Schrementi Bros., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 3, 1969

179 N.L.R.B. 853 (N.L.R.B. 1969)

SCHREMENTI BROS ., INC. 853
Schrementi Bros., Inc. and Retail Clerks Union,
Local 1504, AFL-CIO
Schrementi Bros ., Inc. and Retail Clerks Union,
Local 1504, AFL-CIO, Petitioner. Cases
13-CA-8180 and 13-RC- 11354
December 3, 1969
DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION OF
SECOND ELECTION
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND JENKINS
On June 4, 1969, Trial Examiner Sydney S. Asher
issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceedings,
finding that the Respondent had engaged in certain
unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in
the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He further
found the Respondent had not engaged in certain
other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint
and recommended dismissal as to them. In addition,
the Trial Examiner found that the Respondent had
engaged in objectionable conduct prior to the
election held in Case 13-RC-1 1354 and
recommended that the said election be set aside and
a new election ordered. Thereafter the Respondent,
the Union, and the General Counsel filed exceptions
to the Decision and supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and
the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the
findings,' conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner, as modified herein:
1. We do not agree with the Trial Examiner that
the Respondent's general manager Harold Staley,
unlawfully interrogated employee Morris Doolittle.
According to Doolittle, he and Staley had two
conversations in 1967. On one occasion in late
November, Staley asked him if he "had heard
anything about the Union trying to organize in the
store" and then said that "the union wasn't any
good because he had his own experiences with
them." Doolittle also stated that during a second
conversation on December 15, Staley inquired as to
' We concur with the Trial Examiner ' s finding that the threatening
conduct toward , and assaults on union agents by Respondent's President
Schrementi , violated Section 8(a)(I) of the Act The Trial Examiner,
however, inadvertently failed to include a remedy particularly addressed to
this illegal activity and the General Counsel excepted to that failure
Accordingly, we amend the Order and Notice to provide therefor.
how he "felt about the Union?"
Staley testified, however, that he had only one
conversation with Doolittle and that occurred in
November. His words at that time were, "I presume
that you have heard word going around the store
that the Union is trying to organize. I don't know
how you feel about this situation and I would like to
try to tell you some of the advantages and
disadvantages of a union being in the store."
Although finding that Staley's account of his
conversation with Doolittle more reliable than
Doolittle's version, the Trial Examiner attributed to
Staley a remark culled from Doolittle's account of a
December conversation. Thus, the Trial Examiner's
conclusion that Staley unlawfully interrogated
Doolittle in November 1967 contradicts his own
credibility findings.
Relying only on Staley's credited testimony as
quoted above, we find no evidence that in his
conversation with Doolittle, Staley violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. The Trial Examiner based further unfair labor
practice findings on certain statements made by
Respondent's President Schrementi, to three
employees: Nickie Kloss, Penny Kloss, and Morris
Doolittle.
During a conversation with Nickie Kloss on
February 7, 1968, Schrementi asked, "Why are you
against me?" The following day, he said to her
sister, Penny, "How come you are not for me?" The
Trial Examiner reasoned that Schrementi thereby
implied that he knew that the Kloss sisters intended
to vote for the Union and thus created the
impression that he had engaged in surveillance of
their union activities. We find no merit in this
conclusion.
The record reveals that the Kloss girls made no
attempt to conceal their support for the Union. In
fact, Penny Kloss acknowledged that word had
spread through the store that both she and her sister
had signed union authorization cards. Further, she
told a supervisor that she generally favored unions.
Since the girls' union sympathies were a matter of
common knowledge and they were aware that their
views were known to others, we cannot infer that
they assumed from Schrementi's statement that
their union activities were under surveillance.
Accordingly, we do not find such statements
violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The incident with Doolittle occurred prior to
Christmas 1967, shortly after a supervisor informed
Schrementi that Doolittle was copying names of
employees from time cards. Schrementi accused
Doolittle of obtaining the names for the benefit of
the Union. In referring to the union agents, he
admittedly said, "I know they are around, I have
been told they are."
The Trial Examiner's conclusion that
Schrementi's remarks indicated "he was engaging in
surveillance of the Union agents' conduct of Union
affairs" is not justified by the facts.
179 NLRB No. 147
854 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
It is clear that the Union's interest in organizing
the employees was generally known throughout the
store. The union agents themselves made no effort
to conceal their activities. Indeed, on three occasions
earlier in December, union representatives openly
visited the supermarket, and on two of these visits
had altercations with Schrementi.
Moreover, Doolittle, according to his own
testimony, .made it evident to a supervisor that he
supported the Union.
For the above reasons, we do not adopt the Trial
Examiner's finding . that these comments of
Schrementi to Doolittle violated Section 8(a)(1).
3. Although finding that the Respondent had
engaged in unlawful activity, the Trial Examiner
nevertheless was persuaded that the Respondent did
not act in bad faith in refusing to recognize and
bargain with the Union. While we affirm his
dismissal of the 8(a)(5) allegation of the complaint,
we do not rely on his good-faith rationale.2
In judging when a bargaining order is appropriate
in a case where an employer has refused a request to
bargain based on -signed- authorization cards, the
Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing
Company.' recently stated that an employer's
good-faith doubt is largely irrelevant. Rather, the
Court instructed the Board to determine whether the
gravity of the employer's unfair labor practices has
so diminished the possibility of ensuring a fair
election that employee free choice is better
ascertained by resort to signed authorization cards
than by an election.4
With this standard in mind, we conclude that the
Respondent's misconduct was not sufficiently
flagrant to prevent the conduct of a fair rerun
election. The 8(a)(l) violations found here were
neither so extensive in number nor pervasive in
character that they warrant an 8(a)(5) finding or
require a bargaining order to remedy their unlawful
effect.
4. The Union timely filed 7 objections to the
election conducted on February 9, 1968. Of these,
the Trial Examiner sustained Objections 3, 4, 5, and
7. We adopt his recommendations as to Objections
3 and 5, but do not agree with his disposition of
Objection 4.1
Objection 4 alleges that the Employer granted
wage increases to employees for the purpose of
discouraging them from voting for the Union. In
support of this charge, an employee, Mrs. Russell,
testified that she complained to Schrementi that her
wages were less than those of an employee who had
'Having decided that a bargaining order is inappropriate in this case, we
do not reach questions relating to the Trial Examiner 's findings as to
challenged authorization cards or inclusion in the unit of Schrementi's
nephew
3395 U S. 575.
'/bid
'In the absence of exceptions thereto, we adopt, pro forma , the Trial
Examiner 's recommendations dismissing Objections I, 2, and 6 Since we
conclude that the conduct alleged in Objections 3 and 5 warrants setting
aside the election , we find it unnecessary to pass on Objection 7
worked in the store for a shorter period of time than
she had. Subsequently, 10 days prior to the election,
she received an increase from $1.65 to $1.75 an
hour.
In finding merit in the objection, the Trial
Examiner apparently did not take into account
testimony clarifying the circumstances under which
Mrs. Russell received the pay raise.
The record establishes that it was Mrs. Russell
who initiated the conversation with Schrementi in
which she raised the question of her salary. She
testified that Schrementi explained that full-time
employees made more money than she did as a
part-time employee. She then requested
reclassification as a full-time employee. Mrs. Russell
further stated that only after she was reclassified
and began to work more hours did she receive a pay
raise.
Given these additional factors, we are persuaded
that Mrs. Russell received a wage increase in the
normal course of the Employer's business, not as a
gratuitous benefit designed to affect her vote in the
forthcoming election. We conclude, therefore, that
this objection is without merit.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, as
modified below, and hereby orders that the
Respondent, Schrementi Bros., Inc., South Chicago
Heights, Illinois, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial
Examiner's Recommended Order, as herein
modified:
1. Add the following as paragraph l (a) and
reletter the subsequent paragraphs accordingly:
"1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Committing physical assaults and batteries
upon union representatives."
2. Add as the first indented paragraph in the
Appendix:
WE WILL NOT commit physical assaults and
batteries upon union representatives.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the election
conducted herein on February 9, 1968, be, and it
hereby is, set aside.
[Direction of Second Election' omitted from
publication.]
'in order to assure that all eligible voters may have the opportunity to
be Informed of the issues in the exercise of their statutory right to vote, all
parties to the election should have access to a list of voters and their
addresses which may be used to communicate with them . Excelsior
Underwear Inc, 156 NLRB 1236, N L R B v Wyman -Gordon Company,
394 U S. 759 Accordingly, it is hereby directed that an election eligibility
list, containing the names and addresses of all the eligible voters, must be
filed by the Employer with the Regional Director for Region 13 within 7
days after the date of issuance of the Notice of Second Election by the
Regional Director The Regional Director shall make the list available to
all parties to the election No extension of time to file this list shall be
SCHREMENTI BROS ., INC. 855
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION Upon the entire record in these cases ,2 and from my
observation of the witnesses , I make the following-
SYDNEY S. ASHER, Trial Examiner: On December 19,
1967, Retail Clerks Union, Local 1504, AFL-CIO, herein
called the Union, filed charges in Case 13-CA-8180
against Schrementi's Food and Liquors, South Chicago
Heights, Illinois. On February 2, 1968„ a first amended
charge was filed and on April 12, 1968, a second amended
charge. These referred to the Respondent as Schrementi
Bros., Inc. On October 4, 1968, the General Counsel of
the National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint
which alleged that the Respondent, since on or about
November 1967, has interfered with, restrained, and
coerced its employees in the exercise of rights protected by
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C
Sec. 151, et seq.), herein called the Act. It further alleged
that since on or about December 22, 1967, the
Respondent has refused to recognize or bargain with the
Union as the bargaining representative of the
Respondent's employees in an appropriate unit, although
the Union had been designated as such representative by a
majority of the employees in the unit, and had requested
recognition as such representative. It is alleged that this
conduct violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. The
Respondent filed an answer admitting that the Union
requested recognition as the bargaining agent of the
Respondent's employees in an appropriate unit, and that it
declined to grant such recognition, but alleging that it did
so "because it had a good faith doubt that the Union
represented a majority of the Respondent's employees" in
the unit, and denying the commission of any unfair labor
practice On December 9, 1968, the General Counsel
issued an amendment to the complaint. Thereafter, the
Respondent filed an answer thereto.
Case 13-RC-11354 arises out of an election conducted
by the Regional Director among the Respondent's
employees on February 9, 1968, which the Union lost. The
Union filed timely objections to conduct affecting the
results of the election. On October 9, 1968, (after the
issuance of the complaint in Case 13-CA-8180) the
Regional Director issued a report on objections in Case
13-RC-11354, in which he found that "substantial and
material issues have been raised by the objections which
can best be resolved on the basis of record testimony. .
developed at a hearing." In view of the identity of issues,
the Regional Director consolidated Case l3-CA-8180 with
Case 13-RC-11354.
A consolidated hearing was held before me in Chicago,
Illinois, on various dates between December 10, 1968, and
January 24, 1969, both dates inclusive. All parties were
represented and participated fully in the hearing. During
the hearing, on motion of the Respondent, I dismissed one
part of the complaint for lack of evidence.' After the close
of the hearing each party filed a brief. These have been
duly considered.
granted by the Regional Director except in extraordinary circumstances
Failure to comply with this requirement shall be grounds for setting aside
the election whenever proper objections are filed
'The allegation in question was that on or about February 7, 1968,
Jalane Schultz , a supervisor , had 'interrogated employees concerning
such employees ' union activities , membership and desires " The only
witness produced by the General Counsel to testify with regard to this
allegation was Penny Kloss, an employee, who described a conversation
between herself and Schultz on February 7, 1968 On direct examination,
the witness testified:
Q Do you specifically recall anything she asked you'
A No, she didn't ask me anything
In view of this testimony I held that the General Counsel had failed to
FINDINGS OF FACT
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and it is
found that the Respondent is, and at all material times
has been, an employer engaged in commerce as defined in
the Act, and its operations meet the Board's jurisdictional
standards;' and that the Union is, and at all material
times has been, a labor organization within the meaning
of the Act
A. The Setting
The Respondent's store is a supermarket operation,
with six checkout lanes. It remains open from 8 a.m. until
I1 p.m. daily, 7 days per week. It is one of four stores
located in a shopping center These four stores share a
common parking lot on which there is a sign reading-
"American Plaza." The Respondent's store contains no
employee "break room" or lounge.
The Respondent's meat department employees are
represented for purposes of collective bargaining by a
labor organization identified on the record only as "a
meat cutter's union " The other employees, so far as the
record shows, had never been organized prior to the events
described herein.
In September or October 1967 the Union commenced a
campaign to organize these unrepresented employees. This
included visits by agents of the Union to the homes of
individual employees, in an effort to obtain their
signatures on union authorization cards During the first
week in November 1967 Anthony Schrementi, the
Respondent's president, mailed a letter to employees
advising them that they need not sign union authorization
cards, that by doing so the employee "may be giving the
union the power to bargain for you with or without an
election" and stating: "I do not believe that our
employees need the Retail Clerks' Union."
Ultimately, the Union filed a petition with the Board
seeking to represent these employees. As previously
mentioned, an election was held on February 9, 1968
During the two weeks before the election the Respondent's
supervisors handed out to the employees a number of
pamphlets urging them to vote against the Union, and the
Union sought support by having its agents again visit the
employees in their homes. It is against this backdrop that
we turn to consideration of specific conduct engaged in by
the Respondent.
B Interference, Restraint , and Coercion
1. THE UNION'S AGENTS' VISITS TO THE STORE
a. Facts
On or about December I, 1967, about 10 30 to 10:45
p.m. Frances O'Callaghan and Robert Hamilton, agents
establish illegal interrogation by Schultz on this occasion, and dismissed
the allegation of the complaint from the bench
'The transcript of testimony was corrected by order dated April 22,
1969
'The Respondent is, and at all material times has been, an Illinois
corporation engaged in the retail sale of groceries and liquor in South
Chicago Heights, Illinois During the year preceding October 4, 1968, the
Respondent sold products valued at more than $500,000 During the same
period goods valued at more than $50,000 were shipped to the
Respondent's store directly from sources outside the State of Illinois. The
parties stipulated on January 19, 1968, in Case l3-RC-11354, that
essentially the same situation had existed during the year preceding
January 19, 1968
856 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of the Union, visited the Respondent's store The purpose
of this visit was to determine which employees were
working so as to avoid the waste of time involved in
visiting their homes while they were at the store. The
agents spent about 5 minutes walking in the aisles, then
purchased a package of cigarettes. They did not speak to
any employee or hand out any literature. On the way out
they passed near Schrementi. Hamilton introduced himself
and O'Callaghan to Schrementi as agents of the Union
Schrementi asked the Union's agents: "You work pretty
hard, don't you'?" Hamilton, apparently misunderstanding,
replied: "I know you work hard, Mr. Schrementi, but you
should be better to your employees." Schrementi
remarked that this was a matter of opinion, then added
"Don't bother me, pick on somebody else. Leave me
alone." The Union's agents then left. According to
O'Callaghan, Schrementi's manner on this occasion was
not antagonistic, rather "he FSchrementil was very nice "'
O'Callaghan returned to the Respondent's store
between 2:30 and 4:30 p.m. on December 13, 1967. This
time he was accompanied by a different agent for the
Union, Leroy R. Ilgen. As before, the purpose was to find
out which employees were working at the time. The
Union's agents did not speak to any employee or attempt
to hand out literature. After they had walked in the aisles
of the store for about 5 minutes, an employee reported to
Schrementi that two Union representatives were in the
store and pointed them out. Schrementi approached them
from behind and pushed them both simultaneously Ilgen,
thrown off balance, was "knocked into the shelves on the
righthand side." O'Callaghan stumbled "forward a couple
of steps." Both remained upright. Turning around to face
Schrementi, Ilgen warned that if Schrementi "laid a hand
on him" the Respondent would be subject to a lawsuit.
Schrementi ordered them "to get the fuck out or, the
store, warning that he would call the police if they did not
do so promptly. Ilgen replied that he thought calling the
police might be "a good idea." Angered, Schrementi
threatened: "I will kill you if you don't get out of the
store. And if I can't kill you I will have you killed."
Schrementi accused the Union's agents of harassing his
employees, and demanded to know their business in the
store. [Igen replied that they wished to purchase a pack of
cigarettes. Schrementi responded that cigarettes were "up
by the front at the check stand," adding: "Buy a pack of
cigarettes and get out of here." All three proceeded
toward the checkout lanes, O'Callaghan and Ilgen abreast
and Schrementi following them at a distance of 2 or 3
feet. O'Callaghan and Ilgen bought a pack of cigarettes,
while Schrementi waited for them on the other (outer) side
of the checkout lane. When O'Callaghan and Ilgen had
checked out and were moving toward the exit, Schrementi
again followed them, repeating his demand that they get
out of the store. As all three reached the air door (the
innermost of two doors leading to the street) Schrementi
again pushed O'Callaghan and Ilgen from behind, and
challenged them to fight. They declined, and got into their
car which was on the shopping center's parking lot As
they departed, Schrementi pretended to write down the
license number of their car. At the time of these events,
five checkout lanes were manned by cashiers and carryout
boys:'
'The findings regarding this incident , introduced only for background
purposes , are based upon a synthesis of the testimony of all three
participants in the conversation
Hamilton, accompanied by another agent of the Union,
Robert Carl Hooker, returned to the Respondent's store
on either December 18 or December 21, 1967, between 2
and 4 p.m O'Callaghan and Ilgen, in another car,
remained outside on the parking lot. Once more, the
purpose was to ascertain which employees were working,
so that the Union's agents would not make futile home
calls on employees who were at work. Hamilton and
Hooker did not talk to any employee while in the store,
nor distribute any literature After they had walked
around inside the store for about 5 minutes, an employee
advised Schrementi that representatives of the Union were
in the store Schrementi confronted Hamilton and Hooker
in one of the aisles and said. "I know who you fellows
are You are from the Union Get the f out of my
store. I don't want either one of you assholes back in my
store again." He added that they had no business being in
the store and admonished them not to "bother any of my
employees " One of the Union's agents replied that they
wanted to buy some cigarettes, Schrementi answered that
they should make their purchase and get out. Hamilton
and Hooker moved to a checkout lane and stood in line
Impatient for them to depart, Schrementi opened another
checkout line just for them, and they bought cigarettes
and candy. On their way out, as they were about to pass
through the air door, Schrementi came up behind them,
pushed both of them simultaneously, then struck Hooker
with his fist on the back of Hooker's head. Hooker
temporarily lost his balance and, reaching out to support
himself, grabbed Schrementi's jacket, which ripped
Schrementi remarked "I told you son of bitches to get
out of my store and don't ever come back again" All
three stepped outside the store, where Schrementi caught
sight of O'Callaghan and [lgen sitting in their car.
Angered, Schrementi went up to the car and opened the
door on the driver's side. He dared O'Callaghan, who was
sitting in the driver's seat, to come out and fight, referring
to O'Callaghan as an "Irishman" and a "son of a bitch,"
and himself as a "Dago " When O'Callaghan made no
move, Schrementi tried to pull O'Callaghan out of the
automobile That tactic proving unsuccessful, Schrementi
slammed the car door, opened it again and once more
tried to pull O'Callaghan out, saying. "Get the hell out of
this parking lot, get away from the store, leave my
employees alone and quit bothering us " Ilgen got out of
the car on the opposite side and hollered: "Mr.
Schrementi you know we don't want to cause any
trouble," then got back inside the car. Schrementi
again slammed the car door, then kicked the side of
the car. After that, O'Callaghan and Ilgen drove away.
At about the same time, Hamilton and Hooker also left
in their car.6 According to Hamilton's credited
testimony, while he was inside the store several
'The findings regarding this incident are based upon a synthesis of the
credited testimony of O'Callaghan and Ilgen Schrementi denied that on
December 13, 1967, he used profanity toward the Union's agents, or that
he pushed or otherwise assaulted either of them, or that he threatened to
kill them or have them killed His denials were not convincing and are not
credited Jolane Schultz, a supervisor employed by the Respondent,
testified as a witness for the Respondent She was present that day and
related what she saw and heard Her testimony is of little help in resolving
the basic conflict between the versions of O'Callaghan and Ilgen on one
hand and Schrementi on the other Indeed, her version was consistent with
either of the other two conflicting versions
'The findings with respect to this incident are based upon a synthesis of
the testimony of Hamilton, Hooker, Ilgen, O'Callaghan, and Geraldine
Suttle, an employee who witnessed some of the events, part of them
through the front window of the store Schrementi described the conduct of
SCHREMENTI BROS ., INC. 857
employees were operating registers and bagging groceries,
the scuffle at the doorway was visible from the checkout
lanes, and O'Callaghan's car could be seen from inside the
store. Indeed, Geraldine Suttle, then an employee,
witnessed the scuffle inside as well as outside the store.'
Nobody has ever reported either of these incidents to
the police authorities.
b. Position s of the parties
The complaint alleges, and the answer denies, that on
or about December 13, 1967, and again on or about
December 18, 1967, Schrementi "engaged in violence
against union representatives in Respondent's place of
business and in the presence of Respondent's employees."
The General Counsel admits that "an employer can police
his premises and use reasonable means to exclude those he
does not wish to remain on his premises." But he points
out that Schrementi "without provocation . . pushed
Hooker from behind, on his way out the door " He
contends -that "considering the fact that at least one
employee observed this, and the violence which followed
when he tried to grab a representative and kicked a Union
representative's car constitutes a violation."
At the hearing, the Respondent disclaimed any defense
based on the argument that Union organizers were
"trespassers." Instead, the Respondent's able counsel
contended that "the Board... has made it clear in retail
shops that the employer has the right to tell them to leave
the premises " In its brief, the Respondent argues.
Admittedly, Schrementi was angered by the persistence
of the Union men in returning to the store for a third
time after he had made it clear to them that they were
not to visit the store again . Perhaps Schrementi did
"blow his cool" on the occasion of the third visit, as
evidenced by his admission that he shoved one of the
men through the door and challenged O'Callaghan to
"try out a good Dago," but we submit, that even under
these circumstances a violation of the Act cannot be
supported.
The Board and the courts have long held that an
employer has a lawful right to prohibit non-employee
union organizers access to his property "so long as
other available channels of communication are open,"
[Citations omitted.] even to the point of permitting an
employer to use physical force to eject union organizers
from the premises.
be capable of being turned off like water from a
faucet."
c Conclusions
Certain facts must be stated at the threshold: (1) Ilgen,
Hooker, O'Callaghan and Hamilton are nonemployee
organizers; (2) the Respondent's store is a retail
establishment and the aisles through which the
nonemployee Union organizers walked is a selling area;
(3) the parking lot is part of a typical shopping center, (4)
at no time did any agent of the Union attempt to speak to
any employee, hand out literature, or otherwise interfere
with the operations of the Respondent's store either inside
the store or outside on the parking lot; and (5) so far as
the record shows, the Respondent had no published rule
limiting or forbidding solicitation.
Certain legal precepts must also be borne in mind (1) a
physical assault by an employer upon a nonemployee
union organizer, in the presence of employees, constitutes
interference, restraint, and coercion within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act;' (2) the same is true when the
assault does not occur in the presence of any employee, if
the circumstances are such that the "employees could
reasonably be expected to become aware of them";9 (3) an
employer may refuse access to his plant by nonemployee
union representatives so long as other channels of
communication remain open;'° and the access of
nonemployee union organizers to publicly used portions of
privately owned shopping centers is governed by different
considerations than those governing access to the inside of
a privately owned store "
Let us apply these principles to the facts before us. On
December 13 Schrementi threatened to kill O'Callaghan
and Ilgen. I find that, so far as the record shows, this
threat was not uttered in the presence of any employee, or
under circumstances indicating a reasonable expectation
that employees would learn of it. The physical assaults, in
which Schrementi twice pushed each union organizer from
behind, fall into a different category. The second of these
two assaults took place not far from the checkout lanes,
five of which were manned by employees. I conclude that
it may reasonably be inferred that some employees
witnessed at least the second assault. Moreover,
Schrementi used force where none was needed. He
attacked even before ordering O'Callaghan and Ilgen off
the premises. At no time did either of the Union's agents
disregard or resist Schrementi's order to leave, on the
contrary they departed with reasonable promptness.
Accordingly, I find that Schrementi's conduct toward
Ilgen and O'Callaghan on this occasion was violative of
Section 8(a)(I) of the Act.' 2
Certainly. . . Schrementi's actions of December 13 and
18 were clearly within the bounds of permissable
employer conduct. . . Schrementi's conduct in the
parking lot warrants no less of a conclusion that it was
a continuation of actions started in the store "which
action was too closely associated with adrenal flow to
Hooker and Hamilton as "very cooperative," admitting pushing Hooker
on his way out, challenging O'Callaghan to fight, and kicking the car in
which O'Callaghan and Ilgen were seated However, he denied that he
otherwise touched any of the Union ' s agents, or that he used profanity
Based on my observation of his demeanor , I do not credit these denials
'Although the front window was partially covered by advertisements, this
did not completely block her view from inside the store of what was
happening outside.
'Altamont Shirt Corporation , 131 NLRB 112, 117, and Traveleze
Trailer Company Inc, 163 NLRB No 43
'H R McBride d/b/a H R McBride Construction Company. 122
NLRB 1634, 1635
'°Vanderhevden , Employee Solicitation and Distribution - A Second
Look, 14 Labor L J 781, 783 J H Rutter-Rex Manufacturing
Company. Inc 164 NLRB No 10, cited by the Respondent , involved a
plant rather than a retail store The owner of a retail establishment , unlike
the owner of a plant, imphedly invites the public to enter It may be that
this invitation is revokable and is in fact revoked when the store owner
orders the individual in question to leave See Sullivan Surplus Sales, Inc ,
152 NLRB 132, 146-147, 148-149, which involved a retail store But this
need not be decided here
"Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 et al v Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc. et al . 391 U S 308
"Marshall Field & Company v N L R B . 200 F 2d 375 (C A 7), and
G C Murphy Company, 171 NLRB No 45, cited by the Respondent, are
858 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
We come now to the events of December 18 or 21.
Here, again , Schrementi used force against Hamilton and
Hooker unnecessarily at the very moment when they were
complying with his directive to leave the store. Far from
resisting Schrementi, they were, according to Schrementi's
own description, "very cooperative." This assault was
witnessed by at least one employee, Geraldine Suttle. She
also saw the later attack by Schrementi upon O'Callaghan
and O'Callaghan's car on the shopping center's parking
lot, where O'Callaghan had a legal right to remain even
after Schrementi ordered him to leave." By attacking
Hamilton, Hooker, O'Callaghan and O'Callaghan's
property in the presence of an employee on December 18
or 21, Schrementi additionally violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act."
2. Interrogation
a. By Anthony Schrementi
(1) In general
The complaint alleges, and the answer denies, that
Schrementi "interrogated employees employed at
Respondent's place of business concerning such
employees' union activities, membership and desires" on
or about December 15, 1967, and on or about the
following dates in 1968: January 7 and 12 and February 5
and 8. In a later document, the General Counsel alleges
"that said interrogations occurred in and about and
throughout,the Respondent's store."
On the first day of the hearing Schrementi testified on
cross-examination:
Q. (By Mr. Burstein ) Was there any time at which
you asked any employee in the store how they felt
about the union?
A No.
On the fifth hearing day, again on cross-examination,
Schrementi enlarged on this denial:
Q. (By Mr. Maslanka) Did you ever talk to anybody
while the Union was organizing, with any employees or
with any supervisors, in which the subject of the Union
was discussed?
A. No.
(2) The Kloss sisters
On or about December 15, 1967, approximately 8 or 9
p.m., Schrementi ° summoned to his office Penny Kloss, a
cashier employed by the Respondent. Nobody else was
distinguishable on their facts . In those cases the union agents attempted to
solicit employees on the selling floors, thus disrupting the stores'
operations . Here , on the contrary, there was no attempt at such activity
and no interference with the Respondent 's operations
"See Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 et a! v Logan
Valley Plaza, Inc., et at.. supra
"Citing the majority opinion in Salver Stay Ready Filter Corp, 136
NLRB 1210, the Respondent argues that what happened in the parking lot
was a mere continuation of action started inside the store. But one
distinguishing factor is that in Salver the earlier action was the legal use of
force necessary to oust a resisting trespasser , while here the earlier action
consisted of the use of force when the persons excluded were peacefully
complying with the owner 's expressed desire that they leave Moreover, in
Salver the employer was attempting to enforce a valid no-solicitation rule,
while here there was neither solicitation nor any rule against solicitation
Contrast Sullivan Surplus Sales , Inc , supra, cited in the General Counsel's
brief. To the extent, if any, that Sullivan is inconsistent with the majority
decision in Salver, as Sullivan is the more recent case , it must be regarded
as controlling.
present. According to Penny Kloss' undenied testimony,
which I credit:
He more or less stated that he had been good to us, my
sister and I working at the store, we got the hours we
wanted, we got days off when we wanted, and
altogether he was just telling us, you know, that he had
been a good employer and that we had nice conditions,
nice working conditions and everything was okay. . he
just stated the reasons, you know, why I should be for
him, why I shouldn't go against him.
This was the only testimony presented by the General
Counsel concerning this conversation. There appears to
have been no attempt by Schrementi to elicit from Penny
Kloss information concerning her union activities or
sympathies. I conclude that, in this conversation,
Schrementi did not engage in interrogation violative of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
On or about February 8, 1968, the day before the
election in Case 13-RC-11354, at about 4 30 p.m.
Schrementi called Penny Kloss aside while she was near a
checkout lane in the store, and asked her: "How come
you are not for me?" Penny Kloss replied: "I am for you
as a person. I only wanted a union for higher wages,
that's all." Schrementi then inquired: "Well, are you for
me?" She answered in the affirmative and walked away.15
It is found that, by asking Penny Kloss if she were "for"
him, Schrementi illegally interrogated her regarding her
union sympathies, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
On or about February 7, 1968, the day before the above
Schrementi-Kloss conversation, in the evening, Nickie
Kloss, another cashier in the Respondent's employ, and
sister of Penny Kloss, was near a cash register.
Schrementi approached and asked: "Well, why are you
against me?" She replied: "I'm not against you
personally." Schrementi inquired: "Well, then, why do
you want the union I don't come to your house and
interrupt your meals " Nickie Kloss admitted this was so.
Schrementi also pointed out that he had "always been
good" to the Kloss sisters Nickie agreed. At that point a
customer came up to them and the subject was dropped.'"
Nickie Kloss' reasons for supporting the Union were not a
legitimate matter of concern to Schrementi, and he went
beyond permissable bounds when he sought to elicit from
her information on this subject " Coming at a time when
Schrementi was distributing to the employees literature
underscoring his dislike of the Union, I conclude that on
this occasion his interrogation of Nickie Kloss constituted
a violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.'
"These findings are based on Penny Kloss' credited testimony
Schrementi 's version was somewhat different According to Schrementi "I
said 'Penny, I hear rumors that you are for the union, which is your
privilege, however, I have been fair with you"'; he then related favors he
had extended, ending. "I hope I can count on your support and I hear that
you are not going to support me", she replied "Tony, I like working for
you Maybe it is the money " and there ensued a discussion of wages I
deem Penny Kloss' account of the conversation more reliable than that of
Schrementi.
"This finding is based on the testimony of Nickie Moss Schrementi's
version differed to some extent According to Schrementi , he said . " Nickie,
I hear you are going to support the union and I thought maybe perhaps I
have been fair with you I have been looking forward to your support and
I would appreciate it if I could get it" and that Nickie Kloss gave a
non-commital response I deem Nickie Kloss' version of this event more
reliable than that of Schrementi
"Springfield Garment Manufacturing Company, 152 NLRB 1043, 1046
"In its brief, the Respondent cites a number of decisions of Courts of
Appeals concerning interrogation - John S Barnes Corporation v
NLRB , 190 F 2d 127 (C A 7), NLRB v. Arthur Winer , Inc. 194
SCHREMENTI BROS., INC. 859
(3) Mary Ellen Russell
Late in December 1967 or early in January 1968's
Schrementi and Mary Ellen Russell, a cashier employed
by the Respondent, had a talk in the store. Schrementt
asked Russell whether agents of the Union had visited her
at her home. She answered "No," which was an untruth,
for in fact the Union's representatives had been at her
house a few days before. Schrementi told her: "You can
expect some visitors soon.""' There followed a discussion
of Russell's wages, which will be described in more detail
hereafter. It is found that Schrementi's question, whether
union representatives had visited Russell's home,
constituted illegal interrogation regarding her union
activities and was violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
(4) Morris C. Doolittle
Sometime "around Christmas" 1967 at about 4:05 p.m.
Terry Lee Doyle, a supervisor employed by the
Respondent, came upon Morris C. Doolittle, a stockboy,
within about 2 feet of the timeclock and the timecard
racks Doolittle had a pencil and paper in his hand, and
was writing. Doyle reported to Schrementi that Doolittle
"was taking names off the time cards."2' Within a day or
two, Schrementi accosted Doolittle in the store and
accused him of copying company documents for the
Union's benefit.22 Doolittle denied this. Schrementt,
angered, referred to Doolittle as a spy, or as being
engaged in espionage. He told Doolittle: "You are getting
names off the rack for the union organizer. I know they
are around, I have been told they are." Schrementi then
advised Doolittle that the time rack area was "off limits
to you unless you have permission" to be there.23 I find
nothing in this incident to substantiate the allegation that
Schrementi engaged in illegal interrogation. 24 However,
this conversation will be referred to below, in connection
with another allegation of the complaint
F 2d 370 (C A 7), cert denied 344 U S 819, Sax v NLRB , 171 F 2d
769 (C A 7): Burke Golf Equipment Corporation v N L R B . 284 F 2d
943 (C A 6): Bourne v NLRB, 332 F 2d 47 (C A 2), NLRB v Park
Edge Sheridan Meats, Inc, 341 F 2d 725 (C A 2); N L R B v Mallory
Plastics Company. Division of P R. Mallory & Company, Inc, 355 F 2d
509 (C A 7). and N L R.B v Dorn's Transportation Company. Inc 405
F 2d 706 (C A. 2). In each of these cases, the Board found interrogation
violative of Section 8(a)(I) of the Act, but the court refused to enforce As
the Respondent correctly points out elsewhere in its brief "the Trial
Examiner must follow the established Board precedent Insurance Agents'
International Union , AFL-CIO ( The Prudential Insurance Corporation of
America). 119 NLRB 768. Novak Logging Company, 119 NLRB 1573" I
am therefore , as a Trial Examiner, bound by the Board decisions in the
cited interrogation cases, rather than by the decisions of the Courts of
Appeals for the Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, which reversed them
"Schrementi testified the incident occurred "right after Christmas" 1967
while Russell dated it in January 1968. The record is clear that Schrementi
was out of town from January 7 to 14, 1968 1 conclude this conversation
took place between December 26, 1967, and January 6, 1968
"These findings are based on Russell 's testimony At first, Schrementi
flatly denied that he had asked any employee whether union representatives
visited them in their homes, but after Russell testified, Schrementi
described a conversation with her in which he admittedly asked her that
question
"The Respondent takes the position that Doolittle was, in fact, copying
the names of employees from the timecards in order to furnish this
information to the Union I decline to make a finding on this issue It is
enough to find, as I do, that in the light of Doyle's report, Schrementi had
reasonable grounds for suspecting that Doolittle had done so
"Doolittle set this conversation as occurring January 7, 1968 The record
is clear, however, that Schrementi was not in town on that date
"These findings are based on Schrementi's testimony Doolittle gave a
Late in January, Schrementi contacted Doolittle in the
store and said: "I would like to have your vote when the
union election comes up." Doolittle replied that he "would
like to see the union get in." The conversation then "got
more personal" and Schrementi asked what Doolittle's
"goals were in life " This led to a discussion of Doolittle's
interest in music.25 I find nothing in Schrementi's conduct
on this occasion which was violative of the Act.
b. By Harold Stalev
(1) In general
The complaint alleges, and the answer denies, that
Harold Staley, the Respondent's grocery manager,
interrogated employees concerning their union activities,
membership and desires in November 1967, in December
1967 and again on or about January 22, 1968. The
Respondent admits that Staley is, and at all material
times has been, a supervisor as defined in the Act
(2) Morris C. Doolittle
Late in November Staley called Doolittle to the office
and asked how he was getting along with his job. Doolittle
answered that "he was doing fine " Staley inquired
whether Doolittle had heard "word going around the
store . that the union is trying to organize in the store "
Doolittle replied that he had heard this Staley asked how
Doolittle "felt about the union," and Doolittle responded
that he "would like to see it get in " Staley then related a
past incident which had turned him against unions 26 It is
found that, by probing into the extent of Doolittle's
knowledge of the Union's campaign, and by inducing him
to reveal his prounion sympathies, Staley exceeded
permissable bounds and violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
On about December 22, 1967, on payday, Doolittle's
wages were increased from $1 40 to $1 65 per hour. When
Doolittle picked up his check, Staley pointed out the raise,
and explained: "We thought you were doing a pretty good
job so we gave you a raise." I find nothing in Staley's
conduct on this occasion which violated the Act.
On or about January 22, 1968, Staley passed out an
anti-union pamphlet to some stockboys employed by the
somewhat different version According to Doolittle , Schrementi said "I
have information that you have been soliciting for the union ," and added
that Doolittle "was acting like a spy [and] spies should be shot " I do not
consider either Schrementi or Doolittle a reliable witness However,
Doolittle is a disgruntled former employee who has twice quit the
Respondent's employ Based on this fact and my observation of the
witnesses , as between the two, I deem Schrementi more credible than
Doolittle
"For a discussion of the rights of employers and employees regarding
furnishing information to unions, see Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea
Company, 123 NLRB 747, 756-757, enfd as modified 277 F 2d 759,
761-762 (C A 5) But contrast Steele Apparel Company . Inc , 172 NLRB
No 95
"These findings are based on a synthesis of the testimony of Doolittle
and Schrementi , whose versions were, to a large extent, mutually
corroborative Doolittle testified in addition that Schrementi offered him
"the key to the store and $25,000 if I could run it", which Doolittle
declined Schrementi denied making this remark I deem it unnecessary to
resolve this conflict
"These findings are based on the testimony of both participants, which
were mutually corroborative to a large degree To the extent , if any, that
their versions differ I consider Staley 's version more reliable than that of
Doolittle Doolittle testified , and Staley denied, that Staley referred to the
Union ' s officials as "a bunch of sneaky rotten sons of bitches" In my
opinion I need not , and I therefore do not , resolve this conflict
860 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent and urged them to read it carefully, either at
the store or at home, and to think about it. Among the
stockboys to whom he handed this literature were
Doolittle, John A Denny, Harold Michael Mounts,
Clayton E. Chester, Wolfgang Damsch, and Mark
Rauner. Doolittle said he would read the pamphlet
Several minutes later, when Staley was discussing the
Union with some of the stockboys, Doolittle remarked
that with the Union in the store there would be better
wages, the employees would have better insurance
coverage, and "a better caliber of people [would be]
employed there." Staley retorted that "we do have a
pretty nice caliber of people working here" and that such
matters as wages and insurance, should the Union prevail
in the election, would "have to be negotiated between the
union officials and the employer." Both Staley and
Doolittle became, in Staley's words, "hot under the
collar." Doolittle stated flatly that he was "a hundred
percent" for the Union and nothing Staley could say
would change his mind. Staley retorted that Doolittle
could think any way he wanted.- I find that the General
Counsel has failed to establish by convincing evidence that
Staley violated the Act on this occasion.
c. By James Vendetti
The complaint alleges, and the answer denies, that on
or about February 8, 1968, James Vendetti, a supervisor
of the Respondent, interrogated employees concerning
their union activities, membership, and desires The
Respondent admits that Vendetti is, and at all material
times has been, assistant manager of the store and a
supervisor as defined in the Act.
On February 7, 1968, in the late afternoon, Charles
Ray Weger of Robinson, Illinois, uncle of Morris C.
Doolittle, was killed in an accident. That evening Morris
C. Doolittle telephoned to the Respondent's store and
spoke to Vendetti. He told Vendetti that his uncle had
been killed and that he was going to the funeral the next
day and would not be in to work During the same
evening Vurlyn Doolittle, brother of Morris C. Doolittle,
also telephoned to the store. He informed William
Cooper, the Respondent's general manager, of the death,
and told him that, because of this, Morris C. Doolittle
would not report for work that day or the next day.
Cooper replied: "Well, that is very inconvenient," then,
after a pause, he added: "or convenient."28 On the
following evening, Morris C. Doolittle again telephoned to
Vendetti. When he identified himself, Vendetti asked: "I
thought you went to the funeral. Back already?" Instead
of answering, Doolittle asked a question of his own.
"Were you the one that talked to my brother yesterday
afternoon?" Vendetti answered: "No." Doolittle
continued: "Whoever it was, got smart with my brother
and tell him that I am going to come into the store and
kick his ass." Vendetti denied any knowledge of the
matter, and the conversation ended.29 In my opinion, there
is no convincing evidence that Vendetti on this occasion
questioned Doolittle about his union sympathies, or how
he intended to vote in the coming election.30
"These findings are based on Staley's credited testimony . Denny testified
that Staley "asked us [Chester, Rauner and Denny] if we was for the
union . I stated I was not " Staley denied asking Denny "if he was for the
union ." Although the General Counsel called Rauner and Chester as his
witnesses , and the Respondent called Damsch and Mounts as its witnesses,
no party asked any of these four employees about this incident Denny is a
disgruntled former employee who did not impress me as a reliable witness
I do not credit his version of this event
d By Michael D Schrementi
The complaint as amended alleges, and the answer to
the amendment denies, that on or about February 2, 1968,
Michael D. Schrementi interrogated employees concerning
their union activities, membership and desires The
Respondent admits that, at that time, Michael D
Schrementi was assistant manager of the Respondent and
a supervisor as defined in the Act.
Early in February 1968 Michael D Schrementi
summoned Doolittle to the storage area and directed him
to straighten out the area, which according to Schrementi
was a "mess," made by "someone else " Doolittle
remarked that such a situation would not have arisen had
the store been under a union contract, because better
wages would have attracted "a better grade of employee."
Schrementi replied that this was not true because "we
already had some employees that were being paid above
the union wage." At this point Schrementi left the area to
attend to other duties." There is no convincing evidence
that Michael D. Schrementi on this occasion illegally
attempted to elicit information from Doolittle.
3 Creating the impression of surveillance
The complaint alleges, and the answer denies, that on
or about February 7, 1968, Anthony Schrementi "gave the
impression the [Respondent] knew how employees were
going to vote."
As already mentioned, on or about February 7, 1968,
Schrementi commenced his conversation with Nickie
Kloss by asking: "Well, why are you against me'" 32 His
conversation the next day with Penny Kloss was likewise
started by the inquiry: "How come you are not for me?" 13
It is found that on these two occasions Schrementi made
statements reasonably tending to create in the-minds of
the Kloss sisters the impression that he already knew that
they intended to vote for the Union in the forthcoming
election By thus fostering the impression that he had
engaged in surveillance of their union activities and
sentiments, he violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act 34
"This sarcastic remark referred to the fact that a Board election was
scheduled to be held on February 9 and Morris C Doolittle was well
known in the store as a strong supporter of the Union
"The findings regarding these two telephone conversations are based on
Vendetti's testimony Doolittle testified there was only one such
conversation and in it Vendetti asked how Doolittle felt about the union,
inquiring "You are with us9" and Doolittle replied "No, I am definitely
for the union", Vendetti responded "Well, if that's the way you want to
vote." At first Doolittle admitted, but later denied, that he referred to a
telephone call between his brother and someone at the store Vendetti
denied that he mentioned the union or the election in either telephone call
I credit Vendetti's version
"Evidence was introduced tending to indicate that Doolittle attended the
election in the Respondent's store on February 9, as observer for the
Union, and that he attended his uncle's funeral in Robinson, Illinois, on
February lI I do not consider it necessary to make findings regarding
these matters I do, however, find that Doolittle never thereafter returned
to work for the Respondent
31This finding is based on Michael D Schrementi's credited testimony,
corroborated in part by that of Doolittle To the extent that their versions
differ, Schrementi's is credited over that of Doolittle
"Schrementi admitted saying "Nickie I hear you are going to support
the union "
"Schrementi testified that he started the conversation by stating
"Penny, I hear rumors that you are for the union, which is your privilege "
"There is evidence tending to indicate that on February 8, 1968,
Schrementi telephoned to Marge Kloss, mother of the Kloss sisters, and
started by stating "I hear rumors that your daughters aren't going to
support me" Although Marge Kloss was admittedly not an employee of
SCHREMENTI BROS ., INC. 861
It has been found, ^ above, that Russell had a
conversation with Schrementi between December 26, 1967,
and January 6, 1968. In that conversation, after Russell
stated that the Union's agents had not visited her home,
Schrementi remarked: "A lot of the employees have told
me they haven't talked to the union... I know who talked
to them. The union talked to the people, their names were
checked out that they had seen them. . . . so l know when
they are lying."'33 It is clear, and it is found, that by this
conduct Schrementi created the impression in Russell's
mind that he was engaging in surveillance of the union
activities of the employees by "checking out" the names
of those visited by union agents. This impeded the
employees' exercise of their Section 7 rights and was
therefore violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The December 1967 conversation in which Schrementi
accused 'Doolittle of copying the names from the
timecards for the Union's benefit has already been
described. In that conversation, referring to the union
organizers, Schrementi admittedly said: "I know they are
around, I have been told they are." By stating that he was
in possession of such information, Schrementi created the
impression that he was engaging in surveillance of the
Union's agents' conduct of union affairs. This violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.36
4. Threats of reprisal
a. By Harold Staley
The complaint as amended alleges, and the answer to
the amendment denies, that Staley on or about January
22, 1968, "threatened employees with loss of jobs and
other economic benefits if they supported the Union."
It will be recalled that on or about January 22, 1968,
Staley passed out antiunion pamphlets to some of the
stockboys, including Doolittle. Doolittle stated he was "a
hundred percent" for the Union and the atmosphere
between Staley and Doolittle became heated. According to
Doolittle, Staley "said that right now he would like to fire
me but he couldn't because it would be an act against .
the national labor law." Staley denied making such a
statement. None of the other stockboys present were
questioned about this incident, although three (Denny,
Rauner, and Chester) were witnesses for the General
Counsel and two (Damsch and Mounts) were witnesses for
the Respondent. Based on my observation of Doolittle and
Staley, I credit Staley's denial. Therefore, there is no
convincing proof that Staley threatened Doolittle on this
occasion.
the Respondent , the General Counsel alleges that this telephone
conversation constitutes another instance in which Schrementi violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by creating the impression that the union
activities of the Moss sisters were under surveillance I decline to make
any finding regarding this contention , as such an additional finding would
be merely cumulative , and would not affect the Order hereafter
recommended Xaloy. Incorporated , 175 NLRB No 117, in 2
"This finding is based on Russell's credited testimony Schrementi
denied that he told Russell that a list existed containing the names of
employees whose homes had been visited by union representatives His
denial was not convincing and is not credited
"The complaint alleges -that this type of illegal activity occurred on or
about February 7, 1968 . However, the Russell -Schrementi incident took
place between December 26, 1967, and January 6, 1968, and the
Doolittle-Schrementt talk near Christmas 1967. 1 do not consider this to be
a fatal variance Havnes Stellite Company, Division of Union Carbide
Corporation , 136 NLRB 95, 98 , enforcement denied , 310 F 2d 844 (C A
6)
b. By Michael D. Schrementi
The complaint as amended alleges, and the answer to
the amendment denies, that on or about February 2, 1968,
Michael D. Schrementi "threatened employees with loss
of jobs and other benefits if they supported the Union "
A conversation between Michael D. Schrementi and
Doolittle in the storage area early in February 1968 has
already been referred to. According to Doolittle's version,
Michael D. Schrementi remarked: "that there would be
some people in the store that the company would have to
let go because of the higher wages and hours would be
cut. he said there wouldn't be any standing around and
talking in the aisles. . . if the Union got in." Michael D
Schrementi denied telling Doolittle that if the Union came
in the Respondent would cut personnel or hours of
employment. Based on my observation of Doolittle and
Michael D Schrementi, I credit Schrementi's denial "
Accordingly, the General Counsel has failed to establish
by convincing evidence that Michael D. Schrementi
threatened Doolittle on this occasion.
5. Matters not alleged in the complaint
The General Counsel, in his brief, states-
Schrementi testified that in his first conversation, he
told Doolittle that he had no right to take names off the
timecards, and that thereafter as long as he was not
working, "this is going to be off limits to you unless
you have pernission [sic] to do that. . I told him this
was a form of espionage" [citation to record omitted].
Prohibiting Doolittle from going near the timecards
without permission, although not alleged in the
Complaint, is in itself an 8(a)(1) violation, and the Trial
Examiner should so find.
The Board has held that
where an issue relating to the subject matter of the
complaint is fully litigated at the hearing, the Trial
Examiner and the Board are expected to pass upon it
even though it is not specifically alleged to be an unfair
labor practice in the complaint.38
Here, Schrementi's banishment of Doolittle from the
timeclock area, in Doolittle's nonworking time, is clearly
related to the subject matter of the complaint. But was it
fully litigated'? I think not. The matter first came up on
direct examination by the Respondent of its own witness,
Schrementi, after the General Counsel had rested his
case-in-chief. Doolittle, who did not mention the ban when
he testified, was not thereafter recalled by either party to
give his version. While there is some testimony in general
terms that the timecard rack was in a working area, there
is no evidence concerning the existence or nonexistence of
the rules governing the copying of company records
There is no mention of the issue in the Respondent's brief.
I conclude that Schrementi's alleged banishment of
Doolittle from the area of the timecard rack in his
nonworking time was not "fully litigated at the hearing"
and therefore is not properly before me for decision.
"In addition to demeanor, other factors were considered Doolittle is a
disgruntled former employee who was a strong supporter of the Union
Michael D Schrementt is a former supervisor no longer in the
Respondent 's employ There is no evidence that either Michael D
Schrementi or his father , Michael D Schrementi, held any proprietary
interest in the Respondent, or were related by blood or marriage to
Anthony Schrementi , the Respondent' s president
"Monroe Feed Store . 112 NLRB 1336, 1337
862 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
C. The Refusal to Bargain
1. The appropriate unit
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and it is
found that all full-time and regular part-time employees of
the Respondent at its South Chicago Heights, Illinois,
store, excluding the store manager, the liquor department
manager, all meat department employees, guards,
professional employees, and supervisors as defined in the
Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of
the Act "
2. The Union's majority
a. Size of the unit
The complaint alleges that on or about December 22,
1967, a majority of the employees in the above-described
unit designated the Union as their representative for
collective-bargaining purposes. The answer asserts lack of
"knowledge or information upon which to form a belief"
as to the Union's claim of majority on that date. The
parties stipulated that, as of December 22, 1967, the
above-described unit consisted of a minimum of 45 named
individuals. The General Counsel maintains that there
were no other individuals in the above-described unit on
that date; the Respondent, conversely, contends that three
other named individuals should be included in the
above-described unit as of that date, making a total of 48.
Let us turn, then, to the three individuals in dispute.
John C Schrementi is the son of Anthony Schrementi,
the Respondent's president. He was, on December 22,
1967, employed by the Respondent as a part-time
stockboy. Anthony Schrementi is the owner of 95 shares
of the Respondent's capital stock, out of a total issue of
600 shares. He also is solely responsible for the
Respondent's day-to-day operations.
Section 2(3) of the Act provides. "The term 'employee'.
shall not include any individual. . employed by his
parent." The question therefore arises whether John C.
Schrementi is employed by his father. In Foam Rubber
City 2 of Florida, Inc.. 167 NLRB No. 81, the Board
looked "beyond the Employer's corporate form to the
fundamental of its existence." Applying that approach, the
corporate form of the Respondent here is not controlling
Considering substance rather than form, the significant
facts are that the father owns approximately 16 percent of
the Respondent's stock; and although he might ultimately
be accountable to the Board of Directors for his conduct
of the business, he is solely in charge of the store's daily
operations. I conclude that, on December 22, 1967, John
C. Schrementi was "an individual employed by his
parent," and therefore not an employee within the
meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act For that reason he
cannot properly be included in the above-described unit.40
Anthony S. 'Scrementi and Michael J Scrementi are
the sons of John Scrementi, Sr. They were, on December
22, 1967, employed as part-time stockboys. John
"This is the identical unit stipulated as appropriate by the parties on
January 19 , 1968, in Case 13-RC-11354
44See Charm Handbags , Inc, 170 NLRB No. 16, in 1, and Lake City
Foundry Company, Inc., 173 NLRB No . 159 Compare Buckeye Village
Market, Inc., 175 NLRB No. 46, where the Board included the son of the
store manager who owned approximately 6 percent of the stock, and
someone else was described as the "controlling shareholder " I consider
Buckeye Village Market distinguishable on its facts
Scrementi, Sr., owns 95 shares of the Respondent's capital
stock of a total issue of 600 shares. He is a director of the
Respondent, but does not participate in the daily
management of the store (As noted above, this is reposed
solely in the hands of Anthony Schrementi.) In view of
the fact that John Scrementi takes no part in the store's
day-to-day operations, it is concluded that, on December
22, 1967, his sons were not individuals employed by their
parent and therefore were employees of the Respondent
within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act 41
Should they nonetheless be excluded from the
above-described unit'? This depends, in large measure, on
whether they had a mutuality of interest with other
employees in the unit In this connection, it should be
noted that, in addition to being the sons of John
Scrementi, they are also the nephews of Anthony
Schrementi, the Respondent's president. The record shows
that in September 1967 Anthony S Scrementi entered an
out-of-town college, and did not work for the Respondent
again until he returned in mid-December for the
Christmas holidays, until returning to college in January,
1968. There is no evidence that any other part-time
stockboy in the Respondent's employ was permitted to
work only during the Christmas holidays, because he lived
out of town I am convinced, and find, that Anthony S.
Scrementi was accorded special privileges because of his
family relationship, and his interests therefore are more
closely aligned with management than with other
rank-and-file employees Accordingly, he will be excluded
from the above-described unit.42 So far as Michael J.
Scrementi is concerned, despite his family relationship,
there is no evidence that he was the beneficiary of special
treatment , at least up to and beyond December 22, 1967.
On and before December 22, 1967, he, like some other
stockboys in the Respondent's employ, attended high
school, and worked at the store only part-time. I conclude
that he had a community of interest with the other
rank-and-file part-time stockboys and should be included
in the above-described unit
It follows, and I find, that on December 22, 1967, there
were 46 employees in the above-described unit.
Authorization to represent at least 24 of them was
necessary for majority status
b. The authorization cards
In support of his contention that on or about December
22, 1967, a majority of the employees in the
above-described unit had designated the Union as their
bargaining representative, the General Counsel introduced
into evidence 26 signed cards which read as follows
"The General Counsel contends in his brief that, on December 22, 1967,
Anthony S . Scrementi was not a full-time or regular part-time employee
However, the record indicates that on this date he was working as a
regular part-time employee This contention is therefore rejected
"Cherrin Bros Co. Cherrin Products Co, 147 NLRB 527, 529, fn. 2 1
am aware that , as the Respondent points out in its brief, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the Board on this
point, Cherrin Corporation v N L R B , 349 F.2d 1001 (C A 6) cert
denied 382 U S 981 See also N L R B v Sexton , 203 F 2d 940 (C A 6),
and Uyeda v Brooks. 365 F 2d 326 (C A 6) The Board respectfully
declined to follow the Uyeda decision in Foam Rubber City, supra As a
Trial Examiner , I deem the Board 's decision in Cherrm Bros binding on
me, despite the Sixth Circuit' s disagreement See cases cited supra, fn 18
SCHREMENTI,BROS„ INC.
RETAIL CLERKS INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION
(Affiliated with the AFL-CIO)
Authorization for Representation
Desiring to enjoy the rights and benefits of collective
bargaining I, the undersigned , employee of the
(Firm Name)
Store address
Employed as Dept.
(Job Title)
Home address Phone
hereby authorize Retail Clerks International
Association, AFL-CIO, or its chartered Local Union to
represent me for the purposes of collective bargaining,
respecting rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment, in accordance with
applicable law.
(Date ) (Signature of Employee)'
These bear dates from October 25 through December
20, 1967. The Respondent does not deny the authenticity
of the signatures , nor the dates of signing , nor that the
signers were employees within the above -described unit on
December 22, 1967, nor that any signer was unable to
read or write English . Accordingly , it is found that 26
employees within the above-described unit had, by
December - 22, 1967, affixed their signatures to
unambiguous designations of the Union as their
bargaining agent . At the close of the hearing, the
Respondent 's attorney described the Respondent 's position
regarding the authorization cards as follows:
TRIAL EXAMINER : I would ask the respondent to
point out to me specifically which cards , if any, the
respondent urges I should not count.
MR. RYZA : All of them... in view of their double
purpose representation... .
TRIAL EXAMINER : What double purpose?
MR. RYZA: Mr. O'Callaghan testified that it was the
union ' s procedure , and his specifically, to always tell
them there were two purposes for a card.
The evidence shows that all 26 cards were solicited by
nonemployee representatives, working in pairs, at the
employees ' homes. According to O'Callaghan 's credited
testimony , _ the Union ' s agents, before the cards were
signed , explained to the employee the purpose of the card.
He stated:
We tell the people when a majority of the people have
signed the cards, we demand recognition of the
employer . If the employer agrees to a card check, this
saves a lot of time . If not , we go to an election. . . If
the owner-manager refuses a card check , we file a
petition with the NLRB and go to a government
conducted election, and we go on to explain the
election.
From this testimony I find that it was made clear to the
employees that , in the first instance , an attempt would be
made to secure the employer's recognition on the basis of
the cards , and if this should succeed there would be no
necessity to hold an election . The employees were thus
advised that, possibly, there might be recognition without
863
further opportunity to vote. This, plus the cards' wording,
removed any ambiguity about the cards' purpose and
intended use. Should any lingering doubt survive, this
would have been put to rest by Schrementi's letter of early
November 1967, already described, which stated clearly
that by signing an authorization card an employee "may
be giving the union the power to bargain for you with or
without an election" (emphasis supplied). It is worth
noting that this letter was sent out at a time when only
about five signatures had been obtained, the remaining
cards were signed after the letter had been received. It is
concluded that the employees signed the cards under no
misapprehension; on the contrary, the use to which the
cards would be, and were, put, was fully and accurately
disclosed to them before they executed the designations.
Finally, there is no evidence that any employee who
signed an authorization card made any attempt to revoke
the designation.
The Respondent in addition attacks the validity of six
particular designations because of the circumstances
surrounding their execution. These will be discussed
below, seriatim
John Armatore was, at all material times, a full-time
stockboy employed'by the Respondent. He testified as a
witness for the Respondent that on December 18, 1967,
the union agents visited him in his home for the third
time, and on this occasion he read the authorization card,
filled in 1411, therblanks, and signed it. He also testified:
they said that if the card was, they had so many cards
filled in with the name, that they would turn it in to the
union I mean, to the representatives so they could
have a union, find out about an election And it had to
be turned in so they could have the election by the
Labor Board and then the Labor Board would take
over and then they would come and have an election at
the store.
He further testified that the Union's representatives
explained the benefits that the Union might be able to
provide. The Respondent attacks the validity of
Armatore's authorization because he "understood and was
led to believe from the representations of the Union
organizers that the only purpose of the card was to obtain
an election." In the light of the wording of the card itself,
the letter sent to employees by Schrementi early in
November, and the testimony of Armatore regarding
representations made to him by the union agents before he
signed the card, I reject the Respondent's contention that
he was misled , and hold that his designation of the Union
is valid.
Wolfgang Damsch was, at all material times, a
stockboy employed by the Respondent. As a witness for
the Respondent he identified the authorization card which
he read and signed on November 16, 1967, at the behest
of two union agents . He testified:
Q. Will you tell us. . . what your best recollection is
of what you were told of the purpose of the card?
A. Yes. As I can remember it, they told me that if
they got so many people in the store to sign this card
that if the union made it - no, then there would be an
election to see whether we wanted the union or not.
And if the Union made it in, we wouldn't have to pay
the first initiation fee.
Q. Did they tell you anything else about the card?
A. They said if I signed it Mr. Schrementi would
never see the card.
Q Did they tell you that the card had any other
purpose?
864 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
A. No.
Q. Do you recall what kind of an election, or did
they tell you what kind of an election there would be?
A. They said it would be a secret ballot election.
He further testified that the Union's representatives
discussed the benefits of having a union, and that he was
17 years old at the time. O'Callaghan, who was present
when Damsch signed the card, testified that every
employee visited by the Union's agents -- whether or not
he or she signed a card - was given a certificate stating:
"The bearer. . . shall not be required to pay initiation fees
of any kind."
Based on the above, I am convinced and find that no
misrepresentations were made to Damsch regarding the
purpose of the card, and that, although he was told that
the Union waived the initiation fee, he was not led to
believe that the waiver depended upon his signing the
card. Mere waiver of initiation fee, when not contingent
on execution of a designation, does not invalidate a card 43
Accordingly, his card is deemed a valid and timely
designation of the Union.
Donald Hartman was, at all material times, an
employee in the Respondent's produce department. He
was a witness for the Respondent. He testified that he
signed an authorization card at his home on December 12,
1967, at the behest of two agents of the Union. He was a
high school student at the time, 17 years of age. He
further testified on direct examination-
Q. What did they tell you?
A. They told me that if I signed this card there
would be no initiation fees if the union would get in the
store. And if so many people had signed the card there
would be a majority and there could be an election
held.
On cross-examination, Hartman testified that he read the
card, and filled in the blanks before signing, and that the
Union's agents discussed the Union's insurance program
and welfare plan.
Assuming, without deciding, that Hartman was the
recipient of a "no initiation fee certificate" (O'Callaghan
could not specifically recall his visit to Hartman's home)
there is still the question of verbal inducement. Based
upon Hartman's undenied testimony, I conclude that he
was induced to sign the card upon the verbal promise that
if he did so. he would not later have to pay an initiation
fee should the Union succeed in obtaining recognition as
the employees' bargaining agent. This, therefore, differs
materially from 4 general waiver of initation fee, not
dependent on favorable action by the employee solicited.
Such a substantial inducement vitiates the designation . 14
Nickie Kloss is, as previously stated, a cashier
employed by the Respondent. She was a witness for the
General Counsel. She testified that she signed an
authorization card at her home on October 25, 1967, at
the same time her sister, Penny, did so. Her mother and
two agents of the Union were present, also. On
cross-examination, she testified:
Q. When you were asked to sign the card, you didn't
understand what it was all about? Is that right?
A. Yes.
"Consolidated Rendering Company, d/b/a Burlington Rendering
Company. 161 NLRB I, 14 enfd. 386 F 2d 699 (C A 2) See also
DIT-MCO. Incorporated , 163 NLRB No. 147, which involved objections
to conduct affecting an election , quite a different matter from the validity
of a designation in a refusal to bargain case
"Compare D H. Overmver Co, 170 NLRB No 69
Q. Did the union people say anything about an
election would be held?
A. Yes.
Q What did they say about an election, Nicky [sic]?
A Well, I think they said if they got enough people
to sign the cards that we would be able to have a vote
Nickie Kloss' protestation, more than a year later, that
she did not understand the impact of her signature on the
designation was not convincing, as her mother and sister
were present at the time, and the designation has
remained unrevoked. In any event, her subjective
understanding is immaterial and "cannot negative the
overt action" of signing an unambiguous designation.,'
What are material are the statements made to her by the
Union's agents before she executed the card. Contrary to
the Respondent's argument, I am not convinced that these
statements can reasonably be construed as conveying the
impression that the only purpose of the card was to
obtain an election Her designation, therefore, is valid
Joann Morrison is, and at all material times has been,
a cashier employed by the Respondent. She was a witness
for the Respondent She testified that she signed a union
authorization card in her home on November 27, 1967, at
the request of two union agents, and in the presence of her
husband. She testified on direct examination:
Q I ask you, Mrs. Morrison, would you please tell
us to the best of your recollection what you were told
about the purpose of that card?
A. They said they needed a certain percentage of
cards to be signed before there could be an election.
And if you signed the card now, and if the union won,
you would not have to pay the $25 initiation fee.
Q. Was anything else said about the card that you
recall?
A And those that did not sign the card and if the
union won they would have to pay the $25 initiation
fee.
On cross-examination, she admitted that the Union's
agents told her of "different benefits that you would
receive, like hospitalization and retirement and the pay
scale." She continued:
Q did the union men tell you that if the union
won in the election that they were giving you a certain
kind of card where nobody in the store would have to
pay a $25 initiation fee?
A. No. If you signed the card, then you would not
have to pay the initiation fee If you did not sign the
card you would have to pay. [Emphasis supplied.]
Q. When the union won the election?
A. If they won.
She further testified:
TRIAL EXAMINER: You have described what the
union agents told you about an initiation fee. Did they
tell you that before or after you signed the card?
THE WITNESS: I think it was before.
Gibson, called as a witness for the Union on rebuttal,
testified that he and Hamilton were present at Morrison's
home when she signed the card. He testified that
Morrison was given a "no initiation fee certificate." He
further testified on direct examination.
Q. Was Mrs. Morrison told anything about that card
or did you tell her anything about initiation fees?
A. Yes. It was explained to her that the purpose of
the card was to -- she did not have to take my word --
that she would not have to pay initiation fee. This was
'Joy Silk Mills, Inc v . N L R B , 185 F 2d 732, 743 (C A D C ), cert
denied 341 U S 914
SCHREMENTI BROS ., INC. 865
her guarantee" that she- would not have to, and that all
employees employed at that time would not have to pay
initiation fees, if and when the store went union.
Q. Did you tell her about employees that would have
to pay initiation fees?
A. This was explained that anyone that was
employed after the contract had been signed and put
into effect would have to pay an initiation fee.
On cross-examination he testified:
Q. (By Mr. Ryza): Mr. Gibson, how many times had
you visited Mrs. Morrison before you were able to get
the card signed?
A. Myself, one time.
Q. Before the day on which she signed?
A. Yes.
Q. You gave her one of these no initiation fee card
the first time you visited her, didn't you?
A. No, I don't believe she received' one the first time.
Regardless of whether or not Morrison was handed a
"no initiation fee certificate" on the day she signed the
authorization card, I credit her testimony (which stood up
well under cross-examination) as more accurate than
Gibson's and find that she was advised orally that the
waiver of initiation fees was contingent upon her signing
the authorization. 06 Accordingly, as in Hartman's case,
and for the same reason , her designation resulted from
improper inducement and is invalid.
Harold Michael Mounts is, and at all material times
has been, a stockboy in the Respondent's employ. He
signed an authorization card on November 21, 1967, in his
home at the instigation of two union agents. Mounts was
then a high school student 17 years old; his parents, sister
and brother were present. On direct examination as a
witness for the Respondent he testified:
Q. Now, before you signed the card, did either of the
two men from the union explain to you the purpose of
the card?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you tell us what they said to you?
A. Well, they said that if they had enough people to
sign these cards, that there can be an election held at
Schrementi's either for or against the union. And now
they could have a secret ballot.
Q. Was anything else said about the purpose of the
card?
A. Well, he said he was pretty sure the union was
going to get in, and he said that if you sign the card
then you wouldn't have to pay initiation fees.
[Emphasis supplied.]-
On cross-examination, Mounts testified that the union
agents discussed with him the benefits of union
membership. He also testified, in response to questions by
the Trial Examiner, that his mother asked the amount of
the initiation fee but received a noncommital answer from
the Union's representatives.
O'Callaghan, who had previously identified Mounts'
card, was recalled to the witness stand by the Union after
Mounts had stepped down. O'Callaghan testified that he
and Gibson had obtained Mounts' signature. He further
Mn my opinion , the delivery of such a certificate contemporaneously
with a conflicting oral statement should not be given controlling weight,
for the recipient might nevertheless rely upon the oral statement Looking
at the situation from another angle, delivery of the certificate might be
considered as a contingent delivery, subject to execution of the
authorization card.
testified:
Q. Did you have any discussion with Mr Mounts
concerning initiation fees?
A. Yes
* * * * *
Q. (By Mr. Rosenfeld) What did you tell Mr.
Mounts about initiation fees?
A When I told him that there would be no initiation
fee --- in all organizing campaigns one of the things
that management uses against us is that they're going
to pay initiation fees and assessments and dues. There
is dues, but there is no initiation fee for anybody
working in the store at the time that we are organizing,
whether they support us or not.
Q Did you tell Mr. Mounts that the initiation fee
had anything to do with the signing of a card?
A. No.
Q. Did you tell Mr. Mounts when initiation fees
would be required of employees, or which employees
would have to pay initiation fees?
A Anybody that would start after the organizing
program was over, thirty days after we won the election
or after the card check, we'd sit down and negotiate.
Anybody that started after this time would have to pay
initiation fee. Just like they do in any -
* * * * *
Q. (By Mr. Rosenfeld) Did you tell Mr. Mounts that
if he didn't sign a card at the present time, he would
have to pay an initiation fee?
A. No
Q. Did you pass out any piece of paper or anything
in connection with initiation fees?
A "No initiation fee" card.
Mounts' testimony was at times self-contradictory. On
direct examination he testified that "some man" had filled
out the blanks on his card, but on cross examination
admitted that he himself had done so. He did not impress
me as a reliable witness. As between Mounts and
O'Callaghan, I credit O'Callaghan's version. Accordingly,
I conclude that no improper inducement was held out to
Mounts, and that his signature on the authorization card
is the result of his own free and uncoerced choice.
From the above, it appears that on December 22, 1967,
the Union had obtained 24 valid designations (excluding
those of Hartman and Morrison) which constitutes a
majority of the 46 employees in the above-described unit
on that date
3. The Union's demand and the Respondent's
response
a. Facts
On December 21, 1967 (2 days after filing charges in
Case l3-CA-8180), the Union wrote to the Respondent, in
pertinent part as follows:
Please be advised that the Retail Clerks Union Local
1504, AFL-CIO, is the majority representative of the
employees in Schrementi Food and Liquor, Inc., 3316
Chicago Road, South Chicago Heights, Illinois, and
hereby demands recognition as exclusive Collective
Bargaining Agent, in a unit appropriate for bargaining
as follows:
All full-time employees and regular part-time
employees working at Schrementi Food and Liquor
866 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Inc., 3316 Chicago Road, South Chicago Heights,
Illinois, but excluding the Store Manager, the Liquor
Department Manager, Meat Department Employees
and supervisors as defined in the Act.
The Union is prepared to meet to prove its majority
status by means of a card check to be conducted by a
neutral third party.
On the next day, December 22, the Union filed with the
Board the petition in Case 13-RC-11354, seeking to
represent the employees in the above-described unit. On
December 26, 1967," the Respondent's attorney replied to
the Union by letter as follows:
Your letter of December 21 addressed to Mr.
Schrementi has been referred to this firm for reply.
As you are well aware, the designation of a bargaining
representative through means of a card check is at best
a questionable procedure. The better method is for the
employees to vote by secret ballot in an election
conducted by the National Labor Relations Board.
Inasmuch as our client has a good faith doubt
concerning the Union's alleged majority, we suggest
that any question of representation be determined
through the orderly procedures of the NLRB.
Thereafter, on January 19, 1968, the Respondent and the
Union entered into a Stipulation for Certification Upon
Consent Election, which the Regional Director approved
on January 23. The election was held on February 9,
1968, and the Union lost. The Union promptly filed
ob)ections to conduct affecting the result of the election,
which will be discussed in detail hereafter.
b. Contentions of the Parties
The complaint alleges that "commencing on or about
December 22, 1967, and continuing to date, the Union has
requested, and is requesting, Respondent to bargain
collectively with respect to "wages, hours and other
working conditions, as the exclusive representative of all
the employees" in the above-described unit . The answer
admits "that on or about December 22, 1967, the Union
requested that Respondent bargain collectively."
The complaint further alleges that at all times since on
or about December 22, 1967, more particularly on or
about December 26, 1967, the Respondent has refused to
recognize and/or bargain with the Union. The answer
admits that on or about December 22, 1967, the
Respondent declined to recognize the Union, but states
that it did so "because it had a good faith doubt that the
Union represented a majority of Respondent's employees
and suggested that any question of representation be
resolved" by a Board-conducted election. It further alleges
that the Union's defeat in the election held on February 9,
1968, "demonstrated that a majority of the employees had
not designated the union as their exclusive bargaining
representative, thereby confirming the Respondent's good
faith doubt concerning the Union's majority status."
employees in the above-described unit. It is equally clear,
and is found, that the Respondent's reply letter of
December 26, 1967, constituted a refusal by the
Respondent to recognize or bargain with the Union.
Although the Union had been designated as bargaining
representative by a majority of employees in the unit, it
does not necessarily follow that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by its refusal to bargain. In
order to show such a violation, the General Counsel must
prove that the refusal was illegally motivated, that is,
reflected the Respondent's rejection of the principles of
collective bargaining and its desire to gain time in which
to undermine the Union's majority status."
The General Counsel, in support of his position that the
Respondent lacked a good faith doubt of the Union's
majority and "exhibited an animus towards the union,"
relies upon the violations of Section 8(a)(1) found above.
It is, of course, true that Schrementi's attacks upon union
agents and their property in the presence of employees
manifested his deep-seated antagonism toward the Union.
And it would not be appropriate to dismiss this matter
lightly as "a trivial rough incident or a moment of animal
exuberance.' '41 On the other hand, this and other
violations of 8(a)(1) such as illegal interrogations and
creating the impression of surveillance cannot be viewed in
a vacuum. They must be considered in the context of
other contemporaneous conduct. More particularly, it is
significant that the Respondent was, at this time,
recognizing another union as the bargaining representative
of its meat department employees. This bespeaks neither
hostility to collective bargaining nor a rejection of the
principles embodied in the Act. Moreover, the spirit of
cooperation shown by the Respondent in entering into a
Stipulation for Certification upon Consent Election
underscores the sincerity of its assertion that it desired the
matter of majority representation to be settled by a secret
election conducted by the Board - unquestionably the
most satisfactory method of determining that issue . Surely
this is not a demonstration of any desire on the
Respondent's part to delay matters so that it could, in the
meanwhile, undermine the union's majority On the
contrary, the signing of this document obviated the
necessity of holding a formal pre-election hearing in Case
13-RC-11354 and brought about the election more
promptly.
There are also some indications that the Respondent
did, indeed, harbor a legitimate doubt concerning the
Union's assertion of majority status. At the outset, the
Respondent notified the Union of its doubt, and has
consistently maintained that position during the year and
a half which has elapsed since then Moreover, the unit
placement of John C. Schrementi, Anthony S. Scrementi,
and Michael J. Scrementi has been undetermined until
now. Although they constituted only approximately 7
percent of the total unit, majorities often turn upon such a
small percentage of eligible voters. Finally, the Union's
majority, it now appears, was extemely slim -- a single
card."
c. Conclusions
It is not disputed, and I find, that the Union's letter of
December 21, 1967, quoted above, constituted an
unambiguous and valid demand by the Union for
recognition as the bargaining representative of the
"The Respondent claims on this date it was not yet aware that the
Union had filed a petition on December 22 1 deem this to be immaterial
and a finding thereon unnecessary.
"Joy Silk Mills, Inc, 85 NLRB 1263, enfd 185 F 2d 732 (C A D C ),
cert denied 341 U S . 914, and Hercules Packing Corporation , 163 NLRB
No 35, petition for review denied 386 F.2d 790 (C A 2)
"Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753, et at v
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 293
"Factors militating in favor of an employer's good faith doubt of a
union's majority "have especial weight where, as here, the majority is
slender on the union's own claim" Textile Workers Union of America,
AFL-CIO v. N L R B, 386 F.2d 790, 793 (C. A. 2) See also Wheeler-Van
Label Company v N L R B., 70 LRRM 3055, 3058 (C A 2)
SCHREMENTI BROS., INC. 867
For the above reasons, it is concluded that the General
Counsel has failed to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the Respondent's refusal to bargain with the
Union since December 22, 1967, was not based upon a
good faith doubt of the Union's majority status. There
was therefore no violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.s'
D. Objections to Conduct Affecting the Election
1. In general
On February 15, 1968, the Union filed in Case
13-RC-11354 seven Objections, to Conduct Affecting the
Results of the Election. Thereafter, on October 9, 1968,
the Regional Director issued his Report on Objections and
Order Consolidating Cases, in which he found "that
substantial and material issues have been raised by the
objections which can best be resolved" by a hearing.
Noting the "substantially similar" issues raised in Case
13-CA-8180, he ordered the two cases consolidated "for
the purpose of hearing, ruling and preparation of a
decision by the Trial Examiner," and that, after issuance
of the Trial Examiner's Decision, Case 13-RC-11354
should be transferred- to the Board.
It is well settled that, in deciding to set an election
aside, the Board will "rely only on Respondent's unlawful
conduct after the filing of the Union's representation
petition"52 - in this case December 22, 1967. The
General Counsel urges in his brief herein:
violations of the Act- during the period immediately
preceding the commencement of the crucial period,
namely, the assaults on the union representatives in the
presence of employees- should also be considered as a
basis for setting aside the election. Where the
Employer's pre-petition conduct was so heinous, as in
the instant case, it cannot be said that the effect of that
manifest hostility toward the union did not spill over
into the critical period and alter the "laboratory
conditions" required - by the Board during the
pre-election period.
The Union apparently does not agree, for in its brief it
concedes: "Alleged unlawful Employer conduct preceding
12/22/67 is part of the complaint case only." The
Respondent likewise, in its brief, contends that "unlawful
conduct occurring prior to the filing of the petition may
not be considered as grounds for setting aside the
election." As a Trial 'Examiner , I am bound to follow the
rule established by the Board I shall therefore, in
considering the representation case, disregard
Schrementi's attacks on the Union's agents.
2. Objection Number I
Objection Number l reads:
The Employer unlawfully held captive audience
meetings on February 8, 1968 within 24 hours of the
election in this proceeding. Small meetings of three or
four employees were convened in the back room of the
"Morse Chain Company, Eberhardt-Denver Plant . 175 NLRB No 98,
Shelby Williams of Tennesseq , Inc., I65- NLRB No 108; Mace Food
Stores, Inc. 162 NLRB 1605; Aaron Brothers. Company of California,
158 NLRB 1077, John P. Serpa, Inc, 155 NLRB 99, and Hammond &
Irving . Incorporated. 154 NLRB 1071
"Hancock Fabric Outlet . Inc., 175 NLRB No. 42. See also Green Bay
Aviation , Inc., 165 NLRB No. 137, fn. 2: Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Company, 138 NLRB 453; and The Ideal Electric and Manufacturing
Company. 134 NLRB 1275.
store at various times between the hours of 3:00 p.m
and 11:30 p.m February 8th, presided over by Tony
Schrementi, Bill Cooper, Store Manager, and Harold
Staley, Grocery Manager. At these meetings employees
were promised wage increases if they voted against the
Union and threatened with severe and adverse changes
in working conditions if Retail Clerks won the election.
The record is completely barren of any evidence to
support these allegations. In its brief, the Union moves
that Objection Number I be withdrawn. In the absence of
any opposition, it is recommended that this motion be
granted.
3 Objection Number 2
Objection Number 2 reads:
The Employer unlawfully threatened employees with the
probability of a strike, fewer jobs and termination of its
entire operation if the Union won the election. Said
threats were made by a letter distributed in the store
Thursday, February 8, 1968 from the hour of 1.00 p.m.
to 7:00 p.m., thus denying to Retail Clerks an
opportunity to reply.
The parties stipulated, and I find, that on February 5
and 6, 1968, the Respondent handed out to employees in
the store a written statement which reads as follows:
I understand the Union organizers have been going
around flashing contracts with the big chain stores. I'm
sure they point to the highest wage rates in the book
and want you to believe, that you will get this kind of
money if you just vote for the Union.
Of course, the organizers fail to tell you that the
higher wage rates are paid only to employees who have
been on the job for years. Many of our employees do
not expect to make lifelong careers out of their jobs at
this store and will probably never qualify for most of
the benefits which the Union talks about. But under the
union shop contract they would still have to pay Union
dues every month.
It doesn't require anything but plain common sense
to see through the Union's promises.
This store needs the best employees it can hire. To
get such people we must pay the most that we can
afford while still trying to compete with the big chains.
Unlike A & P, Kroger, Jewel and other giants, we
don't have the money to run a store at a loss for a year
or two to drive out competition and to then make up
the losses by bigger volume and higher prices The big
chains can do this and they would like nothing better
than to see this store forced to take a strike because of
a union's unreasonable demands. Such a strike would
mean that much of our business would probably be lost
to the Jewel store across the road or to Krogers down
the street. Many of these customers would probably be
lost for good. If that happened this would mean fewer
jobs and even less money to pay those who would still
be working here.
Look at it in still another way
To stay in business we would have to sell at prices at
least as low as those of the big chains. We just can't
raise our prices to get the money to pay higher wages.
If we tried to do that we would lose our customers and
in time there would be no store or jobs
Neither can we get cheaper prices from our suppliers
The big chains buy in larger lots than we do and they
get a price advantage over us as it is. But no supplier is
going to charge us less because a union comes in and
demands unreasonable wage increases.
868 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In other words, the money for higher wages and
benefits can't come from either our customers or from
our suppliers.
Neither can it come out of profits I am very proud
of the progress which this store has made. The profit
margin, however, is marginal. To pay out of profits the
kind of wages and fringe benefit costs which the Union
has been promising would, in my opinion, make the
difference between a good and a bad business
Well, if the money can't come from higher prices,
lower costs, or profits it would have to come from
hiring fewer employees and demanding more work from
those who are left. Some money might also be saved by
insisting on stricter work practices and by keeping the
managers on the backs of the employees.
Frankly, this is not the way I would want this store
to operate.
The employees who have been here for some time
know that wage increases have been made. Those who
do their work keep getting higher earnings and better
benefits.
I have honestly tried to make this a good place to
work and to pay as much as the business can afford.
I don't claim that everything has been perfect. I am
sure I have made my share of mistakes and with or
without a union I will probably make mistakes in the
future . But I am not in business to take advantage of
the people who work here. With or without a union, I
intend to continue doing everything possible so that
everyone who works here earns a decent living.
In my opinion, you don't have to share your earnings
with highly paid union organizers to get improvements.
No union can force me to agree to demands which are
unreasonable and reasonable improvements should and
will come with or without a union.
Please vote next Friday, and I sincerely hope you
will agree with me that we do not need a union in this
store.
Tony Schrementi
/s/ Tony
I do not perceive in this statement any coercion or threat
of reprisal by the Respondent should the Union become
the employees ' bargaining agent . In my opinion, it
constituted permissible campaign propaganda which did
not interfere with the employees' freedom of choice.
Moreover , the time of its distribution accorded the Union
ample opportunity to reply. It is therefore recommended
that Objection Number 2 be overruled as lacking in merit
4. Objection Number 3
Objection Number 3 reads:
Tony Schrementi and other of the Employer's
supervisors unlawfully threatened employees that if the
Union got in all part-time help would be laid off and
the hours of all full -time personnel would be reduced to
19 hours per week.
About a week or 10 days before the election, Russell
had a conversation with William Cooper, the
Respondent 's general manager , in the store. According to
Russell , in that conversation
He said that very likely with the union in there that the
store wouldn 't be open as many hours as it is open now
because they wouldn ' t be able to pay the time and a
half and the double time for Sundays.
Cooper's version of the conversation was not necessarily
in direct conflict with Russell ' s, and contained the
following:
she says, "on these holidays. If we had a union in here,
I would make a lot more money" . And I said
"Well, Mary, it's our practice right now on holidays to
pay time and a half." I said "If we do lose the
election, the union and Mr Schrementi maybe would
have to start from scratch on this contract And if when
the contract was completed Mr. Schrementi throught it
was unreasonable, he could refuse it And then the
union would have to do one of two things. They
could back off on the contract and disappoint a lot of
promises to the people . . or they could go on strike...
if a strike is called by the union . . the employees that
are involved in this thing would have to possibly walk a
picket line . . we could permanently replace any
employee that was on a picket line [Emphasis
supplied.]
It is found, on Cooper's own admission, that on this
occasion he mentioned the Respondent's policy of paying
time and a half on holidays, and then warned that, if the
Union won the election, the Respondent and the Union
"would have to start from scratch" to negotiate a
contract He thus hinted that a union victory in the
election might jeopardize the time and a half holiday pay
then enjoyed by the employees. It is concluded that such a
veiled threat of reprisal interfered with the employees'
freedom of choice in the forthcoming election. I
accordingly find merit in this objection.
5. Objection Number 4
(Objection Number 4 reads: "The Employer unlawfully
promised to grant, and did grant, wage increases to
employees for the purpose of discouraging them from
voting for Retail Clerks."
As mentioned above, late in December 1967 or early in
January 1968 Russell had a conversation with Schrementi
about the Union in which Russell's wages were discussed.
And she had a talk with Cooper about the Union,
previously described, about a week or 10 days before the
election In both conversations, Russell complained that,
although she was a long time employee, other employees
who had been employed for a shorter period of time were
being paid better wages Russell testified without
contradiction, and it is found, that after her talk with
Schrementi but before the election, she was given more
hours and classified as full time (before that she had been
only part-time) and her hourly rate was raised from $1.65
to $1.75.
I conclude that the wage increase awarded Russell
following her complaint, in the context of conversations
about the Union, interfered with her freedom of choice
and destroyed the "laboratory conditions" necessary for a
valid election.
6. Objection Number 5
Objection Number 5 alleges that the Employer
unlawfully interrogated employees concerning their
activities for and on behalf of the Union and how they
intended to vote in the election." It has previously been
found that Schrementi illegally interrogated Russell late in
December 1967 or early in January 1968 concerning her
union activities, and that he questioned Nickie Kloss on
February 7, 1968, and Penny Kloss on February 8, 1968,
concerning their union sympathies. It has been held that,
by such conduct, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act. As all three of these incidents occurred after
SCHREMENTI BROS., INC. 869
the filing of the petition but before the election, they
support Objection Number 5.63 It is accordingly concluded
that this objection is meritorious.
7. Objection Number 6
Objection Number 6 reads:
The Employer unlawfully discontinued its prior practice
of sponsoring a Christmas party for employees and
giving employees cash bonuses at Christmas for the
purpose of demonstrating to employees how strict
working conditions would be if Retail Clerks won the
election, thereby discouraging employees from voting
for the Union.
There is not a shred of evidence to bolster this objection.
On the record before me, I find it to be completely
unsupported.
8. Objection Number 7
Objection Number 7 reads:
The Employer unlawfully coerced and intimidated
employees from exercising the rights guaranteed them
by Section 7 of the Act by telephoning the parents of
part-time employees seeking to have these employees
vote against the Union and by stating to the parents
that their children were coming home safely from work
without being represented by the Union.
On the evening of February 7, 1968, Schrementi made
a telephone call to Marge Kloss, mother of Penny and
Nickie Kloss. According to Marge Kloss, Schrementi
asked: "Why are your girls against me?" and she replied
that she "believed in unions" because the Pope had
encouraged people to join unions; that Schrementi stated:
"We know the girls have been getting home safe"; she
asked: "Why shouldn't they? We don't live far from the
store"; and he replied: "Well, we hope that they will
continue to get home safe." Schrementi testified that his
purpose in making the telephone call was to enlist Marge
Kloss' aid in prevailing upon her daughters to vote against
the Union. He further testified on direct examination that
the conversation, in pertinent part, went as follows:
I said, "Mrs. Kloss. . . I am having an election
tomorrow and I hear rumors that your daughters aren't
going to support me. . . I know that the union
organizers have been following my employees out of the
parking lot and calling up their homes, and every
method they can possibly apply to getting these people.
I said, "Do they follow your daughters home?" I said,
"As far as I am concerned, I worry about these kids,
and I feel responsibility that they do get home safe.
And when they are home safe, that is good enough for
me, I am satisfied...."
Later, on cross-examination, Schrementi testified:
I mentioned to Mrs. Kloss that there were employees
being followed out of that parking lot by these union
representatives
and then contradicted his testimony on direct examination
as follows:
Q. While you were talking to Mrs. Kloss, what did
she say?
"The Board has stated - "Conduct violative of Section 8(a)(l) is, a
fortiori, conduct which interferes with the exercise of a free and
untrammeled choice in an election" Dal- Tex Optical Company, Inc, 137
NLRB 1782, 1786
A. She listened . She must have misunderstood me
about the safety or something like that. My
conversation had no bearing on safety
Q. You didn ' t get into safety at all?
A. No, I did not. [Emphasis supplied.]
After this telephone call, Marge Kloss discussed the
matter with her daughters . Concerning this, Nickie Kloss
testified on direct examination:
Q (By Mr. Burstein ). . Can you recall what your
mother told you"
A. Well, I just remember that she told me that Tony
had called and that she just didn't want us to go to the
store without a car, she wanted to pick us up because
she was just afraid , that's all.
* * * * *
Q. (By Mr. Burstein ) Did she tell you why'?
A. She said she didn't want anything to happen to
us . . she said that she almost knew that nothing could
happen and that nothing would happen but she just
wanted to make sure
On cross-examination, Nickie Kloss elaborated-
Q. . You said that your mother told you about
four or five days before the union election that she
wanted to pick you up in her car rather than have you
drive?
A About two or three days. I don't know.
Q. Two or three days before the election because she
wanted to be sure nothing would happen to you?
A. She wanted to be sure.
Q Did she say Tony Schrementi had called her on
this?
A. Yes.
Q. How did you know that this had anything to do
with the telephone call from Tony Schrementi?
A. Well, I know, you know, that she said "I just
want to pick you up to make sure, you know, that
nothing goes wrong because of the call , because of the
phone call I got."
Q I see Did she tell you who she got the phone call
from?
A Well, she said she wasn't sure if it was him or not
but she said that whoever said it was
Q. Whoever called said it was Tony?
A. Yes.
* * * * *
Q. Did your mother say anything to you that made
you understand from what she said that she was afraid
Tony Schrementi was going to hurt you?
A. Well, she didn't know. She didn't think it was
Tony Schrementi, you know, himself. She thought
maybe it was something to do with, you know, that he
could, you know, maybe he could have someone or
something.
Let us examine Marge Kloss' talk with her daughter, as
described in the above-quoted undenied and credited
testimony of Nickie Kloss. Considering that the Kloss
sisters were then impressionable young ladies, the
communication from their mother may reasonably be
deemed to have had considerable impact. I am convinced,
and find, that shortly before the election Marge Kloss,
wittingly or unwittingly, evoked the specter of possible
physical harm, either from Schrementi's supporters or
from the Union's agents. It is quite possible, as the
Respondent argues, that Marge Kloss misunderstood
870 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Schrementi, pr that the Respondent is not accountable for
what she said . But that is not controlling . In conducting
elections, the Board strives for "laboratory conditions"
and if such conditions are destroyed, it matters not that
the party who opposes setting aside the election was not
responsible for the objectionable conduct. I conclude that
the aura of fear engendered by Marge Kloss' remarks to
her daughters is incompatible with the required
"laboratory conditions" and destroyed the employees'
unfettered freedom of choice. Therefore I find merit in
this objection.
9. Conclusion
As merit has been found in Objections 3, 4, 5, and 7, it
is clear, and I find, that the election did not take place in
an atmosphere free of interference, restraint, or coercion.
The objectionable conduct was, in my view, of sufficient
gravity and extent to vitiate the entire election. However,
I do not believe it can be asserted with confidence that
another election would be a futility. I consider it quite
possible to hold a new election under more prophylactic
circumstances. I shall therefore recommend that the
election held qn ,February 9, 1968, be set aside and a new
election be directed.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, and upon
the entire record in these cases, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Schrementi Bros., Inc., is, and at all material times
has been , an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2)
of the Act ,and is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Retail Clerks Union, Local 1504, AFL-CIO, is, and
at all material times has been, a labor organization within
the meaning-of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By coercively interrogating its employees regarding
their union membership , activities, and sympathies, and by
giving its employees the impression that it was subjecting
their union activities to surveillance, thereby interfering
with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the
Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.
4. The above-described unfair labor practices tend to
lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow of commerce, and constitute
unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. The General Counsel has failed to establish that the
Respondent engaged in or is engaging in any unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act,
or that the Respondent has committed any other violation
alleged in the complaint but not herein found.
6. The election held on February 9, 1968, in Case was
invalid.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and
conclusions of law; and upon the entire record in these
cases, I make the following:
RECOMMENDED ORDER
It is recommended that Schrementi Bros., Inc., South
Chicago Heights, Illinois, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interrogating its employees concerning their union
membership, activities, or sympathies, in a manner
constituting a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended.
(b) Creating the impression in the minds of its
employees that it was subjecting their union activities to
surveillance
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the
extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act, as amended.
2, Take the following affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Post at its store in South Chicago Heights, Illinois,
copies of the notice attached marked "Appendix."50
Copies of this notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 13, after being duly signed by an
authorized representative of the Respondent, shall be
posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily displayed. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that such
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(b) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within
20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps it has
taken to comply herewith ss
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be
dismissed, insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not
specifically found herein.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the election
conducted on February 9, 1968, in Case l3-RC-11354, be
set aside and a new election held at an appropriate time to
be fixed by the Regional Director.
"Should this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board the words
the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" shall be stricken and the
words "a Decision and Order " shall be substituted therefor Should the
Board's Order then be enforced by a decree of the United States Court of
Appeals, the words "a Decision and" shall be stricken and the words "a
decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an" shall be
substituted therefor
"Should this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board the words
"20 days from the receipt of this Decision" shall be stricken, and the
words "l0 days from the date of this order " shall be substituted therefor
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our
employees that:
WE WILL NOT question our employees about their
union activities, in a manner which violates the Act.
WE WILL NOT create in the minds of our employees
the impression that we are spying upon their union
activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
SCHREMENTI BROS., INC. 871
with , restrain , or coerce our employees in the exercise
of their right to self-organization , to join or assist
Retail Clerks Union , Local 1504 , AFL-CIO, or any
other union , to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing , to engage in
mutual aid or protection , or to refrain from such
activities , except to the extent that such rights may be
affected by an agreement requiring union membership
as a condition of employment , as authorized in Section
8(a)(3) of the Act, as amended.
Our employees are free to become, remain, or refrain
from becoming or remaining members of any union,
except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an
agreement requiring union membership as a condition of
employment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act,
as amended.
Dated By
SCHREMENTIBROS,INC.
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced,
or covered by any other material
Any questions concerning this Notice may be directed
to the Board ' s Regional Office, 881 U.S Courthouse and
Federal Office Building, 219 South Dearborn Street,
Chicago, Illinois 60604 , Telephone 512-353-7597.