Sensors Unlimited, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 29, 2021

2020001141 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 29, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/954,272 11/30/2015 Thuc-Uyen Nguyen 1510801.107US1 3983
61654 7590 04/29/2021
Locke Lord LLP
P.O. BOX 55874
BOSTON, MA 02205
EXAMINER
WERNER, DAVID N
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2487
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/29/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patent@lockelord.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte THUC-UYEN NGUYEN

Appeal 2020-001141
Application 14/954,272
Technology Center 2400

Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, JEAN R. HOMERE,
and JEREMY J. CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judges.

HOMERE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant appeals from the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–10, and 12–15, all of the claims
pending.2 Appeal Br. 5. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We refer to the Specification filed Nov. 30, 2015 (“Spec.”); the Final
Office Action, mailed Dec. 14, 2018 (“Final Act.”); the Appeal Brief, filed
Sept. 9, 2019 (“Appeal Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer, mailed Oct. 3, 2019
(“Ans.”), and the Reply Brief, filed Nov. 27, 2019 (“Reply Br.”).
2 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a).
Appellant identifies Sensors Unlimited, Inc. as the real party in interest.
Appeal Br. 3.
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Application 14/954,272
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II. CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claimed subject matter relates to multi-sensor imaging system
(100) wherein each sensor accepts a same field of view from the front beam
of polarized beam splitter (111). Spec. 6: 21–23. Figure 1, reproduced and
discussed below, is useful for understanding the claimed subject matter:

Figure 1 above illustrates imaging system (100) including housing (102)
having enclosed therein lens (104) aligned with first sensor (106) along
optical axis-A from which are offset second sensor (108) including lens
(116) and third sensor (110) including lens (FPA-118) along optical axis-B.
Id. at 5:8–14. Angled at the intersection of optical axes A and B, polarized
beam splitter (111) redirects portions of incoming photons travelling on one
lens to another while bandpass filter (112) filters the photons and quarter-
wave plate (119) alters the polarity thereof. Id. at 5:20–6:23.
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Claims 1 and 9 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below with
disputed limitations emphasized, is illustrative:
1. An imaging system comprising:
a housing having a lens defining a first optical axis;
a first sensor within the housing aligned with the first
optical axis;
a second sensor within the housing offset from the first
optical axis;
a third sensor within the housing offset from the first
optical axis opposite from the second sensor across the first
optical axis, wherein a second optical axis is defined between
the second and third sensors;
a polarized beam splitter within the housing at an
intersection of the first and second optical axes to redirect a
portion of incoming photons traveling from the lens along the
first optical axis to the second sensor along the second optical
axis; and
a bandpass filter between the polarized beam splitter and
the second sensor along the second optical axis to pass a portion
of photons traveling from the polarized beam splitter to the
second sensor along the second optical axis and to reflect a
remaining portion of the photons back to the polarized beam
splitter toward the third sensor, wherein the polarized beam
splitter includes a polarized surface oriented to face the second
sensor in order to pass photons reflected back from the second
sensor to the third sensor along the second optical axis.
Appeal Br. 14 (Claims App.) (emphasis added).
III. REFERENCES
The Examiner relies upon the following references.3
Name Reference Date
Travis US 3,527,523 Sept. 8, 1970
Roth US 2009/0290149 A1 Nov. 26, 2009
Webster US 2013/0063629 A1 Mar 14, 2013

3 All reference citations are to the first named inventor only.
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IV. REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 2, 4–10, and 12–15 as follows:
Claims 1, 2, 5–9, and 12–15 stand rejected as obvious under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 over the combination of Webster and Travis. Final Act. 3–5.
Claims 4 and 10 stand rejected as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over
the combination of Webster, Travis, and Roth. Id. at 5–6.
V. ANALYSIS
We consider Appellant’s arguments seriatim, as they are presented in the
Appeal Brief, pages 10–13 and the Reply Brief, pages 10–11.4 We are
unpersuaded by Appellant’s contentions. Except as otherwise indicated
herein below, we adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth in the
Final Action, and the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s Appeal
Brief. Final Act. 3–8; Ans. 3–8. However, we highlight and address specific
arguments and findings for emphasis as follows.
Appellant argues that the Examiner errs in finding that the combination
of Travis and Webster teaches or suggests the following limitations:
[T]he polarized beam splitter includes a polarized surface
oriented to face the second sensor in order to pass photons
reflected back from the second sensor to the third sensor along
the second optical axis;
as recited in independent claim 1. Appeal Br. 10. In particular,
Appellant argues that Webster’s disclosure of using a beam splitter in the
application of polarized imaging does not necessarily mean that the beam
splitter is a polarizing beam. Id. at 10 (citing Webster ¶ 7), Reply Br. 10.

4 We have considered in this Decision only those arguments Appellant
actually raised in the Briefs. Arguments not made are forfeited. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2017).
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Further, Appellant argues that Travis’s disclosure of a beam splitter does not
cure the noted deficiencies of Webster. Appeal Br. 11 (citing Webster 9:14–
19).
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive of reversible Examiner
error. As a preliminary matter, we note that Appellant’s Specification states
the following:
Polarized beam splitter 111 includes a polarized surface
114 oriented to face second sensor 108 in order to pass the
remaining photons (e.g. the photons represented schematically
by C2') reflected back from bandpass filter 112 along second
optical axis B, to third sensor 110. This results in a
multisensory imaging system where each sensor accepts the
same field of view from the front of beam splitter.
Spec. 6:18–23.
Webster discloses a light splitter (made of four identically-sized
polyhedrons) that acts to split an incident light into a first, second and third
color components emerging from a cube through respective exit faces.
Webster ¶¶ 20, 21. According to Webster, the mixture of light wavelengths
arriving at a given sensor can be controlled by appropriately designing the
filtering function of the various dichroic interfaces of the light splitter. Id. ¶
22. Further according to Webster, the color splitting cube architecture may
be used in polarization imaging to improve contrast and enhance visibility of
targets in scattering media. Id. ¶ 7.
We agree with the Examiner that Webster’s indication of using the
beam splitter in the application of polarized imaging encompasses the
polarized splitting architecture, and thereby teaches a polarized beam
splitter. Ans. 7. As noted in the cited portions of Webster above, the
ordinarily-skilled artisan would readily appreciate that, Webster’s color
splitting cube, when used in polarization imaging, would result in a beam
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splitter including a surface oriented to face a sensor passing photons along
an associated optical axis to another sensor thereby improving visibility and
enhance targets in scattering media.
Moreover, Appellant has not provided a meaningful analysis to rebut
the specific findings made by the Examiner. Instead, Appellant’s arguments
merely repeat the claim language, and the cited portions of Webster and
Travis without comparing and contrasting the two. We remind Appellant
that merely repeating the claim language, and the teachings relied upon by
the Examiner in the rejection are not tantamount to a responsive argument.
Such a response to the Examiner’s findings is insufficient to persuade us of
Examiner error, as mere attorney arguments and conclusory statements that
are unsupported by factual evidence are entitled to little probative value. In
re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re De Blauwe,
736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Ex parte Belinne, No. 2009-004693, slip
op. at 7–8 (BPAI Aug. 10, 2009) (informative); see also In re Lovin, 652
F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e hold that the Board reasonably
interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive arguments in an appeal
brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that
the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.”); cf. In re
Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“It is not the
function of this court to examine the claims in greater detail than argued by
an appellant, looking for [patentable] distinctions over the prior art.”). Our
rules require that an Appeal Brief include “arguments” that “shall explain
why the examiner erred.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). “[M]ere statements of
disagreement . . . do not amount to a developed argument.” SmithKline
Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s obviousness
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rejection of claim 1. For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection of claim 1.
Regarding the rejection of claims 2, 4–10, and 12–15, Appellant does not
present separate patentability arguments or reiterates substantially the same
arguments as those previously discussed for the patentability of claim 1
above. Appeal Br. 11–12. As such, claims 2, 4–10, and 12–15 fall therewith.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
VI. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims
1, 2, 4–10, and 12–15.
VII. DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35
U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 5–9,
12–15 103 Webster, Travis
1, 2, 5–9,
12–15
4, 10 103 Webster, Travis, Roth 4, 10
Overall
Outcome
1, 2, 4–10,
12–15

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED