Seesaw Technology Co., Limited

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

May 9, 2019

87265806 (T.T.A.B. May. 9, 2019)

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB

Mailed: May 9, 2019

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

In re Seesaw Technology Co., Limited
_____

Serial No. 87265806

_____

Ruth Khalsa of LegalForce RAPC Worldwide, P.C.,
for Seesaw Technology Co., Limited.

Jessie A. Maihos, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 121,
Richard F. White, Managing Attorney.
_____

Before Zervas, Shaw and Hightower,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Zervas, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Seesaw Technology Co., Limited (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal
Register of the mark for the following
International Class 9 goods:
Carrying cases for mobile phones; Protective cases for smartphones;
Protective covers and cases for cell phones, laptops, tablet computers
and portable media players; Analog to digital converter (ADCs);
Converters; Backpacks especially adapted for holding laptops and
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notebook computers; Laptop carrying cases; Neoprene laptop covers;
Messenger bags especially adapted for holding laptops; Computer
docking stations; Electronic docking stations; Universal series bus
cables; Universal series bus drives.1

Applicant disclaimed the term DOCKCASE apart from the mark as shown. The
mark is described as consisting of “the literal elements DOCKCASE, stylized, with a
plus sign embedded into the letter D.” Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark.
The Examining Attorney refused registration pursuant to Section 2(d) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that Applicant’s mark is likely to
cause confusion with the standard character mark DOCK-IN-CASE registered on the
Principal Register for “batteries and battery chargers, power adapters” in
International Class 9.2
After the refusal was made final, Applicant appealed to this Board. Applicant and
the Examining Attorney filed briefs. We affirm the refusal to register.
Likelihood of Confusion
Our determination under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act is based on an
analysis of the probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors bearing on
a likelihood of confusion. See In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177
USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973) (“du Pont”); see also Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot
Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689 (Fed. Cir. 2005);

1 Application Serial No. 87265806, filed on December 12, 2016 pursuant to Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), asserting a bona fide intent to use the mark in
commerce.
2 Registration No. 3954476, registered May 3, 2011. Section 8 affidavit accepted and Section
15 affidavit acknowledged.
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In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In
considering the evidence of record on these factors, we keep in mind that “[t]he
fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences
in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.” Federated
Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976).
“Not all of the [du Pont] factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of
significance to the particular mark need be considered.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph
Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In
re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601. F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir 2010)).
a. Strength of the Cited Mark
We begin by assessing the strength of the cited mark, which affects the scope of
protection to which it is entitled.3 In this regard we consider the meaning of the
component terms DOCK and CASE and the third-party registrations for marks
containing the term DOCK which Applicant submitted into the record with its
September 21, 2017 Response.
Applicant argues that “the constituent elements, DOCK and CASE, are merely
descriptive and entitled to only the narrowest scope of protection with respect to the

3 In discussing strength, Applicant observes that the Examining Attorney required a
disclaimer of DOCKCASE in Applicant’s mark. The relevant du Pont factors consider the
strength of Registrant’s mark for its goods, not the strength of Applicant’s mark for its goods.
Also, Applicant refers to Exhs. 1 and 2 attached to its brief. 4 TTABVUE. Applicant’s brief
does not have any attachments.
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Cited mark.”4 “Case” is defined as “a box or receptacle for holding something.”5 “Dock”
is defined as a noun as a “base station onto which a device is placed”6 and as a verb
as “to come into or alongside a dock.”7 The Examining Attorney’s evidence depicts a
“dock” for charging a battery:8

It follows from the dictionary definitions and this evidence that DOCK-IN-CASE
suggests to consumers that the goods allow for recharging of an electronic device
while in a receptacle.

4 Applicant’s brief at 20, 4 TTABVUE 27.
5 Merriam-Webster Dictionary accessed at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
case. We take judicial notice of this definition. See Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C.
Gourmet Food Imp. Co., 213 USPQ 594, 596 (TTAB 1982), aff’d, 703 F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ
505 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Red Bull GmbH, 78 USPQ2d 1375, 1377 (TTAB 2006).
6 Computer Desktop Encyclopedia (The Computer Language Co. Inc. © 1981-2017) accessed
at https://www.yourdictionary.com/dock. We take judicial notice of this encyclopedia entry.
7 Merriam-Webster Dictionary accessed at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
dock. We take judicial notice of this definition.
8 October 17, 2017 Office Action, TSDR 105. All citations to documents contained in the
Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database are to the downloadable .pdf
versions of the documents.
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Applicant also argues that DOCK-IN-CASE is a play on “just-in-case,” meaning
“to protect against something bad that could happen.”9 “The [c]ited mark readily
conveys the commercial impression that its products provide backup or emergency
power in the event of the unforeseen.”10 Applicant, however, does not point to any
evidence in the record to support its argument that consumers would so perceive the
mark and hence its arguments are not persuasive, and it is just as likely or even more
likely that consumers will perceive the IN-CASE component of Registrant’s mark as
referring to the placement of the goods in a receptacle.
With regard to the third-party registrations, such registrations may show the
sense in which a mark is used in ordinary parlance; that is, an element common to
both parties’ marks may have a normally understood and well-recognized descriptive
or suggestive meaning, leading to the conclusion that that segment is inherently
relatively weak. Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. KGAA v. New
Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363, 116 USPQ2d 1129, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
see also In re Morinaga Nyugyo Kabushiki Kaisha, 120 USPQ2d 1738, 1745 (TTAB
2016) (“[T]hird-party registrations are relevant evidence of the inherent or conceptual
strength of a mark or term because they are probative of how terms are used in
connection with the goods or services identified in the registrations.”).

9 Applicant’s brief at 11, 4 TTABVUE 18, citing the definition of “just-in-case” submitted with
Applicant’s September 21, 2017 Response, TSDR 22.
10 Applicant’s brief at 11, 4 TTABVUE 18.
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We consider the live registrations and not the cancelled registrations because
cancelled registrations are evidence of nothing but the fact that they once issued.11
Sunnen Prods. Co. v. Sunex Int’l Inc., 1 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (TTAB 1987). Three of
the seven live registrations in the record are for marks registered on the
Supplemental Register and four are for marks registered on the Principal Register
without any disclaimer or showing of acquired distinctiveness:
Mark Reg. No Register Goods
Dock & View 4319136 Supplemental Digital electronic device for charging
and docking cell phones and video and
audio devices and transmitting,
receiving, manipulating, playing and
reviewing text, data, image, audio and
video files consisting of a docking
station charger, remote control, and
electrical audio and video signal
transmitting cables and connectors for
connecting an electronic device to a
television
DOCKSYNC 4566300 Principal Application software for operating
smart phones and tablet computers;
digital cameras; blank USB flash
drives; mobile telephones; portable
media player; portable computers;
rechargeable batteries; smart phones;
tablet computers; wireless headsets
for smart phones and tablet
computers
TURBODOCK 5233681 Principal Chargers for electric batteries
LiveDock 4311441 Principal Mobile phone accessories in the
nature of headsets, devices for hands-
free phone use, chargers, batteries,
cases, covers, holders, docking stands,
and cables

11 Registration Nos. 3975134 (DOCKSTAR), 4163729 (EZdock) and 4047674 (ALARMDOCK)
were cancelled.
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Mark Reg. No Register Goods
MINIDOCK 4047238 Supplemental Adapter plugs; Adapters; Battery
chargers; Cell phone battery chargers;
Chargers for electric batteries;
Electrical plug device enabling
connection and disconnection of power
and/or control cables; Electrical power
connectors; Power adapters; Power
connectors; Power supply connectors
and adaptors for use with portable
electronic devices …
POWERDOCK 3465993 Principal Battery chargers for portable
electronic devices
ALLDOCK
(stylized)
4985770 Principal Scientific, surveying, electric,
photographic, cinematographic,
optical, measuring, signaling,
checking and teaching apparatus,
namely, sensor chips for scientific use,
measuring instruments in the nature
of electric, current, voltage and
frequency meters, electric and
electronic converters, battery
charging stations for mobile phones
and handheld electronic devices,
chargers for batteries, cell phones,
computers, tablet computers, …
chargers for accumulators, namely,
battery chargers

None of the third-party marks include both DOCK and CASE and none concern
the term CASE. Thus, even if the third-party registrations demonstrate weakness in
the term DOCK, they say nothing about the term CASE as a source indicator for
Registrant’s goods. The third-party DOCK-formative marks use DOCK as defined in
the encyclopedia reference noted above.
We find that while there is a suggestive quality to the cited mark based on the
dictionary definitions, these seven registrations for goods overlapping with the goods
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identified in the cited registration are insufficient to significantly narrow the scope of
protection for Registrant’s mark. See In re i.am.symbolic, LLC, 866 F.3d 1315, 123
USPQ2d 1744, 1751 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that evidence of third-party use “falls
short of the ‘ubiquitous’ or ‘considerable’ use of the mark components present in
[applicant’s] cited cases”); cf. Jack Wolfskin, 116 USPQ2d at 1136 (discussing
“voluminous evidence” of registration and use of paw print design elements); Juice
Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1671, 1674 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (referencing evidence of “a fair number” of third-party marks).
Considering the record as a whole, we find that Registrant’s mark is suggestive
and accord it a scope of protection wide enough to encompass similar DOCK and
CASE formative marks for similar goods. See Joseph Phelps Vineyards, LLC v.
Fairmont Holdings, LLC, 857 F.3d 1323, 122 USPQ2d 1733, 1734 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(stating that likelihood of confusion fame varies along a spectrum from very strong to
very weak).
b. The Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks
We compare Applicant’s mark and Registrant’s DOCK-
IN-CASE mark “in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and
commercial impression.” Palm Bay Imps. Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison
Fondee En 1772, 73 USPQ2d at 1691 (quoting du Pont, 177 USPQ at 567). When
comparing marks, the test is not whether the marks can be distinguished in a side-
by-side comparison, but rather whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of
their overall commercial impression that confusion as to the source of the goods
Serial No. 87265806
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offered under the respective marks is likely to result. Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v.
Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., 685 F.3d 1046, 103 USPQ2d 1435, 1440 (Fed. Cir.
2012). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks
confusingly similar.” In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re
1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)). Further, marks
“‘must be considered ... in light of the fallibility of memory ....”‘ In re St. Helena Hosp.,
774 F.3d 747, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting San Fernando Elec.
Mfg. Co. v. JFD Elecs. Components Corp., 565 F.2d 683, 196 USPQ 1 (CCPA 1977)).
The proper focus is on the recollection of the average customer, who retains a general
rather than specific impression of the marks. Winnebago Indus., Inc. v. Oliver &
Winston, Inc., 207 USPQ 335, 344 (TTAB 1980); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co.,
190 USPQ 106, 108 (TTAB 1975).
We may not dissect the involved marks when comparing the marks but must
consider them in their entireties. In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ
749, 750-51 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Nonetheless, there is nothing improper in stating that,
for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a
mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on a consideration of the marks in their
entireties. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 76 F.3d 1317, 110
USPQ2d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2014). For instance, merely descriptive matter that is
disclaimed has been accorded subordinate status relative to the more distinctive
portions of a mark. Nat’l Data, 224 USPQ at 751 (“That a particular feature is
descriptive . . . with respect to the relevant goods or services is one commonly accepted
Serial No. 87265806
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rationale for giving less weight to a portion of the mark.”). However, it also has
frequently been recognized that where a mark consists of a word and a design, the
words generally play a dominant role. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d
1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“In the case of a composite mark containing both words
and a design, ‘the verbal portion of the mark is the one most likely to indicate the
origin of the goods to which it is affixed.”‘) (quoting CBS Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F.2d
1579, 218 USPQ 198, 200 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); In re Dakin’s Miniatures, Inc., 59 USPQ2d
1593, 1596 (TTAB 2001) (“[W]ords are normally accorded greater weight because they
would be used by purchasers to request the goods.”).
Turning first to Applicant’s mark, the Examining Attorney considers the wording
to be merely descriptive of a feature of Applicant’s goods; “Docking Case” appears as
the name of a particular case for electronic products in the evidence. See, e.g., “Incipio
Edge Docking Case for iPhone 4 / 4s – Pearl White.”12 While the evidence reflects that
“dock” is an abbreviation for “docking station,” the evidence does not show that “dock
case” is an abbreviation for “docking case.”13 Applicant, by entering a disclaimer of
the wording in the mark, however, has agreed that “dockcase” is merely descriptive
of a feature of its goods. The disclaimer of a term pursuant to a requirement by the
Examining Attorney is a concession that the term is at best merely descriptive. See
In re Pollio Dairy Prods. Corp., 8 USPQ2d 2012, 2014 n.4 (TTAB 1988) (“By its

12 March 22, 2017 Office Action, TSDR 14 (http://wvffl.outfityours.com/incipio-edge-docking-
case-for-iphone-4-4s-pearl-white/).
13 “[A] docking station … or dock provides a simplified way of ‘plugging-in’ an electronic device
….” March 22, 2017 Office Action, TSDR 70 (https://en.wikipedia .org/wiki/Docking_station).
Serial No. 87265806
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disclaimer of the word LITE, applicant has conceded that the term is merely
descriptive as used in connection with applicant’s goods.”) (citing State Oil Ref. Corp.
v. Quaker Oil Corp., 161 USPQ 547 (TTAB 1969), aff’d, 453 F.2d 1296, 172 USPQ 361
(CCPA 1972)). The Examining Attorney’s position, therefore, is that Applicant’s
composite mark, comprised of descriptive wording, contains a design component that
is sufficiently distinctive as to make a commercial impression that is separate and
apart from the word portion of the mark and hence renders the mark as a whole
registrable (but for the likelihood of confusion refusal).14
We consider Applicant’s disclaimer of the wording in its mark along with the
Federal Circuit’s guidance that “disclaimers are not helpful in preventing likelihood
of confusion in the mind of the consumer, because he is unaware of their existence”
and “it is well settled that the disclaimed material still forms a part of the mark and
cannot be ignored in determining likelihood of confusion.” Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s
Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 218 USPQ 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (finding that
the term “GIANT” was the dominant portion of a mark consisting of the words GIANT
HAMBURGERS with a large background design, even though the applicant
disclaimed “GIANT HAMBURGERS”). Therefore, the disclaimed portions of the
mark cannot be ignored in determining the likelihood of confusion.
In view of the disclaimer and the Federal Circuit’s guidance, we consider whether
the wording or the design characteristics of Applicant’s mark dominate over the

14 The Examining Attorney stated in the March 22, 2017 Office Action, “‘DOCKCASE’ is
descriptive of applicant’s goods that include docking stations and carrying and protective
cases.” TSDR 4.
Serial No. 87265806
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design element. In In re Viterra, the Federal Circuit considered the mark X-Seed and
design, and the registrant’s disclaimer of the term “seed.” The court stated in
reviewing a determination by the Board that the wording in the combination word
and design mark was dominant even in view of the disclaimer, stating:
The Board’s conclusion is also in line with our decisions holding that
the verbal portion of a word and design mark likely will be the dominant
portion. CBS, 708 F.2d at 1581–82 [218 USPQ at 200]. (“[T]he verbal
portion of the mark is the one most likely to indicate the origin of the
goods to which it is affixed.”). This makes sense given that the literal
component of brand names likely will appear alone when used in text
and will be spoken when requested by consumers. See id. at 1582 (“This
is particularly true when a mark appears in textual material, such as
catalog descriptions, in which it is often impossible or impractical to
include the design feature of the mark” (footnote omitted)); In re Dakin’s
Miniatures, Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593 (TTAB 1999) (“In the case of marks
which consist of words and a design, the words are normally accorded
greater weight because they would be used by purchasers to request the
goods.”); see also Alzheimer’s Found. of Am., Inc. v. Alzheimer’s Disease
& Related Disorders Ass’n, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 2d 458, 465 (S.D.N.Y.2011)
(“While a composite mark (consisting of both a word element and a
design element) must be considered in its entirety, trademark law
recognizes that the word portion is often more likely to be impressed
upon a purchaser’s memory because it is the word that purchasers use
to request the goods and/or services.”).

In re Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at 1911.
We find the plus sign on the letter “D” to be a minor contributor to the commercial
impression of the mark due to is size and meaning, and because it would not likely
be articulated by consumers. We therefore find the wording in Applicant’s mark is
the dominant portion thereof.
The wording of the marks is highly similar; both begin with DOCK and end with
CASE. The entire wording of Applicant’s mark is incorporated within Registrant’s
mark, in the same word order. Likelihood of confusion has frequently been found
Serial No. 87265806
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where the entirety of one mark is incorporated within another. See In re El Torito
Rests., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 2002 (TTAB 1988) (MACHO COMBOS likely to cause
confusion with registered MACHO mark).
Due to the shared wording DOCK and CASE in the same word order, the marks
are similar in sound as well as appearance. The lettering style of Applicant’s mark
plays a minor role in forming the commercial impression of the mark; Registrant’s
mark is a standard character mark and hence the words DOCK-IN-CASE “could be
used in any typeface, color, or size, including in the same stylization” as the cited
mark. Anheuser-Busch, LLC v. Innvopak Sys. Pty Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1816, 1823
(TTAB 2015); see also In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1186-87
(TTAB 2018). The display of Registrant’s mark in the stylized font of the Applicant’s
mark (without the plus sign, of course, which is a design element) would make the
marks similar in appearance.
Turning to the meaning and commercial impression, there are differences but not
significant ones. DOCKCASE likely refers a type of case which can be placed in a
dock, such as the “docking case” referred to in the evidence. DOCK-IN-CASE suggests
that the consumer can dock an electronic device while still in its case. We are not
persuaded by Applicant’s argument, which is unsupported by evidence, that DOCK-
IN-CASE is a play on “just-in-case,” meaning “to protect against something bad that
could happen.”15 Rather, both marks refer to the docking function of a device or object

15 Applicant’s brief at 11, 4 TTABVUE 18, citing the definition of “just-in-case” submitted
with Applicant’s September 21, 2017 Response, TSDR 22.
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in a case. Through this association, we find the meaning and commercial impressions
are similar.
Thus, upon consideration of the marks as a whole, we find that the marks are
more similar than dissimilar in sound, meaning, appearance and commercial
impression. The du Pont factor regarding the similarity of the marks favors a finding
of likelihood of confusion.
c. The Goods
The goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of
confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 56 USPQ2d
1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 54 USPQ2d 1894,
1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the
circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the
mistaken belief that [the goods] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v.
Triumph Learning LLC, 101 USPQ2d at 1722 (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83
USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)).
The Examining Attorney submitted pages from various websites showing use of
the same mark for one or more goods of the type identified in Applicant’s application
and the cited registration. The evidence demonstrates a single source offering the
following goods under the same mark:
· Apple: power adapters, battery chargers, and cell phone cases.16

16 March 22, 2017 Office Action, TSDR pp. 21, 29-30, and 38.
Serial No. 87265806
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· Lenovo: laptop bags, docking stations, and batteries.17

· Belkin: tablet cases, battery charges, and power adapters.18

· Griffin: batteries, cases and covers, and battery chargers.19

· Incipio: batteries, chargers, docking stations, and laptop cases, phone
cases, and tablet cases.20

· Microsoft: cases, chargers, docking stations, and laptop bags and
cases.21

· Mophie: batteries, cases, chargers, and docking stations.22

· Otterbox: cases, chargers, laptop cases, and messenger bags.23

· Samsung: batteries and chargers, cases and covers, electronic docking
stations, and laptop bags and cases.24

· Trident: chargers, laptop cases, and tablet cases.25

In addition, the Examining Attorney made of record printouts of 22 use-based,
third-party registrations for marks covering one or more of the goods identified in
Applicant’s application. Third-party registrations that individually cover different
goods and that are based on use in commerce serve to suggest that the listed goods
are of a type that may emanate from a single source. See Mucky Duck Mustard Co.,

17 Id., TSDR pp. 42, 47, and 48.
18 Id., TSDR pp. 57, 58 and 67.
19 October 17, 2017 Office Action, TSDR pp. 77-93.
20 Id., TSDR pp. 115–29.
21 Id., TSDR pp. 108–21.
22 Id., TSDR pp. 129–50.
23 Id., TSDR pp. 151–62.
24 Id., TSDR pp. 163–83.
25 Id., TSDR pp. 184–89.
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6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988) (although third-party registrations are “not
evidence that the marks shown therein are in use on a commercial scale or that the
public is familiar with them, [they] may nonetheless have some probative value to
the extent that they may serve to suggest that such goods or services are of a type
which may emanate from a single source”); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29
USPQ2d 1783, 1786 (TTAB 1993). See, e.g.:
· U.S. Registration No. 5241424 for KYUUE for goods including
batteries; battery chargers; power adapters; laptop carrying cases;
backpacks especially adapted for holding laptops and notebook
computers; laptop carrying cases.26

· U.S. Registration No. 5250879 for WINROCK for goods including
cell phone battery chargers; carrying cases for cell phones; backpacks
especially adapted for holding laptops and notebook computers.27

· U.S. Registration No. 5255769 for NARBLLY for goods including
batteries; power adapters; cases for mobile phones; backpacks especially
adapted for holding laptops and notebook computers.28

· U.S. Registration No. 5246432 for IDRAWL for goods including
batteries and battery chargers; cable television converters; computer
docking stations; electronic docking stations.29

· U.S. Registration No. 5275908 for LARKSING for good including
batteries; carrying cases; protective cases for smartphones; backpacks
especially adapted for holding laptops and notebook computers; USB
cables for cell phones.30

· U.S. Registration No. 5294671 for LAOTZI for goods including
batteries and battery chargers; protective covers and cases for cell

26 Id., TSDR pp. 6–8.
27 Id., TSDR pp. 9–11.
28 Id., TSDR pp. 12–14.
29 Id., TSDR pp. 15–17.
30 Id., TSDR pp. 18–20.
Serial No. 87265806
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phones, laptops and portable media players; carrying cases for cell
phones; messenger bags especially adapted for holding laptops.31

We find the Examining Attorney’s evidence sufficient to show that, at a minimum,
Applicant’s carrying cases for mobile phones, protective cases for smartphones,
protective covers and cases for cell phones, laptops, tablet computers and portable
media players, converters, laptop carrying cases, messenger bags especially adapted
for holding laptops, and electronic docking stations are commercially related to
Registrant’s “batteries and battery chargers, [and] power adapters,” such goods all
being common consumer electronic goods that may emanate from the same source
under the same mark. In addition, they may be used and purchased at the same time.
The Trademark Examining Attorney need not prove, and we need not find, similarity
as to each and every product listed in Applicant’s identification of goods. It is
sufficient for a refusal based on likelihood of confusion that relatedness is established
for any item encompassed by the identification of goods in a particular class in the
application. Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 209
USPQ 986, 988 (CCPA 1981); In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d at 1409.
We find Applicant’s arguments to the contrary unpersuasive. Applicant points out
differences in the goods. The issue, however, is not whether consumers would confuse
the goods but rather whether they would confuse the source of the goods. Orange
Bang, Inc. v. Olé Mexican Foods, Inc., 116 USPQ2d 1102, 1117 (TTAB 2015); Bd. of
Regents, Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. S. Ill. Miners, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1182, 1189 (TTAB

31 Id., TSDR pp. 24–26.
Serial No. 87265806
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2014) (“The issue, of course, is not whether purchasers would confuse the goods or
services, but rather whether there is a likelihood of confusion as to the source
thereof.”). In addition, Applicant challenges the probative value of the Examining
Attorney’s evidence, arguing that (i) although the Examining Attorney found the
goods are related based on “third-party websites that variously sell several of the
items at issue,” “each third-party website is cited as selling different goods under the
same mark, so the actual indicia of relatedness is shallower than would be with a set
of three items all covering the same items”;32 and (ii) “the Examining Attorney has
presented third-party evidence that covers a wide swath of products and services. As
such, each item is of little to no value in establishing that the offerings are related.”33
We find the evidence to be probative; the Examining Attorney has submitted website
evidence from ten different sources that offer goods in the consumer electronics field,
and not in a variety of fields. In addition, the registrations submitted by the
Examining Attorney are all single-class registrations and do not exhibit long lists of
goods. They too are ample in number to persuade us of a commercial relationship
between the goods.
The du Pont factor regarding the similarity of the goods thus favors a finding of
likelihood of confusion.

32 Applicant’s Brief at 14-15, 4 TTABVUE 21-22.
33 Id. at 15, 4 TTABVUE 22.
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d. Similarity or Dissimilarity of Channels of Trade
Applicant acknowledges that the trade channels of Applicant’s and Registrant’s
goods are the same, with “both supply[ing] accessories for electronics devices,” but
adds, “[t]here is no likelihood of confusion arising from the similarity of trade
channels” because “the vast array of electronic devices on the market, and the even
more vast array of accessories available for those devices, makes this a broad market
with a number of niche applications …. Consumers are not likely to expect such a
niche supplier to also sell backpacks and laptop and cellphone covers.”34 Applicant’s
argument has no evidentiary support. Its acknowledgment of a similarity in trade
channels of the respective goods and the website evidence offering some of Applicant’s
and Registrant’s goods on the same pages35 results in our weighing of this factor in
favor of finding likelihood of confusion.
e. Conclusion
We have considered all of the evidence properly in the record and the arguments
of the Examining Attorney and Applicant. In view of the similar marks, related goods
and the acknowledged similar trade channels, we conclude that confusion is likely
between Applicant’s mark for “Carrying cases for mobile phones; Protective cases for
smartphones; Protective covers and cases for cell phones, laptops, tablet computers
and portable media players; Analog to digital converter (ADCs); Converters;
Backpacks especially adapted for holding laptops and notebook computers; Laptop

34 Applicant’s brief at 16-17, 4 TTABVUE 23-24.
35 See, e.g., www.microsoft.com webpage, October 17, 2017 Office Action, TSDR 117.
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carrying cases; Neoprene laptop covers; Messenger bags especially adapted for
holding laptops; Computer docking stations; Electronic docking stations; Universal
series bus cables; Universal series bus drives” and Registrant’s mark for “batteries
and battery chargers, power adapters.”
Decision: The refusal to register is affirmed.