S.C.M. Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 24, 1986

278 N.L.R.B. 681 (N.L.R.B. 1986)

HISTACOUNT CORP. 681
Histacount Corp ., a subsidiary of S. C. M. Corpora-
tion and Local 806, International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America . Case 29-CA-7576
24 February 1986
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
DENNIS AND JOHANSEN
On 30 October 1981 Administrative Law Judge
Raymond P. Green issued the attached decision.
The General Counsel and the Charging Party filed
exceptions and supporting briefs, and the Respond-
ent filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs' and
has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, 2
and conclusions and to adopt the recommended
Order.
ORDER
The recommended Order of the administrative
law judge is adopted and the complaint is dis-
missed.
' The Respondent has requested oral argument. The request is denied
as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues and the
positions of the parties.
2 The General Counsel has excepted to some of the Judge's credibility
findings The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administra-
tive law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of
all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect Standard
Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Or.
1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for re-
versing the findings
William Sckuzman, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Joel Kaplan, Esq. (Jaspar, Kaplan, Levin & Daniels), of
Garden City, New York, for the Respondent.
Herbert Simon, Esq., of Valley Stream, New York, for
the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
RAYMOND P. GREEN, Admimstrative Law Judge. This
case was tried before me on various days in January,
March, and May 1981. The charge in this proceeding
was filed by the Union on November 2, 1979, and a com-
plaint based on that charge was issued by the Regional
Director for Region 29 on December 19, 1979.
The principal issue in the case is whether the Respond-
ent failed or refused to timely offer reinstatement to eco-
nomic strikers when they offered to return to work on
September 17, 1979.
As to the above allegation, the Respondent makes es-
sentially two contentions in its defense. First, it contends
that when the strikers offered to return to work, their
offer was conditioned on the immediate reinstatement of
all the strikers. Second, the Respondent contends that
even if it is concluded that an unconditional offer to
return to work was made, it did offer reinstatement to
the strikers as soon as positions became available. In this
respect, the Respondent asserts that as of September 17,
it could not immediately reinstate the strikers because of
the impact the strike had on its business, the hiring of
permanent replacements during the strike, and other fac-
tors described below. The Respondent therefore con-
tends that it soon thereafter began to offer reinstatement
to the strikers in basically a seniority order as jobs
became available.
Counsel for the General Counsel, for his part, con-
tends that the offer to go back to work was uncondition-
al, and that the Respondent did not offer reinstatement
to the strikers as soon as possible. He contends, there-
fore, that about September 17, the strike was converted
to an unfair labor practice strike.
Additionally alleged by the General Counsel is that on
September 21, 1979, the Respondent warned its employ-
ees of the futility of obtaining union representation and
threatened them with the loss of existing benefits, if they
became members of or supported the Union. The evi-
dence proffered by the General Counsel concerning this
allegation is not in dispute and consists of a letter sent to
the employees on September 21. In brief, this letter
makes two points. First, that even if the Union were to
win an election' the Company had grounds for filing ob-
jections to the election and therefore, after all the legal
proceedings had been completed, it was probable that it
would be 2 years or more before a final decision was
made as to the election's validity and before the Compa-
ny would be compelled to bargain, assuming that the
Union prevailed. The second point raised in the letter
was that bargaining starts from "ground zero" and that
there was no guarantee that the Company's existing ben-
efits would survive after bargaining.
Based on the entire record herein, including my obser-
vation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after con-
sideration of the briefs filed by the General Counsel and
the Respondent, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
It is admitted that the Respondent is a New York cor-
poration located at 965 Walt Whitman Road, Melville,
New York, where it is engaged in the manufacture and
sale of stationery and related products. It also is admitted
that the Respondent annually sells products valued in
excess of $50,000 which are shipped from its New York
i A secret-ballot election was conducted by the Regional Office on
September 28, 1979, in Case 29-RC-4660 In that election the Union
failed to obtain a majority of the valid votes counted Subsequently, the
Regional Director set aside the election based on the September 21 letter.
The propriety of the Regional Director's decision in the representation
case is not before me.
27'8 NLRB No. 104
682 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
plant directly to States other than the State of New York
and that it annually purchases and causes to be delivered
to its New York plant paper products, ink, and other
goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points
located outside the State of New York. It therefore is
concluded that the Respondent is an employer engaged
in interstate commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
At the hearing the Respondent amended its answer to
admit paragraph 6 of the complaint which alleged that
the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
the Act. Accordingly, it is concluded that Local 806,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America is a labor orga-
nization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE OPERATIVE FACTS
As noted above, the Company is engaged in the manu-
facture and sale of stationery and related products. More
specifically, the Company manufactures stationery and
business forms for a variety of businessmen and profes-
sionals such as doctors and lawyers. Most of the Compa-
ny's business consists of a large number of relatively
small orders (in dollar amounts),2 received through the
mail which are processed by a group of clerical employ-
ees and manufactured on premises by a group of printing
employees. It also is evident that a large percentage of
the Company's business is generated through the distri-
bution of catalogs by the Respondent to old and prospec-
tive clients through direct mailing and that the produc-
tion and distribution of these catalogs, on a systematic
basis, is crucial to the Company' s success . Another ele-
ment which appears to be necessary for the Company, in
terms of its ability to compete, is the speed at which it
processes orders and sends out the items desired by its
customers.
The evidence discloses that in June 1979, the Union
commenced an organizational campaign among a portion
of the clerical employees of the Company. Thereafter, on
July 12, the Union made a demand for recognition
which, when rejected by the Company, resulted in an
economic strike by certain of the Respondent's clerical
employees commencing on July 16, 1979. Thereafter, on
August 1, 1979, the Union filed a petition for an election
in Case 29-RC-4660 and on August 29, the Regional Di-
rector for Region 29 issued a Decision and Direction of
Election.3 An election was subsequently held on Septem-
2 According to company witnesses, the Company receives through the
mail about 700 to 800 orders per day with the average order being about
$50
a In the Decision and Direction of Election it was concluded that the
appropriate unit consisted of all full-time and regular part-time clerical
employees, including all filing clerks, order processing clerks, sales
clerks, switchboard operators, zoning clericals, hourly paid and salaried
accounting clericals, mailing clericals, medical claims processing clericals,
and scheduling clericals, excluding all other employees including all ship-
ping, printing, maintenance employees, guards, and supervisors as defined
in the Act It is noted that the Regional Director included in the unit,
over the objection of the Union, six mailing clericals, one medical claims
processing clerk, four scheduling clericals, and two salaried accounting
clerks.
her 28, 1979, which was won by the Company, but
which nevertheless was set aside based on the contents
of the September 21 letter.
Immediately prior to the commencement of the strike
on July 16, the Company employed about 290 people in
toto, and employed about 80 persons in various clerical
positions, including the clerical employees involved
herein. The strike was planned to coincide with the va-
cation period of many of the employees so that when it
occurred, it was difficult at first for the Company to as-
certain who was striking, who was on vacation, and who
was staying away for other reasons. It appears, however,
that there were 32 employees who engaged in the strike
and that these employees were the ones who were large-
ly responsible for processing customers orders.4 Never-
theless, not all of the clerical employees went on strike
and remaining were the mailing clericals, scheduling em-
ployees, sales clericals, and a group of seven clerical em-
ployees having similar jobs as those who engaged in the
strike.5
cause the persons engaged in the strike were theBe
employees who were primarily responsible for process-
4 Based on the record herein, the strikers were:
Name
Date of
Hire
Job Classification
Denise Vilaplana 10/14/68 Pricer
Lorraine LaStrange 1/02/69 Typist
Marjory Leeds 5/12/69 Checker
Constance Alexander 10/07/70 Checker
Gall Rosetta 10/08/70 Checker
Joan Dudick 10/23/70 Sales Clerk
Roselyn Rosenblatt 11/18/70 Look Up Clerk
Nina Sticco 2/16/71 Typist
Agnes Fritz 4/26/71 Typist
Marjorie Wmnie 1/10/72 Correspondence Clk
Sarah Kennedy 10/02/72 Checker
Helen Lartigaut 10/02/72 Chief Clerk
Kathleen Stamm 10/09/72 Correspondence CIk
Frances Vicmo 6/05/73 Look Up Clerk
Gerard Lombardo 8/08/73 Accounting Clerk
Joanne Smalling 10/22/73 Typist
Charlotte Diton 11/12/73 Pricer
Mary Bowler 11/12/73 Correspondence Clk
Joan Tomaselli 11/19/73 Look Up Clerk
Myra Dantus 4/22/74 Pricer
Catherine Grillo 6/24/74 Typist
Diane Shannon 11/05/75 Typist
Kathy McQuillen 8/29/77 Receptionist
Patricia Warganz 10/10/77 Typist
Rosemary Marchese 11/09/77 Typist
Catherine Toscano 11/30/77 Typist
Lilly Costa 6/20/78 Typist
Rosemary Meehan 11/06/78 Typist
Mary Pizzano 5/07/79 Typist
Delores Grosso unknown unknown
Lois Washington unknown unknown
Madelyn Simonetti unknown unknown
5 Among the order processing clericals who did not strike were.
1 Frances Malone, a checker She however left the Company's employ
on August 20, 1979.
2. Juhe Kaht, a checker She left the Company's employ on August 15,
1979.
3. Phyllis Rispoli, a checker She left the Company's employ on
August 24, 1979.
4 Madelyn McDonald, a typist who remained with the Company.
5 Anthony Ten, an accounting clerk who remained with the Compa-
ny.
6. Paulene Engelking, a typist. She left the Company on October 18,
1979.
7 Debra Marty, a file clerk She left the Company on September 17,
1979
HISTACOUNT CORP.
ing customer orders, the Company had to determine its
priorities if it wished to maintain its business . In this re-
spect, it decided to concentrate its efforts on continuing
manufacturing and on processing and filling orders. It
therefore gave other areas of its operations a lower pri-
ority. Accordingly, during the 11-week period of the
strike, the Company made a number of changes and took
certain actions to meet the strike situation as follows:
1. During the course of the strike and until September
17, 11 permanent replacements were hired. All these re-
placements continued to be employed as of September
17, 1979.6
2. About August 1, 1979, five of the mailroom clerical
employees (Elsie Greco, Josephine Russo, Frances Ma-
guire, Stella Petasky, and Alice Knoblock) were trans-
ferred to jobs held by the strikers. As of September 17,
1979, all five were employed in these positions and ac-
cording to the Company they could not be moved back
to the mailroom at that time because there was insuffi-
cient- work in the mailroom for them to do. Thus, ac-
cording to the Company if it did not retain these non-
striking employees in their new,jobs, it would have been
forced to lay them off.7
3. People from other departments such as scheduling
people, sales ' employees, and executives were put into the
office to perform tasks that were normally done by the
strikers.
4. As a result of having to analyze the job functions
needed, certain functions were streamlined, and certain
jobs were found to be unnecessary. Thus, Gerald Kauf-
man testified that two statistical jobs were eliminated, the
chief clerk position was eliminated, one checking job
was eliminated, and one correspondence clerical job was
eliminated.
5. The 'Company eliminated the night shift which had
been instituted shortly before the strike.
6. The Company increased overtime for the employees
who were,available to it.
a Curiously, in its brief,, Respondent asserts that 10 permanent replace.
ments were hired whereas from the exhibits offered into evidence, I
count 11: From the record the following people were hired into perma-
nent positions from July 6, 1979:
Name Date of
Hire Jot' Classification Date Left
Nancy McGregor 8/29/79 P/T Ass
Scheduling Clerk
10/19/79
Barbara Cysner 9/11/79 Clerk Typist still employed
Nancy Romeo 7/16/79 Clerk Typist still employed
Kathleen Weisbrod 7/25/79 P/T Filing Clerk still employed
Dailene Dorn 7/25/79 P/T Filing Clerk still employed
Nancy Warren 8/27/79 Clerk Typist 2/29/80
Doris O'Connor 7/30/79 P/T ]Filing Clerk 1/15/81
Yolanda Sanacore 8/15/79 Clerk Typist 10/26/79
Maureen Till 8/22/79 Receptionist still employed
Roseanne Mallamace 8/23/79 Accounting Clerk still employed
Julie Ann Hopp 9/12/79 Filing Clerk still employed
r Kaufman testified, without contradiction, that the mailroom clericals
were given the option of permanently retaining the jobs to which they
were transferred. However, they all did eventually go back to the mail-
room. Thus, Maguire, Petasky, and Knoblock returned to the mailroom
on October 1, 1979, and Greco and Russo returned to the mailroom on
October 15, 1979
As noted above, the mailroom clerical employees were included as part
of the appropriate unit in the Decision and Direction of Election previ-
ously issued.
683
It also is evident that the impact of the strike reduced
the number of clerical employees needed as there was
credible testimony that the Company's orders declined to
some degree due to the inability to get out the full mail-
ing of the catalogs and because some customers went
elsewhere when their orders were not timely filled.8
Thus, according to Respondent's witnesses, the business
began to stabilize around the fourth week of the strike
and by September 17 the Company was able to meet its
somewhat reduced demand with the clerical -employees
who did not strike, the transfers and changes which had
been made, -and the permanent replacements who had
been hired.
On Monday, September 17, 1979, the strikers, with
Charlotte Diton acting as their spokesman, made an oral
request to return to work. It is agreed that this occurred
at two separate meetings held successively in the Re-
spondent's conference room with Otto and Kaufman
present for the Company and with the strikers divided
into two groups due to size of the room. Diton was
present at both meetings. There is also substantial agree-
ment that on each occasion when Diton stated that the
strikers were ready to return to work, Otto responded
that the Company could not immediately take the strik-
ers back inasmuch as the strike had hurt the Company
very badly and because the Company had restructed and
streamlined the office. Otto then went on to say that the
Company would phase the strikers back into their jobs
according to their job seniority and according to job
need. At this point, in the first meeting, some of the
strikers started to assert that the Company was locking
out the employees, an assertion which was denied by
Otto. The testimony from both sides indicates that subse-
quent to these meetings the strikers resumed their picket-
ing until September 28, the day of the election, and that
some of the picket signs used claimed that there was a
lockout. Also, on September 18, the Company sent a
letter to the strikers which stated:
On Monday morning, September 17th, at ap-
proximately 8:30 a.m. twenty-eight (28) striking His-
tacount employees met with John Otto and Gerald
Kaufman, at which time the striking employees an-
nounced their willingness to return to work.
They were told we have always considered them
Histacount employees, and we'd be glad to have
them back working. However, it was explained to
them that because of the strike, we had to restruc-
ture and streamline our operation. Also, the strike
was responsible for hundreds of order cancellations
and the company had to suspend its regular mailing
advertising schedule, which, has resulted in a re-
duced volume of business.
Because of the below normal volume of business,
and because we have streamlined our order process-
ing procedures since the strike began, we do not
a Catherine Grillo, one of the strikers and a witness called by the Gen-
eral Counsel, testified that she found out, at the start of the strike, that
many orders had been canceled and that during the strike she was aware
that many customers were calling to complain that they were not getting
timely delivery of their orders.
684 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
now know what the strength and mix of our work
force will be. Consequently, it is not possible to
have all of the striking employees return to work at
one time. Therefore, the recall or phasing in will
have to be done in an orderly fashion, based on se-
niority and the level of skills needed.
We will be in touch with you.
Neither the Union nor the strikers responded to the
letter quoted above.
With respect to the September 17 meeting, the Compa-
ny's version is that in addition to what has been de-
scribed above, when Otto said at the first meeting that
the Company could not immediately reinstate all of the
strikers and would have to phase them back in, Rose-
mary Meehan, one of the strike leaders, stated; "Well,
we're not going to stand for that because they had
walked out together and we all want to come back to-
gether." Otto further testified that at the second meeting
held on September 17, Diton said, "We all walked out
together and we're going to come back together." The
witnesses presented by the General Counsel denied that
such a condition was placed on their offer to return to
work, and therefore a critical, and difficult credibility
issue is presented for resolution. For if, at this point in
time, a conditional offer was made by the strikers, then
the Company was under no obligation to offer reinstate-
ment to the strikers unless and until they thereafter made
unconditional offers.9
Subsequent to the September 17 meeting, the Compa-
ny ceased hiring any further replacements for strikers.1 o
Respondent also commenced, on September 26, to send
letters to the strikers offering them reinstatement. These
offers were thereafter made to all of the individual strik-
ers over a period of time until March 11, 1980. The
offers and the responses are set forth as follows:
1. On September 26, 1979, a letter offering reinstate-
ment"' was sent to Denise Viliplana, who was employed
9 Laidlaw Corp., 171 NLRB 1306 (1968), Times Herald Printing Co.,
221 NLRB 225 (1975), Tex-Tuft Products, 134 NLRB 1628, 1631 (1961).
The situation involving unfair labor practice strikers , as opposed to eco-
nomic strikers , is somewhat different Thus, in National Business Forms,
189 NLRB 964 (1971 ), the Board held that where unfair labor practice
strikers make an offer to return to work and insist that all be given their
jobs back or none would return, such an offer is not to be construed as
conditional . In this respect unfair labor practice strikers are entitled to
immediate reinstatement even where permanent replacements have been
hired whereas economic strikers do not have the same right.
10 The record shows that two individuals were hired into bargaining
unit jobs after September 17, 1979, but that no other person, other than
recalled strikers, were hired into bargaining unit positions until March 31,
1980 The two individuals hired were Eleanor Minet, hired on January
28, 1980, and who left on January 29, 1980, and Margaret Potter, who
was hired on February 25, 1980 Although their job classifications were
listed as accounting clerks on a summary prepared by the Company and
received into evidence as G.C. Exh. 30, Kaufman testified that the job in
question was that of a payroll clerk (see fn. 13), which was not occupied
by any of the strikers and which was created and filled in anticipation of
the March retirement of Mary Ranna who did the payroll, and who was
a salaried employee not in the bargaining unit.
11 The letter to Viliplana, which is typical in form to the letters sent to
the other strikers, reads as follows:
You are hereby notified that we are honoring your request to return
to work. We have made arrangements for you to return on Monday,
Oct. 8, 1979, at 7.45 am Naturally, you will be placed in a job
within the bargaining unit as defined by the NLRB and at the new
as a pricer and who had the most seniority of the strik-
ers.12 In response, she sent a letter stating that she was
planning to return on October 8 at 4:30 p.m. (the night
shift). She explains that she indicated that she was plan-
ning to return to the night shift inasmuch as immediately
prior to the strike her request to go on that shift had
been granted. However, she did not actually transfer to
the night shift because of the intervention of the strike.
By letter dated October 8, Viliplana was advised that
there were no current openings on the night shift and
she did not respond. Thereafter, on March 25, 1980, Vili-
plana heard that the Company was advertising for part-
time evening positions in Newsday.13 She thereupon
called Kaufman told him that she saw the advertisement.
She states that Kaufman asked her, during the call, if she
was interested in the position, which she accepted. Vili-
plana returned to work on April 14, 1980, but subse-
quently left on May 12, 1980.
2. On September 26, 1979, an offer of reinstatement
was made to Loraine LaStrange, a typist, who was the
second most senior striker. She accepted the offer and
returned to work on October- 8. She subsequently left the
Company's employ on February 22, 1980.
3. On September 26 an offer of reinstatement was
made to Constance Alexander, a checker, who was the
fourth most senior striker. She accepted the offer and re-
turned to work on October 8.
4. On October 10 an offer of reinstatement was made
to Marjorie Leeds, a checker, who was the third most
senior striker. She accepted the offer and returned to
work on October 22.
5. On October 10 an offer of reinstatement was made
to Joan Dudick, a sales clerk, who was the sixth most
senior striker. She accepted the offer and returned to
work on October 22.
6. On October 10'an offer of reinstatement was made
to Nina Sticco, a typist, who was the eighth most senior
striker. She accepted the offer and returned to work on
October 22.
7. On October 10 an offer of reinstatement was made
to Majorie Winnie, a correspondence clerk, who was the
10th most senior striker. She accepted the offer and re-
turned to work on October 22.
8. On October 10 an. offer of reinstatement was made
to Francis Vicino, a look up clerk, who was the 14th
most senior striker. She accepted the offer and returned
to work on October 22.
rate, including the automatic raise, which you would have received
had you not been on strike. You must notify us, by certified mail,
mailgram or telegram, no later than Thursday, October 4, 1979, of
your intention to return Failure to notify us or subsequent failure to
report to work on the specified date, will be regarded as a voluntary
quit.
12 Because the seniority status of a few of the strikers is unknown to
me, the description hereafter of a striker's seniority status is, of necessity,
approximate
is This advertisement was placed in Newsday on March 20, to run on
March 24, 25, and 26. It is established that apart from two advertisements
for a payroll clerk appearing on January 13 and February 3 to 6, the first
advertisement for a position previously occupied by a strike was the
Newsday ad placed on March 20 for a part-time position on the night
shift. As noted above, this latter advertisement was placed after all the
strikers had been offered reinstatement.
HISTACOUNT CORP.
9. On October 17 an offer of reinstatement was made
to Agnes Fritz, a typist, who was the ninth most senior
striker . She rejected the offer and did not return to
work.
10. On October 17 an offer of reinstatement was made
to Sarah Kennedy, a typist, who was the 11th most
senior striker. She accepted the offer and returned to
work on October 29.
11. On October 17 an offer of reinstatement was made
to Kathleen Stamm, a correspondence clerk, who was
the 13th most senior striker. She accepted the offer and
returned to work on October 29.
12. On October 17 an offer of reinstatement was made
to Mary Bowler, a correspondence clerk, who was the
18th most senior striker. She accepted the offer and re-
turned to work on October 29.
13. On October 17 an offer of reinstatement was made
to Joan Tomaselli , a look up clerk , who was the 19th
most senior striker. She accepted the offer and returned
to work .on October 29.
14. On October 17 an offer of reinstatment was made
to Madeline Simonetti , whose job and seniority are un-
known. She accepted the offer and returned to work on
October 29.
15. On October 17 an offer of reinstatement was made
to Joanne Smalling , a typist , who was the 16th most
senior striker . She accepted the offer and returned to
work on October 29. She, however, left the Company's
employ on January 7, 1980.
16. On October 31 an offer of reinstatement was made
to Gerard Lombardo, an accounting clerk, who was the
15th most senior striker . She accepted the offer and re-
turned to work on November 12.
17. On November 13 an offer of reinstatement was
made to Charlotte Diton, a typist , who was the 17th
most senior striker . She accepted the offer and returned
to work on November 26.
18. On November 13 an offer of reinstatement was
made to Myra Dantus, a pricer, who was the 20th most
senior striker . She rejected the offer and did not return
to work.
19. On November 13 an offer of reinstatement was
made to Catherine Grillo, a typist , who was the 21st
most senior striker . She rejected the offer and did not
return to work.
20. On November 14 an offer of reinstatement was
made to Lois Washington, whose job and seniority is un-
known. She accepted the offer and returned to work on
November 26.
21. On November 23 an offer of reinstatement was
made to Diane Shannon, a typist, who was the 22d most
senior striker . She accepted the offer and returned to
work on November 26.
22. On December 21 an offer of reinstatement was
made to Gail Rossetti , a checker, who was the fifth most
senior striker . She rejected the offer and did not return
to work.
23. On December 21 an offer of reinstatement was
made to Rosemary Marchese , a typist, who was the 25th
most senior striker . She accepted the offer and returned
to work on January 7, 1980.
685
24. On December 21 an offer of reinstatement was
made to Dolores Grasso , whose job and seniority status
are unknown . She accepted the offer and returned to
work on January 7, 1980.
25. On December 22 an offer of reinstatement was
made to Catherine Toscano , a typist, who was the 26th
most senior striker . She accepted the offer and returned
to work on January 7, 1980.
26. On March 11 an offer of reinstatement was made
to Roslyn Rosenblatt, a look up clerk, who was the sev-
enth most senior striker. She accepted the offer and re-
turned to work on March 24, 1980.
27. On March 11 an offer of reinstatement was made
to Helen Lartigaut, the chief clerk, who was the 12th
most senior striker . She accepted the offer and returned
to work on March 24 . Although accepting a job different
from the one she held prior to the strike, she did not
suffer a loss of pay. As noted above , Kaufman' testified
that the chief clerk 's job was eliminated when it was de-
termined that it was a superfluous position.
28. On March 11 an offer of reinstatement was made
to Kathy McQuilken , the receptionist , who was the 23d
most senior striker . She accepted the offer and returned
to work on March 24 . (One of the permanent replace-
ments, Maureen Till , was hired as the receptionist.)
29. On March 11 an offer of reinstatement was made
to Lilly Costa , a file clerk, who was the 27th most senior
striker . 'She accepted the offer and returned to work on
March 24.
30. On March 11 an offer of reinstatement was made
to Rosemary Meehan , a typist, who was the 28th most
senior striker . She accepted the offer and returned to
work on March 24.
31. On March 11 an offer of reinstatement was made
to Mary Pezzano, a typist, who was the 29th most senior
striker . She did not respond to the offer and did not
return to work.
The General Counsel also contends that assuming an
unconditional offer was made by the strikers on Septem-
ber 17 , the Respondent violated the Act by delaying the
recall of the strikers . That is, instead of arguing that the
Respondent simply refused to offer reinstatement to the
strikers, his theory of violation is that even though the
Company ceased hiring replacements after September 17,
and did in fact make offers of recall to each and every
striker, it could have, and therefore should have, made
such offer sooner than it did. In support of this theory
the General Counsel argues that after September 17, the
Company required substantial amounts of overtime from
the people ' who were working as compared with the
amounts of overtime worked before the strike . He there-
fore argues that had the Company not required such ex-
cessive overtime , it could have recalled some or all of
the strikers sooner . For its part, the Respondent asserts
that overtime has always been a part of its normal oper-
ations and therefore the utilization of overtime after Sep-
tember 17 was nothing new. It contends that the Compa-
ny's policy is and has been to maximize the hours of its
work force so as to have the minimum number of people
employed necessary to provide the required services.
686 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In connection with the above, portions of the payroll
records for the years 1979 and 1980 were introduced into
evidence . These covered departments numbered 102,
130, 150, and 155, of which departments 102 and 130 in-
clude both bargaining unit and nonbargaining unit posi-
tions . While the payroll records received were not total-
ly complete , a pattern did emerge which shows that, al-
though overtime was worked before the strike and was
increasingly worked during the months of June and early
July 1979 (perhaps in anticipation of the plantwide vaca-
tion), the amount of overtime increased dramatically
during the strike and was maintained at a high level after
September 17.
One of the problems with the General Counsel's
theory is that given the records in evidence , and also
given the fact that the Company did not hire any people
after September 17 to perform jobs previously done by
the strikers, it is difficult at best to show that particular
vacancies existed at particular times for particular strik-
ers. It therefore would seem to me that it would be spec-
ulative for one to say , that Miss X, for example , should
have been offered reinstated 10 days sooner and there-
fore is entitled to 10 days of backpay. Also, if overtime
was increased dramatically during the strike so that the
Company could meet its needs with an available work
force, the retention of that practice after the strike ended
could be construed as a legitimate business judgment in
the absence of proof showing discriminatory intent.14 On
the other hand, it may be possible to argue that the
Company's policy of requiring excessive overtime after
the strike ended was intended to delay the recall of the
strikers.15
In addition to the contentions of the complaint relating
to the alleged failure to reinstate the strikers, the General
Counsel, as noted above, alleged that statements con-
tained in a letter transmitted to employees on September
21 were violative of the Act. This reads as follows:
To All Histacount Employees:
This election is so important to all of us we want
you to have all the facts so those who vote will
make an informed , rational decision. '
WHAT HAPPENS AFTER AN ELECTION?
First, one essential point: All that any union ever
obtains if it wins an NLRB election is the right to
14 In NLRB v Fleetwood Trailers, 389 U S. 375 (1967), in connection
with refusals to reinstate economic strikers:
A second basis for justification is suggested by the Board-when the
striker's job has been eliminated for substantial and bonafide reasons
other than considerations relating to labor relations. for example,
"the need to adapt to changes in business conditions or to improve
efficiency."
In Fleetwood, the Court did hold that certain strikers had been discrimi-
nated against because the company hired new employees , rather than re-
callmg ,those strikers.
15 In Beo-Medical Applications, 247 NLRB 973 In. 2 (1980), Board con-
cluded that the Company had violated the Act when it discharged cer-
tain strikers inasmuch as the evidence showed that the Respondent's re-
fusal , "was accompanied by the hiring of nonunit employees (LPNs) to
perform the same work and by an increase in the hours worked by both
unit and nonunit employees. This further rebuts Respondent's assertion
that it was able to operate normally without the unlawfully discharged
strikers and without hiring additional employees."
bargain as a representative of the employees in the
voting unit. That bargaining may not begin until
years after the election, depending on what took
place prior to the election,
Because of the many documented incidents of
picket line violence, we guarantee you that in the
unlikely event that the union has a majority vote,
Histacount will object to the validity of the election
on the grounds that the Teamster violence and co-
ercion affected the votes of the employees.
Once the company does this the Brooklyn NLRB
Regional Office will obtain the facts about the ob-
jection and make a decision. That decision, which
will require some months, can be appealed to the
NLRB in Washington, which normally takes more
time. After that, if Histacount is dissatisfied with the
NLRB decision, it can force the NLRB to take the
case to the United States Court of Appeals which
requires many months (often well over a year.) So
it probably would be two years or more before
there was a final decision on the election.
Therefore, in the inconceivable event of a union
election victory we can assure you that it would be
approximately two years or so until the bargaining
begins (and the bargaining would begin only in the
unlikely event that the Board and Court of Appeals
both ruled that the union won a fair election.)
WHAT HAPPENS IN BARGAINING?
Once the bargaining begins, the union makes its
proposals to management and argues for their ac-
ceptance. The company has equal rights to make its
proposals and to try and convince the union of their
acceptance. This process can continue for weeks,
months, or even years until the parties come to a
"mutual agreement," and "mutual" means that both
management and the union agree.
There is another important aspect of bargaining:
There is no guarantee that the company's existing
benefits "before bargaining" will survive the bar-
gaining. In short, the company is legally entitled to
bargain from "ground zero." This means that a
company can get rid of one or more of its pre-exist-
ing benefits in the course of bargaining. Let me give
you, one example:
One metropolitan area company had provided
Major Medical coverage for its employees prior to
bargaining. But as a result of bargaining, the compa-
ny discontinued paying for the Major Medical cov-
erage and the employees had to pay for the cover-
age themselves. This same result could happen for
various Histacount benefits in bargaining with the
Teamster Local.
So, in short, every pre-benefit is "up for grabs" in
bargaining with the union. While the company
would bargain "in good faith," it would do so in
light of all of its legal rights:
HISTACOUNT CORP.
PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE COMPANY
DURING BARGAINING
At any time during the bargaining the Teamsters
could call a strike as they already have done to try
to put additional pressure on the company.
But I think you have all seen that Histacount and
the overwhelming majority of its employees will
not give in to a strike.
Should the union conduct another strike, the
company can continue operating with the non -strik-
ing employees , and can hire replacements for the
strikers.
There have been plenty of cases where strikes
grind on for months without ever getting a union
contract . So you can see that:
There is more to bargaining than just accept-
ing the union 's proposals.
Bargaining does begin at "ground zero."
We do not think that Histacount employees need
or want- to have us bargain with this Teamster
Local. With all its fraud, mis-management and cor-
ruption , we can 't believe that this union is worthy
of Histacount employees.
It's your decision , and we feel confident that
you'll make the right decision to VOTE "NO"
to Teamster interference with Histacount em-
ployees.
to Teamsters causing a wasteful and unnecessary
strike.
to Teamster violence in that strike.
to being members , of this graft-ridden , corrupt
Teamster Local
In connection with the September 21 letter, the Com-
pany's argument is that its statements regarding bargain-
ing from ground zero are privileged. As to its statements
concerning the amount of time it would-take before the
Union would have a right to bargain, the Respondent as-
serts that this merely is an accurate description of reality.
As to the latter point, the Respondent offered evidence
that certain of the strikers, who are asserted to be strike
leaders, had engaged in picket line misconduct.16 The
Respondent therefore argues that if the Union had won
the election, the Company would have had grounds for
filing objections to the election and given the legal pro-
cedures to resolve such issues, its statement about a pos-
sible 2 years' delay before ' bargaining could begin was a
realistic assessment of the circumstances existing on Sep-
tember 21.17
16 Respondent does not contend that any of the strikers should be dis-
qualified from reinstatement because of alleged picket line misconduct.
' a Since the election herein evolved from a Decision and Direction of
Election issued by the Regional Director, the following procedure rela-
tive to objections would normally, be followed. Had the Union won the
election and had the Company filed objections to the election, the Com-
pany would have been required in the first instance to furnish informa-
tion in support of its objections, after which an investigation would be
made by the Regional Office. If after an investigation had been conduct-
ed, and if there was a prima facie showing that picket line misconduct
had taken place and had been engaged in by persons for whom the Union
was legally responsible, or in the presence of union agents who condoned
IV. ANALYSIS
687
A. Alleged Failure to Recall the Strikers
As I have indicated above, the issue of whether a con-
ditional or unconditional offer to return to work was
made is, to my mind , an exceedingly difficult issue as nei-
ther side's testimony was wholly implausible and as none
of the witnesses were obviously untruthful. Nevertheless,
considering all the circumstances and the record as a
whole, I am inclined to favor the Company's version as
being more plausible. That is, I shall credit the assertions
by Kaufman and Otto that Meehan and Diton said in
effect that unless all of the strikers were reinstated to-
gether, none of them would return to work. My reasons
for this conclusion are as follows.
Given the fact that the strike was called for the pur-
pose of gaining recognition and as the strikers did not
offer to return to work either when the Union filed its
petition for an election on August 1 or when the Region-
al Director issued his Decision and Direction of Election
on August 29, it seems likely that the original intent was
to maintain the strike until the election, and, have the
people vote from the picket line.
It appears, however, that during the week preceding
September 17, the strikers began discussing among them-
selves the idea of going back to work and on Friday,
September 14, a meeting was held at the Union's office
to discuss this idea. In attendance at the meeting were
the strikers plus certain of the Union's officials. At the
meeting, it was decided that the stikers would return to
work and to that end Helen Lartigaut, one of the strik-
ers, was delegated the responsibility of calling the Com-
pany and/or its attorney over the weekend to let them
know that they were returning to work: She, however,
did not get through to the Respondent's attorney or its
management . Whether conscious or not, it also was de-
cided that the offer to return to work would be made
orally and no provision was made to transmit the offer
by letter or telegram.
In support of the case, the General Cousel called as
witnesses six of the striking employees whom he charac-
terized as being militantly in favor of the Union. These
were Charlotte Diton, Helen Lartigaut, Catherine Grillo,
Rosemary Meehan, Marjorie Leeds, and Denise Vili-
plana. As to the September 14 meeting, Catherine Grillo
testified "We just decided to go back to work as a
group, you know, to go in as a group." She testified that
such conduct, a hearing would be held assuming that there were disputed
issues of fact A hearing officer would then conduct such a hearing and
issue a report which would be appealable to the Regional Director in the
first instance, and then to the Board on a limited basis pursuant to a re-
quest for review Assuming that the Board overruled the objections and a
certification of representative was issued, the company could still test the
certification by refusing to bargain with the Union In such a case, it
would be normal for a complaint to issue under Sec 8(a)(5) of the Act
alleging the refusal to bargain which would be processed before the
Board in a summary judgment procedure After the Board issued its opin-
ion, the matter could then be heard in an appropriate circuit court of ap-
peals pursuant to Sec. 10(e) or (t) of the Act where the court would be
called upon, in circumstances such as these, to approve or reject the
Board's findings on the objections Needless to say, the above proce-
dures, if earned through to their ultimate, would take a, considerable
amount of time.
688 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
there was no discussion as to what the strikers would say
if the Company told them that they could not be imme-
diately reinstated , but that "we assumed that as a group
they were going to take us back." With respect to the
same meeting, Majorie Leeds testified, "I think we all
decided that we would all come Monday. We would all
get dressed and get back to work." (During the strike,
the strikers wore different clothes than they normally
wore at work.) She also testified that based on what took
place at the Friday meeting, it was her opinion that if the
strikers showed up for work on Monday, the Company
would put them right back to work. Similarly, Denise
Viliplana testified that at the Friday meeting, the strikers
thought the Company would take them back on the day
they came in or, if not on that day, then within the next
day or two. In the same vein , Rosemary Meehan testified
that, although the strikers were aware that the Company
had hired people during the strike, they all thought that
the Company would put them all back to work on
Monday and that it was, in her opinion , a simple matter
as the Company could take the people who were doing
the strikers ' jobs in the upstairs office and move them
downstairs to do other work.
With respect to the meetings held on September 17
with management, Charlotte Diton testified that the
strikers all got dressed, "ready for work." She testified
that she said , "we are here to come back to work,"
whereupon Otto said that he was happy to have them
back but that there were some changes in the structure
of the office and therefore the strikers could not come
back at that time. She states that he told them that they
would have to come back based on seniority and the
need for their skills. Diton testified, "We wanted to
know why we couldn't just come in that day, we were
prepared to work." According to Diton, Otto responded
that they could not because of the change in the office
and because the Company was not prepared for their
return. Diton recalls Rosemary Meehan asking why the
Company could not simply put the strikers upstairs and
take the people upstairs and send them downstairs. She
also testified, "We came in thinking that we could all go
back to our jobs. We knew our jobs and we knew that
we were needed , so we didn 't think in those terms as to
this group going back or that group going back."
Catherine Grillo's testimony relating to the September
17 meetings was that when Diton said , "we're here to
work," Otto said, that due to the strike the Company was
hurt very badly, that they had restructured the office up-
stairs, that they could not take us back right then and
there, and that they would have to phase in the strikers
by seniority and need. According to Grillo, Diton said,
"so then you're locking us out," which Otto denied.
Helen Lartigaut testified that when Otto said that they
could not "take us all in," there was a lot of shouting by
the strikers , and that Myra Dantus may have screamed,
"Lockout, does that mean you're locking us out." Also,
Rosemary Meehan states that when the Company did
not agree with her proposal that they put the strikers
back upstairs and put the other employees back down-
stairs, she asked if this meant that the Company was
locking them out. She states that Otto said no, that the
strikers were still employees of Histacount , and that the
Company would bring them back to work when it
could. 18
Following the meetings held on September 17, the
strikers resumed their picketing and the evidence dis-
closes that a picket sign with the phrase "lockout" was
used. At the conclusion of the meeting, Majorie Leeds
testified that after her group left the office, "we were a
little upset because we thought we could really come
back to work."
Based on the above, it seems to me that the intent of
the strikers, as manifested by their testimony (and their
dress), was to return to work on Monday, September 17,
with the expectation that the Company would immedi-
ately reinstate them all as a group. Therefore if that was
their collective intent, which I believe it was, it would
be more likely than not that they translated that intent
into verbal expression as contended by the Respondent.
Moreover, the accusation by the stikers that they were
being locked out, when they clearly were not, only
makes sense if they had intended and expected to go
back as a group and were expressing their anger in
having such a demand rejected . In this respect, there is
nothing in what Otto said , which to me could reasonably
be construed as a lockout. In fact, he told the strikers
that the Company still considered them to be employees,
that he was happy to have them back, but because of the
circumstances, the strikers would have to be phased back
into work. That statement did in fact comport with the
Company 's situation at that time.' 9
In addition, the letter sent to the strikers on September
18 is consistent with and tend to confirm the testimony
of Otto and Kaufman to the effect that on September 17
the strikers demanded to return to work on an "all or
none" basis . Thus, the letter stated , inter alia, "Conse-
quently, it is not possible to have all of the striking em-
ployees return to work at one time ." It is also of some
significance that neither the Union nor the strikers re-
sponded to this letter, or otherwise sought to meet with
the Company to talk about arrangements for the orderly
return of the strikers in some rational manner.
While not totally free from doubt, the evidence as a
whole suggests that on September 17 the strikers went to
the Company seeking reinstatement as a group and ex-
pressed the condition that they would only return if they
all were reinstated together. In short , it is my conclusion
that this is the more plausible verison of the events on
18 Denise Viliplana in her description of the conversation between
Diton and Otto , testified on cross-examination
Q. It's a fact, is it not, that Mrs Diton told Mr Otto and Mr
Kaufman that you all wanted to go back to work but you all had to
go back together , isn't that right?
A I don't remember
Q. I ask you to think very carefully, Mrs Diton did say in your
presence that we want to come back to work, but its all of us or
none of us'
A. I don't remember.
is At the very least, given the fact that 11 permanent replacements
had been hired, that various employees had been transferred into jobs
previously done by the strikers, and the evidence that there was some
decline m orders, it seems clear that the Company was in no position to
reinstate all of the strikers as of September 17
HISTACOUNT CORP
September 17 and I shall therefore credit the testimony
of Otto and Kaufman in this regard.
In view of my conclusion that an unconditional offer
to return to work was not made by the strikers, it there-
fore follows that the Company was under no obligation
to recall them.2° Thus, coupled with the evidence estab-
lishing that as of September 17 the Respondent=did not
have vacancies for the entire group of strikers , it is evi-
dent that the General Counsel cannot successfully con-
tend that the economic strike was converted into an
unfair labor poractice strike. The fact that the Company
thereafter offered to recall the strikers over a period of
time, which offers were for the most part accepted, does
not to my mind prove that an unconditional offer to
return was made by the strikers in the first place or serve
to impose on the Company an obligation to treat the
conditional offer as if it were unconditional.
With respect to Viliplana (a strike leader), who was
one of the first persons offered reinstatement , the Gener-
al Counsel asserts: (1) that the Company failed to offer
her reinstatement to her prestrike job and (2) that she
thereafter made an unconditional offer to return to work
which was not honored in a timely fashion. As to the
first proposition, this can only be sustained if it is con-
cluded that an unconditional offer to return was made on
her behalf before the Company's offer of reinstatement.
As I have concluded that no unconditional offer was
made on September 17, the General Counsel 's first con-
tention can have no merit. As to the second point, it was
shown that prior to the strike, Viliplana worked full time
on the day shift, although her request to transfer to the
night shift on a part-time basis had been approved by the
Company. When the Company, on September 26, sent
Viliplana an offer of reinstatement she responded that
she intended to return to the night shift which, at that
time, was not operational . On March 20 , 1980, the Com-
pany placed an advertisement in a newspaper for a part-
time clerical position on the night shift which was seen
by Viliplana about March 25, 1980 . Not having been no-
tified of this vacancy by the Company, Viliplana phoned
Kaufman who thereupon asked if she was interested in
the job. She accepted, and thereupon returned to work.
It therefore appears from this record that when the
Company reinstated the night shift, it neglected to notify
Viliplana of such a vacancy before seeking to employ
other people . Nevertheless, it seems to me that this fail-
ure to notify Viliplana was the result of inadvertence and
was quickly remedied. As such, I do not conclude that
the Respondent has violated the law in this respect.
B. The September 21 Letter
Whether or not statements by an employer that it will
"bargain from scratch," are violative of the Act have,
20 In Laidlaw Corp., 171 NLRB 1366, 1370 (1968), the Board stated.
[E]conomic strikeis who unconditionally apply for reinstatement at a
time when their position are filled by permanent replacements (1)
remain employees and (2) are entitled to full reinstatement upon the
departure of replacements unless they have in the meantime acquired
regular and substantially equivalent employment, or the employer
can justify his burden of proof that the failure to offer full reinstate-
ment was for legitimate and subtantial business reasons [Emphasis
added ]
i
689
under Board cases, turned on the context in which such
statements were made. Thus in Plastronics, 233 NLRB
155, 156 (1977),-the Board stated:
Depending upon the surrounding circumstances,
an employer which indicates that collective bargain-
ing "begins from scratch" or, "starts at zero" or
"starts with a blank page" may or may not be en-
gaging in objectionable conduct . . . . Such state-
ments are objectionable when , in context, they ef-
fectively threaten employees with the loss,of exist-
ing benefits and leave them with the impression that
what they may ultimately receive depends in large
measure upon what the Union can induce the em-
ployer to restore. On the other hand, such state-
ments are not objectionable when additional com-
munication to the employees dispels any implication
that wage and/or benefits will be reduced during
the course of bargaining and establishes that a re-
duction in wages or benefits will occur, only as a
result of the normal give and take of collective bar-
gaining . . . . The totality of all the circumstances
must be viewed to determine the effect of the state-
ments on the employees.
In the present case, the statements, (1) that bargaining
"can take weeks, months, or even years ," (2) that the
Company is "legally entitled to bargain from ground
zero," and (3) that "there is no guarantee that the com-
pany's existing benefits . . . will survive the bargaining,"
were made in a context which would indicate to employ-
ees that bargaining is a process in which each side makes
its own proposals, that it requires mutual agreement, and
where existing benefits may be traded away. Thus, these
statements, in context, do not appear to be designed to
relay the message that the employer would unilaterally
discontinue existing benefits if the employees selected
union representation , but rather that existing benefits
may be lost as a result of bargaining.21 Nor is this case
similar to one in which "bargaining from scratch" state-
ments are coupled with expressions by a company that it
intends to engage ' in long drawn out negotiations. Thus,
unlike the situation in Madison & Kipp Co., 240 NLRB
879, where the employer also told employees that it in-
tended to "bargain long" and gave as an example a com-
pany which had bargained for 8 years without reaching
an agreement , the letter herein merely states that bar-
gaining "can continue for weeks, months or even years,"
and that the, Company would bargain in good faith "in
light of all of its legal rights."
The statements relating to the possibility that it would
take 2 years or more before the Company would be le-
gally compelled to bargain ' with the Union, are also al-
leged as being violative of the Act. The fact is, however,
that such statements are probably correct and given the
evidence herein, there was at least a colorable ground
upon which the Respondent 'could have filed objections
to the election had the Union obtained a majority of the
votes. The fact that the Respondent told its employees
21 Computer Peripherals, 215 NLRB 293 (1974); Host International, 195
NLRB 348 (1972),
690 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that it intended to file such objections if it lost the elec-
tion and that the legal process could take 2 years or
more before it might be obligated to commence bargain-
ing, was "simply a statement of what the Respondent
was legally entitled to do" and therefore should not be
construed as a threat that selection of a union by the em-
ployees would be a futility.22 Although there are cases
wherein the Board has held to be violative statements to
the effect that bargaining would be delayed because of a
company's intent to contest an election, those cases all
involved situations where other 8(a)(1) conduct was also
found.23 Moreover, in those cases there appears to have
been no evidence that the respective companys had co-
lorable grounds for filing objections to contest the out-
come of the elections. Thus, in the cited cases, the asser-
tions that the respective companys would contest the
election can be viewed as statements indicating only an
intent to delay or forestall collective bargaining rather
than a good-faith assertion, based on objective evidence,
that the companys intended to exercise their legal rights
to contest the elections. As the Respondent herein ad-
duced evidence to the effect that certain of the strikers
and strike leaders engaged in picket line misconduct, it
had a colorable objective basis for telling employees that
it would file objections to the election if the Union won,
and that the legal proceedings necessary to resolve such
objections might take a considerable length of time.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Histacount Corp., a subsidiary of
S.C.M. Corporation, is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
2. Local 806, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. Respondent has not engaged in any conduct viola-
tive of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
ed24
ORDER
It is ordered that the complaint is dismissed in its en-
tirety.
22 Devon Gables Lodge & Apartments, 237 NLRB 775 (1978). Cf. Dal-
Tex Optical Co, 137 NLRB 1786 fn. 8 (1962)
23 See May Department Stores Co., 191 NLRB 928 (1971); International
Medication Systems Ltd, 244 NLRB 861, 869 (1979), Kent Bros. Transpor-
tation Co , 188 NLRB 53, 59 (1971); Woodline, 233 NLRB 97, 100 (1977),
Two Guys Department Stores, 242 NLRB 1139, 1149 (1979)
24 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations , the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.