worth, Texas
76102, Telephone 334-2921.