Seminole Asphault Refining, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 8, 1976

225 N.L.R.B. 1202 (N.L.R.B. 1976)

1202 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Seminole Asphalt Refining , Inc. and United Steel-
workers of America , AFL-CIO. Case 12-CA-5550
September 8, 1976
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND WALTHER
On May 18, 1976, Administrative Law Judge Paul
L. Harper issued the attached Supplemental Decision
in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed ex-
ceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that the Respondent, Seminole Asphalt Refin-
ing, Inc., St. Marks, Florida, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in
the said recommended Order.
1 The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge It is the Board's established policy not to over-
rule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility
unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us
that the resolutions are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91
NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A 3, 1951) We have carefully
examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PAUL L. HARPER, Administrative Law Judge' On Novem-
ber 9, 1973, the National Labor Relations Board issued its
Decision and Order (207 NLRB 167 (1973)) directing Re-
spondent to take certain affirmative action to remedy the
unfair labor practices found, including reinstatement and
backpay to certain individuals, and reinstatement, upon
application, to certain other individuals. On July 18, 1974,
the Board's Decision and Order was enforced, in pertinent
part, by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit (497 F.2d 247 (1974) ). At the time of the subject
hearing all compliance matters had apparently been re-
solved with the exception of the amounts of backpay due
John Heard, Percy Stewart, and R.W. Dunn.
A hearing was held before me at Tallahassee, Florida, on
February 19 and 20, 1976. Briefs, which have been careful-
ly considered, have been received from the General Coun-
sel and Respondent.
Upon the entire record in the case and upon my observa-
tions of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE ISSUES
The primary issue herein centers on the backpay period
for John Heard and Percy Stewart, and in a somewhat
different manner to R. W. Dunn. The first question to be
resolved is whether or not Respondent's offer of reinstate-
ment to Heard and Stewart, by letter dated June 28, 1973,
was a timely and unconditional offer. Both letters were
forwarded by Respondent by certified mail postmarked
Saint Marks, Florida, on June 28, 1973. Heard's letter was
postmarked by the delivering post office at Woodville,
Florida, on July 2, 1973; Stewart's at Tallahassee, Florida,
on June 30, 1973. The letters were received by Heard and
Stewart on July 2, 1973. June 28 fell on Thursday, June 30
on Saturday, and July 2 on Monday. Thus, a weekend in-
tervened between the mailing and receiving dates. July 2
was the deadline for acceptance of the offer, the same date
of their receipt by Heard and Stewart
The next question to be resolved concerns the response
of Heard and Stewart upon their receipt of the June 28
letter, and the reaction of Respondent's personnel manag-
er, Jimmie Dale Lee, to their response. General Counsel
contends that Heard and Stewart responded timely and,
but for the conditions attached to such offer by Respon-
dent, would have accepted reinstatement Respondent con-
tends that Heard and Stewart were either too late in re-
sponding to its offer of June 28 or indicated lack of interest
in reinstatement.
The backpay specification alleges that the backpay peri-
od for unfair labor practice strikers Heard and Stewart be-
gan March 29, 1972, when Respondent rejected their re-
quest for reinstatement; that said initial backpay period
ended April 27, 1972, for Heard and on May 8, 1972, for
Stewart, when both refused individual offers of reinstate-
ment in order to continue their unfair labor practice strike.
Respondent admits such allegations. Therefore I find the
initial backpay period for Heard runs from March 29 to
April 27, 1972, and for Stewart from March 29 to May 8,
1972.
The specification further alleges that a second backpay
period for Heard began on March 27, 1973, and for Stew-
art on April 19, 1973, when each of them abandoned the
strike and made unconditional individual applications for
reinstatement on the dates indicated. Respondent so stipu-
lated but reserved the right to challenge their specified in-
terim earnings which could possibly reduce their respective
net backpay.
General Counsel further alleges and contends that, since
Respondent's purported reinstatement offer on June 28
225 NLRB No. 171
SEMINOLE ASPHALT REFINING, INC 1203
was not unconditional, the second backpay period of
Heard and Stewart has not tolled and continues to run
until an unconditional reinstatement offer is made.
A. The Issue of Whether or Not the June 28 Letter Was a
Valid Offer of Reinstatement
The pertinent language contained on both letters is iden-
tical and is quoted as follows:
June 28, 1973
You are hereby offered an opportunity to return to
Seminole Asphalt Refining, Inc. as a truck driver If
you are interested, please contact me as soon as possi-
ble but not later than Monday, July 2, 1973, at 5:00
p.m.
Sincerely,
SEMINOLE ASPHALT REFINING, INC.
/ J.D. Lee
The letters were sent by certified mail to both Heard and
Stewart return receipt requested. As noted above, both let-
ters were dated June 28, 1973, and Respondent's copy of
the return receipt was stamped at Saint Marks, Florida, on
the same date. Heard's certified receipt was postmarked by
the delivering post office in Woodville, Florida, on July 2,
and Stewart's at Tallahassee, Florida, on June 30 Stewart
however testified that he did not receive the letter until July
2. Therefore, both Heard and Stewart received the letter on
the same day they were required to notify Respondent of
their interest in returning to work for the Respondent.
There is much testimony in this record, much of it con-
tradictory, regarding the response, or lack of response, by
Heard and Stewart to the June 28 letter of the Respondent.
However, I find, without reaching any of the events subse-
quent to their receipt of the June 28 letter, that the letter,
by its own terms, does not constitute a valid unconditional
offer of reinstatement. This finding is based primarily on
the unreasonably limited time that both discriminatees
herein were allowed in which to contact the Respondent
and accept the purported offer of reemployment.
In National Tape Corporation, 187 NLRB 321, 325
(1970), the Board, in a similar situation, found that an
employer's reinstatement offer was inadequate where the
claimant was required, as in the subject case to accept such
offer on the same day it was received. Thus the Board
stated:
Moreover, even if the offer were considered valid in
these respects, we would still find it to be inadequate
by its own terms since it was limited timewise to an
unreasonably short period in that Morber was re-
quired to accept such offer on the very day it was
received by him Under these circumstances, we do
not consider the offer of reinstatement to be a valid
one.
In another case the Board found a reinstatement offer
conditioned upon acceptance and return within 4 days to
have been an unreasonable limitation. Thus, in Thermoid
Company, 90 NLRB 614, 616 (1950), the Board stated as
follows:
We are unable to find that the Respondent made an
adequate, good faith offer of reinstatement to Gadd.
In the first place, the offer was conditioned upon
Gadd's returning within 4 days. This time limitation is
most likely to have been too short to enable Gadd to
have given his new employer reasonable notice. .. .
In Penco Enterprises, Inc., Penco of Ohio, and Acoustical
Contracting and Supply Corp., 216 NLRB 734, 735 (1975),
the Board, in reversing the Administrative Law Judge, held
as follows:
While we do not attempt to prescribe what is reason-
able in every circumstance, we do not view the time
allotted herein as reasonable. Mooney would have had
to inform Respondent of his intentions the same day
he received the letter or else report for work on the
following morning. We find this totally inadequate.
Thus, contrary to the conclusion of the Administrative
Law Judge, we find that Respondent did not make a
valid offer of reinstatement to Mooney.
Judged on the principles enunciated in the Board's deci-
sion noted above, I conclude and find that Respondent's
June 28 letter to Heard and Stewart did not, by its own
terms, constitute a valid and unconditional offer of rein-
statement. Accordingly I find that their backpay, as urged
by the General Counsel, continues to run until a valid and
unconditional offer of reinstatement has been made by the
Respondent.
In view of possible reversal of this finding by the Board
or courts it is necessary to consider and make findings and
conclusions with respect to the events subsequent to the
June 28 letter. As the conversations between Respondent's
personnel manager, Lee, and the claimants occurred at dif-
ferent times and under different circumstances they will be
discussed separately.
B. The Conversation Between Respondent Personnel
Manager Lee and John Heard Regarding the June 28
Letter
Heard testified he received the Respondent's letter on
July 2 at the Woodville, Florida, post office where he
maintains a postbox. He stated he signed the certified re-
turn receipt about 5 p.m., already too late to contact Re-
spondent since the Employer's office normally closed at 5
p.m. The deadline for such contact was 5 p.m. on July 2.
On July 3 Heard left his house at 4 a.m. to report for work
with his then current employer at 6 a.m. This was before
Respondent's office normally opened for business. That
evening, on July 3, he arrived home "late," after
Respondent's office had closed. July 4 was a holiday and
Respondent's office was not open. On July 5 Heard was off
work earlier than usual and, apparently by chance, ran into
Lee at a local grocery and service station in Woodville.
According to Heard, he first asked Lee if he would be put
back on his old truck and Lee said no, somebody else was
driving his old truck, and he would have to come back as a
1 See also C E Collins, and 0 C Collins, d/b/a Collins Mining Company,
177 NLRB 221, 242 (1969), Harrah's Club, 158 NLRB 758, fn 1 (1966),
Betts Baking Company, 173 NLRB 1018 (1968)
1204 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
"junior" employee, and further that Heard hadn't "re-
sponded by the deadline on the letter." This is about the
extent of Heard's recall concerning his conversation with
Lee, allegedly occurring on July 5.
Lee recalled the conversation with Heard at the service
station, but testified it occurred sometime in August 1973,
at least a month after Heard received the June 28 letter. In
support of this contention Respondent produced gas pur-
chase tickets, invoices, and canceled checks which indi-
cated Lee had made no gas purchase from the Woodville
Service Station during the entire month of July. The rec-
ords revealed purchases on August 7 and 21. Counsel for
General Counsel did not challenge the accuracy of these
records. Lee testified the only reason he ever stopped at the
Woodville Service Station was to buy gas. Lee's version of
the conversation, except for the date of its occurrence, is
not in substantial conflict with that of Heard. Lee testified
that Heard approached him and first asked if it was "too
late" to consider reinstatement Lee testified he told Heard
"we had made him an offer and he didn't respond to that
offer." Lee acknowledges that Heard asked if he "were
ever to get to come back-if he would get it (his old truck)
back...." Lee further admits he told Heard he "couldn't
promise him anything like that." Contrary to Heard's fail-
ure to recall anything being said about seniority, other than
he would have to come back as a "junior" driver. Lee re-
called that Heard "asked if there was any way he could get
his seniority back." Lee replied that because the case was
"still under appeal" he "just couldn't really discuss that
with him."
Concluding Findings
Lee's testimony that the only reason he ever visited
Woodville Grocery and Service Station was to purchase
gas, buttressed by records (purchase tickets, invoices, and
canceled checks which were in mutual balance) showing no
gas purchases during the entire month of July, is somewhat
persuasive but not wholly convincing that it was impossible
for Lee to have been on the scene on July 5 as indicated by
Heard. I find it dust as plausible that Heard would have
recalled such an event occurring, as he claimed he did, the
day following the July 4 holiday. There was nothing in
Heard's demeanor that would tend to adversely reflect on
his reliability as a witness. He appeared to be responsive to
interrogation by counsel and to attempt to recall events,
occurring nearly 3 years ago, to the best of his ability. In
any event, the scales are tipped in this conflict over the
date of the conversation by Respondent's admission that
even if the conversation occurred on July 5 it would still
have been too late to consider Heard for reinstatement.
Further, it is clear from Lee's own testimony that Re-
spondent, during Lee's conversation with Heard on July 5,
did not make a valid and unconditional offer to reinstate
Heard in conformity with the Board's court-enforced Or-
der Thus, Lee admitted that he told Heard he "just
couldn't really discuss that [his seniority] with him." It is
also admitted by Respondent that seniority, although not
considered important in making assignments of equipment
or routes, was indeed the basis of determining vacation
privileges.
Based on the above considerations, I find that Respon-
dent, either by its June 28 letter or in the subsequent con-
versation between Personnel Manager Lee and discrimina-
tee Heard, has not made a valid and unconditional offer of
reinstatement to Heard in compliance with the Board's
court-enforced Order. Accordingly, I find that Respon-
dent's backpay liability to John Heard continues to run
from the second backpay period set forth in the specifica-
tion, beginning on March 27, 1973, until a valid and un-
conditional offer of reinstatement has been made to Heard
by the Respondent
C. The Telephone Conversation Between Respondent's
Personnel Manager Lee and Percy Stewart Regarding the
June 28 Letter
It is undisputed that Stewart telephoned and talked with
Lee on the morning of July 2, before the 5 p.m. deadline.
There is conflict in the testimony of Lee and Stewart over
what was said during this conversation. I credit Lee's ver-
sion over that of Stewart.2
Briefly, Stewart testified that in his phone conversation
with Lee he asked Lee if he would get his seniority and his
old truck back Lee replied "no, it would just-that would
be-just I'd have a job, just go back to work, and I'd be
starting over as a junior man." Stewart responded, "I told
him that I'd have to wait awhile ... that if I went back to
work then it would be a hardship on me because I'd have
to go back and wait two weeks before I got paid down
there." Stewart, testified further that he told Lee he
couldn't return under the circumstances because he would
be "sitting on the bench" since he would be a "junior"
man.
Lee testified that Stewart first asked him if he was seri-
ous about "the offer." Lee replied, "You've got the offer in
your hand. We are making you an offer to return to work
at Seminole." According to Lee, Stewart then asked
"would [he] get [his] seniority back." Lee admitted he told
Stewart "that it was being decided by the courts and that
.. I dust could not discuss it with him at that time." Lee
testified again that seniority was of no consequence regard-
ing equipment or route assignments, but admitted it was
used as a basis in determining vacation privileges.
Concluding Findings
There is much testimony in the record concerning the
type and condition of the trucking equipment handled by
Heard and Stewart before the strike, and whether or not
they would be entitled to the same equipment should they
accept Respondent's offer. Both Heard and Stewart testi-
fied that Lee told them they would not be driving their old
trucks should they return to work. Lee testified he told
2 Stewart's demeanor while testifying was characterized by such hesitancy
and evasiveness in his responses to interrogation of counsel as to make most
of his testimony completely unreliable Nevertheless, portions of Stewart's
testimony are not in substantial conflict with that of Lee This is signifi-
cantly true with respect to the matter concerning seniority Lee denied using
the term "junior" and I credit his denial On the other hand he does not
deny, as in the case of Heard, that he told Stewart he "just could not discuss
it [seniority] with him at that time "
SEMINOLE ASPHALT REFINING, INC.
both of them he could give them no answer one way or the
other, that they might get their old equipment back, newer
or older equipment, or better or worse equipment than
their previous rigs, depending on the circumstances.
The General Counsel strongly argues in his brief that
Respondent's failure to offer Heard and Stewart to return
to work on trucks driven by them before the strike is ample
evidence of Respondent's failure to make a valid offer of
reinstatement. The burden of proof of such contention is
on the General Counsel and I find the evidence insufficient
to sustain such an allegation. As the credible evidence
shows, after a lapse of about 3 years, new equipment has
been purchased, other equipment has been overhauled,
some sold, and various pieces of equipment have been as-
signed and reassigned among various drivers. The General
Counsel did not show, by substantial and credible evi-
dence, that there were actual advantages or disadvantages
in driving different pieces of trucking equipment, or that if
the trucks driven by Heard and Stewart about 3 years ago
were in better or worse condition than any other piece of
equipment. Moreover, the evidence is unrefuted that as-
signments of equipment and routes are made purely on a
judgmental basis unrelated to seniority or other criteria.
Accordingly, I find Respondent's lack of assurance to
Heard and Stewart that they would be driving their old
trucks should they return to work to be insubstantial and
not to constitute a condition for acceptance of
Respondent's offer.
Notwithstanding the above findings, I find that
Respondent's offer, based on Lee's own testimony, was in
fact not a valid and unconditional offer of reinstatement to
either Heard or Stewart in compliance with the Board and
court order. Lee admitted in his testimony that Stewart, as
did Heard, inquired of him if the June 28 offer contemplat-
ed reinstatement without loss of seniority. Lee testified that
Stewart asked him "would [he] get [his] seniority back."
Lee replied, "I just could not discuss it with him at that
time."
Based on all the above considerations I find that Re-
spondent has not made a valid and unconditional offer to
reinstate Stewart by the June 28 letter or during Lee's sub-
sequent conversation with Stewart on July 2. I further find
that, inasmuch as both Heard and Stewart had obtained
interim employment and were currently employed at the
time they received Respondent's June 28 letter, as well as
during their conversations with Personnel Manager Lee, it
was not incumbent upon either of them to accept Respon-
dent's conditional offers. Accordingly, I find that
Respondent's backpay liability to Stewart continues to run
from the beginning of the second backpay period set forth
in the backpay specification until Respondent makes a val-
id and unconditional offer of reinstatement to Stewart in
compliance with the Board's court-enforced Order
D R. W. Dunn
The parties are in agreement that Respondent owes
Dunn $ 970.69 in backpay for the period from March 29 to
May 8, 1972. At the hearing , Respondent waived its right
to offer proof regarding any possible interim earnings of
Dunn.
1205
The General Counsel alleges in the backpay specifica-
tion that backpay for unfair labor practice striker R. W.
Dunn is not set forth "because he cannot be located at the
present time." In his brief, counsel for General Counsel
requests that the amount of $970.69, plus interest to date of
payment, be ordered to be deposited with the Regional
Director for Region 12 for a period of 24 months from date
of such deposit; that in the event Dunn is not located with-
in the 24-month period, the entire sum be refunded to Re-
spondent. However, counsel for General Counsel states
that such refund should not operate to extinguish Respon-
dent's liability to Dunn should he appear in the indefinite
future.
Counsel for General Counsel further requests that, in the
event Dunn is located during the 24-month escrow period,
the parties be afforded an opportunity to examine Dunn
and other witnesses with relevant testimony and to intro-
duce evidence bearing on the amount of backpay due
Dunn; and that additionally, provision be made for the
agency to seek additional backpay for Dunn should it de-
velop that Dunn, during the escrow period or thereafter,
unconditionally offered to return to work and was not of-
fered unconditional reinstatement by Respondent on or af-
ter May 15, 1972.
Respondent admits backpay liability of $970.69 to Dunn
from March 29, 1972, when it admittedly refused Dunn's
reemployment request, to May 8, 1972, when Dunn failed
to respond to Respondent's valid offer of reinstatement.
Respondent further urges in its beef that any escrow peri-
od should run 2 years from the Board's Decision and since
about 3 years have now elapsed no escrow deposit is ap-
propriate. In support of this contention, Respondent cites
Robert Haws Company, 161 NLRB 299 (1966), wherein the
Board approved an escrow deposit period running 1 year
from the date of such deposit with the Regional Director.
The Administrative Law Judge had recommended, based
on the merits of the case, such a period, inasmuch as more
than a year had elapsed from the original recommended
Order in the case. In Haws, contrary to the subject case, it
was not necessary for the Board to seek enforcement of its
Order. The Board's Order in this case was enforced on July
18, 1974, so that less than 2 years have elapsed from the
date of the court order to the date of the subject hearing.
Nevertheless, Dunn's whereabouts have been unknown to
the General Counsel for a considerable period of time
since the commencement of proceedings in this matter.
Under all the circumstances, I am of the opinion that the
escrow period should not exceed 1 year from the date of
deposit. I therefore direct the Respondent to deposit the
sum of $970.69 to be held by the Regional Director of
Region 12 in Tampa, Florida, in escrow subject to the con-
dition that if Dunn is located within a period of 1 year
from the date of deposit, a determination (including a fur-
ther hearing if requested by Respondent) shall be made as
to the amount of net backpay due to Dunn at that time.
But, if Dunn shall not be located within said period, the
entire sum deposited shall be refunded to Respondent.
However, such refund shall not operate to extinguish
Respondent's liability of any backpay which may be due to
Dunn. Since Dunn admittedly has made no application for
reemployment with the Respondent since the end of his
1206 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
first backpay period on May 8, 1972, he is entitled to no
further backpay under the given circumstances at the time
of the subject hearing. Any further backpay liability by
Respondent to Dunn will be dependent upon circum-
stances occurring subsequent to the close of this hearing on
February 20, 1976.
11. THE REMEDY
For the reasons described above, I find that
Respondent's obligations to the discriminatees herein will
be partially discharged by the payments to them of the
respective amounts set forth in the Appendix attached
hereto. Such amounts shall be payable, plus interest at the
rate of 6 percent per annum in accordance with the formu-
la set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289
(1950), and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716
(1962)3
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings and conclusions
and upon the entire record in this proceeding, I hereby
issue the following recommended:
ORDER4
Respondent, Seminole Asphalt Refining, Inc., its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall make the em-
ployees involved in this proceeding whole (to the extent
noted in the section entitled "Remedy") by payment to
them of the following amounts, together with interest at the
rate of 6 percent per annum, and continuing until the
amounts are paid in full, minus tax withholding required
by Federal and state laws.
John Heard $4,882.10
Percy Stewart 5,254.36
R.W. Dunn 970.69
3 Backpay to Heard and Stewart continues to run until Respondent has
made an unconditional offer of reinstatement to each of them in compliance
with the Board's court-enforced Order Respondent stipulated and agreed to
the accuracy of the backpay specification reserving at the hearing only the
right to present evidence of wilful loss, if any, with respect to the interim
employment opportunities of Heard and Stewart No such evidence was
presented Subsequent to the close of the hearing the parties jointly filed a
motion with me to accept their stipulation agreeing upon gross interim earn-
ings for Percy Stewart for the four quarters in 1975 The motion is granted
and the stipulation received into evidence However, since the backpay
specification does not include gross backpay for Stewart for the fourth quar-
ter of 1975 no net backpay has been calculated for this period at this time
4 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec
10248 of the Rules and Regulations. be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
APPENDIX
John Heard
Gross Interim
Net
Interim Net
Quarters Backpay Earnings Expenses Earnings Backpay
1972--1 $ 83.64 None $ 83.64
-2 674.16 None 674.16
-3 None
-4 None
1973--1 None
-2 2545.27 $1931.41 $ 25.00 $190641 638.86
-3 2424.38 2425.98 - - None
-4 2589.69 1625.25 131.82 1493.43 1096.26
1974--1 2334.13 1525.00 25.00 1500.00 834.13
-2 2223.13 1211.05 25.00 1186.05 1037.08
-3 2546.96 3429.29 38.40 3390.89 None
-4 2659.93 2642.29 281.60 2360.69 299.24
1975--1 2161.25 2056.01 62.40 1993.61 167.64
-2 2447.38 3152.34 62.40 3089.94 None
-3 2306.33 3152.34 62.40 3089.94 None
$4,831.01
51.09*
$4,882.10
Percy Stewart Net
Gross Interim Interim Net
Quarters Backpay Earnings Expenses Earnings Backpay
1972--l $ 83.64 None None None 83.64
-2 887 05 $ 541.67 None $ 541.67 345.38
-3
-4
1973--1
-2 1879.58 900.92 900.92 978 66
-3 243048 2031.02 2031.02 399.46
-4 2589.73 1755.00 1755.00 834 73
1974--1 2334.15 2283.70 2283.70 50.45
-2 2223.13 2283.70 2283.70 None
-3 2546.96 2542.38 2542.38 4.58
-4 2659.93 2542.38 2542.38 117.55
1975--1 2161.25 709.38 709.38 1451.87
-2 2447.38 1924.78 1924.78 522.60
-3 2306.33 1924.78 1924.78 381.55
-4 - -
$5,170.47
83.89*
$5,254.36
* prestrike vacation benefits