Sea-Jet Trucking Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 29, 1999

327 N.L.R.B. 540 (N.L.R.B. 1999)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 540
Sea-Jet Trucking Corporation, A.P.A. Warehouses,
Inc., Affiliated Terminals, Incorporated, Sea-Jet
Industries Incorporated, and Sea-Jet Trucking
& A.P.A. Warehouse, Inc., a Single Employer
and International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Work-
ers of America, AFL–CIO. Case 29–CA–18500
January 29, 1999
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FOX, LIEBMAN, AND BRAME
On May 7, 1997, Administrative Law Judge Jesse
Kleiman issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the Union
filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions1 and
to adopt the recommended Order as modified.2
We agree with the judge that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing to bargain
with the Union concerning the effects on employees of
the Respondent’s relocation of its facility from Brooklyn,
New York, to Bloomfield, New Jersey.3 We further agree
that a Transmarine4 limited backpay remedy is warranted
to remedy the Respondent’s effects bargaining violation.
We find merit, however, in the Respondent’s exception
to the judge’s modification of the standard Transmarine
remedy to include in the backpay calculations the em-
ployees’ increased transportation costs or moving ex-
penses. Matters such as moving expenses or increased
transportation costs occasioned by the relocation of the
Respondent’s facility are issues over which the parties
may bargain pursuant to the Transmarine remedy. In our
view, however, they are not germane to backpay compu-
tations.
Additionally, we have modified the judge’s remedy to
conform with Transmarine remedy language changes
that the Board adopted subsequent to issuance of his de-
cision in this case.5 We have also modified his remedy to
delete general bargaining order language that does not
apply to the type of 8(a)(5) violations found here. Ac-
cordingly, an amended remedy is set forth below.

1 We deny the Union’s request for an award of attorney’s fees, as we
find that the Respondent’s defenses were not frivolous. See United
States Service Industries, 324 NLRB 834, 838 fn. 20 (1997); Frontier
Hotel & Casino, 318 NLRB 857 (1995), enf. denied in part 118 F.3d
795 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
2 We have modified the judge’s recommended Order to require the
Respondent to provide the Union with the information that it requested
without the necessity of making a new request. See I & F Corp., 322
NLRB 1037 fn. 1 (1997).
3 As the Respondent did not give the Union any advance notice of its
final decision to relocate, we find it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s
statements, in the second paragraph of sec. III,B of his decision, con-
cerning how far in advance an employer must notify a union when
selling a business or relocating a facility. See Compact Video Services,
319 NLRB 131 fn. 1 (1995).
4 Transmarine Navigation Corp., 170 NLRB 389 (1968).
AMENDED REMEDY
1. Delete the first two paragraphs of the judge’s rec-
ommended remedy and insert the following.
“Having found that the Respondent has engaged in un-
fair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act, we shall order that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.”
2. Insert the following at the end of the fourth para-
graph of the judge’s recommended remedy.
“Accordingly, we shall require the Respondent to pay
to the unit employees involved in the relocation in any
way their normal wages when in the Respondent’s em-
ploy from 5 days after the date of this decision until the
occurrence of the earliest of the following conditions: (1)
the date the Respondent bargains to agreement with the
Union on those subjects pertaining to the effects of the
relocation of the Respondent’s facility from Brooklyn,
New York to Bloomfield, New Jersey; (2) the date a
bona fide impasse in bargaining occurs; (3) the failure of
the Union to request bargaining within 5 business days
after receipt of this Decision, or to commence negotia-
tions within 5 business days after receipt of the Respon-
dent’s notice of its desire to bargain with the Union; or
(4) the subsequent failure of the Union to bargain in good
faith; but in no event shall the sum paid to any employee
exceed the amount that he or she would have earned as
wages from the date of the relocation of the Respon-
dent’s facility to the time he or she secured equivalent
employment; provided, however, that in no event shall
this sum be less than these employees would have earned
for a 2-week period at the rate of their normal wages
when last in the Respondent’s employ, with interest.”
3. Delete the twelfth paragraph of the judge’s recom-
mended remedy.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Sea-Jet
Trucking Corporation, A.P.A. Warehouse, Inc., Affili-
ated Terminals, Incorporated, Sea-Jet Industries, Incor-
porated, and Sea-Jet Trucking & A.P.A. Warehouses,
Inc., a single employer, Bloomfield, New Jersey, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the Order, as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(c).
“(c) Furnish to the Union in a timely fashion the informa-
tion requested by the Union in its May 10, May 13, and
August 10, 1994 letters.”

5 See Melody Toyota, 325 NLRB 846 (1998).
327 NLRB No. 107
SEA JET TRUCKING CORP. 541
Rosalind Rowen, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Steven B. Horowitz, Esq. (Horowitz & Associates, P.C.), for the
Respondent.
Thomas W. Meiklejohn, Esq. (Livingston, Adler, Pulda & Meik-
lejohn, P.C.), for the Union.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JESSE KLEIMAN, Administrative Law Judge. Upon the basis
of a charge filed on August 31, 1994 by the International Un-
ion, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Imple-
ment Workers of America, AFL–CIO (UAW or the Union),
against Sea-Jet Trucking Corporation, A.P.A. Warehouses, Inc.,
Affiliated Terminals, Incorporated, Sea-Jet Industries Incorpo-
rated, and Sea-Jet Trucking & A.P.A. Warehouses, Inc., a Sin-
gle Employer (the Respondent, or the Employer), a complaint
and notice of hearing was issued on June 30, 1995, alleging that
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) and Section
2(6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act).1 By
answer timely filed the Respondent denied the material allega-
tions in the complaint.
A hearing was held before me in Brooklyn, New York, on
July 10, 11 and 24, 1996. Subsequent to the close of the hear-
ing, the General Counsel, the Union, and the Respondent filed
briefs.
On the entire record and the briefs of the parties, and on my
observation of the witnesses, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondents, all Delaware corporations, have their prin-
cipal offices and place of business located at 8 Franklin Street,
in the Township of Bloomfield, State of New Jersey (the New
Jersey facility), formerly located at 140–143d Street, in the
Borough of Brooklyn, City and State of New York (the Brook-
lyn facility). The Respondent admits that at all times material,
the Respondents have been affiliated businesses with common
officers, ownership, directors, and operators and have formu-
lated and administered a common labor policy affecting em-
ployees of its operations. I therefore find that the Respondents
constitute a single integrated business enterprise and a single
employer within the meaning of the Act. Moreover, the Re-
spondent admits and the evidence shows that Respondents each
are and have been at all times material, employers engaged in

1 On January 27, 1995, the Regional Director for Region 29 in Case
29–CA–18500 dismissed that portion of the UAW charge which al-
leged that the Respondent unlawfully failed or refused to bargain with
the Union regarding its decision to relocate its operations, and transfer
equipment and employees, from Brooklyn, New York to Bloomfield,
New Jersey, stating: “Under current Board law, if an employer can
establish that its decision to relocate its operations did not turn on labor
costs, it is relieved of the obligation to bargain over that decision.
Dubuque Packing Co., 303 NLRB 386 (1991).” However, the Region
29 dismissal letter does not state that the UAW’s request to bargain
over the decision to move was unlawful, or that the UAW had bar-
gained to impasse over this nonmandatory bargaining subject, nor was
a charge filed to that effect by the Respondent. An appeal by the Union
of that dismissal was denied. The complaint in this case alleges that the
Respondent failed and refused to bargain in good faith over the affects
of such a relocation in violation of Sec. 8(a)(1) and (5) and Sec. 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.2
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
It is undisputed that the International Union, United Auto-
mobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America, AFL–CIO is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
Background
Pursuant to an election conducted by the Board on March 28,
1988, the Union was certified on December 19, 1989 as the
bargaining representative of the Respondents’ employees in a
unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within
the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act, as follows:

All full time and regular part-time warehouse employees em-
ployed by Sea-Jet Trucking Corporation, A.P.A. Warehouse,
Inc., affiliated Terminals, Incorporated, Sea-Jet Industries, In-
corporated, and Sea-Jet Trucking & A.P.A. Warehouse, Inc.,
at its 140-43rd Street, Brooklyn, New York location, exclud-
ing all office clerical employees, trailer drivers, truck drivers,
drivers’ helpers, building maintenance employees. truck
maintenance, professional employees and supervisors as de-
fined in the Act.

See, Sea-Jet Trucking Corp., 304 NLRB 67, 68 (1991).
On January 17, 1990, the Union made a request to meet and
bargain with the Respondent, and requested information rele-
vant and necessary to its role as bargaining representative,
those requests were refused. Sea-Jet Trucking Corp., 304
NLRB at 68. A charge filed by the Union ultimately resulted in
a United States Court of Appeals (2d Cir. 1992) judgment on
July 15, 1992, enforcing the Board’s Order in 304 NLRB 67
(1991); that Board Order and the Court’s Judgment required the
Respondent to meet and bargain with the Union and provide the
Union with the information requested in 1990. Although bar-
gaining commenced in 1992, the Respondent and the Union
have never entered into a collective-bargaining agreement.
Other litigated unfair labor practice charges involved the Re-
spondent’s refusal to reinstate an unfair labor practice striker,
291 NLRB 627 (1988), enfd. 141 LRRM 2488 (D.C. Cir.
1990), 307 NLRB 134 (1992); the improper reinstatement of
twelve unfair labor practice strikers who were assigned more
onerous work and/or improperly transferred to less desirable
positions, 302 NLRB 110 (1991); three unlawful discharges,
302 NLRB 110 (1991); and the Respondent’s violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and (3) as found in Orbit Corp., 294 NLRB 695
(1989).
A. The Evidence
By letter dated April 6, 1994, Sanford E. Pollack, Esq., An
attorney for the Respondent, notified the Union that “The eco-
nomic conditions in the location in which our client presently
operates forces as to consider the possibility of relocating all or
2 The Respondents individually have been engaged at all times mate-
rial and respectively in interstate and intrastate transportation of freight
and commodities, in transportation, warehousing, and storage of freight
and commodities in interstate commerce, providing the service of con-
solidation and distribution of freight and commodities; and as a pur-
chasing agent providing financial services, including the purchase of
materials, supplies and equipment for Respondent A.P.A. and Respon-
dent Sea-Jet Trucking; etc.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 542
part of our present facilities”, and we would be “happy to dis-
cuss the problem with you and receive your input In that re-
gard.” A meeting between the parties was held on May 10,
1994 at the Union’s subregional office in New York City. In
attendance for the Respondents were Harold Pretter, the Re-
spondent’s, controller, and Gary Cooke, Esq., an attorney rep-
resenting the Respondent. Representing the Union were Robert
Madore, assistant regional director for Region 9A of the UAW,
Beverly Gans, subregional director for Region 9A of the UAW,
and Charlie Gibbons, a business agent for Local 365 UAW.
At the May 10, 1994 meeting the Respondent advised the
Union that they had entered into a binder (a tentative agreement
to either lease or buy a facility) for an unspecified location in
Bloomfield, New Jersey.” The Respondent cited the costs of
doing business in New York, including tolls, gas, and taxes as
their rationale for desiring to relocate and not labor cost related,
and promised that if they made a firm commitment to relocate,
“we will let you know.” Madore asked Cooke whether the
Respondents had identified a “time line” as to when the move
might occur, but the Respondents stated that they had not.
Madore testified that he also requested information needed by
the Union to bargain over both the possible decision to move
and its effects, but did not receive clear or specific answers to
most of his questions. Neither of the Respondent’s representa-
tives specifically questioned the relevance of the information
the Union was requesting. Madore testified that he stated ex-
plicitly at the meeting that, if the Respondent were unwilling to
engage in decision bargaining, the Union nonetheless wanted to
bargain over the effects if a decision to move were made. At
the end of the meeting Madore indicated that on May 13, 1994
he would follow up with a written information request, and that
once he received the information, he would contact the Re-
spondent to arrange for additional meetings.
During the negotiation session, the parties discussed the
benefits that the employees of the Respondent received, includ-
ing vacation, holidays, annuity, jury duty, bereavement, em-
ployees out on absence, employees out on worker’s compensa-
tion, and insurance claims. Harold Pretter indicated that all
benefits would remain the same in New Jersey in accordance
with what had been provided in the past except that wage rates
would increase to New Jersey’s higher minimum wage rates.
The Respondent asserted that the benefits that the employees of
the Respondent received during all relevant times would be the
same as were previously provided to Beverly Ganz through the
ongoing collective-bargaining negotiations with the Union, and
Pretter also advised the Union that all employee’s would be
offered continued employment in New Jersey. Pretter testified
that the negotiations concluded with Madore indicating that the
Union insisted on bargaining over both the decision and the
effects together, and would not schedule any additional meet-
ings until the company provided extensive documentation per-
taining to both the decision and the effects of the relocation.
Pretter testified that on May 11, 1994, the Respondent for-
warded some of the information requested the previous day to
the attorney for the Union, including the participation agree-
ment with Local 348, which referenced the annuity plan that the
Respondent offered, along with an offer for the Union to review
the books and records of the Respondent based on the extent of
the request for information that was made of the Respondent at
the negotiation session. It was not until after the charges had
been filed on this matter on August 31, 1994 that a representa-
tive of the Union finally did appear at the Respondent’s place
of business to inspect the books and records as previously of-
fered by the Respondent on May 11, 1994.
By letter dated May 13, 1994, Madore wrote to Cooke re-
questing the information relevant to both the possible decision
to relocate and its effects. The letter stated that the Union
would be “willing to begin negotiations immediately upon the
Company fulfilling the following information requested . . .,”
and concludes:

We need this information to bargain over the decision, not just
the effects. We cannot bargain over this decision without
possession of this information. We are informing you that we
believe you must give us sufficient time and information to
bargain over any decision as that we may make effective pro-
posals . . . Upon receipt of the above-requested information,
we will exchange dates with which to begin bargaining over
the Decision.

Pretter stated that the attorney for the Respondent also ad-
vised the Union on May 13, 1994 that the move was economi-
cally motivated and, not related to labor costs. Pretter related
that in fact the Respondent incurred greater labor costs in New
Jersey, based on its higher minimum wage, a consideration
recognized by the Regional Director, among other things in the
partial dismissal of the Union’s charge dealing with the Re-
spondent’s decision to relocate to New Jersey (R. Exh. 2, p. 2,
par. 1). Also, according to Pretter, the Union was notified that
the move would take 6 months to complete, beginning at the
end of the summer/early fall 1994.
On May 23, 1994, Cooke wrote a letter to Madore, stating, “I
have forwarded a copy of your request to the Company in order
for them to compile the documents which you requested. We
will forward the information as soon as it becomes available.”
This letter does not state that any of the information requested
by Madore had been previously provided to the UAW, or that
any of the information did not have to be provided because it
was not relevant to effects bargaining.
In late July or early August 1994, Carl Redis, a UAW inter-
national representative, told Madore about rumors among the
Respondents’ employees about an impending plant relocation.
On August 10, 1994, Madore wrote a letter to Cooke stating
that it was his understanding that the Respondent was moving
equipment and transferring employees to either a Brooklyn
location or a New Jersey location. The August 10 letter also
requested further information about the move and its effects,
and reminded Cooke that he had not forwarded any information
to Madore pursuant to the requests made on May 10 and May
13, 1994. There was no response to Madore's August 10, 1994
letter. Although Pretter testified at the hearing that the Respon-
dent had not commenced its relocation operation as of August
31, 1994, the UAW filed its charge in the instant case, Case 29–
CA–18500.
On September 13, 1994, the Respondent entered into a lease
with Newels Realty, to occupy a building on property located in
Bloomfield and Belleville, New Jersey. The lease states that
the Respondent Sea-Jet “is the occupant of a portion of a build-
ing situated on the Property,” and that “Sea-Jet desires to re-
main in possession of the Premises.” A copy of the lease was
attached to a letter to Region 29 dated November 10, 1994,
which was also copied to Madore. The lease states that “ the
Property [is] more particularly bounded and described in Ex-
hibit A attached hereto (Property)”, but exhibit A was not pro-
vided to Region 29, or to the UAW. According to Pretter, it
SEA JET TRUCKING CORP. 543
was not until October, 1994 (contrary to the language in the
lease) that the Respondent commenced its relocation from
Brooklyn, New York to Bloomfield, New Jersey. In early Oc-
tober, 1994, employees were given forms to sign to indicate
whether or not they wished to relocate to New Jersey, but the
UAW was not told about this. The move was completed in
January 1995.
The Respondent never notified the UAW that it had decided
to proceed with the move nor that it had decided not to bargain
with UAW over the decision to move. Moreover, the Respon-
dent failed to notify the Union that it had concluded that it had
no obligation to furnish the information requested by the Union
in May 1994, even regarding the effects of the relocation. Sub-
sequent to the May 10, 1994 meeting, the Union made no fur-
ther request to meet and bargain with the Respondent because,
according to Madore, without the necessary information, the
Union was unable to develop severance proposals for employ-
ees who opted not to relocate, or proposals regarding transpor-
tation costs and other matters pertaining to employees who did
choose to relocate.
The move of the Respondent started in October of 1994.
Prior to the move, the Respondent circulated to every unit
member an offer of continued employment, asking them to
check off whether or not they would make the relocation. Ac-
cording to the Respondent this notice was circulated based on
the assurances at the May 10, 1994 negotiations session that the
Respondent would offer continued employment to all employ-
ees in New Jersey.
Subsequent to the filing of the charges in this case, the Re-
spondent did provide additional information to the Region, with
copies to the Union regarding whether the decision to relocate
was a mandatory subject of bargaining. The Respondent as-
serts that at no time after the receipt of the documentation pre-
sented did the Union ever request to bargain over the effects of
the move only. Not even after the dismissal of the “decisional”
aspect of the charge by the Regional Director for Region 29 on
January 25, 1996, and the completion of the relocation com-
pleted in January 1995 and to date, had the Union requested to
negotiate limited only to the issue of effects of the move. The
Respondent also maintains that the Union was already in pos-
session at the time of the trial of all necessary documentation
and information so as to formulate substantive proposals re-
garding effects bargaining and has still failed to request to ne-
gotiate limited only to the issue of effects of its move.
Finally, at the May 10, 1994 negotiations, the Respondent
adamantly rejected the paying of severance to any employee
who chose not to relocate. Moreover, the Company also re-
jected the proposals for transportation costs in that most em-
ployees would receive an increase in wages caused by the move
to New Jersey.
The Union on May 10 and 13, 1994 by letter and orally re-
quested the Respondent to furnish the following information as
set forth in the complaint and any evidence in the record per-
taining thereto, paragraph 17.

1. Location and mailing address of the New Jersey facility.
The Respondent never provided this information to the
UAW on November 10, 1994, as discussed above, the Re-
spondent provided Region 29 with a copy of their lease
dated September 13, 1994, “for a portion of the property
located in the Townships of Bloomfield and Belleville,
New Jersey . . . described in Exhibit A annexed hereto,”
but Exhibit A was not provided to the Region. A copy of
this incomplete lease was also sent to Madore.

2. Information pertaining to the Respondents’ Annuity Plan
covering employees in Brooklyn Unit.
No pertinent information was provided. At the meet-
ing on May 10, 1994, when Madore asked whether the Re-
spondent had a pension plan, Pretter told him that they had
an annuity plan with Local 342, but that Pretter did not
have the details. Pretter did not tell the Union which job
classifications were covered by the annuity plan, or inform
the UAW that the annuity plan did not cover the ware-
house unit. At the hearing on July 11, 1996, the Respon-
dent’s attorney stated with reference to the Respondents’
Exhibit 7,” This is an annuity plan. The exhibit actually
contained no annuity Moreover, on July 24, 1996, during
Pretter’s testimony at the hearing, Madore learned that
bargaining unit employees were not covered by the annu-
ity plan.

3. Holidays to be paid to employees prior to any layoff.
At the May 10, 1994 meeting, Pretter only said that the
Respondent currently had nine paid holidays.

4. Names of any Brooklyn Unit employees with unpaid Be-
reavements leave claims, and number of days owed.
At the May 10, 1994 meeting, Pretter told Madore that
the past practice in Brooklyn would continue in the event
that the Respondent moved to New Jersey, but was unsure
what the Respondents’ actual past practice was.

5. Names of any Brooklyn Unit employees currently on jury
duty and any money owed to them.
At the May 10, 1994, meeting Pretter told Madore,
“whatever we’ve done in the past, we’ll continue to do.”

6. The present vacation schedule, and names, seniority dates,
and departments of employees eligible for vacations.
At the May 10, 1994, meeting Pretter stated that the
current vacation schedule was “whatever it was in the
past” but that he did not know what it was. No informa-
tion identifying employees currently eligible for vacation
time was provided.

7-8. Names and clock numbers and type of leave, for all
Brooklyn Unit employees presently on leaves of absence; list
of Brooklyn Unit employees on layoff and benefits owed or
received.
The Counsel for the General Counsel asserts that the
Respondent provided none of this information.

9. List of bargaining unit employees presently on Workers
Compensation, with the amounts of Benefits owed or being
received by these employees.
Beverly Gans’ bargaining notes indicate that at the
May 10, 1994, meeting Pretter told Madore that there were
no employees on Workers Compensation that he knew of.
10. List of bargaining unit employees with unpaid hospital
insurance claims.
No such list was ever provided, and the Respondent
never gave the Union a clear answer as to whether the
warehouse employees had health insurance coverage in
1994. Rather the Respondent provided contradictory
documentation as to whether or not bargaining unit em-
ployees had health coverage in the past. On August 28,
1992, the Respondent informed the UAW that there was
presently no health insurance plan covering bargaining
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 544
unit employees. On May 11, 1994, however, Cooke sent
Eugene Eisner, Esq., an attorney, representing the UAW
who was not at the May 10, 1994 meeting, a copy of a
“participation agreement” dated August 10, 1990, which
purports to show that Bargaining unit employees did have
health insurance coverage as of 1990.

11-15. Copy of the Respondents’ insurance plan, benefits
schedule procedure and premiums paid; list of employees
with unpaid life insurance claims and amounts owed; list of
all bargaining unit employees with the average hours they
worked since 1990, and current rates of pay; list of all bar-
gaining unit employees with estimated list of earnings for the
year 1990 due to the reduction of employees; list of part-time
employees, their jobs and Hourly wages, respectively.
The Counsel for the General Counsel asserts that some
of the requested information was provided to the Union.

16-20. A copy of the job classifications; side agreements with
bargaining unit employees or any employee committee since
January 1990; overtime records of bargaining unit employees
since January 1990; names and wage rates of employees who
exercised bumping rights since January 1990; list of names of
bargaining unit employees temporarily transferred, the length
of time and the rates of pay paid since that time; respectively.
The Counsel for the General Counsel maintains that
none of the above information was provided to the Union
by the Respondent.

Moreover, paragraph 18 of the complaint asserts that on or
about August 10, 1994, Madore requested that the Respondents
furnish the Union with the following additional information.

1. Names of members of the Brooklyn Unit who were
transferred to the new location, their salaries, benefits, any
incentives, and any compensation for transportation costs.
2. Type of work being performed at the new location,
number of employees at the Brooklyn facility and the new
location and their hours and benefits.
Counsel for the General Counsel alleges that the above
information was not provided except that the Respondents
told the UAW at the May 10, 1994, meeting, that they
would not compensate employees for transportation costs
to New Jersey or make severance payments to any em-
ployee who chose not to relocate. Additionally, on Febru-
ary 23, 1995, nearly six months later and well after the
move was completed, the Respondents sent Region 29 a
copy of Respondents’ January, 1995, payroll records, with
a copy to Madore.

The Respondent asserts that at all material times, the Union was
already in possession of much of the necessary documentation
and information so as to formulate substantive proposals re-
garding effects bargaining.
Credibility
The resolution of the issues in this case requires some deter-
mination of the credibility of the parties respective witnesses.
After carefully considering the record evidence, I have based
my findings on my observation of the demeanor of the wit-
nesses, the weight of the respective evidence, established and
admitted facts, inherent probabilities and reasonable inferences
which may be drawn from the record as a whole, Gold Stan-
dard Enterprises, Inc., 234 NLRB 618 (1978); V & W Castings,
231 NLRB 912 (1977), Northridge Knitting Mills, 223 NLRB
230 (1976).
Two witnesses testified herein, Robert Madore for the Gen-
eral Counsel and Harold Pretter for the Respondent. Both the
General Counsel and the Union assert that Pretter was not a
reliable witness because of his inconsistent, evasive, and shift-
ing testimony and should be discredited. The Respondent
maintains, in effect, the same about Madore. Interestingly
enough, as the record shows, both have some merit to their
allegations. Therefore as the occasion arises, I will discuss the
issue of credibility as it effects the issue or circumstances pre-
sented in the light of my additional evidence such as documen-
tary evidence or the failure to call witnesses or present docu-
ments to support testimony given herein,
B. Analysis and Conclusions
The complaint alleges that the Respondent has failed and re-
fused to bargain collectively with the Union with respect to the
effects of the relocation of its facilities from Brooklyn, New
York to Bloomfield, New Jersey in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
and (5) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Under Section 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the Act, an Employer who
relocates is required to bargain in good faith with the collec-
tive-bargaining representative of its employees regarding the
effects of the relocation on those employees, even where deci-
sional bargaining is not required as a mandatory subject of
bargaining. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 170 NLRB 389
(1968); Otis Elevator Co., 283 NLRB 223 (1987); Morco In-
dustries, Inc., 279 NLRB 762 (1986). Also, see Richmond
Convalescent Hospital, 313 NLRB 1247 (1994). Moreover, in
Metropolitan Teletronics Corp., 279 NLRB 957 (1986) the
Board stated, “The Company was obligated to bargain ‘in a
meaningful manner and at a meaningful time’ with the [Union]
over the effects on employees of the decision to close and relo-
cate. First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666
681-682 (1981).” An element of “meaningful” bargaining is
“timely notice to the Union” of the decision. Penntech Papers,
Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 18, 26 (1st Cir. 1983); Metropolitan
Teletronics, supra. At a minimum, this requires that a union be
notified of the relocation before it takes place, rather then being
confronted with a fait accompli. Transmarine, supra. In the
context of the sale of a business, the minimum requirement is
that a union be notified of the sale when the Employer executes
a binding agreement to sell the business. Compact Video Ser-
vices, 319 NLRB 131 (1995). This would imply that in the
context of a relocation, a union must be notified of an impend-
ing move at least by the time the Employer enters into a lease,
or a contract to buy the new facility. Moreover, notice to the
union must be definite and unequivocal. Metropolitan Teletron-
ics, supra at footnote 5.
For example, in the sale context, the statement that “there
may possibly be a prospective buyer for the facility” does not
constitute notice, where there is no notice as to the timing of the
sale or the identity of the new owner; promises to provide no-
tice which are later breached may only serve to mislead a un-
ion. Live Oak Skilled Care & Manor, 300 NLRB 1040 (1990).
In the instant case, despite the Respondent’s contention, the
Union was not given notice of the move. On April 6, 1994, the
Respondent merely notified the Union that it was “con-
sider[ing] the possibility of relocating all or part of its present
facilities.” At the May 10, 1994 meeting, the Respondent ad-
vised the Union that it had entered into a tentative agreement to
lease or buy a facility in Bloomfield, New Jersey, “no definite
contract yet to that property,” that there was a confusing “time
SEA JET TRUCKING CORP. 545
line” as to when the possible move might take place since Pret-
ter testified that at the meeting he told Madore that “it would
take about six months to complete starting the end of summer,
early fall” 1994, and that the Respondent would “let [the Un-
ion] know” if it made a firm commitment to relocate. The Re-
spondent never let the Union know as promised. Moreover, the
Respondent stated at the May 10, 1994 meeting that the “pick
and pack” department would stay in Brooklyn. This was un-
true. Additionally, based on this assertion and the Union’s
expectation that in the event of a decision to relocate, the Union
would receive notice, the Union could not possibly have
guessed that the Respondent’s 15-year lease for the Brooklyn
facility expired on December 31, 1994, or that the move to New
Jersey would be timed to coincide with the expiration of the
Brooklyn lease. At the May 10 meeting, when Madore asked if
there was a time line for the move, it would have made sense
for the Respondent to advise the Union that the December 31,
1994, expiration date on the Brooklyn lease was their time line
if this was true. Also, the lease for the New Jersey facility is
dated September 13, 1994. As soon as the Respondent made a
definite decision to enter into the September lease, the Union
should have been notified. The failure to do so constitutes
failure and refusal to bargain in good faith.
As set forth hereinbefore, it is well established that, even if a
decision to relocate bargaining unit work is not a mandatory
subject of bargaining, an employer is obliged to bargain over
the effects of that move on bargaining unit employees. Otis
Elevator Co., supra, Morco Industries, supra. The undisputed
evidence establishes that the Respondent failed and refused to
bargain over the effects of the decision to relocate. First, ad-
mittedly the Respondent relocated bargaining unit work from
Brooklyn to New Jersey. Second, the evidence establishes that
Madore requested decision and effects bargaining at the May
10, 1994 meeting and in his letters to the Respondent of May
13 and August 10, 1994.
Moreover, during the May 10, 1994 meeting Cooke was am-
biguous in his responses to Madore’s request for decision bar-
gaining. He clearly said nothing to advise the Union that the
Respondents’ decision not to bargain over the decision to relo-
cate was final, so that the parties would have to proceed to ef-
fects bargaining. The Respondents’ actions thereafter evi-
dences that the Respondent decided to completely ignore its
bargaining obligations to deal with the Union regarding the
move. Cooke responded to the May 13 letter by stating that the
Respondent would supply the requested documents. However,
documents were not forthcoming, and the Respondent ignored
Madore’s followup letter of August 10. Instead, the Respon-
dent went forward with its decision without notifying the Un-
ion. Additionally, the Respondent unilaterally implemented its
own effect's package. Specifically, the Respondent offered jobs
to any employees who wished to commute to New Jersey, but
decided not to offer travel or relocation costs to employees who
did relocate and not to offer severance to employees who felt
that they could not handle the relocation. Thus, by failing to
respond to Madore’s letters and going forward with its unilat-
eral actions regarding the effects of the move, the Respondent
clearly rejected the Union’s demands for effects bargaining.
The Respondent argues that it did not respond to the Union’s
demands for effects bargaining because it believed that the
Union sought to negotiate over both the decision and the effects
of the relocation and not the effects only,3 and that the receipt
by the Union of information requested by it was a condition
precedent to continued negotiations. This argument appears
disingenuous in light of the facts in this case. Decisional bar-
gaining, while not required under the circumstances present In
this matter, would not have been unlawful, and the Union did
not unlawfully bargain to impasse with respect to this non-
mandatory subject of bargaining. Since the Respondent noti-
fied the Union of the “possibility of relocating” and their will-
ingness to “discuss the problems” before the relocation decision
had been made, it was not unreasonable for the Union to con-
clude that the Respondent was offering to bargain over the
decision. In May, 1994 in the absence of any documentation to
support the Respondents’ claim that its decision to relocate was
economically motivated, the Union had no way of knowing that
decisional bargaining was not required.4 It was not until Janu-
ary 27, 1995, well after the move had been completed, that
Region 29 dismissed that portion of the Union’s charge which
pertained to the Respondents’ refusal to engage in decisional
bargaining, putting the Union on notice, for the first time, that
decisional bargaining was not mandatory. Where a Union de-
mands bargaining over both the decision and its effects, and
decisional bargaining is not mandatory, this does not excuse an
Employer from bargaining over the effects of the decision,
Compact Video, supra.
Moreover the Union’s letters of May 13 and August 10,
1994, both of which explicitly and unambiguously demand
decision and effects bargaining. While the Union was certainly
interested in decision bagaining that provided no basis for dis-
regarding the clear demand for effects bargaining as well. In
both Otis Elevator, supra, and Morco Industries, supra while
finding that the decision to relocate was a nonmandatory sub-

3 Madore testified that at the May 10, 1994 meeting he advised Pret-
ter and Cooke that the Union would be willing to bargain over the
effects of the relocation alone. Pretter denies this. In this instance I
credit Pretter’s version of this because the notes of the May 10, 1994
meeting taken by Madore and Beverly Ganz indicate that the Union
sought to bargain over the decision and the effects of the relocation
failing to mention anything about bargaining over the effects alone.
Moreover, Madore’s letter of May 13, 1994 to Cooke also mentions
decision and effects bargaining. Madore failed to explain the omission
in his notes of the May 10 meeting and neither Beverly Ganz nor
Charles Gibbons were called as witnesses herein. However, it should
also be noted that Pretter had no notes of the meeting and Cooke was
not called as a witness either.
As to other matters herein, I tend to credit the General Counsels’
witness Madore on the basis of my observation of his demeanor as a
witness. Moreover, it is hard for me to believe that Pretter took no
notes at the May 10, 1994 meeting and if Cooke did, that they were not
produced at the hearing. While the General Counsel failed to call Ganz
and Gibbons as witnesses to support Madore’s testimony, the Respon-
dent, in turn, failed to call Cooke as its witness since it would appear
that he acted as a negotiator for the Respondent at the meeting.
From the failure of a party to produce material witnesses or relevant
evidence obviously within its control without satisfactory explanation,
the trier of the facts may draw an inference that such testimony or evi-
dence would be unfavorable to the party 7-Eleven Food Store, 257
NLRB 108 (1981); Publishers Printing Co., 233 NLRB 1070 (1977);
Martin Luther King, Sr., Nursing Center, 231 NLRB 15 (1977).
4 Cf. Compact Video Services, supra, at 143–144 (holding that even
where decisional bargaining was not required with regard to the sale of
a business, the Employer was required to provide information pertain-
ing to the decision so that the Union could determine whether the new
owner was a successor employer, and what the rights of its members
would be). Sierra International Trucks Inc., 319 NLRB 948 (1995).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 546
ject of bargaining, nonetheless the Board found that the em-
ployers had refused to bargain over the effects in violation of
the Act. Additionally, the Respondent never made it clear to
the Union that it would not bargain over the decision to relocate
but might engage in effects bargaining.
The Respondent may also argue that the Union’s inaction be-
tween May and August reflects a lack of interest in effects bar-
gaining. Again, it bears emphasizing that the Respondent re-
plied to the May 13 letter by promising to supply the requested
information. In addition, the Respondent had told Madore that
the move was not definite. Both Polack’s letter, which speaks
of a “possibility” of a move, and the statement at the May 10
meeting that the Respondent was “investigating” a move, indi-
cated that nothing was definite or imminent. In light of the
Respondent’s promise to supply the information and the uncer-
tainly as to whether the Respondent would actually go forward
with the move, it as reasonable for Madore to await further
word from the Company before taking further steps to pursue
bargaining. When he heard rumors that the move was going
forward, he immediately sent a followup letter, reminding the
Respondent of the promise to supply information and reiterat-
ing the demand for effects bargaining. This time, he received
absolutely no response.
Additionally, the Respondent cannot argue that the Union
waived its right to engage in effects bargaining. A waiver of
statutory rights must be “clear and unmistakable.” Metropoli-
tan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708, (1983); Olivetti
Office U.S.A. v. NLRB, 926 F.2d 181, 197, (2d Cir. 1991);
Johnson Bateman Co., 295 NLRB 180 (1989). Under this gen-
eral standard, a union may be found to have waived its rights if,
upon being notified of a proposed change in terms and condi-
tions of employment, it “fails to act diligently in seeking bar-
gaining.” Intermountain Rural Electric Assn., 305 NLRB
NLRB 783 (1991). The evidence herein shows that the Union
acted diligently. On first receiving word of the proposed move,
the Union promptly scheduled a meeting with the Respondent
to discuss the issues. Madore then verbally demanded bargain-
ing May 10, and reiterated his demand in writing a few days
later. Madore’s failure to pursue the issue over the next 2
months does not reflect any lack of diligence under the circum-
stances . The Respondent had told the Union that it was only
“investigating” a move. Cooke promised Madore a response to
the May 13, 1994 letter. Madore again reacted promptly in
August when he heard that the move was going forward. In
light of Pretter’s testimony that the move was not actually im-
plemented until October 1996, the August 10, 1994 letter above
was a timely demand for effects bargaining. Had the Respon-
dent replied to that letter, the parties would have had 2 months
in which to possibly conclude effects bargaining. Instead the
Respondent ignored the letter.
From all of the above, I find and conclude that the Respon-
dent engaged in unfair labor practices when it failed and re-
fused to bargain collectively with the Union with respect to the
effects of its relocation from Brooklyn to New Jersey in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
The complaint also alleges that the Respondent violated Sec-
tion 9(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by failing and refusing to provide
the Union with requested information relative to the wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment of the
Brooklyn Unit and the New Jersey, Unit. The Respondent
denies this allegation.
It is well established that a labor organization which has an
obligation under the Act to represent employees in a bargaining
unit with respect to wages, hours, and working conditions, in-
cluding collective bargaining, is entitled, by operation of the
statute, on appropriate request, to such information as may be
relevant to the proper performance of that duty. NLRB v. Acme
Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co.,
351 U.S. 149 (1956). See also Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB,
440 U.S. 301 (1979). Failure to fulfill that obligation to furnish
relevant material on request is a violation of the employer’s
duty to bargain in good faith and may violate Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 1310
(8th Cir. 1979).
An employer’s duty to bargain “in a meaningful manner” re-
garding the effects of a plant relocation also encompasses the
obligation to timely provide a Union, on request, with informa-
tion relevant and necessary to the proper performance of its
duties as bargaining representative. Air Express International
Corp., 659 F.2d 610 (5th Cir. 1981).5 The failure to supply a
union with such information, even in the absence of any other
violation, constitutes a failure to bargain in good faith and a
violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Sierra International
Trucks, Inc., supra; 6 Live Oak Skilled Care & Manor, 300
NLRB at 1042, 1047.7
Where the requested information concerns items and condi-
tions of employment relating to employees in the bargaining
unit represented by the Union, the information is presumptively
relevant to the Union’s representative function. George Koch
& Sons, Inc., 295 NLRB 695 (1989). See San Diego Newspa-
per Guild v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1977). The Board
uses a liberal, discovery-type standard to determine whether the
information is relevant, or potentially relevant, to require its
production. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., supra; W-L Molding
Co., 272 NLRB 1239 (1984). In evaluating the relevance of
broad categories of requested information, the Board stated in
Ohio Power Co., 216 NLRB 987 (1975), enfd. 531 F.2d 1381
(6th Cir. 1976):

Where the information sought covers the terms and conditions
of employment within the bargaining unit thus involving the
core of the employer-employee relationship, the standard of
relevance is very broad, and no specific showing is normally
required.

It is only necessary to find that the desired information is
probably relevant, and appears reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of relevant evidence that would be of use to a
union in carrying out its statutory duties and responsibilities.
New England Newspapers, 856 F.2d 409, 413, (1st Cir. 1988);
W-L Molding Co., supra; IMTT-Bayonne, 304 NLRB 476
(1991). Information pertaining to the identity of bargaining
unit employees, and their wages and other terms and conditions

5 In the context of bargaining over the effects of a merger and reloca-
tion, Air Express required the Employer to provide the union with the
acquisition agreement and employees’ names, job classification, and
dates of hire
6 In the context of bargaining over the sale of a business, Sierra re-
quired the Employer to supply the union with the assets sale agreement.
7 Also in the context of the sale of a business; Live Oak required that
the Employer supply the union with sale agreements, timecards, an
employee list with addresses and dates of hire, job classifications work-
ers’ compensation information, and payroll records to ensure that
wages and benefits were properly paid.
SEA JET TRUCKING CORP. 547
of employment, is presumptively relevant. Sea-Jet Trucking
Corp., 304 NLRB 67 (1991); Excel Fire Protection Co., 308
NLRB 241 (1992); Dynatron/Bondo Corp., 305 NLRB 574
(1991); IMTT-Bayonne, supra; New England Newspapers; su-
pra; Richmond Convalescent Hospital, supra.
If a union’s information request is overbroad, an employer
must nevertheless provide all requested information which is
relevant and necessary to the proper performance of the union’s
statutory bargaining duties. Azabu U.S.A., 298 NLRB 702
(1990). In the instant case, for example, the Respondents
should have provided the Union with information relevant to
effects bargaining, even if information relevant to decisional
bargaining did not have to be provided. Requested information
which is not in the employer’s possession must be provided.
Requested information which is not in the employer’s posses-
sion must be provided if it can be obtained from a third party
with whom the employer has some relationship. Public Service
Co. of Colorado, 301 NLRB 238 (1991). In the present case,
for example, any requested insurance coverage information
obtainable from the union or unions representing other bargain-
ing units should have been provided by the Respondents to the
Union. Information requested by a union must be provided
reasonably promptly. Fitzgerald Mills, 133 NLRB 877, enfd.
52 LRRM 2174 (2d Cir. 1963). For example, the payroll re-
cords provided in February, 1995 (G.C. Exh. 7) did not satisfy
the Respondents’ bargaining obligation. A Union may refuse
to engage in effects bargaining unless and until necessary in-
formation is provided. Compact Video Services, 319 NLRB at
138. Here, the union was reasonable in its reluctance to request
further bargaining sessions in the absence of the information it
needed to properly represent the warehouse unit.
In the instant case, all of the requested information set forth
in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the complaint pertains to the identity
of bargaining unit employees and their wages and other terms
and conditions of employment. Therefore, it is presumptively
relevant. Without the requested information pertaining to em-
ployee wages, benefits, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment, it was impossible for the Union to properly perform
its statutory duties. The requested information was necessary
to ensure that employees were receiving the wages and benefits
to which they were entitled, to negotiate a severance package
for employees who chose not to transfer to New Jersey, and to
negotiate transportation costs and other benefits for employees
who did transfer to New Jersey. In the absence of the requested
information pertaining to the location of the New Jersey plant
and the identities of the employees represented by the UAW it
is inconceivable how any union could have effectively repre-
sented these employees.
The Respondent contends that much of the information had
been supplied previously in contract bargaining. With respect
to the former point, the Respondent’s representatives were
aware that Madore had not previously been involved directly in
dealings with the Company. If the Respondent genuinely felt
that Madore’s requests were burdensome or repetitive, it could
have pointed out to him in writing, in a systematic fashion,
which information ws already accessible to him. Instead, the
Respondent promised to collect the requested documents, then
cut off all further communications with the Union. The duty to
supply information is an aspect of the duty to bargain in good
faith, and the Respondent is obligated to reply to an information
request in a fashion which is consistent with the principles of
good faith. See Rochester Acoustical Corp., 298 NLRB 558,
562 (1989). Promising to supply information, then leaving
Madore to guess which information the Company had decided
not to supply on the ground that the Union already was in pos-
session thereof, is inimicable to good-faith bargaining. More-
over, the Respondent failed to produce evidence to estab-
lish.that it had previously supplied any significant portion of
the information at issue in this case.
The Respondent also introduced correspondence from Cooke
to Region 29 during the investigation of this case. Cooke sent
copies of that correspondence to Madore, and some of the Un-
ion’s information requests were answered in those letters.
However, that correspondence began in November, after the
Respondent had initiated the move, It was of little use to the
Union at that point in time. An employer is obligated to re-
spond to an information request in a timely fashion. Bundy
Corp. 292 NLRB 671, 672 (1989). Supplying information after
the move has commenced, and 6 months after it was requested,
is not a timely response. Thus, the Respondent’s refusal to
supply information is a second basis for a finding that the Re-
spondent failed to bargain over the effects of its decision to
move.
Accordingly, by refusing to timely provide the requested in-
formation pertaining to effects bargaining, and by failing to
timely notify the union of their decision to relocate, the Re-
spondent failed and refused to bargain in good faith with the
Union, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) and Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
ON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III,
above, found to constitute unfair labor practices occurring in
connection with the operations of the Respondent described in
section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation-
ship to trade, traffic and commerce among the several states
and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow thereof.
Accordingly, by refusing to timely provide the requested in-
formation pertaining to effects bargaining, and by failing to
timely notify the union of their decision to relocate, the Re-
spondent failed and refused to bargain in good faith with the
Union, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) and Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that the Respondent has failed and refused to
meet and bargain with the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
and (5) of the Act with regard to its employees in the appropri-
ate unit, the Respondent shall be ordered to cease and desist
therefrom and on request, to bargain collectively in good faith
with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of all
its employees in the appropriate unit, and in the event an under-
standing is reached, to embody such understanding in a signed
agreement. See Winn-Dixie Stores, 243 NLRB 972 (1979). In
addition, the Respondent shall maintain in effect the terms and
conditions of employment specified in the now expired collec-
tive-bargaining agreement regarding the above appropriate
bargaining unit unless and until the Respondent and the Union
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 548
agree otherwise, or until the parties bargain to a legitimate im-
passe.
Furthermore, as a result of the Respondent’s unlawful failure
to bargain in good faith with the Union about the effects of its
decision to relocate, the unit employees have been denied an
opportunity to bargain through their collective-bagaining repre-
sentative. Meaningful bargaining cannot be assured until some
measure of economic strength is restored to the Union. A bar-
gaining order alone, therefore, cannot serve as an adequate
remedy for the unfair labor practices committed.
Accordingly, it is necessary, in order to effectuate the pur-
poses of the Act, to require the Respondent to bargain with the
Union concerning the effects of the relocation of its facility on
its employees, and to accompany the order with a limited back-
pay requirement designed both to make whole the employees
for losses suffered as a result of the violations and to re-create
in some practicable manner a situation in which the parties’
bargaining position is not entirely devoid of economic conse-
quences for the Respondent. The Respondent should therefore
be required to pay backpay to employees in a manner similar to
that required in Transmarine Navigation Corp., supra.
Transmarine involved an employer who had moved its op-
erations from Los Angeles to Long Beach, California, and ter-
minated its Los Angeles employees. The union representing
the Los Angeles employees was only given 3 days’ notice of
this change, and the employer did not offer to bargain over the
effects of its relocation until 7 months after terminating its Los
Angeles operations. Although the relocation and merger were
economically motivated and decisional bagaining was not man-
datory, the Ninth Circuit found that the Employer had violated
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by withholding information about the
shutdown, deterring the union from bargaining over its effects
on the employees. Transmarine Navigation, 380 F.2d 933 (9th
Cir. 1967). In a subsequent Supplemental Decision and Order,
the Board noted that the employees had been “denied an oppor-
tunity to bargain through their contractual representative at a
time prior to the shutdown when such bargaining would have
been meaningful . . . [rather than] when the collective strength
of the employees’ bargaining unit had been dissapated.”
Transmarine Navigation Corp., 170 NLRB 389 (1968). Since
it was “impossible to reestablish a situation equivalent to that
which would have prevailed had the Respondent more timely
fulfilled its statutory bargaining obligation,” the Board fash-
ioned a partial backpay remedy, designed “both to make whole
the employees for losses suffered as a result of the violation and
to recreate in some practicable manner a situation in which the
parties” bargaining position is not entirely devoid of economic
consequences for the Respondent.” Transmarine, 170 NLRB at
390. Accordingly, the Board awarded backpay to the Los An-
geles employees, to run from a date 5 days from the issuance of
the Supplemental Decision “until the occurrence of the earliest
of the following conditions: (1) the date the Respondent bar-
gains for agreement with the Union on those subjects pertaining
to the effects of the closing on guards at its Los Angeles termi-
nal; (2) a bona fide impasse in bargaining, (3) the failure of the
Union to request bargaining within 5 days of this Supplemental
Decision, or to commence negotiations within 5 days of the
Respondent’s notice of its desire to bargain with the Union, or
(4) the subsequent failure of the Union to bargain in good
faith.” Transmarine, 170 NLRB at 390. The minimum back-
pay award per employee awarded by the Board was 2 weeks’
backpay; the maximum award was the amount the employees
would have earned from the date of the shutdown of the Los
Angeles facility until the date the employees secured equivalent
employment elsewhere. Transmarine, 170 NLRB at 390. The
minimum backpay award per employee awarded by the Board
was two weeks’ backpay; the maximum award was the amount
the employees would have earned from the date of the shut-
down of the Los Angeles facility until the date the employees
secured equivalent employment elsewhere. Transmarine, 190
NLRB at 390. Also see, Metropolitan Teletronics Corp., 279
NLRB 457 (1996); Live Oak Skilled Care & Manor, supra;
Richmond Convalescent Hospital, supra; Sierra International
Trucks, Inc..
The same considerations which led the Board to award a
Transmarine remedy in the cases cited above are present in the
instant case. Although the Respondents notified the Union that
a relocation was possible, they failed to provide the Union with
any notice that the decision to move had been finalized. Addi-
tionally, the failure to provide the Union with the requested
information made meaningful bargaining impossible. For ex-
ample, without knowing when the Respondent was actually
relocating, or where, or the identities of the current bargaining
unit members, the Union was unable to bargain “at a meaning-
ful time, in a meaningful manner.” As with the cases cited
above, the change is now a fait accompli, necessitating a rem-
edy which will, in some fashion, restore a measure of bargain-
ing strength to the Union. The only means of restoring some
measure of bargaining power to the Union is through the award
of a Transmarine remedy.
Additionally, the Transmarine remedy is necessary to miti-
gate the losses suffered by employees as a result of the move,
and the Respondents’ failure to bargain in good faith about its
effects. For example, the move from Brooklyn to Bloomfield,
New Jersey, confronted employees with the choice of either
expending time and money on the extra commute, or giving up
their jobs. Since the move to New Jersey involved a monetary
savings on the part of the Respondent the Union might have
succeeded in negotiating for commuting or relocation expenses,
had the Respondent bargained in good faith. It is unclear,
based on the state of the record, how many of the employees in
the Brooklyn unit left the Respondents’ employ because of the
difficulty and expense of commuting to New Jersey. However,
it is clear that if the Union had had an opportunity to bargain
over transportation and relocation expenses, the Union might
have been able to mitigate the hardship to employees occa-
sioned by the move, and the concomitant loss of its member-
ship. It is also unclear whether employees who gave up their
jobs received any accrued benefits to which they were entitled,
or whether the Union could have negotiated a severance pack-
age had the Respondent bargained in good faith. Although
New Jersey had a higher minimum wage than New York in
1994, it is possible that employees earning more than the mi-
numum wage, received a pay cut after the move to New Jersey,
or suffered a loss in other benefits. Had the Respondent bar-
gained in good faith, the Union might have negotiated higher
wages or better benefits for unit employees.
The Transmarine remedy is not onerous. Since the backpay
awarded in a Transmarine-type remedy does not begin to ac-
crue until 5 days after any Board decision, a Respondent may
cut off its liability immediately by either reaching agreement,
or bargaining to impasse with respect to the effects of its deci-
sion. More importantly, the Transmarine remedy is warranted
by the facts of this case.
SEA JET TRUCKING CORP. 549
The Respondent may argue, however, that a Transmarine
remedy is not appropriate because it offered jobs in the new
facility to all of the unit employees. That argument should be
rejected for several reasons. First, the Respondent’s offer of
work to the unit employees was part and parcel of the unfair
labor practice the Respondent committed. Instead of dealing
with the Union about the terms and conditions of employment
for employees at the new facility, the Respondent decided to
contact them directly and offer them work in New Jersey. The
Respondent should not be allowed to rely on its own misdeeds
in order to avoid a remedy.
Second, as indicated above, the Respondent’s argument is
premised upon the erroneous assumption that the purpose of the
Transmarine remedy is to compensate employees for lost earn-
ings. However, as the Board made clear in Transmarine, the
purpose of the remedy is not only to compensate the employ-
ees, but to restore to the Union the bargaining leverage it would
have enjoyed in the absence of the employer’s unfair labor
practices. 170 NLRB at 390. Thus, as the Board stated in
Transmarine, the remedy is designed to ensure that the bargain-
ing has economic consequences for the employer. Therefore,
the need for a Transmarine remedy is not vitiated by the Re-
spondent’s offer of jobs to the unit employees at the new facil-
ity.
The Respondent may also argue that the Transmarine rem-
edy is not necessary because it gave the employees everything
that the Union would have asked for: jobs at the new facility,
etc. This argument fails for several reason. First, as noted
above, it would allow Respondent to profit from its own
wrongdoing. Second, it is contrary to fact. Pretter acknowl-
edged that the Union asked for transportation costs for the em-
ployees forced to travel longer distances because of the move.
Madore testified that, if the Respondent had allowed effects
bargaining to take place, the Union would have sought reloca-
tion reimbursement for employees who chose to move to be
closer to their relocated jobs, and severance for those employ-
ees unable or unwilling to accept jobs because of the new loca-
tion. Therefore, there was much for the parties to negotiate
about.
Moreover, because this case does involve employees who in-
curred increased transportation costs and/or moving expenses,
and because the Respondent failed to bargain over those costs,
the Transmarine remedy should be modified to calculate em-
ployees’ losses by taking into consideration these added costs.
Thus, to determine whether an employee who accepted a job at
the New Jersey facility, in fact incurred losses under the
Transmarine formula, income from employment at the New
Jersey facility should be offset by added commuting costs. If
the employees’ earnings, after subtracting commuting costs,
were less than their earnings before the relocation, the new job
would not be “equivalent employment,” and they would be
entitled to more than 2 weeks’ backpay.
However, any backpay due shall be based upon earnings
which the unit employees would normally receive during the
applicable period, less any set interim earnings, and shall be
computed in accordance with F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB
289 (1950), with interest as prescribed in New Horizons for the
Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
Also, the Respondent argues that in awarding the Transma-
rine remedy in Live Oak Skilled Care & Manor, supra, the
Board stated that it was not deciding “whether the remedy pro-
viding for a minimum of 2 weeks’ backpay in Transmarine is
warranted for all effects bargaining violations, regardless of
loss.” 300 NLRB at 1040. However, the Board has consistently
followed Live Oak Skilled Care & Manor in subsequent cases
involving the sale by an employer, where the successor retained
the bargaining unit employees. Sierra International Trucks,
supra; Compact Video Services, supra; Richmond Convalescent
Hospital, supra. The instant case is arguably distinguishable on
the ground that it involves a relocation rather than a sale of a
business. That is not a distinction which argues for a different
result. The need to restore to the Union its lost bargaining
power is the same in a case of a relocation as in a case of a sale.
Moreover, there is palpable harm to the employees which can
be remedied in a relocation case, but which is not present in the
case of a sale. Some employees find the job at the new location
to be too far to travel and thus incur loss of earnings. Other
employees are confronted with a longer and more expensive
commute. Thus, there are real losses to be compensated in a
case like this. Accordingly, the holding of Live Oak should be
applied in this case, and the Transmarine remedy should be
imposed.
Moreover, The Respondent in its brief also asserts that the
Union is “hard pressed to show that there has been an erosion
of their bargaining position for the implementation of a Trans-
marine remedy. The Respondent bases this on its alleged
timely notice of the relocation to the Union, on-going negotia-
tions with the Union, its offers of jobs to unit employees at the
new facility, etc., and attempts to distinguish a series of cases in
which a Transmarine remedy was imposed on the basis of un-
timely notice. The Respondent adds that additionally it is “un-
disputed that there was no intent on Respondent to mislead or
withhold information concerning its decision to transfer the
facility by virtue of the April 6, 1994 notification letter (G.C.
Exh. 3).” The Respondent continues that any deterrence to the
parties bargaining over the effects of the relocation was based
upon the Union’s own actions by conditioning their request to
bargain over effects and decision and on the providing of in-
formation prior to the scheduling of future negotiations. The
record in this case does not support the contentions of the Re-
spondent as more particularly discussed before.
The Respondent also cites the decision in NLRB v. Okla-
homa Fixture Co., 79 F.3d 1030 (10th Cir. 1996), to support its
contentions herein. The court in that case stated that the ade-
quacy of notice depends on the facts of a given case. The court
found that the union had advance notice of the subcontracting
decision, the union had ample opportunity to request bargaining
both during the week that the electricians were still on the pay-
roll and thereafter, and there was evidence of willingness on the
part of the company to bargain about effects. However, in the
instant case the Respondent did not give the Union clear notice
of when the relocation from Brookyn to New Jersey would
actually take place, the Union did request to bargain about the
effects and decision to relocate in a timely fashion, the Respon-
dent failed to furnish requested information to The Union, and
the Respondent in effect refused to bargain with the Union over
the effects of the relocation.
Additionally, the record in this case shows that the Respon-
dent has a history of and a proclivity to commit unfair labor
practices in violation of the Act. In the light thereof, I shall
recommend the issuance of a broad-cease-and-desist order pro-
hibiting the Respondent from violating the Act “in any other
manner.” S. E. Nichols, 284 NLRB 556 (1987), enfd. 862 F.2d
952 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1108 (1989); St.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 550
Frances Hospital, 252 NLRB 1247 fn.3 (1980); Hickmott
Foods, 242 NLRB 1357 (1979).
The Respondent shall also be required to post the customary
notice. Moreover, for the same reason as above, the Respon-
dent shall be ordered to mail the notice to any employees who
did not accept the offer of transfer to the new locations or who
are otherwise no longer employed by the Respondent since
August 31, 1994.
The Respondent in its brief also argues that under Fairmont
Hotel, 314 NLRB 534 (1994) the Administrative Law Judge
may rule on the adequacy of a proffered settlement pursuant to
the Respondent’s motion to dismiss, “where the proffered set-
tlement advances the purposes of the Act and resolves the al-
leged unfair labor practices. See Fairmont Hotel 314 NLRB
No. 93 (1994).”
During the hearing the Respondent moved to dismiss the
complaint herein and/or for the administrative law judge to
approve a proposed settlement. The General Counsel and the
Union opposed such settlement. The Respondents’ proposed
settlement was as follows:

1. Payment of two (2) weeks of the partial/modified
Transmarine remedy to employees who did not make the
move from Brooklyn to Bloomfield;
2.No Transmarine remedy for any employee that does
appear on the New Jersey payroll of Respondent;
3.That Respondent would provide documentation to
the extent that it hasn’t been provided and to the extent
that it exists, as per the the Union’s request for documenta-
tion embodied in their May 13, 1994 correspondence (or
in the alternative, makes said books and records available
to Charging Party for their inspection);
4.That the Employer would agree to continue to bar-
gain over the “effects” of the relocation; and
5.That there would be a Formal Board settlement, with
an appropriate notice posting.

In Fairmont Hotel supra, the Board held that where the with-
drawal of a complaint is a matter for :adjustication” before the
administrative law judge (after the hearing opens), the Board
has the authority to determine whether withdrawal of the com-
plaint is appropriate.
The General Counsel’s authority not to prosecute includes
settlement of a case over a parties objection where a complaint
has issued but the hearing has not opened. See also Section
102.18 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations and Sec 101.9 of
Statements of Procedure. On the other hand, if the General
Counsel rejects a proffered settlement and wishes to continue to
prosecute the case, the Board will be called on to exercise its
adjudicatory function. In that connection, the Board may rule
on the adequacy of the proffered settlement, pursuant to a Re-
spondent motion to dismiss. Fairmont Hotel, supra at 534 fn.4.
Also see Independent Stave Co., 287 NLRB 740 (1987).
In Independent Stave Co., supra, the Board set forth some of
the critical factors to be considered as to whether approval of a
proposed settlement would effectuate the purposes and policies
of the Act. Among those cited for our purposes herein were:
1. Whether the parties have agreed to be bound regarding the
settlement;
2. Whether the settlement is reasonable in the light of the na-
ture of the violations alleged, the risks inherent in litigation and
the stage of the litigation;
3. Whether the Respondent has engaged in a history of viola-
tions of the Act or has breached previous settlement agreements
resolving unfair labor practices disputes.
Moreover, in Cooper State Rubber, 301 NLRB 138 (1991),
the Board rejected a unilateral settlement on the following
grounds;
1. That the opposition of the General Counsel and the Charg-
ing Party to the settlement was a significant factor to be consid-
ered in determining whether to accept the proffered adjustment;
2. The adjustment did not address all the allegations of the
complaint; and
3. The proposal did not protect against future misconduct by
the Respondent.
Applying the rationale of the above cases to the instant mat-
ter, I find the proposed settlement offer of the Respondent falls
short of the criteria necessary for acceptance. One of the im-
portant considerations in coming to this decision is the fact that
both the General Counsel and the Union oppose the proposed
agreement. Although it is clear that the opposition from these
parties is not a decisive factor to be weighed, it is definitely
significant and militates heavily against accepting the unilateral
proposal. Iron Workers Local 27 (Morrison-Knudson), 313
NLRB 215 (1990); Food Lion, Inc., 304 NLRB 602 fn. 4
(1991); Cooper State Rubber, supra. Moreover, the remedy
proposed by the Respondent regarding the amounts to be paid
to the unit employees involved regarding backpay and interest
and whatever additional benefits owed to these employees may
be inadequate under the facts of this case. Additionally, the
Respondent has a long history of serious unfair labor practices
and in addition, were the proposed settlement offer to be ac-
cepted, it would not conserve the Board’s resources because a
hearing on the merits of the allegations in thecomplaint has
already been held in this proceeding. Iron Workers Local 27
(Morrison-Krudson) supra; Independent Stave Co., supra.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.Sea-Jet Trucking Corporation, A.P.A. Warehouse, Inc., af-
filiated Terminals, Inc., Sea-Jet Industries, Inc., & Sea-Jet
Trucking & A.P.A. Warehouses, Inc., a Single Employer and
each of them are and have been at all times material herein
employers engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2),(6) and (7) of the Act.
2.International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL–CIO is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. (a) At all times material herein until in or around Decem-
ber 1994, the following employees of the Respondents, herein
called the Brooklyn Unit, constituted a unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9(b) of the Act.

All full-time and regular part-time warehouse employees em-
ployed by Sea-Jet Trucking Corporation, A.P.A. Warehouse,
Inc., Affiliated Terminals, Incorporated, Sea-Jet Industries,
Incorporated, and Sea-Jet Trucking & A.P.A. Warehouse,
Inc., at its 140-43rd Street, Brooklyn, New York location, ex-
cluding all office clerical employees, trailer drivers, truckdriv-
ers, drivers’ helpers, building maintenance employees, truck
maintenance, professional employees and supervisors as de-
fined in the Act.

SEA JET TRUCKING CORP. 551
(b) At all times material since in or around 1994, the follow-
ing employees of the Respondents, herein called the New Jer-
sey Unit, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the
Act:

All full-time and regular part-time warehouse employees em-
ployed by Sea-Jet Trucking Corporation, A.P.A. Warehouse,
Inc., Affiliated Terminals, Incorporated, Sea-Jet Industries,
Incorporated, and Sea-Jet Trucking & A.P.A. Warehouse,
Inc., at its 8 Franklin Street, Bloomfield, New Jersey, location,
excluding all office clerical employees, trailer drivers, truck-
drivers, drivers’ helpers, building maintenance employees,
truck maintenance, professional employees and supervisors as
defined in the Act.

4. (a) On December 19, 1989, the Board issued a “Decision,
Order and Certification of Representative” in Cases 29–RCA–
6841 and 29–RC–6844, certifying the Union as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the
Brooklyn Unit.
(b) On August 14, 1991, the Board issued a Decision and
Order, reported at 304 NLRB 67, ordering the Respondents,
inter alia, to recognize and bargain with the Union pursuant to
the certification issued in Cases 29–RC–6841 and 29–RC–6844
on December 19, 1989, described above in subparagraph (a).
(c) On July 15, 1992, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit entered a judgment enforcing the Board’s
Decision and Order, reported at 304 NLRB 67, described above
in subparagraph (b).
5. At all times material since December 19, 1989, until in or
around December, 1994 the Union has been , and is now, the
exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees of the
Brooklyn Unit within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
6. On a date presently unknown in the summer or fall of
1994, the Respondents commenced the relocation of its princi-
pal facility from 140 43rd Street, Brooklyn, New York to 8
Franklin Street, Bloomfield, New Jersey, which relocation was
completed in or about January 1995.
7. At all times material since a date presently unknown in the
summer or fall, 1994, the Union has been the exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining representative of the New Jersey Unit.
8. On or about May 10 and 13, and August 10, 1994, the Un-
ion requested that the Respondent’s bargain collectively with
the Union with respect to the effects of the relocation from
Brooklyn, New York to Bloomfield, New Jersey.
9. The above relates to the wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment of the Brooklyn Unit and the New
Jersey Unit and is a mandatory subject for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining.
10. Since about May 10, 1994, the Respondent’s have failed
and refused to bargain collectively with the representatives of
these employees about the effects of the relocation of its facility
noted above, and have thereby engaged in, and are engaging in,
unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
11. On or about May 10 and 13, 1994, the Union orally and
by letter, respectively, requested that the Respondents furnish
the Union with the following information:

Location and mailing address of the New Jersey facility.

The following information pertaining to Respondents’ Annu-
ity Plan covering employees in the Brooklyn Unit:
1. (a) A full and detailed history of each such em-
ployee, including date of hire, date payments started, cred-
ited service, rate of new payments to annuity, breaks in
annuity service or payments or credits, vesting or non-
vesting (including the effect of the new five-year provision
and its effective date), date of expected employee vesting
and eligibility to receive upon eligibility, whether or not
any of the employees involved are eligible for yearly dis-
ability annuity, survivors rights, if any, and whether such
annuity payments by the employer are current or deficient,
and in what amount.
(b) Whether or not the present annuity plan allows
the employer, if agreed to in bargaining, to make annuity
payments for employees during such time they are laid off,
for both vested and non-vested employees, and whether
there is a difference in making annuity payments to a non-
active and/or laid off employee, if the employee is on tem-
porary layoff with recall rights, and which provisions of
the Annuity Plan apply to this question.
(c) Annual Report Form 5500 and Schedule B for
Plan Years (specify years).
(d) Complete Actuarial Valuation (specify years).
(e) Trustee’s Assets Statement (specify years).
(f) Trust of Insurance Agreement relating to holding
and investment of assets of the Annuity Plan.
(g) Current census of the unit (i.e., date of birth, sex,
annuity service for active workers; same information for
retirees with annuity amount and type of benefit speci-
fied).
(h) List of other units, if applicable, covered under
current Annuity Plan (including number of participants in
each unit and summary of any material differences in plan
documents covering the several units).
(i) Any redrafts or amendments to the Annuity Plan
document since its inception.
3. Holidays to be paid to employees prior to anyone
being laid off.
4. Whether any Brooklyn Unit employees have unpaid
bereavement leave claims, and their names, clock num-
bers, and the amount of days due to each employee.
5. Whether any Brooklyn Unit employees are out on
Jury Duty and their names, clock numbers and any money
owed to these employees.
6. The present vacation schedule and the names, clock
numbers, seniority dates, departments of all employees
who are eligible for any vacation.
7. Names and clock numbers and type of leave, for all
Brooklyn Unit employees presently on leaves of absence.
8. A list of Brooklyn Unit employees on layoff by
name, seniority, clock number, job description and de-
partment, and the amount of benefits owed or being re-
ceived by the laid-off employees.
9. A list of the bargaining unit employees presently on
Workers Compensation by name, clock number, and sen-
iority with the amount of benefits owed or being received
by these employees.
10. A list of bargaining unit employees by name and
clock number who have unpaid hospital insurance claims,
including the amounts that they are owed.
11. A copy of Respondents’ insurance plan in what-
ever form and a copy of its benefits schedule procedure
and premiums paid, single/married and families.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 552
12. A list of bargaining unit employees by name and
clock number who have unpaid life insurance claims, in-
cluding the amount they are owed.
13. A list of all bargaining unit employees by name
and clock number with the average hours they have
worked since January 1990, and the current rate of pay for
each employee.
14. A list of all bargaining unit employees by name
and clock number with the estimated list earnings for the
year 1990 due to the reduction of employees.
15. A list of any part-time workers presently working
in the plant by name and clock number and the jobs they
are presently working, and hourly wages being paid.
16. A copy of all job classifications.
17. A copy of any oral or written side agreements
made between the Company and any bargaining unit em-
ployees and/or any employee committee since January
1990.
18. A copy of all the overtime records of hours of
equalization of bargaining unit members since January
1990.
19. A copy of names and the rate of the job and the
date any employee exercised his/her bumping rights since
January 1990.
20. A list of names of any bargaining unit employees
temporarily transferred, for what length of time trans-
ferred, and the rates of pay paid since that time.
12. On or about August 10, 1994, the Union requested that
the Respondents furnish the Union with the following informa-
tion:

1. Names of members of the Brooklyn Unit who were
transferred to the new location, their salaries, benefits, any
incentives, and any compensation for transportation.
2. Type of work being performed at the new location,
number of employees at the Brooklyn facility and the new
location, and their hours and benefits.

13. The information described above requested by the Union,
relates to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment of the employees in the units described above, and is
necessary for and relevant to, the Union’s performance of its
functions as the exclusive collective bargaining representative
of the employees in the above units.
14. Since on or about May 10, 1994, the Respondent has
failed and refused to furnish the Union with the information
requested as described above, and has thereby refused to bar-
gain collectively, and are refusing to bargain collectively, with
the representative of their employees and has thereby engaged
in, and are engaging in, unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) and Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, and upon the entire record, and pursuant to Sec-
tion 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recom-
mended8

8 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
ORDER
The Respondents, Sea-Jet Trucking Corporation,
A.P.A.Warehouse, Inc., Affiliated Terminals, Incorporated,
Sea-Jet Industries, Incorporated, and Sea-Jet Trucking &
A.P.A. Warehouses, Inc., A single Employer, Bloomfield, New
Jersey, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing to bargain in good faith with the International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Im-
plement Workers of America, AFL–CIO concerning the effects
on employees of its decision to relocate its Brooklyn, New
York facility to Bloomfield, New Jersey.
(b) Failing or refusing, on request, to furnish the Union with
information relevant and necessary to the Union’s fulfillment of
its functions as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive of the employees in the appropriate units.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or co-
ercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them
by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain collectively in good faith with the
Union concerning the effects on its employees in the appropri-
ate units of the decision to relocate its Brookyn, New York
facility to Bloomfield, New Jersey, and if an understanding is
reached embody the understanding in a signed agreement.
(b) Pay to the unit employees involved in the relocation in
any way, limited backpay in the manner set forth in the remedy
section of this decision.
(c) On the Union’s request promptly furnish the Union with
the information sought in its May 10, May 13 and August 10,
1994 letters.
(d) Preserve, and within 14 days of a request make available
to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards, per-
sonnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Or-
der.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in New York, New York and Bloomfield, New Jersey
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix9 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
29 after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized represen-
tative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other mate-
rial. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceed-
ings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the
facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to
all current employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent at any time since August 31, 1994. Moreover, the
Respondent shall also be ordered to mail the notice to any em-
ployees who did not accept the offer of transfer to the new loca-
9 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
SEA JET TRUCKING CORP. 553
tion or who are otherwise no longer employed by the Respon-
dent as of May 10, 1994.
(f) Within 14 days after the service by the Region, file with
the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible
official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps
that the Respondent has taken to comply.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the
National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide
by this notice.

WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to bargain collectively and in
good faith with the International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America,
AFL–CIO, concerning the effects resulting from the relocation
of our facility from Brooklyn, New York to Bloomfield, New
Jersey on its employees in the appropriate units.
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to furnish the Union with the in-
formation requested by it in its letters of May 10, May 13 and
August 10, 1994, so that the Union may discharge its duties as
the employees’ collective-bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with, restrain, or co-
erce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by
Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request, bargain with the Union concerning the
effects on their employees in the appropriate units resulting
from the relocation of the Respondents’ facility from Brooklyn,
New York to Bloomfield, New Jersey.
WE WILL, furnish the Union with the information requested
by it in its May 10, May 13 and August 13, 1994 letters, so that
the Union may discharge its duties as the employees’ collec-
tive-bargaining representative.
WE WILL, pay employees involved in the relocation in any
manner limited backpay with interest as provided in the remedy
section of this decision.

SEA-JET TRUCKING CORPORATION, A.P.A.
WAREHOUSES, INC., AFFILIATED TERMINALS,
INCORPORATED, SEA-JET INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED,
AND SEA-JET TRUCKING & A.P.A. WAREHOUSES,
INC., A SINGLE EMPLOYER