Securitas Security Services USA

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Sep 28, 2017

16-CA-176006 (N.L.R.B. Sep. 28, 2017)

JD–78-17
Austin, TX
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
SECURITAS SECURITY SERVICES USA
and CASES 16–CA–176006
16–CA–183494
RYAN PATRICK MURPHY, An Individual
Robert Perez, Esq. and Maxie Gallardo, Esq.
for the General Counsel.
Maurice Baskin, Esq. (Littler Mendelson, PC
Washington, DC), for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
DONNA N. DAWSON, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Austin,
Texas on April 27, 2017. The Charging Party, Ryan Patrick Murphy (Murphy), filed the
charges giving rise to these cases on May 12 and August 31, 2016.1 The General Counsel
issued the Order Consolidating Cases, Amended Consolidated Complaint and Notice of
Hearing on April 7, 2017.
The General Counsel alleges that Respondent has violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act
by maintaining unlawful employee handbook policies banning recording and cameras at
work; promulgating and maintaining a rule prohibiting gossip, nonwork-related idle talk and
rumor spreading; and prohibiting an employee from discussing internal investigations.2
On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
after considering the briefs filed by the parties, I make the following

1 All dates are in 2016 unless otherwise indicated.
2 Subsequent to the trial in this case, the parties entered into a partial bilateral informal
settlement agreement resolving several of the unlawful rules allegations. I approved the
agreement, and granted their joint motion to sever those allegations from this case. The
severed, resolved allegations include Respondent’s confidential information policy (complaint
paragraph 6), proprietary information policy (complaint paragraph 8) and social networking
policy (portion of complaint paragraph 7).
JD–78-17
2
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent owns and operates a corporation with an office and place of business in 5
Austin, Texas, where it provides security services to other companies. In conducting its
operations in 2015, Respondent performed services valued in excess of $50,000 in states other
than the State of Texas. Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act.
10
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Respondent’s Business
Respondent is the second largest security service provider in the country, with about 15
14,000 customers and 90,000 security guards/officers. It provides its customers with guards,
as well as a variety of security services and products. In the Austin, Texas area, Respondent
provides security guards to two Samsung facilities—the Samsung Austin Research Center and
the Samsung Austin Semiconductor Plant. Respondent employs about 110 employees at both
locations, with branch manager Joe Shuler over area operations. This case involves 20
occurrences at the Austin Research Center, where Respondent employs about 10 guards, with
2 guards and a shift supervisor on each shift.
B. Respondent’s Security Officer Employee Handbook Policy
25
Respondent maintains a Security Officer Handbook, updated in January 2015. (Jt.
Exh. 1). This employee handbook contains an acceptable usage and electronic
communications policy, which, relevant to this case, bans all recordings of communications at
any time, including disciplinary sessions and investigations. It also bans any and all picture
taking while on duty, with cell phone cameras and/or any other photographic or video 30
devices, unless required or directed by post orders or a supervisor or manager.3 Respondent
presented extensive testimony through Michael Pope, its deputy general counsel, as to why
these rules are necessary to maintain the integrity of its unique security business with a
primary focus on its “golden rule” of protecting clients’ employees, property and information.
He explained that some of Respondent’s clients, such as hospitals, require heightened, 35
specialized levels of security to protect patients, medical records and hospital visitors, and that
others require security of information connected with national defense. Customers also
include, but are not limited to, high rise apartment and condominium complexes, industrial
centers, college campuses, homeowners’ associations, theme parks, corporate headquarters,
fast food restaurants and high-tech facilities. In sum, he emphasized that Respondent deals 40
with many confidentiality and privacy issues associated with different types of industries, and
that their handbook rules at issue help reduce the risk of losing clients or compromising the
mission due to a loss of confidence in Respondent’s security program.

3 These rules will be set forth and discussed further in the analysis section of this decision.
JD–78-17
3
Pope explained that their clients do not want their people, property/facilities and
information to be publicly revealed through audio and video recordings or pictures taken by
Securitas employees. He testified that the rules at issue in this case protect against the
possibility of security guards being bribed or blackmailed to steal clients’ property and
information (presumably with assistance by these guards to record and/or photograph security 5
cameras, the comings and goings of chief officers, the inner workings of clients’ facilities,
client conversations and secret information) for the benefit of outsiders or client insiders with
ill intent. He also believed that the rules prevent security officers from taking and publicly
posting pictures of each other “goofing around.” (Tr. 74, 83–85, 92–97, 113–114). He
maintained that their security policies and protocols are the best, and have been reviewed and 10
vetted by retired law enforcement officials, state regulatory agencies and the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), and meet the highest standards in the security industry.4
However, he acknowledged that the handbook rules at issue would prohibit employees from
immediately taking photographs or making recordings to document an unsafe working
condition or discriminatory discipline without prior authorization from management. He did 15
not believe that employees would be disciplined for doing so if they were “carrying out their
duties properly,” but admitted that Respondent does not inform employees that they may
engage in recording and picture taking under those circumstances, without punishment. (Tr.
134–136).
20
C. Respondent Bans Employees From Discussing Internal Investigations and From
Gossiping and Nonwork-Related Idle Talk
The Charging Party, Murphy, worked as a security officer for Respondent at the
Samsung Research Center from August 2015 to August 2016.5 His duties included 25
conducting entry and exit control of personnel and items, monitoring the facility via closed
circuit television, providing customer service and responding to incidents. Murphy worked
his shift with two other officers—Amanda Marino6, shift supervisor, and David Brown,
security officer. As stated, Joe Shuler managed the facility. Tennille Gray was the human
resources manager.7 30

4 For example, Respondent introduced evidence through Pope to show that the handbook rules
had been reviewed and vetted by the DHS in order for Securitas to receive a certificate of
conformance as a security provider under the Safety Act. However, Pope admitted on cross-
examination that he was not sure what industries the Safety Act applied to, and that it would
not apply, for example, to a client who ran a chicken farm. There is no evidence that the
Safety Act, DHS or any other regulatory or industry guidelines required Respondent to
promulgate or maintain these rules as written, or that Samsung required such rules or required
the guards at its Austin research center to sign confidentiality or non-disclosure agreements.
(Tr. 63–68, 125–129; R. Exhs. 1–3).
5 Murphy voluntarily resigned.
6 Marino’s last name is misspelled in the transcript.
7 Respondent admits, and I find, that for all relevant times, Marino, Shuler and Gray have been
supervisors and/or agents of Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(11) and Section
2(13) of the Act.
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4
On April 26, 2016, Murphy was involved in and/or witnessed an incident that resulted
in another employee, David Brown, filing a race discrimination complaint and the company
initiating an investigation. (Tr. 30–31, 122–123, 127). On May 5, branch manager Shuler
and a human resources representative, Pablo Gonzalez, interviewed Murphy regarding the
April 26 incident. He did not know that a discrimination complaint had been filed, but 5
understood the investigation to be about an argument that occurred on April 26. (Tr. 45).
While questioning Murphy, they orally instructed him not to discuss the investigation or
incident with anyone.8 They also asked him to submit a written statement, which he emailed
to human resources manager Gray on May 6. Murphy attached to his email a number of
specific questions about the directive not to discuss the investigation or incident. He asked 10
the following:
First, are you barring me and any other officer who is assigned to SARC from
discussing this matter in perpetuity? Is it just while you are investigating it?
Are there specific individuals with whom this bar is attached or is it a blanket 15
prohibition among every security officer? Does the prohibition to talk just
include this incident or does it include other work related matters? What is the
intent of this prohibition? Does the prohibition only apply during work hours
and on site, or am I, and every other officer prohibited from speaking about
this incident amongst ourselves regardless of the setting? Lastly, what are the 20
possible ramifications that I or any other officer may face if we fail to adhere
to this prohibition?
If I don’t receive a response, I’ll assume that the prohibition to not talk about
this incident applies to myself and every officer assigned to SARC [Samsung 25
Austin Research Center] regardless of the timing or the setting. If this
prohibition was in fact [erroneous], it is my hope that I, along with every
officer on site [receives] education on this matter.
(Tr. 31–34; GC Exh. 2). On the same day, Respondent issued a memorandum promulgating 30
the following rule, which it has since maintained:
Memo: Excessive none [sic] related idle talk/rumor/gossip in the work place
Please refrain from gossiping and excessive none [sic] work related idle talk 35
and rumor spreading while in the work place. Remain vigilant and helpful and
keep our conversations professional, the work place [is] not the place for
gossip and idle talk.
Securitas Officer Handbook Actions That Warrant Immediate Termination of 40
Employment, page 88, Line item #10

8 Pope testified that this was not a policy “which is kind of the Bible of the Company,” but
“words out of that particular manager’s mouth on that particular day.” (Tr. 139). However,
Gray made it clear in a subsequent email to Murphy (discussed below) that this was the
company’s policy to all employees. (GC Exh. 2).
JD–78-17
5
Disruptive or inappropriate conversation at work.
Actions That May Result in Warning Prior to Termination of Employment
page 91 Line item #65
Abusive, foul or inappropriate language.
Acknowledge by signing:
10
(Jt. Exhs. 2–3 and 1).
On May 9, Murphy emailed Shuler (copied to Gray and Marino), indicating that he did
not receive a response to his May 6 email inquiry. He also advised that a few hours after he
sent his May 6 email to Gray, his supervisor, Marino printed out the ban on gossip and idle 15
talk memo, and instructed him to sign it. He acknowledged that he had read the form, but that
he would not sign the document “under any circumstances.”9 (GC Exh. 2). Murphy testified
that he told Marino that, “if I had a choice between signing the memo and keeping my job and
not signing it and getting fired, I told her that I would rather quit.” (Tr. 35).
20
Later that morning, Gray emailed Murphy thanking him for his statement, and
responding to his May 6 email inquiries as follows:
In regards to your questions, all are barred from talking during the time of the
investigation in any circumstance. After the investigation is concluded – if any 25
one starts conversing about it and those conversations become a distraction to
the workplace anyone involved in conversing could face disciplinary action in
accordance with the handbook.
(GC Exh. 2).10 Gray also sent a second email to Murphy on May 9, informing him that, “[a]s 30
long as you have read and acknowledged that you read and received the memo concerning
Rumors it is your option to sign the document but the policy will still apply. In regards to
your question below, I responded to you separately this morning.” She reiterated the ban on
and warning about anyone discussing the investigation. (Id.) Thus, there is no doubt that this
policy prohibiting discussion about the investigation applied to “all” employees. 35

9 Of note, Murphy testified that Marino only showed him the memo on the computer, and that
he later saw the paper copy, posted above the security officers’ sign-in sheet, with a document
next to it instructing to read and sign. There was no dispute that this memo was issued for all
of the guards at the research center facility. (Tr. 35, 145–148).
10 On the same morning, Gray emailed David McAllister, Respondent’s Vice President of
Human Resources in Kennesaw, GA, informing him that they had investigated a hotline call,
and “informed all Officers not to discuss the investigation with anyone.” She sought his
advice “to make sure that I respond” to Murphy’s concerns “correctly.” McAllister told her to
tell Murphy that they were “barring him from talking during the time of the investigation in
any circumstance,” and that after it concluded, he could be disciplined if his discussions
became a distraction in the workplace. (Jt. Ex. 4).
JD–78-17
6
Murphy testified that he was concerned that the memo he was instructed to sign was
“extremely broad and that people’s jobs were going to be in jeopardy if they decided to
actually follow through on the threat, you know, of disciplinary action.” He stated that he
discussed the memo with Marino, Brown and two fellow officers, Campbell and Nick 5
Hassenzahl. He testified that they were all concerned, and that Campbell also sent an email to
Shuler indicating that he would not sign the memo. (Tr. 36–37). Murphy further testified that
he interpreted Gray’s prohibition on discussing the investigation as prohibiting him from
talking about “any work conditions at all” to any other employees. He gave an example of
how discussions about a problematic supervisor would constitute a working condition, but 10
might also be considered gossip. He disagreed that nothing in the aforementioned
memoranda precluded him from discussing working conditions with fellow employees, and
believed that nonwork-related idle talk would include communications about unionizing. (Tr.
39, 42–43, 46–49, 55). Nevertheless, Murphy never received discipline in connection with
his refusal to sign the memo. 15
Pope, the only witness for Respondent, testified that he believed Respondent issued
the memo prohibiting gossip and other nonwork-related idle talk because Brown had
complained about employees gossiping about his complaint. In addition, he insisted that
Respondent’s rules and directives prohibiting gossip and idle chitchat, and requiring that 20
employees not discuss (or record) internal investigations, are rock solid because they comply
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC’s) guidelines for
investigating discrimination and harassment claims. He testified that Respondent, like the
EEOC, wants to ensure that witnesses, like Brown, feel free to come forth and provide
“unvarnished, untainted, uninfluenced” truthful statements. (Tr. 110–111, 122–124; R. Exh. 25
4).
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
The Board has long recognized the right of employees to communicate in the 30
workplace, which includes the right to discuss with each other hours, wages and other terms
and conditions of employment. Parexel Int’l., LLC, 356 NLRB 516, 518 (2011), citing
Aroostook County Regional Ophthalmology Center, 317 NLRB 218, 220 (1995), enfd. in part
81 F.3d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
35
In determining whether a work rule violates Section 8(a)(1), the appropriate inquiry is
whether the rule would reasonably tend to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7
rights. Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 825 (1998), enfd. 203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
If the rule explicitly restricts Section 7 rights, it is unlawful. Lutheran Heritage Village-
Livonia, 343 NLRB 646, 646 (2004). If it does not, a violation is established by showing that 40
1) employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the
rule was promulgated in response to protected activity; and/or (3) the rule has been applied to
restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights. Id. at 647. In addition, maintenance of the rule may
be deemed unlawful even absent any evidence of enforcement. Lafayette Park Hotel, above
at 825. The Board has explained that where an employer does not intend for a rule to extend 45
to or prohibit protected activity, the employer’s lawful intent must be “clearly communicated
JD–78-17
7
to the employees.” Id. at 828. Further, it is well settled that “any ambiguity in a rule must be
construed against the Respondent as the promulgator of the rule.” Id., citing
Norris/O’Bannon, 307 NLRB 1236, 1245 (1992).
A. Respondent’s Officer Handbook Rules violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.5
Respondent’s Acceptable Usage and Electronic Communications Policy rules on
recording and cameras, maintained since November 9, 2015, state in relevant part as follows:
 Recording: You may not record communications at work. Tape 10
recording disciplinary sessions and/or investigations are not permitted.
 Cameras: Employees must not take pictures while on duty unless
required by Post Orders or when directed by your Supervisor or Manager. This
applies to cell phone cameras and/or any other photographic or video devices.
15
****
Note: Nothing in this policy is intended or should be construed to infringe
upon an individual's legal rights or their right to engage in a protected
concerted activity.
20
(Jt. Exh. 1 at 46; Jt. Exh. 3). The only question regarding these handbook rules is
whether or not employees would reasonably construe them to prohibit Section 7 activity.
There is no evidence that either of these rules was promulgated and maintained in response to
union or other protected activity or expressly issued to restrict Section 7 rights.
25
I find both of these policies are overbroad, despite the savings clause at the end noting
that it is not intended nor should it be construed to interfere with an individual’s legal rights or
right to engage in protected concerted activity. The recording policy forbids employees from
recording any communications at all while at work, including disciplinary sessions and
investigations. The cameras policy prohibits all picture taking and videotaping while on duty, 30
regardless of location, without prior authorization. The Board has established that “employee
photographing and videotaping is protected by Section 7 when employees are acting in
concert for their mutual aid and protection and no overriding employer interest is present.”
Rio All-Suites Hotel & Casino, 362 NLRB No. 190, slip op. at 4–5 (2015). The Board in Rio
All-Suites Hotel cited examples of types of protected conduct potentially affected by such a 35
rule, such as employees recording and documenting employees picketing, unsafe work
equipment or conditions, discussions about terms and conditions of employment and
discriminatory application of employer rules. Id, citing Hyundai America Shipping Agency,
Inc., 357 NLRB 860, 860, 871 (2011) enfd. in part and reversed in part, 805 F.3d 309 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (finding unlawful a rule barring employees from disclosing “information or 40
messages” from company email, instant messaging and phone systems, except to “authorized
persons.”). In its finding, the Board also relied on White Oak Manor, 353 NLRB 795, 795 fn.
2, 798–799 (2009) (finding photography to be part of the “res gestae of employee’s protected
concerted activity in documenting inconsistent enforcement of employer dress code”),
reaffirmed and incorporated by reference at 355 NLRB No. 211 (2010), enfd. 452 Fed.Appx. 45
374 (4th Cir. 2011); and Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 303 NLRB 1007, 1013 (1991) (finding
JD–78-17
8
tape recording in the workplace to support federal investigation protected), enfd. mem. 976
F.2d 743 (11th Cir. 1992). Id.
In T-Mobile USA, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 171, slip op. at 4–5 (2016), the Board
overturned the judge’s conclusion and relied on the decisions in Rio All-Suites Hotel & 5
Casino, above, and Whole Foods Market, 363 NLRB No. 87, slip op. at 4 fn. 11 (2015)
(finding unlawful a rule prohibiting all recording of conversations, calls, images or company
meetings with a camera or other recording device without prior management approval) in
finding that “employer rules broadly prohibiting recording in the workplace on employees’
own time and in nonwork areas restricted Section 7 activity in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of 10
the Act.” In T-Mobile, the respondent’s rule restricted employees from using cameras and
audio and recording devices in the workplace without certain management authorization. The
Board in T-Mobile determined that the respondent’s rules were not justified by its “general
interest in maintaining employee privacy, protecting confidential information, and promoting
open communications.” T-Mobile, above, slip op. at 5. 15
In this case, the rules do not indicate, explicitly or implicitly, that they are designed to
protect the privacy of customers or other legitimate business interests. Rather, they
unqualifiedly prohibit all workplace recording and any unauthorized photography. I find
unpersuasive Respondent’s argument and testimony (by Pope) that their security business is 20
so unique and exceptionally linked to securing their clients’ confidential information,
employees and property that it is common sense that Respondent’s employees would
reasonably understand the rules to represent a legitimate means of protecting client privacy,
and not as interfering with or prohibiting protected activity. The rules here, like those in T-
Mobile, Whole Foods Market and Rio All-Suites Hotel, above, fail to differentiate between 25
Section 7 protected recordings and photographing and those that are not protected. Further,
Respondent’s rules fail to qualify whether or not employees would be permitted to use their
cameras or recording equipment to capture unfair labor practices in break or other
nonworking areas or during nonworking, break or meal times.11 The language “while on
duty” in the cameras rule does not cure this defect. Thus, I find that employees would 30
reasonably construe these broad rules to prevent them from documenting unsafe or hazardous
working conditions, work injuries, inconsistent application of employer rules or other unfair
labor practices.
I have considered all of Respondent’s arguments in support of these rules, and reject 35
them as insufficient justifications for the rules’ broad restrictions. Respondent relies heavily
on its savings clause at the end of these rules. First, Respondent argues that this case is
distinguishable from the decisions in which the Board found similar policies unlawful because

11 Thus, I dismiss Respondent’s assertion that its recording and photography policies, unlike
those in Whole Foods Markets, above, slip op. at 1, and Rio All-Suites Hotel, above, slip op. at
4, in that they explicitly limit recording in the workplace or during an investigatory session
and photographing in the workplace while on duty. As previously stated, Respondent’s rules
do not distinguish between nonworking time and working time for recording, nor do they
define what is meant while on duty or specify whether or not employees may take pictures
during breaks or in nonworking areas.
JD–78-17
9
the policies in those cases did not include similar savings clauses or language informing
employees that the rules did not, and were not meant to, interfere with their protected
concerted activity.12 It is true that in some circumstances, “an employer’s express notice to
employees advising them of their rights under the Act may, in certain circumstances, clarify
the scope of an otherwise ambiguous and unlawful rule.” See First Transit, Inc., 360 NLRB 5
619, 621–622 (2014). However, I agree with the General Counsel in this case that the
provision following the overly broad recording and cameras rules does not make them lawful.
In First Transit, Inc., the Board found that the respondent’s policy stating that the
employer supported employees’ right to vote for or against the union without ‘influence or 10
interference from management’ was too narrow. It held that “[a]n effective ‘safe harbor’
provision of this kind, also referred to as a ‘savings clause,’ should adequately address the
broad panoply of rights protected by Section 7.” (Id.) The Board recognized that a savings
clause clarifies the scope of an “otherwise ambiguous” policy, but that in the case before it,
the savings clause failed to “ensure that employees would not read otherwise overbroad rules 15
as restricting their Section 7 rights.” Therefore, the question is whether or not employees
would reasonably understand a savings clause to permit the type of protected activity that the
rule associated with it implicitly bans. Although the savings clause in the instant case is
placed directly underneath the rules it purports to address, I find that employees would not
reasonably understand it to allow them to engage in protected activity as described above by 20
documenting through recording or photography safety violations or unfair labor practices.
Nor does Respondent’s safety clause set forth any explanation or examples of protected
activity such that employees understand in layman’s terms what Respondent means by
protected concerted activity. See Ingram Book Co., 315 NLRB 515, 516 fn. 2 (1994)
(explaining that “rank-and-file employees do not generally carry lawbooks to work or apply 25
legal analysis to company rules as do lawyers, and cannot be expected to have the same
expertise to examine company rules from a legal standpoint.”)
I also reject Respondent’s argument that this case is distinct from G4S Secure
Solutions, 364 NLRB No. 92, slip op. at 5–6, where the Board held the employer’s disclaimer 30
was insufficient because it failed to inform employees that its policy did not prohibit conduct
protected by Section 7. Respondent claims that its savings clause essentially tracks the
language of Section 7 in its declaration that the policy would not infringe upon employees’
right to engage in protected concerted activities. However, as stated above, the legal term
“protected concerted activity” under Section 7 does not specify for employees examples of 35
what protected concerted activities are permitted under the rules. Although the savings clause
language identifies the particular federal law, it does not adequately clarify the scope of
Respondent’s overly broad rules.
In the same vein, I reject Respondent’s contention that similar disclaimers were found 40
sufficient to uphold the legality of challenged confidentiality and social media policies by an

12 See R. Br. at 13–15, citing Whole Foods Markets, 363 NLRB No. 87, slip op. at 3; G4S
Secure Solutions, 364 NLRB No. 92, slip op. at 5–6 (2016); Rio All-Suites Hotel and Casino,
362 NLRB No. 190, slip op. at 4; or Verizon Wireless, JD-40-17, slip op. at 11–13 (May 25,
2017).
JD–78-17
10
administrative law judge (Tiffany & Co., Case No. 01–CA–111287, at 9–11 (Davis, ALJ Aug.
5, 2014)) and in a Division of Advice memorandum (Cox Communications, Inc., Case No.
17–CA–087612, at 5 (Div. of Advice) (Oct. 19, 2012)), respectively. First, the decision and
guidance are not legal precedent, and I must follow current Board law unless or until it has
been reversed by the Supreme Court.13 Nevertheless, Respondent’s reliance on them is 5
misplaced. The savings clause in Tiffany & Co. specifically tracked the language of the
prohibition against disclosing confidential information and provided that the policy did not
apply to actions specifically barred by the rule such as communicating with fellow employees
or others about wages, benefits or other terms and condition of employment “in the exercise
of their statutory rights to organize or to act for their individual or mutual benefit under the 10
[NLRA] or other laws.” Similarly, the savings clause addressed in the advice memorandum
specifically provided examples of the types of communications permitted by employees.
Contrary to Respondent’s assertion, and as stated above, its policy does not contain a similar
disclaimer.
15
Next, Respondent asserts that its employees (and everyone else) would readily
recognize the legitimate business reasons and special circumstances for which these rules
were promulgated, and not believe that they would interfere with Section 7 activity, given the
unique role that it has in the security industry of protecting customers’ people, property and
information. Respondent argues that unlike other employers, Respondent’s security guards 20
usually work in a facility owned and operated by one of its customers. As such, they must
abide by the rules and policies of the customers, including their demands and expectation for
“complete confidentiality and privacy,” and in some cases, their requirement that Respondent
execute nondisclosure and confidentiality agreements. (Tr. 92–93; R. Br. at 17). In addition,
Respondent relies on evidence presented of industry standards and laws requiring 25
confidentiality such as trade industry codes, state regulations and federal regulations such as
the Safety Act. Respondent, through Pope, testified that its DHS certification, enabling it to
provide security to certain customers which involves fighting terrorism and otherwise
ensuring national security, resulted from DHS review of its handbook practices and policies,
including its recording and cameras policies. As such, Respondent insists that my finding 30
these rules unlawful “would explicitly conflict with the DHS’s certification and sanctioning of
those rules, and would run afoul of Supreme Court precedent that requires consideration of
‘equally important Congressional objectives,’ i.e. national security interests.” (R. Br. at 20–
21, quoting Southern S.S. Co., 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942) and citing Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Union, Local, 770 U.S. 235, 250 (1970)). Respondent also relies on Hoffman Plastic 35
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151 (2002) to support its argument that the Board is
required to defer to local and federal licensing and regulation of the security industry, and
must not preempt such laws by a finding that its policies violate the Act. (R. Br. at 21–22).
However, the findings in those cases are not applicable here. There is no evidence in this case
that DHS required that these rules be placed in Respondent’s officer’s handbook, nor was40
there any evidence that DHS or any other government agency or regulation required them to

13 See Pathmark Stores, 342 NLRB 378 fn. 1 (2004); Hebert Industrial Insulation Corp., 312
NLRB 602, 608 (1993); Lumber & Mill Employers Assn., 265 NLRB 199 fn. 2 (1982), enfd.
736 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 934 (1984).

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11
encompass such a far range of activities such that employees would reasonably interpret them
to infringe upon their Section 7 rights. Further, Pope acknowledged that Respondent’s
customers were extremely diverse and included many businesses that did not involve
protecting national security, other heightened security interests or the Safety Act.
5
Respondent also relies on the Board’s decision in Flagstaff Medical Center, Inc., 357
NLRB 659 (2011) to support its argument that its special circumstances justify a no
photography policy. Flagstaff Medical Center is distinguishable as it involved the protection
of privacy of hospital patients and their confidential medical records. In Flagstaff, the Board
found lawful a hospital’s rule banning employee use of electronic equipment during worktime 10
and of cameras “for recording or photographing images of patients and/or hospital equipment,
property or facilities.” Flagstaff, above, slip op. at 4–5. The Board found that the “privacy
interests of hospital patients are weighty, and [the employer] has a significant interest in
preventing the wrongful disclosure of individually identifiable health information, including by
unauthorized photography.” Id. I find Respondent’s insistence that its unique business as a 15
security provider is similar to the medical center in Flagstaff unpersuasive. A finding, as
Respondent suggests, that all of its customers have “weighty” privacy interests would run afoul of
the applicable legal standards. It would also be contrary to Pope’s testimony showing that only
some of Respondent’s customers, such as hospitals, required heightened security, while others,
such as fast food restaurants and other types of businesses did not. And, “[u]nlike the rule in 20
Flagstaff, which expressly referenced ‘recording images of patients,’” the rules at issue here
do not indicate “that they are designed to protect privacy or other legitimate interests,” such as
sensitive hospital patient information, images of patients or patients themselves. Instead, they
generally prohibit all recordings and photography no matter the facility or circumstance. Rio
All-Suites Hotel, 362 NLRB No. 190, slip op. at 4–5. I also reject Respondent’s contention that 25
it would be too inefficient and unduly burdensome for it to have to adjust its handbook rules for
its officers working at each of its customers’ facilities. The handbook certainly could be modified
such that its rules do not invade employees’ Section 7 rights. Further, the evidence presented did
not support a finding that the Samsung facilities required such heightened security, or that their
security needs would not be satisfied with a suitable explanation in its rules.30
In G4S Secure Solutions, above, slip op. at 7, the Board found no evidence of “identifiable
government policy to justify the judge’s presumption that all” of the respondent’s clients have
common privacy concerns of comparable weight,” or “privacy interests similar to those
articulated in Flagstaff.” I disagree with Respondent’s argument that G4S Secure Solutions is not 35
applicable here because it submitted sufficient evidence of its legitimate business reasons for its
rules, including documentation of some of its customers’ privacy interests and requirements,
government regulations and DHS and EEOC requirements. It is true that the Board in G4S Secure
Solutions found that “such a presumption cannot simply be founded on the fact that the
Respondent provides ‘security’ services.” However, as previously stated, I find that the 40
government agency guidelines and regulations presented in this case do not support a finding that
all of Respondent’s customers have similar privacy concerns of comparable weight such that they
justify such a blanket prohibition on recording, picture taking and videotaping that would
reasonably be read to prohibit Section 7 activity.
45
Next, Respondent’s assertion that their rules are lawful because no employees have
ever complained about them, or been disciplined for violating them, is without merit. The
JD–78-17
12
applicable standard set forth to evaluate these rules is not based on subjective interpretations
or evidence of discipline. As stated, maintenance of the rules may be deemed unlawful even
absent any evidence of enforcement. Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB at 825. Similarly, I
reject the argument that these rules should remain in effect because the Board has previously
reviewed Respondent’s entire handbook in connection with another unfair labor practice 5
charge involving a solicitation policy in another region. The circumstances in that case,
which resulted in a notice posting, are irrelevant to those in this case. (R. Br. at 4, citing R.
Exh. 4 and Tr. 65–67).
I have considered all of Respondent’s evidence and arguments in support of its special 10
circumstances and justification for its rules, but find they are insufficient to justify the overly
broad recording and cameras rules in this case.14 These rules, even with the savings clause,
would reasonably be construed to interfere with employees’ Section 7 rights. Therefore, I
find their promulgation and maintenance violate Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
15
B. Respondent’s Rule Not to Discuss an Internal Investigation is Unlawful
On April 26, Respondent, through Shuler and Gray, orally directed Murphy not to
discuss with anyone the ongoing investigation, or the underlying incident, which involved
Brown’s discrimination claim. On May 9, Gray, in response to Murphy’s inquiry, 20
Respondent explained the rule in writing:
[A]ll are barred from talking during the time of the investigation in any
circumstance. After the investigation is concluded – if any one starts
conversing about it and those conversations become a distraction to the 25
workplace anyone involved in conversing could face disciplinary action in
accordance with the handbook.
(GC Exh. 2) In doing so, Gray confirmed that the rule was applicable to all employees, and
extended it to circumstances beyond the investigation and in perpetuity. 30
The General Counsel alleges that Respondent unlawfully promulgated and maintained
this rule in response to Murphy’s questioning the ban on discussing the investigation, and
therefore in order to discourage employees from engaging in protected concerted activity, i.e.,
discussing the investigation. Therefore, the initial questions here are whether the rule was 35
promulgated in response to employees’ Section 7 activity, and whether employees would
reasonably construe the rule to prohibit their Section 7 activity. Lutheran Heritage Village-
Livonia, 343 NLRB at 646–647.
The Board has established that in order for a ban on employee discussions about 40
ongoing investigations to be lawful, an employer must show a legitimate and substantial

14 Respondent contends that it would have provided additional evidence of its special
circumstances if permitted by me. However, Pope was allowed to provide ample relevant
testimony in support of Respondent’s special circumstances as a security provider. (Tr. 93–
105).
JD–78-17
13
business justification that outweighs employees’ Section 7 rights. See Advanced Services,
Inc., 363 NLRB No. 71, slip op. at 3–4 (2015); Banner Health System, 362 NLRB No. 137,
slip op. at 2–3 (2015); Hyundai America Shipping Agency, 357 NLRB at 874, enfd. in
relevant part, 805 F.3d 309 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Caesar’s Palace, 336 NLRB 271, 272 fn. 6
(2001). In Banner Health, the Board emphasized that “it is the employer’s burden to justify a 5
prohibition on employees discussing a particular ongoing investigation.” The Board also
stated that “the employer must proceed on a case-by-case basis;” must not “reflexively impose
confidentiality requirements in all cases or in all cases of a particular type; and must
determine “that confidentiality is necessary in a particular case…based on objectively
reasonable grounds for believing that the integrity of the investigation will be compromised 10
without confidentiality.” Banner Health, above at slip op. at 3. In Caesars Palace, the Board
recognized the confidentiality in investigations rule intruded on employees’ Section 7 right to
discuss with each other internal investigations; however, it found that the employer’s need for
confidentiality during a drug investigation was a “substantial business justification” that
outweighed interference with employees’ exercise of their Section 7 rights. Id. The employer 15
in that case showed that it imposed the rule in that case to protect witnesses, and ensure
evidence was not destroyed and testimony was not fabricated. Id. The Court of Appeals
enforced the Board’s order that the confidentiality rule was so broad that the Board
“reasonably concluded” that the employer did not establish a legitimate business reason.
Caesar’s Palace, 336 NLRB 271, 272 (2001). In Hyundai, the Board adopted the Judge’s 20
rejection of the employer’s justification that the rule was necessary to protect the victim,
witnesses and the accused harasser; “to preserve confidentiality consistent with the [EEOC]
guidelines and state and federal courts;” and “to avoid potential liability from accused
harassers in defamation and other causes of action;” Hyundai, above at 873–874.
25
The next question is whether Respondent’s stated business justification sufficiently
and legitimately outweighs employees’ Section 7 rights. I find that Respondent has not
shown that it conducted an analysis to determine if the integrity of its investigation would
have been compromised without the ban on employees discussing it. Pope, Respondent’s
only witness, who did not interview the employees or issue the directive and rule to Murphy 30
and the other employees, testified that he believed the rule was implemented because Brown
complained that people were gossiping about his discrimination case and to prevent
harassment.15 However, Shuler and Gray orally banned Murphy from discussing the
investigation during his interview and before Gray issued the written ban. There was no
unequivocal, non-hearsay evidence that either the oral or written rule was issued after or in 35
response to Brown’s complaint that others were gossiping about him or his case. Nor was
there evidence that Gray mentioned justification of the rule or the alleged gossip complaints
when she sought advice from McAllister.
Additionally, I find the latter part of the rule is ambiguous in that an employee would 40
reasonably be unsure about how and when a post-investigation conversation would become

15 Respondent did not call Shuler, Gray or Gonzalez to testify regarding justification for the rule.
Although Pope testified that he was involved with updating handbook rules, there was no
evidence that he participated in the prohibition on employees discussing the investigation or
underlying incident which involved Murphy and other employees.
JD–78-17
14
distracting and whether such conversations would encompass protected activity. “The
ambiguity of this admonition gives the employer great discretion in defining it and in deciding
when to impose discipline—enough discretion to invalidate the rule under established law.”
See Advance Transportation Co., 310 NLRB 920, 925 (1993). Thus, any ambiguity in a rule
should be construed against the employer. Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB at 825, citing5
Norris/O'Bannon, 307 NLRB 1236 at 1245.
Respondent also argues that it must follow EEOC rules and guidelines in harassment
cases in order to maintain confidentiality by keeping records and other information
confidential, and by creating an environment where investigation participants can speak 10
freely. However, similar assertions regarding EEOC guidelines and expectations have been
rejected by the Board. See Hyundai, above, which has not been overturned by the Board or
the Supreme Court. Respondent distinguishes this case from Banner Health System, above,
slip op. at 2; however, I have found that Respondent did not present sufficient justification for
its rule. 15
Thus, I find that Respondent’s prohibition on employee discussion of the investigation
unlawfully restricts employees’ Section 7 rights, and that employees would reasonably
understand it to do so. Accordingly, I find that this rule violates Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
20
C. Respondent’s Anti-Gossip, Idle Talk and Rumor Spreading Policy violates
Section 8(a) (1) of the Act
On about May 6, 2016, Respondent promulgated, and has since maintained, the
following rule: “Please refrain from gossiping and excessive none [sic] work related idle talk 25
and rumor spreading while in the work place. Remain vigilant and helpful and keep our
conversations professional, the work place [is] not the place for gossip and idle talk.” (Jt.
Exh. 2). The General Counsel alleges that Respondent also issued this rule in response to
Murphy’s questioning of Respondent’s ban on discussing the investigation in order to restrict
employees’ Section 7 rights. Although the Board has upheld an employer’s right to prohibit 30
gossip, I agree with the General Counsel that the Board has also found no gossip policies
unlawful where the language was “overly broad, ambiguous, and severely restricted
employees from discussing or complaining about terms and conditions of employment.” See
Laurus Technical Institute, 360 NLRB 1155, 1163 (2014) (adopting the administrative law
judge’s finding that an overly broad no gossip policy violated the Act). 35
I find that this case is distinguishable from Hyundai, in which the Board overturned
the administrative law judge’s finding that the respondents’ rule prohibiting employees from
engaging in “harmful gossip” violated the Act. The Board found that the respondent’s no
gossip rule “merely [prohibited] gossip,” defined in Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 40
(10th ed. 1999) as “rumor or report of an intimate nature” or “chatty talk,” and did not deal
with “employee conversations generally, which would implicitly include protected concerted
activity.” Hyundai, above at 861. The no-gossip or idle talk rule in this case issued almost
immediately following the oral rule banning employees from discussing the underlying
investigation and incident in this case, on the same day as Murphy’s email inquiry to Gray 45
and only 3 days before the written ban. In fact, the rule’s issuance in such close proximity to
JD–78-17
15
the confidentiality rule regarding investigations and Murphy’s inquiry, leads me to believe
that Respondent promulgated it in response to Murphy’s inquiry about the parameters of the
oral ban and concerns about restricting employees from discussing the investigation. I have
found that restricting employee discussion about the investigation and incident violated the
Act by chilling employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. Therefore, I find that in 5
this context, this rule was issued in response to employees’ protected activity, and that it
would easily lead employees to understand it to restrict their Section 7 rights to discuss terms
and conditions of their employment with each other. Indeed, Murphy testified that he and the
other officers were concerned with the constraints of this rule.
10
Further, I find this rule is ambiguous and overly broad in that it not only prohibits
mere gossip, but also undefined nonwork related idle talk and rumor spreading in the
workplace. The unrestricted rule would reasonably lead employees to construe it to generally
limit any non-work related discussions, including those involving subjects such as union
organizing, or even about terms and conditions of employment not directly related to their 15
security guard duties. Moreover, it does not restrict such ambiguous talk to work areas and
during working time, such that employees would reasonably believe it to ban them from such
talk during lunch and other breaks or in nonworking areas. Thus, I agree with the General
Counsel that such broad prohibitions, with no defined “areas of permissible conduct in a
manner clear to employees” are unlawful. (GC Br. 16–17, citing American Cast Iron Pipe 20
Co., 234 NLRB 1126 (1978)). See also Hyundai, above at 871 (“employees should not have
to decide at their own peril what information is not lawfully subject to such a prohibition”).
For the reasons cited above, I also reject Respondent’s reliance on Lytton Rancheria of
California, 361 NLRB No. 148, slip op. at 1, 3 (2014), and similar cases cited, where the 25
Board held that a policy prohibiting gossip about other coworkers, including supervisors, was
lawful. (R. Br. 28). Unlike this case, the rules in those cases were not issued in close
proximity to other unlawful rules, were not issued in response or to interfere with employees’
protected concerted activities and/or not limited to mere gossip or rumor spreading. See Hills
and Dales General Hospital, 360 NLRB 611, 617 (2014) (employer’s right to prohibit gossip 30
does not make the entirety of its rule containing a gossip ban lawful). And, for the reasons set
forth above, I reject Respondent’s justification for this rule. Pope’s belief that it was issued in
response to Brown’s complaints that people were gossiping about his discrimination claim is
insufficient and does not outweigh employees’ right to discuss internal investigations
involving themselves or other employees. Accordingly, I find that this overbroad and 35
ambiguous rule interferes with employees’ Section 7 rights in violation of Section 8(a) (1) of
the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
40
By maintaining unlawful handbook rules, prohibiting employees from discussing an
internal investigation and promulgating and maintaining a rule prohibiting gossip and
excessive nonwork related idle talk and rumor spreading, Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section Section 8(a) (1) and
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.45
JD–78-17
16
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall
order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act. It must rescind the overbroad, unlawful Security Officer 5
Handbook rules in all of its facilities nationwide, and furnish all current employees employed
at its facilities nationwide an insert for its current handbook that (1) advise that the unlawful
rules have been rescinded, or (2) provide lawfully worded rules on adhesive backing that will
cover the unlawful rules; or publish and distribute to all current employees in its facilities
nationwide revised handbooks that (1) do not contain the unlawful rules, or (2) provide 10
lawfully worded rules. This is the appropriate remedy for the violation concerning these
unlawful handbook rules given Respondent’s admission that these handbook rules have been
distributed to all of its employees nationwide, regardless of the type of facility in which they
work. As requested by the General Counsel, the required affirmative remedial action properly
includes posting a notice to employees regarding the unlawful recording and cameras rules in 15
all of Respondent’s facilities nationwide. See Banner Health System, 362 NLRB No. 137,
slip op. 1 & fn. 3.
However, this general remedy does not extend to all of Respondent’s employees in all
facilities nationwide with regards to the prohibition on investigation discussions and the rule 20
banning gossip, nonwork idle talk and rumor spreading, as there was no evidence that these
rules affected employees outside of Austin, Texas and Respondent’s employees working in
facilities there.
Respondent must rescind, in writing, the overbroad, unlawful prohibition on 25
employees discussing internal investigations, and advise all current employees working in
Austin, Texas facilities in writing (1) that the unlawful prohibition has been rescinded, or (2)
provide lawfully worded rules.
Respondent must rescind, in writing, the overbroad, ambiguous, unlawful prohibition 30
on employees from gossiping and excessive nonwork related idle talk and rumor spreading
while in the workplace, and advise all current employees working in “Austin, Texas facilities
in writing (1) that the unlawful prohibition has been rescinded, or (2) provide a lawfully
worded rule.
35
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended16

16 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations,
the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the
Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all
purposes.
JD–78-17
17
ORDER
The Respondent, Securitas Security Services, USA, Austin, Texas, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall
5
1. Cease and desist from
a. Maintaining overly broad, unlawful recording and cameras policies in
its Security Officer Handbook, which prohibit its employees from and subject them to
discipline for taking pictures while on duty unless required by post orders or when directed by 10
their supervisor or manager, including with use of cell phone cameras and/or any other
photographic or video devices.
b. Prohibiting employees from talking to each other or anyone else about
internal investigations.15
c. Promulgating and maintaining a rule prohibiting employees from
gossiping and engaging in excessive nonwork related idle talk and rumor spreading while in
the workplace.
20
d. In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the
Act.25
a. Within 14 days from this Order, rescind or modify the language in its
recording and camera policies to the extent that it bars employees from taking pictures while
on duty unless required by post orders or when directed by their supervisor or manager,
including use of cell phone cameras and/or any other photographic or video devices. 30
b. Within 14 days from this Order, rescind the prohibition on employees
from discussing with anyone internal investigations.
c. Within 14 days from this Order, rescind or modify the rule prohibiting 35
employees from gossiping and excessive nonwork related idle talk and rumor spreading while
in the workplace.
d. Furnish all current employees at all of Respondent’s facilities
nationwide with inserts for the Security Officer Handbook that (i) advise that the unlawful 40
rules have been rescinded, or (ii) provide the language of lawful rules on adhesive backing
that will cover or correct the unlawful rules; or publish and distribute a revised Security
Officer Handbook policy that (i) does not include the unlawful rules, or (ii) provides the
language of lawful provisions.
45
JD–78-17
18
e. Within 14 days after service by the Region, post copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix A” at all facilities where its employees work or are assigned in
Austin, Texas, and the attached notice marked “Appendix B” at all of the facilities nationwide
where it has distributed its Security Officer Handbook to its employees.17 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 16, after being signed by the 5
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for
60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be
distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or
other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by 10
such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency
of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved
in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of
the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any 15
time since November 9, 2015.
f. Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional
Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region
attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.20
Dated, Washington, D.C. September 28, 2017
Donna N. Dawson25
Administrative Law Judge

17 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice
reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.”
4/04.w ,axed4,
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain provisions in our Security Officer Handbook which prohibit you from
and subject you to discipline for taking pictures while on duty unless required by post orders
or when directed by your supervisor or manager, including with use of cell phone cameras
and/or any other photographic or video devices.
WE WILL NOT prohibit you from talking to each other or anyone else about internal
investigations.
WE WILL NOT prohibit you, orally or in writing, from gossiping and engaging in excessive
nonwork related idle talk and rumor spreading while in the workplace.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL rescind or modify the recording and cameras policies in the Security Officer
Handbook to the extent that they bar you from taking pictures while on duty unless required
by post orders or when directed by their supervisor or manager, including with use of cell
phone cameras and/or any other photographic or video devices.
WE WILL rescind the prohibition on you discussing with each other or anyone else internal
investigations.
WE WILL furnish you with inserts for the Security Officer Handbook that (i) advise that the
unlawful rules have been rescinded, or (ii) provide the language of lawful rules on adhesive
backing that will cover or correct the unlawful rules; or publish and distribute a revised
Security Officer Handbook policy that (i) does not include the unlawful rules, or (ii) provides
the language of lawful provisions.
SECECURITAS SECURITY SERVICES, USA
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to
enforce the National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine
whether employees want union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor
practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and how
to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the
Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s
website: www.nlrb.gov.
819 Taylor Street, Room 8A24, Fort Worth, TX 76102-6178
(817) 978-2921, Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/16-CA-176006
or by using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the
Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington,
D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE
DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY
ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE
REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (817) 978-2941.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain provisions in our Security Officer Handbook which prohibit you from
and subject you to discipline for taking pictures while on duty unless required by post orders
or when directed by your supervisor or manager, including with use of cell phone cameras
and/or any other photographic or video devices.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL rescind or modify the recording and cameras policies in the Security Officer
Handbook to the extent that they bar you from taking pictures while on duty unless required
by post orders or when directed by their supervisor or manager, including with use of cell
phone cameras and/or any other photographic or video devices.
WE WILL furnish you with inserts for the Security Officer Handbook that (i) advise that the
unlawful rules have been rescinded, or (ii) provide the language of lawful rules on adhesive
backing that will cover or correct the unlawful rules; or publish and distribute a revised
Security Officer Handbook policy that (i) does not include the unlawful rules, or (ii) provides
the language of lawful provisions.
SECURITAS SECURITY SERVICES, USA
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/16-CA-176006
or by using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the
Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington,
D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940.
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to
enforce the National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine
whether employees want union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor
practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and how
to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the
Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s
website: www.nlrb.gov.
819 Taylor Street, Room 8A24, Fort Worth, TX 76102-6178
(817) 978-2921, Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE
DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY
ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE
REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (817) 978-2941.