Schott Gemtron Corporationv.SSW Holdings Company, Inc.

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

May 26, 2015

12562920 (P.T.A.B. May. 26, 2015)

Trials@uspto.gov Paper No. 62
571-272-7822 Entered: May 26, 2015

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

SCHOTT GEMTRON CORPORATION,
Petitioner,

v.

SSW HOLDING COMPANY, INC.,
Patent Owner.
____________

Case IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2
____________

Before JUSTIN T. ARBES, PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, and
GEORGIANNA W. BRADEN, Administrative Patent Judges.

BRADEN, Administrative Patent Judge.

FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73

IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

2
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
SCHOTT Gemtron Corporation (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition to
institute an inter partes review of claims 2–4, 7–10, 14–18, 22, 23, 26, 27,
29, 30, 33–40, 42–45, 48–51, 54–59, 63, and 64 of U.S. Patent No. 8,286,561
B2 (Ex. 1101, “the ’561 patent”) pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319. Paper 2
(“Pet.”). SSW Holding Company, Inc. (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary
Response (Paper 5, “Prelim. Resp.”). We instituted an inter partes review of
claims 2–4, 7–10, 14–18, 22, 23, 26, 27, 29, 30, 33–40, 42–45, 48–51, 54–59,
63, and 64 on certain grounds of unpatentability alleged in the Petition.
Paper 9 (“Dec. to Inst.”). After institution of trial, Patent Owner filed a
Second Corrected Patent Owner Response (Paper 43, “PO Resp.”), to which
Petitioner filed a Corrected Reply (Paper 59 (confidential); Paper 60
(public)) (“Reply”). An oral hearing was held on February 11, 2015.
1

We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(c). In this Final Written
Decision, issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73, we
determine Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
any of the challenged claims of the ’561 patent are unpatentable.
B. Related Proceedings
Petitioner informs us that the ’561 patent is involved in an action
captioned SSW Holding Co., Inc. v. Schott Gemtron Corp., No. 3:12-cv-

1
A transcript (“Tr.”) of the oral hearing is included in the record. Paper 61.
We authorized the filing of Petitioner’s Corrected Reply at the oral hearing.
Tr. 4:8–12.
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

3
00661 (W.D. Ky.). Pet. 2. The ’561 patent is the subject of related
IPR2013-00358,
2
which is on appeal.
C. The ’561 Patent
The ’561 patent describes shelving, such as shelving adapted for use
in refrigerators and having a top surface with a hydrophobic surface
arranged in a spill containment pattern. Ex. 1101, 1:15–18; 2:1–4. The spill
containment pattern is intended to act as a barrier to prevent spilled liquid
from spilling onto other surfaces. Id. at 11:28–37. An example of a spill
containment pattern is shown in Figure 3 of the ’561 patent, reproduced
below:

Figure 3 illustrates a preferred embodiment that includes shelving
with a spill containment pattern consisting of a hydrophobic surface in the
pattern of a frame-like border. Id. at 2:26–30; 3:43–45. The border defines

2
IPR2013-00358 was filed by the same Petitioner (SCHOTT Gemtron
Corp.) and challenged independent claims 1, 13, and 25 of the ’561 patent.
In that proceeding, we determined that Petitioner had shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 13, and 25 are unpatentable.
See SCHOTT Gemtron Corp. v. SSW Holding Co., Inc., IPR2013-00358,
slip. op. (PTAB Aug. 20, 2014) (Paper 106) (“IPR2013-00358 Final Dec.”).
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

4
the boundaries of a single non-hydrophobic spill containment area therein.
Id. at 3:39–46.
D. Challenged Claims
Although independent claim 1 is not challenged in the Petition, many
of the challenged claims depend from claim 1. Thus, claim 1 is reproduced
below. Claims 2, 13, 16, 18, 33, and 35, which are illustrative of the
claimed subject matter in this trial, also are reproduced below.
1. A shelf assembly comprising:
a shelf panel having a generally flat top surface which is
capable of supporting articles which may be placed on said
shelf panel;
a hydrophobic surface applied in a spill containment
pattern on the said top surface;
wherein the majority of the surface area of said top surface
of the shelf panel is not hydrophobic, thereby providing
one or more non-hydrophobic central portions bounded by
said spill containment pattern of said hydrophobic surface.

2. The shelf assembly of claim 1, wherein said spill
containment pattern is a continuous border which defines a
single non-hydrophobic central portion within said border.

13. The shelf assembly of claim 1, wherein the hydrophobic
surface comprises:
a ceramic frit layer adjacent to and bonded to the top
surface of said shelf panel; and
a hydrophobic compound coated over the ceramic frit
layer.

16. The shelf assembly of claim 1, wherein said hydrophobic
surface comprises a hydrophobic coating over a roughened
area in the surface of said shelf panel.

IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

5
18. The shelf assembly of claim 1, wherein said hydrophobic
surface comprises a coating of hydrophobic particles on
the surface of said shelf panel.

33. A shelf assembly comprising:
a generally flat shelf panel having a top surface and a
bottom surface, the top surface capable of supporting
articles;
a hydrophobic surface applied in a spill containment
pattern generally in the plane of said top surface;
at least one non-hydrophobic central portion competed
completely [sic] bounded by the spill containment patter
for containing liquids on the top surface of the shelf panel;
and
at least one support bracket attached to the bottom surface
of the shelf panel such that the top surface of the shelf
panel is completely free from intrusion or other
obstruction, thereby maximizing the available shelf space
on the top surface of the shelf panel.

35. The shelf assembly of claim 33, further comprising an
adhesive material disposed between the support bracket
and bottom surface of the shelf panel thereby attaching the
support bracket to the shelf panel.

E. Prior Art References Alleged to Support Unpatentability Challenges
The following prior art references were asserted in the instituted grounds:
Name Description Date Exhibit
Angros US 5,948,685 Sept. 7, 1999 Ex. 1105
Baumann US 6,872,441 B2 Mar. 29, 2005 Ex. 1106
Picken International Publ. No.
WO 2006/044641 A2
Apr. 27, 2006 Ex. 1108

IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

6
F. Grounds of Unpatentability Instituted for Trial
The following table summarizes the challenges to patentability that
were instituted for inter partes review:
Reference(s) Basis Claims Challenged
Angros and Picken § 103(a) 2–4, 7–10, 23, 33–40,
42–45, 48–51, and 64
Angros, Picken, and Baumann § 103(a) 14–18, 22, 26, 27, 29,
30, 54–59, and 63

II. ANALYSIS
A. Claim Interpretation
In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are given
their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the
patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see also In re Cuozzo
Speed Techs., LLC, 778 F.3d 1271, 1279–83 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Congress
implicitly adopted the broadest reasonable interpretation standard in
enacting the AIA,” and “the standard was properly adopted by PTO
regulation.”). Under that standard, and absent any special definitions, we
give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be
understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. In
re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
In related IPR2013-00358, we construed the terms “shelf panel” and
“majority of the surface area of said top surface of the shelf panel is not
hydrophobic” in independent claim 1 and “generally in the plane of said top
surface” in independent claim 25. See SCHOTT Gemtron Corp. v. SSW
Holding Co., Inc., IPR2013-00358, slip. op. at 6–9 (PTAB Nov. 4, 2013)
(Paper 14). Both Petitioner and Patent Owner in the instant case adopted the
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

7
Board’s claim constructions for these terms from related IPR2013-00358.
Pet. 18–19; Prelim. Resp. 8. We then applied the constructions in the
Decision to Institute in this proceeding. Dec. to Inst. 6–7. During the course
of the trial, neither party challenged our constructions of these claim terms.
Thus, we see no reason to alter the constructions of these claim terms as set
forth in the Decision to Institute and we incorporate our previous analysis
for purposes of this decision. Therefore, for the reasons set forth in the
Decision to Institute in IPR2013-00358 (Paper 14), we interpret various
claim terms of the ’561 patent as follows:
Term(s) Interpretation
“shelf panel” “a piece of material positioned horizontally at a
distance above some other surface to hold objects”
“generally in the
plane of said top
surface”

“all or a portion of the hydrophobic surface
extending a small distance above the level of the top
surface of the shelf panel that is not readily
noticeable to the naked eye”
“majority of the
surface area of said
top surface of the
shelf panel is not
hydrophobic”
“the surface area of the non-hydrophobic portion is
greater than the surface area of the hydrophobic
portion”
“leaving the
majority of the
surface area of said
top surface of the
panel non-
hydrophobic”
“the surface area of the non-hydrophobic portion is
greater than the surface area of the hydrophobic
portion”
See Dec. to Inst. 6–7. All other claim terms will be given their ordinary and
customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the
art at the time of the invention.
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

8
B. Principles of Law
To prevail in its challenges to the patentability of the claims, a
petitioner must establish facts supporting its challenges by a preponderance
of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d). A claim is
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). A reference
qualifies as prior art for an obviousness determination under § 103 only
when it is analogous to the claimed invention. In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343,
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 637 F.3d
1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
2004); In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
A reference is considered analogous prior art: (1) if the reference is
from the same field of endeavor as the claimed subjected matter, regardless
of the problem addressed, or (2) if “the reference still is reasonably pertinent
to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved,” even though
the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor. Bigio, 381
F.3d at 1325. The “field of endeavor” test asks if the structure and function
of the prior art is such that it would be considered by a person of ordinary
skill in the art, because of the similarity to the structure and function of the
claimed invention as disclosed in the application. Id. at 1325–27. It is
necessary to apply “common sense” in “deciding in which fields a person of
ordinary skill would reasonably be expected to look for a solution to the
problem facing the inventor.” Id. at 1326 (citations and quotation marks
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

9
omitted). As to the “reasonably pertinent” test:
A reference is reasonably pertinent if, even though it may be in
a different field from that of the inventor’s endeavor, it is one
which, because of the matter with which it deals, logically
would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in
considering his problem. Thus, the purposes of both the
invention and the prior art are important in determining whether
the reference is reasonably pertinent to the problem the
invention attempts to solve. If a reference disclosure has the
same purpose as the claimed invention, the reference relates to
the same problem, and that fact supports use of that reference in
an obviousness rejection. An inventor may well have been
motivated to consider the reference when making his invention.
If it is directed to a different purpose, the inventor would
accordingly have had less motivation or occasion to consider it.
Clay, 966 F.2d at 659.
To be considered reasonably pertinent, prior art must “logically
commend” itself to an inventor’s attention in considering the problem
addressed by the challenged patent. Innovention Toys, LLC, 637 F.3d at
1321; In re Icon Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (quoting Clay, 966 F.2d at 659). In other words, “familiar items may
have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes.” KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S.
at 420. Importantly, however, the pertinence of prior art as a source of
solution to the inventor’s problem cannot be considered using hindsight, but
must instead be recognizable with the foresight of a person of ordinary skill.
In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
We analyze the instituted grounds of unpatentability in accordance
with the above-stated principles.
C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
In determining whether an invention would have been obvious at the
time it was made, 35 U.S.C. § 103 requires us to determine the level of
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

10
ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the invention. Graham v.
John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). “The importance of resolving the level
of ordinary skill in the art lies in the necessity of maintaining objectivity in
the obviousness inquiry.” Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
1. Effective Filing Date of the ’561 Patent
In order for us to resolve the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art
at the time of the invention, we must determine the time of the claimed
invention. The ’561 patent was filed on September 18, 2009 and is a
continuation-in-part of Application No. PCT/US2009/048775, filed on June
26, 2009. The ’561 patent claims priority to two provisional applications:
U.S. Prov. App. No. 61/133,273 (“the ’273 provisional”), filed June 27,
2008; and U.S. Prov. App. No. 61/216,540 (“the ’540 provisional”), filed
May 18, 2009. Petitioner alleges that none of the claims of the ’561 patent
are entitled to the benefit of the filing dates of the provisional applications to
which the ’561 patent claims priority, because the written descriptions of the
provisional applications fail to provide sufficient detail to support the
challenged claims. Pet. 11–17. We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments
and the provisional applications, and are not persuaded by Petitioner’s
contentions. Rather, we conclude that the ’273 provisional application,
which is the earlier filed of the two provisional applications, provides
written description support for the claim elements recited in the challenged
claims, and incorporate our previous analysis herein. See IPR2013-00358
Final Dec. 11–16 (analyzing disclosure in ’273 provisional application and
finding support for claims 1, 13, and 25 in the ’561 patent). For example,
challenged claim 2 requires a “spill containment pattern [that] is a
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

11
continuous border which defines a single non-hydrophobic central portion
within said border,” and such a spill containment patter can be found in the
’273 provisional application. See Ex. 1102, 7–8, 12, 30–31, Figs. 4, 43.
Another example of a challenged claim supported by the ’273 provisional
application is claim 13, which recites a hydrophobic surface that comprises a
ceramic frit layer adjacent to and bonded to the top surface of the shelf panel
and a hydrophobic compound coated over the ceramic frit layer. See
IPR2013-00358 Final Dec. 12–15. Yet another example is for claims 10 and
51, which require a transparent shelf plate, figure 24 of the ’273 provisional
application illustrates a glass shelf plate 604 that is transparent with metal
frame 602 visible through the shelf plate. Ex. 1102, 23–24, 34, Fig. 24. A
final example is for claims 23 and 64, which require a micron thin coating of
hydrophobic material, the ’273 provisional application specifies that “the
hydrophobic surface treatment may be applied in a number of different
methods, including methods such as plasma techniques, vacuum coating,
spin coating, [and] spraying,” thereby allowing a micron thin coating of
material to be added to a shelf plate. Id. at 14, 34–35.
Therefore, we find that the ’561 patent is entitled to the June 27, 2008
filing date of the ’273 provisional application, and the relevant time period
for resolving the level of ordinary skill in the art is June 27, 2008.
2. Determination of the Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
Having determined the appropriate time of the invention (June 27,
2008), we turn to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art at that
time. Petitioner’s witness, Mr. Chris B. Schechter, submitted a declaration
in support of the Petition. Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1109). In his declaration,
Mr. Schechter testified that a person of ordinary skill in the art relevant to
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

12
the ’561 patent “would have at least a Bachelor’s degree in mechanical
engineering and at least four years of experience in the spill-proof shelf
assembly industry, or equivalent education and training.” Ex. 1109 ¶ 5
(emphasis added). In related IPR2013-00358, Mr. Schechter also submitted
a declaration in support of Petitioner’s petition, in which he testified that a
person of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’561 patent “would have at
least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering and at least four years of
experience designing and manufacturing shelf assemblies or equivalent
education and training.” See IPR2013-00358, Ex. 1010 ¶ 4 (emphasis
added). Patent Owner’s witness, Mr. Richard Bruce Mills, previously
defined a person of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’561 patent to be a
person with “at least an associate’s or bachelor’s degree and [three] years of
experience working with shelf assemblies,” and having familiarity with
“encapsulated spill containing refrigerator shelves.” See IPR2013-00358,
Ex. 2022 ¶ 8 (emphasis added). In this inter partes review, Mr. Mills adopts
the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art as expressed by the
Board in IPR2013-00358. Ex. 2121 ¶ 8 (citing IPR2013-00358 Final Dec.
17).
Based on our review of the ’561 patent, the types of problems and
solutions described in the ’561 patent and cited prior art, and the testimony
of the parties’ declarants, we conclude that a person of ordinary skill in the
art at the time of the claimed invention (i.e., as of June 27, 2008, as
discussed above in Section II.C.1) would have had a degree in mechanical
engineering or a similar discipline, and at least three years of work
experience with refrigerator shelf assemblies. See, e.g., Ex. 1101, 1:16–62
(stating that the ’561 patent relates to “shelving which may be adapted for
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

13
use with refrigerators,” and describing conventional refrigerator shelf
assemblies that use plastic molded parts to encapsulate shelves and silicone
sealants to form physical spill containment barriers around the perimeter of
the refrigerator shelving); Ex. 1109 ¶¶ 1–3 (describing the background of
Mr. Schechter); Ex. 2121 ¶¶ 5–7 (describing the background of Mr. Mills).
Given the stated qualifications of Mr. Mills (Ex. 2121 ¶¶ 5–7 and Ex.
1110, 13:9–24:18), Patent Owner’s declarant meets the requirements of this
definition. Petitioner’s witness, Mr. Schechter, however, does not qualify as
a person of ordinary skill in the art. Although Mr. Schechter now testifies
that he has a Master’s of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering and
became a Product Development Engineer for Petitioner in December 2010,
his prior declaration states that he began in his position in December 2011,
compare Ex. 1109 ¶ 1, with IPR2013-00358, Ex. 1010 ¶ 1, thus indicating
that Mr. Schechter may have had less than two years of experience when he
signed his prior declaration on June 14, 2013, IPR2013-00358, Ex. 1010 ¶
36.
3
Furthermore, Mr. Schechter was not a person of ordinary skill in the art
at the time of the invention of the ’561 patent (i.e., June 27, 2008). Indeed,
at his deposition, Mr. Schechter testified that he does not qualify as one of
ordinary skill in the art under the definition in his declaration. Ex. 1121,
26:2–13. Therefore, for these reasons, we accord the testimony of Mr.
Schechter regarding the alleged obviousness of the claims less weight.

3
Petitioner argues that the Board “misapprehended” Mr. Schecter’s
qualifications, and “committed four errors” in doing so, in the final written
decision in IPR2013-00358. Reply 9–10. These arguments are improper, as
they are directed to facts and determinations made in a different proceeding,
and a “reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding . . .
patent owner response” under 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). Regardless, though, we
disagree with Petitioner’s assertions for the reasons stated herein.
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

14
D. Alleged Obviousness of Claims 2–4, 7–10, 23, 33–40, 42–45, 48–51,
and 64 in view of Angros and Picken
Petitioner alleges that claims 2–4, 7–10, 23, 33–40, 42–45, 48–51, and
64 of the ’561 patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Angros
and Picken. Pet. 49–50. Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s position,
arguing that Angros is not analogous art and that a person of ordinary skill in
the art would not have had reason to combine the references in the manner
proposed by Petitioner. PO Resp. 4–12.
For reasons discussed below, we are persuaded by Patent Owner’s
arguments. Thus, we determine that Petitioner has not shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that claims 2–4, 7–10, 23, 33–40, 42–45, 48–
51, and 64 of the ’561 patent are unpatentable as obvious over Angros and
Picken.
1. Angros’s Disclosure
Angros describes an analytic plate, such as a microscope slide or a
diagnostic plate, having a containment border for containing a liquid. Ex.
1105, Abst. Angros discloses that the containment border can be a
hydrophobic material applied to the plate surface in a bordered pattern to
confine liquid that is applied to the plate within the area surrounded by the
border. Id. at 1:45–48. According to Angros, the hydrophobic containment
border “is substantially transparent and is substantially flush with the surface
of the slide or plate[,] and [ ] covers only a portion of the surface of the slide
or plate.” Id. at 1:67–2:3. Figure 1A of Angros is reproduced below:

IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

15
Figure 1A illustrates microscope slide 10 with containment border 16. Id. at
2:39–45. Containment border 16 surrounds containment area 18 of the
upper surface 12 of slide 10, and prevents spreading, leakage, or migration
of liquid from containment area 18. Id. at 2:49–58. Figure 1B of Angros is
reproduced below:

Figure 1B illustrates a side view of an analytic plate with a
containment border, top surface 12, and lower surface 14. Angros discloses
that “border 16 forms a molecular layer when dry and therefore is
substantially flush (level) with the upper surface 12 of the slide 10. The
border 16 is[,] therefore[,] not raised above the upper surface 12 to a degree
that is visible to the naked eye.” Ex. 1105, 3:3–7.
2. Picken’s Disclosure
Picken describes a shelf assembly for use in a refrigerator. Ex. 1108,
Abst. Figure 1 of Picken is reproduced below:

Figure 1 illustrates shelf assembly 10 with generally flat shelf panel
12 and a pair of support rails 16. Id. The shelf panel may include a curved,
turned, or bent edge on the upper surface of the shelf to limit spillage of
liquid over the edge of the shelf panel. Id. ¶ 4. Figure 13 of Picken is
reproduced below:
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

16

Figure 13 illustrates a shelf panel with forward edge 120 that curves
upward to provide a spill-proof edge. Id. ¶ 55. An alternative embodiment
disclosed by Picken is shown in Figure 17, reproduced below:

Figure 17 illustrates shelf panel 312 that includes an upper form or
guard 346—bonded, via adhesive 326, along edge region 314 on upper
surface 336 of shelf panel 312—to prevent liquid movement. Id. ¶ 57. The
shelf panel may include a frit layer
4
on the upper or lower surfaces of the
panel. Id. ¶¶ 6, 57, 71.
3. Obviousness Analysis
The primary dispositive fact Petitioner must establish is that Angros is
analogous prior art to the claimed invention. As discussed previously, a
reference is considered analogous prior art: (1) if the reference is from the
same field of endeavor as the claimed subjected matter, regardless of the
problem addressed, or (2) if “the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the
particular problem with which the inventor is involved,” even though the
reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor. Bigio, 381 F.3d
at 1325. In KSR, however, the Supreme Court ruled that “any need or

4
A frit layer is a substrate of glass or ceramic material that is placed or
printed in a pattern. Ex. 1001, 6:7–13. The material can include finely
ground particles. Id. at 6:41–59.
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

17
problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and
addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining [prior art]
elements in the manner claimed.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 420. Although that
holding addressed a slightly different doctrinal aspect of nonobviousness
analysis, the bases for the Supreme Court’s ruling in KSR could apply to the
“field of endeavor” prong of the analogous arts test. Moreover, the Federal
Circuit has held that KSR “directs [courts] to construe the scope of
analogous art broadly” based on the statement in KSR that “familiar items
may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and a person of
ordinary skill often will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents
together like pieces of a puzzle.” Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231,
1238 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 402). Yet, the impact of
KSR on the analogous arts test must be viewed in light of the fact that our
obviousness analysis must avoid reliance upon hindsight and the fact that a
prior art reference in a separate field of endeavor will not be analogous art
unless it is pertinent to the entire problem being solved by the challenged
patent. See Klein, 647 F.3d at 1348 (emphasis added). Additionally, a
reference is only considered reasonably pertinent if it would have logically
commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his or her
problem. See Clay, 966 F.2d at 659.
The parties do not dispute that Angros’s disclosure regarding
microscope slides is not in the same “field of endeavor” as the ’561 patent,
which relates to refrigerator shelves. Pet. 26–27; PO Resp. 6–7; Reply 4–9.
Rather, Petitioner contends Angros is analogous art to the claimed invention,
because “Angros is reasonably pertinent to the problem faced by the
Applicants of the [’]561 patent.” Pet. 26–27; Tr. 6:12–7:23. Specifically,
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

18
Petitioner states that “[t]he problem faced by the Angros inventors was the
same as the problem faced by [the applicants of the ’561 patent], namely,
how to contain a liquid in a predetermined area using a structure that is thin
and does not extend significantly above the top surface of the panel.”
Pet. 26–27.
In IPR2013-00358, the Board found that Angros was not analogous
art to claims 1, 13, and 25 of the ’561 patent. IPR2013-00358, slip. op. at 31
(Paper 106). The Board specifically held that one of ordinary skill in the art
of the ’561 patent would not have considered the subject matter of Angros,
which deals with microscope slides, to be reasonably pertinent to the
problem being addressed by the applicants of the ’561 patent in designing
refrigerator shelves. Id. at 23. Petitioner presently argues that the Board
incorrectly concluded in IPR2013-00358 that Angros did not address the
same problem as the ’561 patent. Reply 5. Petitioner contends the Board’s
conclusion was premised on flawed analysis that found Angros did not
address how to contain an unintentional release of liquid on refrigerator
shelves. Id. Petitioner further argues that Angros was pertinent to the
problem of the ’561 patent because one of ordinary skill in the art would
have understood that the technology in Angros would have retained liquids,
and therefore “spills,” on a larger panel like a refrigerator shelf. Id.
Patent Owner disputes that Angros is reasonably pertinent to the
problem addressed by the claimed invention, because Angros does not teach
a “spill containment pattern,” does not maximize storage space while
containing spills, and would not have been considered in designing
refrigerator shelves. PO Resp. 5–6. According to Patent Owner, the
problem faced by the inventors of the ’561 patent is described by the
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

19
testimony of Mr. Mills as well as the disclosure of the ’561 patent itself.
See, e.g., Ex. 2121 ¶¶ 43–53; Ex. 1101, Abst. (“a method for containing
spills on shelving and the like”); 1:24–2:14 (describing prior art shelves and
the objects of the disclosed “method for containing spills on shelving and the
like”); 11:41–49 (“[C]omponents such as a plastic rim (or even a frame) may
be completely unnecessary with the use of the hydrophobic surface 1030 to
provide the spill containment feature. As such, the shelf assembly 1020
depicted in FIGS. 3 and 4 maximizes the available useful shelf space since it
does not include a plastic rim, a frame, or any other physical barrier or dam
extending above the top surface 1023 of the shelf panel 1024 for preventing
liquids from spilling off of the shelf panel 1024.”); 13:51–56 (“by
eliminating the space taken up by plastic encapsulation, sealants, adhesives,
or formed lips, ridges, physical barriers, and dams, the relative amount of
usable shelf space is increased, i.e., maximized, on the top surface 1023 of
the shelf panel 1024 in accordance with the preferred embodiments
described herein”).
Patent Owner argues that Angros had a significantly different purpose
and related to a significantly different problem than the ’561 patent. PO
Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 2121 ¶¶ 43–53). Mr. Mills, a former employee of
Whirlpool Corporation and witness for Patent Owner, testified:
the hydrophobic border in Angros is not being used to contain
spills or to otherwise provide a spill resistant barrier. Instead,
Angros’s border is being used to hold a very small, preselected
specimen, which is intentionally placed in a small, defined
location under carefully controlled conditions, so as to allow
microscopic examination of the specimen. The liquid samples
described by Angros are not the result of a spill. They are
purposely “placed upon” a slide at a specific location – the
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

20
holding area of the slide.
Ex. 2122 ¶ 45.
We agree with Patent Owner’s characterization of the problem faced
by the inventors of the ’561 patent, which is supported by the testimony of
Mr. Mills and the disclosure of the ’561 patent. Therefore, we determine
that the hydrophobic spill-containment perimeter on refrigerator shelves of
the ’561 patent is designed to contain liquid and maximize available storage
space while otherwise avoiding or minimizing the disadvantages in prior art
encapsulated shelves. See PO Resp. 9–10 (citing Ex. 2121 ¶ 44).
Petitioner, however, contends that the scope of the problem addressed
by the ’561 patent should be dictated by the scope of the term “spill.”
Reply 4. According to Petitioner, “spill” should be construed broadly as
“the release of liquid onto a surface” thereby encompassing both
accidentally released liquid and intentionally placed liquid. Id. Petitioner
argues that such a broad construction of “spill” necessarily leads to the
conclusion that Angros is analogous art because it addresses the exact
problem addressed by the ‘561 patent, namely, liquid containment. Id.
Petitioner offers testimony from John P. Driver, one of the named inventors
of the ’561 patent, to counter Patent Owner’s argument and to support its
own position that Angros was pertinent to the problem addressed by the
challenged claims. Reply 8; Tr. 6:6–7:23; Ex. 1143, 48:23–51:8, 170:23–
172:25. Petitioner specifically states that Mr. Driver confirms Angros is
analogous art to the ’561 patent. Tr. 6:6–7:23. According to Petitioner, Mr.
Driver “intentionally poured liquid on shelf panels that were smaller than
refrigerator shelves” in order to demonstrate the technology embodied by the
’561 patent. Reply 8; Tr. 6:24–25. Petitioner reasons that Mr. Driver’s
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

21
demonstrations “confirmed that intentional spills onto small shelf panels
were representative, simulated, unintentional spills on refrigerator shelves,”
thus, indicating that what is at issue in this case is liquid retention and not
spill retention. Tr. 7:8–15.
Petitioner’s argument is unpersuasive, regardless of how the term
“spill” is construed, because Petitioner’s argument fails to address
sufficiently the full scope of the problem pertinent to the inventors of the
’561 patent of how to contain liquids (whether accidentally spilled or
intentionally placed) in a predetermined area while maximizing the available
storage space on a shelf and while otherwise avoiding or minimizing the
disadvantages in prior art encapsulated shelves. See PO Resp. 9–10 (citing
Ex. 2121 ¶ 44). Petitioner contends that “[t]o be analogous prior art, . . . a
reference does not have to address every problem addressed by the claimed
technology or provide every benefit ultimately provided by the technology.”
Reply 8 (citing Sci. Plastic Prods., Inc. v. Biotage AB, 766 F.3d 1355, 1358–
59 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Petitioner’s contention, however, is at odds with the
Federal Circuit’s holding in Klein, which found that a prior art reference in a
separate field of endeavor will not be analogous art unless it is pertinent to
the entire problem being solved by the challenged patent. See Klein, 647
F.3d at 1348.
In Klein, the Federal Circuit sided with the patent applicant and
rejected the Office’s obviousness conclusions, holding that none of the five
prior art references by the examiner could be considered “analogous art.”
Id. at 1352. Klein’s patent application was directed toward a device for
measuring and mixing sugar and water for bird feeders, because
ornithologists had discovered that different species of birds prefer different
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

22
sugar-water ratios. Id. at 1345. One embodiment of Klein’s device looked
like a measuring cup with a movable divider that separates the space into an
area for sugar and another area for water. Id. (depicting Figs. 1, 2A, 2B of
Klein’s application). The placement of the divider was set according to the
bird species being fed. Id. With the divider in place, sugar and water could
then be added to their respective areas. Id. The proper ratio was guaranteed
so long as water and sugar were added to the same level or “line of sight.”
Id. In the application, Klein admitted that the ratios for the various species
were known in the prior art. Id. Based on that admission, the Examiner
issued five separate obviousness rejections — each using a different prior art
reference in combination with the admitted ratios. Id. at 1346–47. Three of
the references disclosed containers with movable dividers used to
separate solid items such as screws or bolts. Id. at 1348–50. In determining
that those references were non-analogous, the court considered the problem
being solved by Klein and found that “[a]n inventor considering the problem
of ‘making a nectar feeder with a movable divider to prepare different ratios
of sugar and water for different animals,’ would not have been motivated to
consider any of these references when making his invention, particularly
since none of these three references shows a partitioned container that is
adapted to receive water or contain it long enough to be able to prepare
different ratios in the different compartments.” Id. at 1350–51. Given the
analysis and holding in Klein, we are unpersuaded by Petitioner’s position,
because even if a reference is pertinent to some aspect of the patentee’s
problem (e.g., a moveable divider), the reference still would fail the
analogous art test if it is not related to the problem as a whole.
We also disagree with Petitioner’s assertion that prior art like Angros,
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

23
which involves intentionally pouring liquid onto a small surface, is
analogous to the ’561 patent simply because the named inventors tested their
shelves by intentionally pouring liquid onto them. See Reply 7–8; Tr. 8:10–
14:8, 23:23–26:7. First, Petitioner does not cite any legal authority for this
proposition. Indeed, the analogous art inquiry requires that we determine
whether a reference is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem faced
by the inventor, not whether a reference is reasonably pertinent to how the
inventor chose to test his or her invention. See Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325;
Clay, 966 F.2d at 659. Second, what the inventor actually knew or did to
test his invention has no bearing on the obviousness analysis. See Standard
Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding
“[t]he issue of obviousness is determined entirely with reference to a
hypothetical ‘person having ordinary skill in the art.’ It is only that
hypothetical person who is presumed to be aware of all the pertinent prior
art. The actual inventor’s skill is irrelevant to the inquiry, and this is for a
very important reason. The statutory emphasis is on a person of ordinary
skill.”) (second emphasis added). Lastly, the ’561 patent draws a clear
distinction between containing “spills” (e.g., from an overturned soda can)
and “pouring” liquid on a surface merely to “illustrate the concepts of liquid
spillage” or test a shelf to see how much liquid it can contain. See, e.g.,
Ex. 1101, 1:23–62, 10:30–42, 11:28–40, 20:7–30. Thus, Petitioner’s
arguments regarding testing are not persuasive.
We find that regardless of the construction of the term “spill,”
Petitioner has not carried its burden to show that Angros is analogous art,
because Petitioner has not shown Angros to be pertinent to the entire
problem faced by the inventors of the ’561 patent.
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

24
Patent Owner also disputes that Angros is analogous art to the claimed
invention, arguing that a person having ordinary skill in the art of the ’561
patent would not have considered Angros’ microscope slides when
developing a spill-containing shelf for refrigerators, freezers, pantries, etc.
PO Resp. 7–9; Ex. 2121 ¶¶ 40, 42–53. According to Patent Owner’s
declarant, Mr. Mills, a person of ordinary skill in the art of the ’561 patent
would not have been familiar with microscope slides and would not have
considered them a design resource. Ex. 2121 ¶ 42.
Mr. Schechter, an employee of, and witness for, Petitioner,
corroborates the testimony of Mr. Mills. Ex. 1121, 79:4–113:2. Mr.
Schechter testified that during the course of his work for Petitioner, he
familiarized himself with the state of the art by reviewing “patents focused
primarily on the consumer appliance industry” (id. at 78:19–79:15) and
occasionally reviewed technical publications, technical data sheets, and
manuals for production equipment (id. at 79:16–81:1). Mr. Schechter,
however, testified that microscope slides are not something he was familiar
with nor are they something he uses in his work for Petitioner, and could not
recall any instance where he reviewed patents or publications (other than
Angros) related to microscopes. PO Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 1121, 112:12–
113:2). In fact, Mr. Schechter testified he did not find Angros during a prior
art search; rather, it was given to him by legal counsel. Ex. 1121, 92:1–4.
We credit the testimony of both Mr. Schechter and Mr. Mills on this point.
Unlike Patent Owner’s citation to Mr. Mills’ testimony, Petitioner
does not cite any testimony (from Mr. Driver, Mr. Schechter, or otherwise)
stating that Angros is analogous art to the ’561 patent or explaining why that
would be the case. See PO Resp. 2–3, 22–23. Rather, Petitioner argues that
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

25
the technology in Angros worked in exactly the same way as the technology
in the ’561 patent (Reply 4–5) and there was no engineering challenge to one
of skill in the art that would have prevented scaling up the Angros
technology from microscopes to refrigerator shelves (id. at 7–8). According
to Petitioner, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that
the liquid retention technology in Angros would have applications beyond
microscopes. Id. at 5 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 420–21).
We find Petitioner’s arguments to be unpersuasive because Petitioner
fails to address how the containment of miniscule amounts of liquid on a
microscope slide as disclosed in Angros logically would have commended
itself to the inventor’s attention in considering the problem addressed by the
’561 patent. See Clay, 966 F.2d at 658–59 (to be considered reasonably
pertinent, prior art must “logically commend” itself to an inventor’s attention
in considering the problem addressed by the challenged patent). The fact
that microscope slides theoretically could be scaled up to have a larger size
(see Reply 8) does not explain sufficiently why or how a skilled artisan
would have recognized that Angros would have applications in designing
refrigerator shelves that maximized shelf space and avoided problems with
prior art shelves. The Supreme Court in KSR, 550 U.S. at 420, stated that
“familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and
in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of
multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.” Yet, the burden is on
Petitioner in this proceeding to demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that the microscope slides in Angros would qualify as a familiar
item to an inventor addressing liquid retention and space maximization on
refrigerator shelves. We determine that Petitioner has not carried its burden
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

26
on this issue.
Therefore, based on the evidence of record, we are persuaded that one
of ordinary skill in the art of the ’561 patent would not have considered the
subject matter of Angros, which deals with microscope slides, to be
reasonably pertinent to the problem being addressed by the applicants of the
’561 patent in designing refrigerator shelves. Accordingly, we determine
Petitioner has not shown Angros to be prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
In addition, even if Angros did qualify as prior art, Petitioner has not
shown that the combination of Angros with Picken would have rendered
claims 2–4, 7–10, 23, 33–40, 42–45, 48–51, and 64 of the ’561 patent
obvious. Petitioner argues it would have been obvious to one of skill in the
art to modify the shelf panel, as taught by Picken, with the hydrophobic
liquid containment barrier, as taught by Angros, because “[t]he application
of the spill-containment border of Angros to the shelf assembly of Picken is
nothing more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their
established functions.” Pet. 49–50 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 417). According
to Petitioner, merely substituting one element (e.g., guard 346 of Picken) for
another element known in the field (hydrophobic containment border of
Angros) would have been obvious to one of skill in the art and it would have
been expected to yield predictable results. Id.
We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that the application of
Angros’ spill-containment border is merely the predictable use of prior art
elements, because we do not find Angros to be analogous art to Picken.
Although it may be obvious for one of skill in the art to “[make a] simple
substitution of one known element for another” (KSR, 550 U.S. at 417), the
element must be familiar or known to the person of ordinary skill in the art
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

27
to be used in the substitution. Based on the testimony of record, we do not
find that a person of ordinary skill in the art of the ’561 patent would have
been familiar with items related to microscope slides.
Furthermore, a patent claim “is not proved obvious merely by
demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the
prior art.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 401. “Rather, obviousness requires the
additional showing that a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention
would have selected and combined those prior art elements in the normal
course of research and development to yield the claimed invention.”
Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 421). For an obviousness analysis, “it can be
important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of
ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the
claimed new invention does.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 419. In that regard, Mr.
Schechter, witness for Petitioner, testified that Angros and Picken were
known in the art and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been
motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art so as to make a design
that (i) was more simple or clean or aesthetically pleasing and (ii) had a less
obtrusive hydrophobic barrier. Ex. 1121, 180:12–183:23; Ex. 1109 ¶ 31; Ex.
1010 ¶ 28. He then concluded that one of ordinary skill would know how to
substitute the spill-contain border in Angros for the plastic guard in Picken.
Ex. 1109 ¶ 36.
Mr. Schechter, however, does not explain sufficiently why a person of
ordinary skill in the art would look to the field of microscope slides to find a
hydrophobic coating to act as a less obtrusive spill containment border in
place of the plastic rim in Picken. Mr. Schechter’s testimony is
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

28
impermissible hindsight; he opined that all of the elements of the claims
disparately existed in the prior art, but fails to provide sufficient reason for
why one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing would have
combined these references. See, e.g., InTouch Techs., Inc. v. VGO
Commc’ns, Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding expert
testimony to be impermissible hindsight for failing to explaining what
reason or motivation one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
invention would have had to place the prior art together).
In an obviousness determination, we must avoid analyzing the prior
art through the prism of hindsight. Instead, we must “cast the mind back to
the time the invention was made (often as here many years), to occupy the
mind of one skilled in the art who is presented only with the references, and
who is normally guided by the then–accepted wisdom in the art.” W.L. Gore
& Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Petitioner attempts to imbue one of ordinary skill in the art with knowledge
of the claimed invention, when no prior art reference or references of record
convey or suggest that knowledge. Rather, Petitioner’s argument that
Angros is analogous art and that Angros is combinable with Picken appears
to be premised on Petitioner’s knowledge of the ’561 patent disclosure.
Petitioner bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of
evidence that the asserted prior art references are analogous art and
otherwise combinable. On the record before us, we find that Petitioner has
not shown that Angros qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 103 or that,
even if it did, it renders the claims unpatentable in combination with Picken.
Therefore, we conclude Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

29
of evidence that claims 2–4, 7–10, 23, 33–40, 42–45, 48–51, and 64 of the
’561 patent would have been obvious in view of Angros and Picken.
E. Claims 14–18, 22, 26, 27, 29, 30, 54–59, and 63 – Alleged
Obviousness over Angros, Picken, and Baumann
Petitioner alleges that claims 14–18, 22, 26, 27, 29, 30, 54–59, and 63
of the ’561 patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Angros,
Picken, and Baumann. Pet. 46–48; Reply 9. Patent Owner disputes this
ground, arguing that Angros and Baumann are both non-analogous art to the
claimed invention and cannot be used to establish obviousness. PO
Resp. 12.
As discussed in Section II.D.3 above, we are persuaded by Patent
Owner’s reasoning regarding Angros being non-analogous art; thus, Angros
cannot be used in combination with other references (including Baumann) to
support a showing of obviousness. Therefore, we determine that Petitioner
has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 14–18, 22, 26,
27, 29, 30, 54–59, and 63 of the ’561 patent are unpatentable as obvious
over Angros, Picken, and Baumann.
1. Baumann’s Disclosure
Baumann describes substrates with at least one structured
hydrophobic substrate that “provides a good self-cleaning effect.” Ex. 1106,
1:9–11. In one embodiment disclosed by Baumann, the substrate is a
ceramic material that is coated with “a composition containing a material
producing a glass flux such as a glass frit and structure-forming particles”
and that, when the “substrate” is fired at a certain temperature, the glass flux
is made hydrophobic. Id. at 2:32–39. Baumann further discloses a
micro-rough layer [that] is printed by means of a printing paste
containing a glass frit which forms a glass flux, and the
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

30
structure-forming particles are applied to the still moist printing
surface for example by powdering or dripping on, possibly
followed by partial pressing of the particles into the printed
surface.
Id. at 6:1–8. “The substrate thus treated is then burnt and made hydrophobic
in a known manner.” Id. at 6:6–8.
2. Angros’s and Picken’s Disclosures
The disclosure of Angros and Picken are discussed in detail above in
Sections II.D.1. and II.D.2.
3. Analysis
Claims 14–18 and 22 depend directly or indirectly from claim 1,
claims 26, 27, 29, and 30 depend directly or indirectly from claim 25, and
claims 54–59 and 63 depend from claim 33. In addition to the elements
recited in independent claims 1, 25, and 33, dependent claims 14–18, 22, 26,
27, 29, 30, 54–59, and 63 require (a) various configurations of a spill
containment pattern, (b) various types of shelf panels, (c) a ceramic frit layer
adjacent to and bonded to the top surface of a shelf panel, or (d) a
hydrophobic compound coated over the ceramic frit layer.
Petitioner contends that ceramic frits coated with hydrophobic
surfaces were well known in the art at the time the ’561 patent was filed.
Pet. 47. Indeed, the ’561 patent cites to Baumann as disclosing a ceramic
frit. See Ex. 1101, 7:36–41. According to Petitioner, the application of a
hydrophobic surface comprising a ceramic frit and a hydrophobic
compound, as described in Baumann, to form a spill-containment border, as
described in Angros, would be the predictable use of prior art elements
according to their established functions. Pet. 47 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at
417). Petitioner then contends that, if the border described in Picken was
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

31
substituted with the hydrophobic surfaces described in Baumann, a person of
ordinary skill in the art would expect that the shelf assembly of claims 14–
18, 22, 26, 27, 29, 30, 54–59, and 63 would result. Pet. 47–48. Petitioner
further contends that Baumann and Angros are analogous art and in
combination with Picken would render the challenged claims obvious.
Reply 9.
Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s position, asserting that Baumann is
non-analogous art that is neither from the same field of endeavor as the ’561
patent, nor is it “reasonably pertinent” to the problem faced by the inventors
of the ’561 patent. PO Resp. 12–15; Ex. 2121 ¶ 57. According to Patent
Owner, Baumann is directed to self-cleaning substrates suitable “for glazing
vehicles and trains and for glass bricks,” as well as “building material such
as roof tiles, clinker and floor tiles.” Id. at 12–13 (citing Ex. 1106, 6:62–
7:3). Thus, Patent Owner concludes Baumann is in a different field of
endeavor from the ’561 patent, which is directed to refrigerator shelves. PO
Resp. 14.
Patent Owner also contends that Baumann is non-analogous art,
because it is directed to a much different problem than that faced by the
inventors of the ’561 patent. Id. at 14–15. Specifically, Patent Owner
characterizes Baumann as providing a substrate that eliminates water and
dirt that may otherwise collect thereon. Id. (citing Ex. 2121 ¶¶ 59–60;
Ex. 1106, 2:64–3:1). According to Patent Owner, Baumann’s intended
objective is directly opposite that of the ’561 patent, which is to contain
spills, not to eliminate them from the shelf. PO Resp. 14–15.
The hydrophobic coating disclosed in Baumann is designed to coat an
entire top surface of an article to create a self-cleaning surface that facilitates
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

32
liquid run-off. Ex. 1106, 2:64–3:1. Based on the disclosure in Baumann, we
conclude that a combination of Picken and Baumann would result in a
refrigerator shelf, as disclosed in Picken, with its entire top surface treated
with Baumann’s self-cleaning coating. Furthermore, the raised form from
Picken would remain, because there is no suggestion that the coating of
Baumann could perform liquid containment. Thus, we find that a
combination of Picken and Baumann lacks a suggestion to create (1) a
hydrophobic barrier wherein the majority of the top surface of shelving
assembly is not hydrophobic or (2) a generally flat shelf panel having a top
surface and a spill containment pattern generally in the plane of the top
surface. Therefore, we determine that the only disclosure that Petitioner has
identified for a hydrophobic barrier that would not coat the entire top surface
of a shelving assembly and that would retain liquid is Angros.
As discussed in detail above, however, we already have concluded
that Petitioner has not shown Angros to be reasonably pertinent to the
problem addressed by the challenged claims. Such a deficiency defeats
Petitioner’s obviousness challenge as to claims 14–18, 22, 26, 27, 29, 30,
54–59, and 63 and is not remedied by the combination of Angros, Picken,
and Baumann. Therefore, we determine Petitioner has not demonstrated by
a preponderance of the evidence that claims 14–18, 22, 26, 27, 29, 30, 54–
59, and 63 of the ’561 patent would have been obvious over Angros, Picken,
and Baumann.
F. Secondary Considerations of Non-Obviousness
Patent Owner contends Petitioner has failed to meet its burden of
showing unpatentability, because objective indicia of nonobviousness
indicate that the claimed subject matter would not have been obvious. PO
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

33
Resp. 24–35. Petitioner disputes the application of secondary considerations
of non-obviousness of the challenged claims. Reply 10–15. As discussed
above, we have found Angros to be non-analogous and not combinable with
the other references. Thus, we need not address Patent Owner’s evidence
regarding secondary considerations of non-obviousness.
G. Motion to Exclude
Petitioner moves to exclude the following evidence submitted by
Patent Owner in this proceeding: Exhibits 2006–13, 2037, 2108 (¶¶ 7–21),
2109–2112, 2115–2119, 2121 (¶¶ 15–21, 32–36), and 2123. Paper 50.
Patent Owner filed an opposition (Paper 53), and Petitioner filed a reply
(Paper 56). All of the evidence sought to be excluded by Petitioner pertains
to Patent Owner’s assertions of secondary considerations of non-
obviousness. Because we need not reach that issue, for the reasons
explained above, Petitioner’s motion is dismissed as moot.

III. CONCLUSION
We have considered the record before us in this inter partes review
proceeding. We conclude Petitioner has NOT proven by a preponderance of
the evidence that:
(1) The subject matter of claims 2–4, 7–10, 23, 33–40, 42–45, 48–51, and
64 of the ’561 patent is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the
teachings of Angros and Picken; and
(2) The subject matter of claims 14–18, 22, 26, 27, 29, 30, 54–59, and 63
of the ’561 patent is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the
teachings of Angros, Picken, and Baumann.
IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

34
IV. ORDER
For the reasons given, it is hereby:
ORDERED that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that claims 2–4, 7–10, 14–18, 22, 23, 26, 27, 29, 30, 33–40, 42–45,
48–51, 54–59, 63, and 64 of the ’561 patent are unpatentable;
FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion to exclude (Paper 50)
is dismissed; and
FURTHER ORDERED that because this is a final written decision,
parties to the proceeding seeking judicial review of the decision must
comply with the notice and service requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 90.2.
Certain materials have been sealed in this proceeding, but have not
been relied upon in this final written decision. See Papers 32, 54. The
record will be maintained undisturbed pending the outcome of any appeal
taken from this decision. At the conclusion of any appeal proceeding, or if
no appeal is taken, the materials will be made public. See Office Patent
Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,760–61 (Aug. 14, 2012).
Further, either party may file a motion to expunge the sealed materials from
the record pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.56. Any such motion will be decided
after the conclusion of any appeal proceeding or the expiration of the time
period for appealing.

IPR2014-00367
Patent 8,286,561 B2

35
For PETITIONER:

Marshall J. Schmitt
Gilberto E. Espinoza
MICHAEL BEST & FRIEDRICH LLP
mjschmitt@michaelbest.com
geespinoza@michaelbest.com

Oliver A. Zitzmann
SCHOTT CORPORATION
oliver.zitzmann@us.schott.com

PATENT OWNER:

Michael P. Furmanek
Jennifer Burnette
Michael R. Weiner
MARSHALL, GERSTEIN & BORUN LLP
mfurmanek@marshallip.com
jburnette@marshallip.com
mweiner@marshallip.com

Nathaniel L. Dilger
Joseph K. Liu
Kainoa Asuega
Michael P. Furmanek
ONE LLP
ndilger@onellp.com
jliu@onellp.com
kasuega@onellp.com
mfurmanek@marshallip.com