Scott Mace et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 2, 2020

11552099 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 2, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/552,099 10/23/2006 Scott Mace RENT 1000-2 1490
23460 7590 09/02/2020
LEYDIG VOIT & MAYER, LTD
TWO PRUDENTIAL PLAZA, SUITE 4900
180 NORTH STETSON AVENUE
CHICAGO, IL 60601-6731
EXAMINER
VETTER, DANIEL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3628
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/02/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Chgpatent@leydig.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte SCOTT MACE, BART ALAN MELTZER,
JOSEPH DONOVAN, and SEAN GALLAVAN
____________

Appeal 2020-001869
Application 11/552,099
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, and
TARA L. HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judges.

CRAWFORD, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 57–76. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
International Group, Inc. (Appeal Br. 1).
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THE INVENTION
Appellant claims a method of server-side tracking of click-throughs
by users presented with advertising, with options for tracking advertising
impact beyond making a reservation to fulfillment (Spec. ¶ 10).
Claim 57 is representative of the subject matter on appeal.
57. A method of persisting and updating an updatable
itinerary data structure that records online negotiations between
a consumer and multiple distinct travel-related vendors,
including:
identifying a travel-related subject matter of interest;
identifying purchase categories within the travel-related
subject matter;
for at least two particular purchase categories, identifying
one or more relevant vendors;
in a first network session, intermediating, by a travel
service hub server, an online negotiation between a user or
user’s agent ( collectively referred to as the user) and at least
first and second vendors in different purchase categories, the
first and second vendors being distinct, including for a vendor
sending the vendor’s offerings to the user via the
travel service hub server, including availability and
pricing,
receiving, by the travel service hub server, the
user’s selection of a particular offering,
channeling messages between the vendor and the
user via the travel service hub server, and
persisting, as an item in non-transitory memory of
the travel service hub server, confirmation of the
intermediated negotiation, the item forming part of an
updatable itinerary data structure;
in a second network session with the user, accessing, by
the travel service hub server, the updatable itinerary data
structure and sending the user a formatted version of items in
the updatable itinerary data structure with at least one control
for adding an additional item;
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in response to the travel service hub server receiving a
message indicating selection of said at least one control for
adding the additional item, repeating, by the travel service hub
server, the sending, receiving, channeling and persisting
actions, thereby adding the additional item to the updatable
itinerary data structure;
transmitting electronically, by the travel service hub
server, to a web site a referral of the user in response to
advertising;
determining from the electronically received referral an
advertising stimulus leading to the user referral;
wherein identifying the travel-related subject matter of
interest, the purchase categories and the relevant vendors is
based on the user referral;
persisting, by the travel service hub server, in the
updateable itinerary data structure an identification of the
advertising stimulus; and
after a date for fulfillment of the items on the itinerary
passes, electronically reporting, by the travel service hub server,
fulfillment without cancellation to at least one vendor
associated with the advertising stimulus.

THE REJECTIONS
Claims 57–76 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a
judicial exception without significantly more.
Claims 57–62 and 64–70 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over DeLorme (US 5,948,040, Sept. 7, 1999), in view of
Horowitz (US 2005/0097204 A1, May 5, 2005), and Whyel (US
2001/0027481 A1, Oct. 4, 2001).2

2 We treat the Examiner’s identification at page 6 of the Final Action of
claims 34–38 and 44–49 as the claims subject to this rejection as inadvertent
error. See Final Act. 6–14 (analyzing claims 57–62 and 64–67 as subject to
this rejection).
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Claim 63 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over DeLorme, in view of Horowitz and Whyel, further in view of Tagawa
(US 5,732,398, Mar. 24, 1998).
Claims 71–75 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over DeLorme, in view of Horowitz and Whyel, further in view
of Monk (US 2004/0138928 A1, July 15, 2004).
Claim 76 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over DeLorme, in view of Horowitz, Whyel, and Monk, further in view of
Warren (US 2003/0101131 A1, May 29, 2003).

ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION
We will sustain the rejection of claims 57–76 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Supreme Court
set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that
claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, . . .
determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of
those patent-ineligible concepts. If so, . . . then ask, “[w]hat else
is there in the claims before us?” To answer that question, . . .
consider the elements of each claim both individually and “as
an ordered combination” to determine whether the additional
elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-
eligible application. [The Court] described step two of this
analysis as a search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is “sufficient to ensure
that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a
patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–218 (citations omitted)
(citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66,
72–73, 78–79 (2012)).
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To perform this test, we must first determine whether the claims at
issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept. The Federal Circuit has
explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims,
considered in light of the [S]pecification, based on whether ‘their character
as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft
Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp.
v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks
whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant
technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for
which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335–36.
In so doing we apply a “directed to” two prong test: 1) evaluate
whether the claim recites a judicial exception, and 2) if the claim recites a
judicial exception, evaluate whether the judicial exception is integrated into
a practical application. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 50–57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”).
The Examiner determines that the claims are directed to creating and
updating an updatable itinerary that records negotiations between a customer
and travel vendors (Final Act. 4). The Examiner determines that the claims
are directed to a method of organizing human activities because it manages
the travel planning of persons and their relationships with service providers
and agents that involves basic commercial practices. The Examiner
additionally determines that the claims could be performed in the human
mind or through pen and paper. The Examiner finds that the additional
elements recited beyond the abstract ideas identified are known and
conventional generic computing elements that do not present improvements
to a technological field or functioning of the computer itself (Final Act. 5).
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The Specification discloses that the present invention relates to
persisting and updating an updatable itinerary data structure that records
online negotiations between a consumer and multiple distinct travel-related
vendors (Spec. ¶ 197). The method includes steps of negotiations between a
consumer and at least two particular vendors in at least two particular
purchase categories (Spec. ¶ 198).
Consistent with this disclosure, claim 57 includes the steps of
“sending the vendor’s offerings to the user via the travel service hub server,”
“receiving, by the travel service hub server, the user’s selection of a
particular offering,” “channeling messages between the vendor and the user
via the travel service hub server.”
We thus agree with the Examiner’s findings that the claims are
directed to controlling the behavior of persons, i.e., the behavior of
customers and travel vendors. It follows from prior Supreme Court cases,
and Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), in particular, that the claims
at issue here are directed to an abstract idea. Controlling the behavior of
persons concerning travel is a method of organizing human behavior
because, as the Examiner determined, “it manages the travel planning of
persons and their relationships with service providers and agents” (Final Act.
4), which is not eligible subject matter. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18. We
also note that the Specification discloses and the claims recite a method
involving advertising which is a fundamental economic practice and
therefore the invention is a method of organizing human activity on that
basis as well. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Also, we find the steps of “sending the vendor’s offerings to the user,”
“receiving . . . the user’s selection,” “channeling messages between the
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vendor and the user,” “receiving a message indicating selection,” and
“transmitting electronically . . . a referral of the user,” and “determining . . .
advertising stimulus leading to the user referral,” constitute “analyzing
information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical
algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the
abstract-idea category.” Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d
1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765
F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (claims directed to certain arrangements
involving contractual relations are directed to abstract ideas). Thus, we find
that the claims recite an abstract idea of methods of organizing human
activity and, in the alternative, a mental process.
Turning to the second prong of the “directed to” test, claim 57
requires a “server.” The recitation of the word “server” does not impose “a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” 84 Fed. Reg.
at 53. We find no indication in the Specification, nor does Appellant direct
us to any indication, that the operations recited in independent claim 57
invoke any inventive programming, require any specialized computer
hardware or other inventive computer components, i.e., a particular machine,
or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic
computer components to perform generic computer functions. See DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer
limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”).
We also find no indication in the Specification that the claimed
invention effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
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different state or thing. Nor do we find anything of record, short of attorney
argument, that attributes any improvement in computer technology and/or
functionality to the claimed invention or that otherwise indicates that the
claimed invention integrates the abstract idea into a “practical application,”
as that phrase is used in the revised Guidance. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 55.
In this regard, the recitation of a “server” does not affect an
improvement in the functioning of the server or other technology, does not
recite a particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claims, and
does not transform or reduce a particular article to a different state or thing.
Id. Thus, claim 57 is directed to a judicial exception that is not integrated
into a practical application and, thus, is directed to an “abstract idea.”
Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, because we find that
claim 57 is directed to abstract ideas, the claim must include an “inventive
concept” in order to be patent-eligible, i.e., there must be an element or
combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the claim in practice
amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See Alice, 573
U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
The introduction of a computer server into the claims does not alter
the analysis at Alice step two.
[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a
patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
Stating an abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply it’” is
not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an
abstract idea “‘to a particular technological environment.’”
Stating an abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with a
computer” simply combines those two steps, with the same
deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a computer
amounts to a mere instruction to “implemen[t]” an abstract idea
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“on . . . a computer,” that addition cannot impart patent
eligibility. This conclusion accords with the preemption
concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the
ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer
implementation is not generally the sort of “additional
featur[e]” that provides any “practical assurance that the
process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the [abstract idea] itself.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
Instead, the relevant question is whether claim 57 here does more than
simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea . . . on a
generic computer. Id. at 225. It does not.
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
server at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a server to
retrieve, select, and apply decision criteria to data and modify the data as a
result amounts to electronic data query and retrieval—one of the most basic
functions of a computer. All of these computer functions are well-
understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the trading
industry. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354; see also In re Katz
Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’
‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved by any
general purpose computer without special programming.”). In short, each
step does no more than require a generic computer server to perform generic
computer functions. As to the data operated upon, “even if a process of
collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a
particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the collection and analysis
other than abstract.” SAP Am. Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168
(Fed. Cir. 2018).
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Considered as an ordered combination, the server of Appellant’s
claims adds nothing that is not already present when the steps are considered
separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis-access/display is
equally generic and conventional or otherwise held to be abstract. See
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing
access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction); Inventor Holdings,
LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(holding that sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation,
display, and transmission was abstract); Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast
Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding
sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring was abstract).
The ordering of the steps is, therefore, ordinary and conventional.
Claim 57 does not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of
the server itself. As we stated above, claim 57 does not affect an
improvement in any other technology or technical field. Claim 57 at issue
amounts to nothing significantly more than instructions to apply the abstract
ideas using some unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that
is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
See Alice, 573 U.S. at 226.
We have reviewed all the arguments (Appeal Br. 4–14) Appellant has
submitted concerning the patent eligibility of the claims before us that stand
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We find that our analysis above
substantially covers the substance of all the arguments, which have been
made. But, for purposes of emphasis, we will address various arguments in
order to make individual rebuttals of same.
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We are not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner by
Appellant’s argument that the steps of claim 57 cannot be performed in the
human mind or by pen and paper because the steps are specifically directed
to recording online negotiations that occur in an e-commerce setting. We
note that, if a claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers
performance in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer
components, then it is still encompassed by the mental processes category
unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the mind. See
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps,
there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being
performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”); Mortg. Grader,
Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(holding that computer-implemented method for “anonymous loan
shopping” was an abstract idea because it could be “performed by humans
without a computer”); Versata Dev. Grp. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306,
1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Courts have examined claims that required the use
of a computer and still found that the underlying, patent-ineligible invention
could be performed via pen and paper or in a person’s mind.”); CyberSource
Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (holding that the incidental use of “computer” or “computer readable
medium” does not make a claim otherwise directed to process that “can be
performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper” patent
eligible).
In the instant claims, we find that the fact that the steps of claim 57
are performed in an e-commerce setting does not mean that the claim cannot
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be performed in the human mind or by a human using a pen and paper. We
find the claim analogous to the claims in Ultramercial in “recit[ing] an
invention that is . . . merely the routine or conventional use of the Internet.”
DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1258–59. That the steps are performed in an e-
commerce setting is not necessarily sufficient to transform an otherwise
abstract claim to patent eligible subject matter. Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at
716 (limiting the use of the abstract idea “to a particular technological
environment” does not make the abstract idea patent-eligible). The claims
essentially entail selection and negotiations between a vendor offering travel
related services and a user which has been performed in the mind of humans
with perhaps the aid of pen and paper for many years.
We are not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner by
Appellant’s argument that each pending claim includes significantly more
than a judicial exception and is directed to a new and useful practical
application because the Appellant does not explain why the claims are
directed to a new and useful practical application. (Appeal Br. 6).
We do not agree with Appellant that the claims recite a particular
device that satisfies the machine-or-transformation test. In making this
argument, Appellant refers to the steps of claim 57 but does not identify a
particular machine. The only machine recited in claim 57 is a travel service
hub server. However, Appellant has not established that this server is
anything other than a conventional server. We note that for a machine to
impose a meaningful limit on the claimed invention, it must play a
significant part in permitting a claimed method to be performed, rather than
merely providing the generic environment in which to implement the recited
abstract idea. Cf. Versata Dev. Grp., 793 F.3d at 1335 (explaining that in
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order for a machine to add significantly more, it must “play a significant part
in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function
solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved
more quickly”); see also MPEP § 2106.05(b)(II) (citing Versata).
We are not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner by
Appellant’s argument that the claim does not preempt the abstract idea.
(Appeal Br. 7). “While preemption may signal patent ineligible subject
matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent
eligibility.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788
F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]hat the claims do not preempt all
price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-
commerce setting do not make them any less abstract.”). And, “[w]here a
patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter
under the Mayo framework, as they are in this case, preemption concerns are
fully addressed and made moot.” Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1379.
We are not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner by
Appellant’s argument that the claims are inextricably tied to a computer
system, are rooted in computer technology and improve the operation of a
computer-implemented travel service hub server operating on the internet
(Appeal Br. 8). Not all claims purporting to address Internet-centric
challenges are eligible for patent. For example, in DDR Holdings, the Court
distinguished the patent-eligible claims at issue from claims found patent-
ineligible in Ultramercial. See DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1258–59 (citing
Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715–16). As noted there, the Ultramercial claims
were “directed to a specific method of advertising and content distribution
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that was previously unknown and never employed on the Internet before.”
Id. at 1258 (quoting Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 714). Nevertheless, those
claims were patent ineligible because they “merely recite[d] the abstract idea
of ‘offering media content in exchange for viewing an advertisement,’ along
with ‘routine additional steps such as updating an activity log, requiring a
request from the consumer to view the ad, restrictions on public access, and
use of the Internet.’” Id.
Appellant’s asserted claims are analogous to claims found ineligible
in Ultramercial and distinct from claims found eligible in DDR Holdings.
The ineligible claims in Ultramercial recited “providing [a] media product
for sale at an Internet website;” “restricting general public access to said
media product;” “receiving from the consumer a request to view [a] sponsor
message;” and “if the sponsor message is an interactive message, presenting
at least one query to the consumer and allowing said consumer access to said
media product after receiving a response to said at least one query.”
Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 712. Similarly, Appellant’s asserted claims recite
receiving, analyzing, modifying, and transmitting data related to travel
services. This is precisely the type of Internet activity found ineligible in
Ultramercial.
We are lastly not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner by
Appellant’s argument that the applied references fail to render claim 57
unpatentable and do not teach or suggest the method of claim 57 but rather
that the claimed approach includes unconventional limitations that confine
the claims to a particular useful application (Appeal Br. 8–9). To the extent
Appellant maintains that the limitations of claim 57 necessarily amount to
“significantly more” than an abstract idea because the claimed apparatus is
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allegedly patentable over the prior art, Appellant misapprehend the
controlling precedent. Although the second step in the Alice/Mayo
framework is termed a search for an “inventive concept,” the analysis is not
an evaluation of novelty or non-obviousness, but rather, a search for “an
element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself.”’ Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 72–73). A novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely
abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90.
In view of the foregoing, we will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 57 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We will also sustain this rejection as
directed to the remaining claims because Appellant has not argued the
separate eligibility of the remaining claims.

REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
We are not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner by
Appellant’s argument that the prior art does not disclose “transmitting
electronically, by the travel service hub server, to a web site a referral of the
user in response to advertising . . . wherein identifying the travel-related
subject matter of interest, the purchase categories and the relevant vendors is
based on the user referral,” as recited in claim 57. The Examiner relies on
Horowitz at paragraphs 45–46 for teaching this subject matter.
Appellant’s Specification discloses:
The method embodiment described may further include
receiving electronically at a website a referral of a user in
response to advertising and determining from the electronically
received referral an advertising stimulus 1304 leading to the
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user referral. For instance, advertising associated with words or
categories purchased from an advertising vendor, such as a
search engine vendor, attracts the user to click through for more
information. When the user clicks 1302, the search engine
invokes a URL provided by the entity that bought the
advertising.
Spec. ¶ 209. As such, the referral recited in claim 57 is the action of the user
of clicking through for more information.
We find that Horowitz describes at paragraphs 45 and 46 and depicts
in Figure 4 that an advertisement presented to the user is redirected to the
advertiser destination (412) in response to the user clicking through
advertisement (410). As such, we agree with the Examiner that the “user
referral” reads on the advertising link click in Horowitz (Ans. 8).
We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred because none of the
applied references provides a credible reason to one of ordinary skill in the
art to modify such disclosures to provide a method having the combination
of steps and features recited in claim 57 (Appeal Br. 10). The Examiner
clearly set out the reasons for combining DeLorme and Horowitz and clearly
set out the reasons for combining DeLorme, Horowitz and Whyel on page
10 of the Final Action. This argument is not persuasive because, as pointed
out by the Examiner, the specific reasons provided for the combination are
not rebutted by Appellant.
In view of the foregoing, we will sustain the Examiner’s rejection
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of claim 57. We will also sustain this rejection as
it is directed to claims 58-62 and 64-70 dependent therefrom because
Appellant does not argue the separate patentability of these claims. We will
also sustain the remaining rejections under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) because
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Appellant relies on the arguments made in support of the patentability of
claim 57 in responding to these rejections (Appeal Br. 13–14).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 57–76 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 57–76 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
57–76 101 Eligibility 57–76
57–62,
64–70
103 DeLorme,
Horowitz, Whyel
57–62, 64–70
63 103 DeLorme,
Horowitz, Whyel,
Tagawa
63
71–75 103 DeLorme,
Horowitz, Whyel,
Monk
71–75
76 103 DeLorme,
Horowitz, Whyel,
Monk, Warren
76
Overall
Outcome
57–76

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED