SCORELOGIX LLCDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardFeb 12, 20212019003845 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 12, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/339,703 07/24/2014 Suresh K ANNAPPINDI 132770.00106 4909 122391 7590 02/12/2021 Chad Peterson 4409 Tetbury Pl Raleigh, NC 27613 EXAMINER HAMERSKI, BOLKO M ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3694 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/12/2021 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ________________ Ex parte SURESH K. ANNAPPINDI ________________ Appeal 2019-003845 Application 14/339,703 Technology Center 3600 ________________ Before JEAN R. HOMERE, BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, and ERIC B. CHEN, Administrative Patent Judges. BAUMEISTER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 2–11, 13–15, 17, and 18, which constitute all of the pending claims.1 Appeal Br. 4. Claims 1, 12, 16, 19, and 20 have been canceled. Appeal Br. 11–16 (Claims App.). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). The Board conducts a limited de novo review of the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). We AFFIRM. 1 Appellant identifies the inventor as the real party in interest. Appeal Brief filed October 9, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”) 2. Appeal 2019-003845 Application 14/339,703 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Appellant describes the claimed subject matter as follows: Systems and methods are described for scoring consumers’ credit risk by determining consumers’ income risk and future ability to pay. Methods are provided for measuring consumers’ income risk by analyzing consumers’ income loss risk, income reduction risk, probability of continuance of income, and economy’s impact on consumers’ income. In one embodiment, a method is provided to evaluate an individual’s creditworthiness using income risk based credit score thereby providing creditors, lenders, marketers, and companies with deeper, new insights into consumer’s credit risk and repayment potential. By predicting consumers’ income risk and the associated creditworthiness the present invention increases the accuracy and reliability of consumers’ credit risk assessments, results in more predictive and precise consumer credit scoring, and offers a new method of rendering a forward-looking appraisal of an individual’s ability to repay a debt or the ability to pay for products and services. Spec. Abstr. STATEMENT OF THE REJECTIONS2 Claims 2–11, 13–15, 17, and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to a judicial exception to patent-eligible subject matter (an abstract idea) without reciting significantly more. Final Act. 12–23; see also Appeal Br. 4 (stating, “[c]laim 12 was canceled in an amendment filed on December 7th, 2017”). 2 The Examiner initially rejected claim 12 under 25 USC § 112(b) (pre-AIA § 112, ¶ 2) and under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Final Act. 8–9, 24. But Appellant subsequently canceled claim 12, mooting the rejection. Appeal Br. 4 (stating, “[c]laim 12 was canceled in an amendment filed on December 7th, 2017”). Appeal 2019-003845 Application 14/339,703 3 Claims 2, 7–10, 15, and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Feinstein (US 7,970,676 B2; issued June 28, 2011), Scorelogix, Job Security Score Predicts Unemployment Risk with 85% Accuracy: Promises to Lower Credit and Mortgage Losses November 20, 2007 (http://www.prnewswire.com/news/scorelogix) (“Scorelogix 2007”), and Annappindi (US 2005/0125259 A1; published June 9, 2005). Final Act. 24–41. Claims 3–6 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Feinstein, Scorelogix 2007, Annappindi, Robert B. Avery et al., Consumer Credit Scoring: Do Situational Circumstances Matter? 28(4) Journal of Banking and Finance 835–856 ISSN 0378-4266 (2004) (“Avery”), and Zarikian (US 7,653,593 B2; issued Jan. 26, 2010). Final Act. 41–48. Claims 11 and 14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Feinstein, Scorelogix 2007, Annappindi, Avery, and Scorelogic, US 78948553 trademark application, Specimen, mail/create date of August 6, 2006, Scorelogic® Smarter Risk Solutions pp. 1–2 http://www.scorelogix.com (July 18, 2006) (“2006 Specimen”). Final Act. 48–55. Claim 17 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Feinstein, Scorelogix 2007, Annappindi, and 2006 Specimen. Final Act. 58–59. Appeal 2019-003845 Application 14/339,703 4 THE SECTION 101 REJECTION The Claimed Subject Matter Independent claim 2 is representative of the claimed subject matter.3 Claim 2 is reproduced below with emphasis added to the claim language that recites an additional element beyond an abstract idea: 2. A method to determine an individual’s credit score, comprising: (a) Calculating the individual’s income reduction risk, comprising generating by a computer, an unemployment risk using the individual’s personal data, including age, education, demographic data and employment history, and using historical and projected unemployment and hiring trends, historical and projected macroeconomic and microeconomic data, and generating by the computer, the income loss [sic: reduction] risk for the individual using the unemployment risk; (b) Calculating the individual’s income loss risk, comprising generating by a computer, an unemployment risk using the individual’s personal data, including age, education, demographic data and employment history, and using historical and projected unemployment and hiring trends, historical and projected macroeconomic and microeconomic data, and 3 Appellant argues all of the claims together as a group. Appeal Br. 5–7. Accordingly, we select independent claim 2 as representative. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (“When multiple claims subject to the same ground of rejection are argued as a group or subgroup by appellant, the Board may select a single claim from the group or subgroup and may decide the appeal as to the ground of rejection with respect to the group or subgroup on the basis of the selected claim alone.”). Appeal 2019-003845 Application 14/339,703 5 generating by the computer, the income reduction [sic: loss] risk for the individual using unemployment risk; and (c) Using the individual’s income reduction risk, the individual’s income loss risk, the individual’s personal information, and population data to calculate the individual’s credit score. Appeal Br. 11. The Examiner’s Findings The Examiner finds that the claims are directed to the abstract idea of evaluating risk (Final Act. 12–14) and more specifically to “a computer- implemented method of modelling consumer credit risk based on consumers’ income or unemployment risk” (id. at 13). The Examiner determines that these concepts relate to fundamental economic practices, mathematical formulas/relationships, and certain methods of organizing human activity. Id. The Examiner additionally finds that the claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because the additional elements when considered both individually and as an ordered combination do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea the claims are directed to because the claims do not provide improvements to another technology or technical field, improvements to the function of the computer itself, do not provide meaningful limitations beyond general linking the use of an abstract idea to a particular technological environment, and amount to a mere instruction to implement on a computer and/or network the abstract ideas recited in the claims. Final Act. 22. The Examiner concludes, The claims recite generic computer and network limitations/elements that when considered separately, perform in Appeal 2019-003845 Application 14/339,703 6 a well-understood, routine, and purely conventional manner. The additional limitations are merely generic computer components performing well-understood, routine, and conventional activities such as performing repetitive calculations; receiving, processing, and storing data; electronic recordkeeping; and automating mental tasks; which are computer functions courts have recognized to be well-understood, routine, and conventional. Id. at 22–23. Appellant’s arguments will be addressed below in the Analysis section of this Opinion. Principles of Law A. SECTION 101: Inventions for a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” generally constitute patent-eligible subject matter. 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75– 77). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ Appeal 2019-003845 Application 14/339,703 7 application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. at 191 (citing Benson and Flook); see also, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). Appeal 2019-003845 Application 14/339,703 8 If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. B. USPTO SECTION 101 GUIDANCE: In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) published revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Guidance”), updated by USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/ default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf) (“October 2019 Guidance Update”); see also October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update, 84 Fed. Reg. 55942 (Oct. 18, 2019) (notifying the public of the availability of the October 2019 Guidance Update). “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51; see also October 2019 Guidance Update at 1. The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure Appeal 2019-003845 Application 14/339,703 9 (“MPEP”) now incorporates this revised guidance and subsequent updates at Section 2106 (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, rev. June 2020).4 Under MPEP § 2106, we first look to whether the claim recites the following: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.5 MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), (d). Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activity” in the field; or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. MPEP § 2106.05(d). 4 All references to the MPEP are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 10.2019 (Last Revised June 2020), unless otherwise indicated. 5 “Examiners evaluate integration into a practical application by (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a practical application.” MPEP § 2106.04(d)II. Appeal 2019-003845 Application 14/339,703 10 Analysis STEP 2A, PRONG 1: Under step 2A, prong 1, of the 2019 Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes). MPEP § 2106.04(a). Limitation (a) of claim 2 recites a step of calculating a number (“the individual’s income reduction risk”) through the use of other gathered and generated data. Limitation (b) similarly recites a step of calculating a number (“the individual’s income loss risk”) through the use of other gathered and generated data. Finally, limitation (c) recites a step of calculating a third number (“the individual’s credit score”) by using unemployment risk using even further data including the individual’s income reduction and loss risks, as generated in steps (a) and (b). As such, each of limitations (a) through (c) recites a step of performing a mathematical concept, such as determining a mathematical relationship or performing a mathematical calculation. The 2019 Guidance expressly recognizes mathematical relationships and calculations as constituting patent-ineligible abstract ideas. MPEP §§ 2106.04(a). Calculating numbers also constitutes a mental process, such as an evaluation or judgment that can be performed in the human mind. The 2019 Guidance expressly recognizes such mental processes as constituting patent-ineligible abstract ideas. MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), (d). For these reasons, the combination of limitations (a) through (c) recites a judicial exception to patent-eligible subject matter under step 2A, prong 1, of the Appeal 2019-003845 Application 14/339,703 11 2019 Guidance. See RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Adding one abstract idea . . . to another abstract idea . . . does not render the claim non-abstract.”) STEP 2A, PRONG 2: Under step 2A, prong 2, of the 2019 Guidance, we next analyze whether claim 2 recites additional elements that individually or in combination integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53–55. The 2019 Guidance identifies considerations indicative of whether an additional element or combination of elements integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, such as an additional element reflecting an improvement in the functioning of a computer or an improvement to other technology or technical field. Id. at 55; MPEP § 2106.05(a). The only language of claim 2 that is directed to an additional element beyond the recited abstract ideas is that in limitations (a) and (b), which recite that unemployment risk, the income reduction risk, and the income loss risks are generated “by a computer.” Appeal Br. 11. As such, limitations (a) and (b) merely recite a generic computer that amounts to mere instructions to implement the abstract idea on a computer, and therefore do not recite sufficient additional elements to integrate the abstract ideas into a practical application under Step 2A, prong 2. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 226 (determining that the claim limitations “data processing system,” “communications controller,” and “data storage unit” were generic computer components that amounted to mere instructions to implement the abstract idea on a computer); October 2019 Guidance Update at 11–12 (recitation of generic computer limitations for implementing the abstract idea “would not Appeal 2019-003845 Application 14/339,703 12 be sufficient to demonstrate integration of a judicial exception into a practical application”). Appellant argues, “a method to generate ‘[a] credit score’ by itself is not necessarily merely an abstract idea” because there have been numerous patents issued by the USPTO on the subject matter of calculating credit scores and optimizing insurance policies. Appeal Br. 7. This argument is unpersuasive because even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that some given method of generating a credit score does not necessarily recite an abstract idea, Appellant does not present persuasive arguments for why the present claim integrates that abstract idea into a practical application. See In re Gyurik, 596 F.2d 1012, 1018 n.15 (CCPA 1979). (“Each case is determined on its own merits” and “[i]n reviewing specific rejections of specific claims, this court does not consider allowed claims in other applications or patents”). Appellant next argues, “the present invention describes a fundamentally new approach to evaluate an individual’s credit score, using factors that have never been taken into consideration in the prior art, such as the unemployment risk and the income reduction and loss risk[,] to generate an individual’s credit score.” Appeal Br. 7. This argument is unpersuasive because “[t]he ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–89 (1981). A novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent ineligible. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90. Appeal 2019-003845 Application 14/339,703 13 Appellant also argues, “the claimed processes are a technologically rooted solution to a technology-based problem of unemployment risk assessment and risk prediction.” Appeal Br. 7. Appellant asserts, “the invention uses the complex capabilities of the technology,” and “[i]n order to calculate the unemployment risk score, a large population data set and statistical techniques need to be used.” Id. This argument is unpersuasive at least because it is not commensurate in scope with the claim language. Claim 2 does not recite any limitation that would necessarily preclude the calculations from being done with pencil and paper or at least with a general purpose computer. Nor does Appellant provide persuasive evidence to support the assertion, “[t]he execution of the claims requires a processor and non-trivial computation power.” Appeal Br. 7. It is well settled that arguments of counsel cannot take the place of factually supported objective evidence. See, e.g., In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 139–40 (Fed. Cir. 1996); In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984). For these reasons, Appellant does not persuade us that claim 2 is directed to an improvement in the function of a computer or to any other technology or technical field. MPEP § 2106.05(a). Nor does Appellant persuasively demonstrate that claim 2 is directed to a particular machine or transformation, or that claim 2 adds any other meaningful limitations for the purposes of the analysis under Section 101. MPEP §§ 2106.05(b), (c), (e). Accordingly, Appellant does not persuade us that claim 2 integrates the recited abstract ideas into a practical application within the meaning of the 2019 Guidance. See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Appeal 2019-003845 Application 14/339,703 14 STEP 2B: Under step 2B of the 2019 Guidance, we next analyze whether claim 2 adds any specific limitations beyond the judicial exception that, either alone or as an ordered combination, amount to more than “well- understood, routine, conventional” activity in the field. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; MPEP § 2106.05(d). Appellant’s Specification, by describing computer-related components at a high level without details of structure or implementation, indicates that the recited additional element—“a computer”—is well understood, routine and conventional. See, e.g., Spec. 21 (describing “the computer implemented system” broadly as including “a data processing unit (4402),” “a consumer score generating computer (4404),” and “an administrator workstation computer (4405)”); see also id. at 38 (wherein originally filed claim 1 broadly sets forth, “wherein the risk forecasting computer consists of a microprocessor CPU, memory, databases, software programs, analytical and statistical programs, input and output devices, and networking capability”). Furthermore, Appellant’s Specification does not indicate that consideration of these conventional elements as an ordered combination adds any significance beyond the additional elements, as considered individually. Rather, Appellant’s Specification indicates that the invention is directed to a new abstract idea that is made more efficient with generic computer components—generating a credit score based on different data than was previously used. See, e.g., Spec. 6 (“The key difference between traditional credit scores and current invention is that traditional credit scoring systems compare an applicant’s credit profile to credit experiences Appeal 2019-003845 Application 14/339,703 15 of others whereas the current scoring system compares an applicant's income risk profile to credit experiences of others.”). For these reasons, we determine that claim 2 does not recite additional elements that, either individually or as an ordered combination, amount to significantly more than the judicial exception within the meaning of the 2019 Guidance. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55; MPEP § 2106.05(d). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to an exception to patent-eligible subject matter without reciting significantly more. We, likewise, sustain the 101 rejection of claims 3–11, 13–15, 17, and 18, which Appellant does not argue separately. Appeal Br. 5–7. THE SECTION 103(a) REJECTION Examiner’s Findings The Examiner finds that Feinstein generally discloses a method to determine an individual’s credit score. Final Act. 25 (citing Feinstein col. 2, ll. 12–32, col. 2, l. 63–col. 3, l. 16; Figs. 4A–B). The Examiner finds that Scorelogix 2007 relates to predicting job-loss and income-loss for use in credit scoring and teaches the following steps of Appellant’s claim 1: (a) calculating the individual’s income reduction risk; (b) calculating the individual’s income-loss risk; and (c) using the individual’s income-reduction risk, income-loss risk, and personal information, as well as population data, to calculate the individual’s credit score. Final Act. 25–26 (citing Scorelogix 2017 ¶¶ 1–4). The Examiner determines that it would have been obvious to modify Feinstein’s teachings Appeal 2019-003845 Application 14/339,703 16 with those of Scorelogix 2007 to improve predictive power and assist lenders in identifying good and bad accounts, increasing approvals without increasing loss risk, and identifying a larger number of delinquent accounts earlier. Id. at 26 (citing Scorelogix 2007, ¶¶ 1 4). The Examiner finds that Annappindi teaches, generating by a computer . . . , an unemployment risk using the an individual’s personal data, including age, education, demographic data and employment history, and using historical and projected unemployment and hiring trends, historical and projected macroeconomic and microeconomic data. Final Act. 26–27 (citing Annappindi ¶¶ 20, 32, 56, 79–86, 90–95 Figs. 4A, 8–17). The Examiner finds that Annappindi also teaches, “generating by a computer, the income loss risk for the individual using the unemployment risk.” Id. at 28 (citing Annappindi Figs. 4A, 16). The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to modify Feinstein’s technique of credit-risk prediction with Annappindi with the motivation of using “[t]he various employment and unemployment risk scores of the present invention” in “assessing [businesses’] present and future costumer’s credit risks [ ... ] associated with employment as explicitly taught in Annappindi at paragraph [0026], especially since Feinstein explicitly discloses that the model of credit scoring in Feinstein could incorporate economic conditions including “model[ling] interaction between changes in the unemployment rate and performance” with the motivation of putting “a lender [ ... ] in an improved position to modify lending policies in anticipation of economic downturns.” Final Act. 30 (citing Feinstein col. 6, l. 62–col. 7, l. 6) (emphasis omitted). Appeal 2019-003845 Application 14/339,703 17 Appellant’s Contentions and Analysis Appellant argues, [Overall], Feinstein’s teachings of using future actions data is entirely different and essentially teaching away from the present invention. Feinstein’s teachings are very specific to (a) future consumer actions, and (b) consumer actions related to inputs in a FICO score, such as balance change. It advocates changing a user’s future credit score by factoring future changes in the user's credit metrics, such as balance change. Whereas the present invention doesn’t use future behavior data and is based on current unemployment risk profile of the consumer. Appeal Br. 8. More specifically, Appellant argues, The present application . . . computes a person’s current Job Security Score, which is a measure of a person’s unemployment risk, and this unemployment risk is also an indicator of credit risk, and no future data is needed. Note that the present patent application is different in 2 important ways: (1) It is based on completely different inputs, unemployment risk vs. credit related aspects such as balance change and defaults; and (2) The present application is NOT dependent on user’s future credit actions but is based on an assessment of unemployment risk. Appeal Br. 8. This teaching-away argument is unpersuasive because Appellant merely argues that Feinstein’s method is different from the present invention’s method. But Appellant does not explain why the teachings and purposes of Feinstein’s method cannot be used in combination with the other references’ teachings in a manner that takes into account both current risk, as well as Feinstein’s future consumer actions. That is, Appellant does not explain why Feinstein criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages using Feinstein’s methods in combination with additional methods that use current risk profiles of a consumer. DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Appeal 2019-003845 Application 14/339,703 18 Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009). “A reference does not teach away […] if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention.” Id. Appellant next argues in relation to the website of Scorelogix 2007, “there the message was that by predicting an individual’s unemployment risk, one can approximate the credit risk prediction. However, there was no attempt made to create a credit system using actual income risk input parameters.” Appeal Br. 9. This argument is unpersuasive because the Examiner relies on Annappindi for teaching the use of an employee’s actual income risk input parameters. Final Act. 26–30; Examiner’s Answer 14–15. One cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Appellant only mentions Annappindi once in the Appeal Brief. But this one reference to Annappindi appears in Appellant’s final summarization of the arguments, which reads as follows: Applicant humbly notes that in the Office Actions, Examiner oversimplified and made an abstract connection between all the cited teachings and overly generalizing that present invention would have been obvious. As discussed earlier, Feinstein was teaching away from the approach in the present application; Avery was quite uncertain how situational circumstances can be used to build credit scores; Zarikian did not offer specific solution to the issues observed; And previously Annappindi didn’t advocate a real credit system. Therefore, these references should not be combined in a 35 USC § 103 rejections to reject the Claims in the present invention. Appeal Br. 10. Appeal 2019-003845 Application 14/339,703 19 This reference to Annappindi is unsupported by any previous arguments regarding Annappindi. See Appeal Br. 7–10. This summarization also entails the same argument Appellant sets forth in relation to Scorelogix 2007 (Appeal Br. 9), and this final summarization paragraph does not summarize Appellant’s arguments regarding Scorelogix 2007 (id. at 10). As such, we interpret the summarization’s reference to Annappindi on page 10 of the Appeal Brief to include a clerical error, intending to be referencing Scorelogix 2007 instead of Annappindi. Furthermore, even if Appellant really did mean to reference Annappindi, Appellant’s one-sentence conclusory assertion would not constitute an argument based on facts. It is well settled that arguments of counsel cannot take the place of factually supported objective evidence. See, e.g., In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 139–40 (Fed. Cir. 1996); In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Appellant also presents general arguments in relation to Avery and Zarikian. Appeal Br. 9–10. These arguments do not persuade us of error in relation to the obviousness rejection of claims 2, 7–10, 13, 15, and 18 because the Examiner did not rely on either of Avery or Zarikian in rejecting these claims. See Final Act. 24–31. For these reasons, Appellant does not persuade us the Examiner committed reversible error in relation to claims 2, 7–10, 13, 15, and 18. We, therefore, affirm the obviousness rejection of these claims. With respect to the remaining rejections of claims 3–6, 11, 14, and 17, Appellant does not argue these claims separately, much less point out what language in these claims the additionally cited references, Avery and Zarikian, purportedly fail to teach or suggest. Accordingly, we affirm the Appeal 2019-003845 Application 14/339,703 20 obviousness rejections of these claims for the same reasons as set forth in relation to independent claim 2. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References/ Basis Affirmed Reversed 2–11, 13–15, 17, 18 101 Eligibility 2–11, 13–15, 17, 18 2, 7–10, 15, 18 103(a) Feinstein, Scorelogix 2017, Annappindi 2, 7–10, 13, 15, 18 3–6 103(a) Feinstein, Scorelogix 2017, Annappindi, Avery, Zarikian 3–6 11, 14 103(a) Feinstein, Scorelogix 2017, Annappindi, Avery, 2016 Specimen 11, 14 17 103(a) Feinstein, Scorelogix 2017, Annappindi, 2016 Specimen 17 Overall Outcome 2–11, 13–15, 17, 18 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation