Sebrenia Amacker, Appellant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Pacific/Western Region), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 24, 1999
01974738 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 24, 1999)

01974738

06-24-1999

Sebrenia Amacker, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Pacific/Western Region), Agency.


Sebrenia Amacker, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal No. 01974738

v. ) Agency No. 4F-900-1224-94

) Hearing No. 340-95-3935X

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

(Pacific/Western Region), )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

Appellant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of

unlawful employment discrimination on the bases of race (Black), sex

(female), and reprisal (prior EEO activity), in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

Appellant alleges she was discriminated against when the agency scheduled

a fitness-for-duty (FFD) examination for her in August of 1994.

The appeal is accepted in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001.

For the following reasons, the agency's decision is AFFIRMED as CLARIFIED.

The record reveals that appellant, a PS-5 Clerk at the agency's West

Los Angeles, California station was involved in an off-duty automobile

accident in December of 1993. Due to her injuries, appellant was given

light duty assignments starting in January 1994 and remained on light

duty until June 1, 1994, at which time she took time off for reasons

unrelated to the accident. On June 8, 1994, the agency initiated the

process to have appellant undergo a FFD examination. Appellant then

submitted a note from her physician dated July 25, 1994, releasing

her to return to full duty work with no physical restrictions. On or

about July 28, 1994, appellant was notified that she had been scheduled

to undergo a FFD examination on August 2, 1994, for injuries related

to her accident. However, appellant believed that due to submission

of her medical statement, the FFD examination was unnecessary.<1>

Believing she was a victim of discrimination, appellant sought EEO

counseling and, subsequently, filed a formal complaint on October

24, 1994. At the conclusion of the investigation, appellant received

a copy of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an

EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(e),

the AJ issued a Recommended Decision (RD) without a hearing finding

no discrimination.

The AJ initially concluded that appellant failed to demonstrate she was

an aggrieved employee, as the agency's requirement that she undergo a FFD

examination before she returned to her usual position did not cause her a

personal harm which affected a term, condition or privilege of employment.

As appellant was not aggrieved, the AJ concluded that she failed to

state a viable claim of discrimination. The AJ then found that should

the FFD examination be considered a sufficient personal harm, appellant

failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination because

she failed to demonstrate that similarly situated non-Black employees

on light duty were treated differently under similar circumstances.

However, the AJ found that appellant established a prima facie case of

sex discrimination as a similarly situated male employee was not sent for

a FFD examination after being out of work for physical reasons. The AJ

then concluded that the agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for its actions, namely, that FFD examinations are routinely

scheduled for employees unable to perform their full duties for extended

periods, and appellant had been on light duty for several months

before taking leave due to stress. The AJ found that appellant did not

establish that more likely than not, the agency's articulated reasons

were a pretext to mask unlawful sex discrimination. She also concluded

that appellant failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of reprisal

as there was no credible evidence that appellant's prior EEO activity

motivated the agency's scheduling of the FFD examination. The agency's

FAD adopted the AJ's RD. Appellant makes no new contentions on appeal,

and the agency requests that we affirm the FAD.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the

AJ's RD summarized the relevant facts and referenced the appropriate

regulations, policies, and laws. We note that contrary to the AJ's

finding, the Commission has held that being required to undergo a FFD

examination concerns a term, condition or privilege of employment,

and thus appellant was aggrieved such that she stated a claim of

discrimination under 29 C.F.R. � 1614.103. See Hughlette v. United States

Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01983227 (March 30, 1999). We further

find that appellant presented insufficient evidence to show that the

agency treated a similarly situated employee outside of her protected

group more favorably than she. In this regard, the Commission finds that

the male employee not required to have a FFD examination was not similarly

situated to appellant because, unlike appellant, he had been cleared to

return to duty by the agency medical unit and did not take leave from a

light duty job due to non-physical impairments. See Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1987). Notwithstanding the AJ's errors,

we agree with her ultimate finding that appellant failed to present

credible evidence that any of the agency's actions were in retaliation

for her prior EEO activity or were motivated by discriminatory animus

toward appellant's sex or race. We thus discern no basis to disturb

the AJ's findings of no discrimination which were based on a detailed

assessment of the record. Therefore, after a careful review of the record

and arguments and evidence not specifically addressed in this decision,

we AFFIRM the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in the

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive the decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive the decision. To ensure that your civil action is

considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS from the date that you receive the decision or to consult an attorney

concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction in which your

action would be filed. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil

action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph

above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

June 24, 1999

DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations1 The record reflects

that after completion of the FFD examination,

appellant returned to her usual position as

a Clerk.